This is part of the price which the toiling ma.s.ses of Germany are paying for the gold standard experiment, which, without their consent their imperial government foisted upon them.

Bismarck made the mistake that many able men in all countries of the western world have made and continue to make, namely, that of attributing the commanding position of Great Britain in the commercial and industrial world to her adoption of the gold standard. Bismarck mistook for cause and effect what was a mere coincidence, the result of exceptional conditions, as did those of our legislators in 1873, who happened to know anything whatever of the nature of the act demonetizing silver. The belief of some of the most far-sighted statesmen of Great Britain has been that she secured her position, not by reason of the gold standard, but in spite of it.

In a speech delivered at Glasgow, in November, 1873, after the alteration by Germany in her monetary standard, Mr. Disraeli said:

The monetary disturbance which has occurred, and is now to a certain extent acting very injuriously upon trade, I attribute to the great changes which the Governments of Europe are making in reference to their standard of value. Our gold standard is not the cause of our commercial prosperity, but the consequence of that prosperity. It is quite evident that we must prepare ourselves for great convulsions in the money market, not occasioned by speculation or any of the old causes which have been alleged, but by a new cause with which we are not sufficiently acquainted.

And again in March, 1879, when the effects of the decreasing volume of money were making themselves more and more felt, Mr. Disraeli, then Lord Beaconsfield, said:

All this time the produce of the gold mines of Australia and California has been regularly diminishing, and the consequence is that, while these great alterations on the continent in favor of a gold currency have been made, notwithstanding that increase of population which alone requires a considerable increase of currency to carry on its transactions, the amount of the currency itself is yearly diminishing, until a state of affairs has been brought about by gold production exactly the reverse of that which it produced at first. Gold is every day appreciating in value, and as it appreciates the lower become prices. It is not impossible that, as affairs develop, the country may require that some formal investigation should be made of the causes which are affecting the value of the precious metals, and the effect which the change in the value of the precious metals has upon the industries of the country, and upon the continual fall of prices.

In reaching their conclusions, Bismarck and others ignored the fundamental principle that a gold supply that might be sufficient for one country with a gold standard, and might even result in a measure of prosperity to that country, would be wholly insufficient if other countries should adopt the same standard and should enter upon a keen compet.i.tion and rivalry for the acquisition of gold.

The adoption of that standard by Germany and France was therefore not only destructive of their own prosperity, but was a stunning blow at the prosperity of England and all other gold-using countries. In taking England for his model, Bismarck had not the condition of the toiling ma.s.ses before his mind, but the glamour of prosperity which surrounded the creditor-barons.

The unprejudiced observer can not fail to perceive that the $370,000,000 coined under the Limited Coinage Act of the United States of 1878, supplementing the gold stock of the western world, postponed great industrial and financial crises. But the elements of these crises are gathering, and, unless relief be soon forthcoming, will burst upon the world with crushing severity.

DEMONETIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

If we are surprised that the sordid selfishness of the privileged cla.s.ses of Europe should have induced them to perpetrate so gross an act of injustice, we are reminded that the legislation of monarchical countries has usually been controlled in the interest of the privileged cla.s.ses. But what shall be said in defense of the demonetization of silver by the United States? No such stupendous act of folly and injustice was ever before perpetrated by the representatives of a free people.

Our position differed materially from that of Great Britain. This was not a creditor nation. Our people did not, and do not, own thousands of millions of dollars of foreign bonds, on which to receive semi-annual interest in a constantly appreciating money, which would have to be paid from the current earnings of foreign labor. Instead, therefore, of our demonetization unjustly enriching our creditor-cla.s.ses at the expense of foreigners, it enabled the creditors at home here to rob and despoil the debtors among their own countrymen. Instead of despoiling the Canadian, the Australian, the East Indian, the Egyptian, or the Turk, the spoliation arranged for by our adoption of the gold standard was a spoliation of the debtors in our own communities. In so far, however, as our debt was held abroad, it provided for a spoliation of our citizens by the foreign bondholders also. And as nearly all our public debt was so held, we had presented to us in 1873 the extraordinary spectacle of representatives, sent here to enact laws for the welfare and advancement of our own people, devoting all their energies, whether aware of it or not, to the upbuilding of the fortunes of the moneyed aristocracies of other countries, at the expense of the producers of the United States.

CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY AT THE TIME.

Consider for a moment the condition of this country at the time when this amazing piece of legislation was enacted.

The Republic was but just recovering from an exhausting war, which loaded it with a national debt approaching $3,000,000,000. There were also State, county, city, and town debts aggregating many more thousands of millions, with railroad and other corporate bonds and debts aggregating yet other thousands of millions and private debts of indefinite and unascertainable amount, represented largely by mortgages on real estate. This const.i.tuted an aggregate whose burden might naturally be presumed to be sufficient to tax all the resources of the people. Although some portion of those debts has been liquidated and the national bonds have been refunded at lower rates of interest, yet we all know that in this age all munic.i.p.al and corporate debts, if not national debts, are practically perpetual. No sooner is one form of bond liquidated than another takes its place; no sooner is one public improvement completed than another is begun.

At the time silver was demonetized it might well have been supposed that a sufficiently large unearned increment had already been realized by the foreign and domestic holders of United States bonds. The greater portion of the debt of the Government was, when incurred, made payable simply in "lawful money"--the interest alone being payable in coin. Yet in March, 1869, the bond-holders secured the pa.s.sage of an act of Congress, ent.i.tled "An act to strengthen the public credit," containing a pledge to pay in coin or its equivalent not merely the interest, but the princ.i.p.al of all national obligations not specially provided to be paid otherwise.

THE COURSE OF THE CREDITORS.

And again, when in 1870 Congress was about to provide for a refunding of the public debt, these clamorous creditors, not satisfied with having got the bonds at rates much below their face value, and not satisfied with the pledge to pay in coin--a pledge made long after the contract was made and the debt incurred--insisted that not only should the new bonds be payable in coin, but in order to guard against any possible interpretation which might work to their detriment they did what has rarely been done in the history of monetary legislation, insisted that even the very _standard_ of that coin should be fixed and nominated in the bond. They were willing to take no chances. They were not willing to place confidence in the sense of equity and fair dealing of the people of the United States. They held before Congress the covert threat that if the new issue of bonds did not provide for payment in "coin," instead of "lawful money," and did not prescribe the precise standard of coin in which they were to be payable, it would be difficult if not impossible to place the bonds on the market.

So, by the refunding act of July 14, 1870, Congress provided for the payment in "coin of the present standard value," that is to say, in either gold dollars of 25.8 grains of gold, nine-tenths fine, or in silver dollars of 412-1/2 grains of silver, nine-tenths fine, at the option of the United States. But even this extreme advantage to the creditors over payment in "lawful money" of the United States, in which the bonds were bought, and in which they were legally payable, was insufficient. All but the most ingenious would imagine that having thus provided for payment in coin then bearing a considerable premium over the current money of the Republic, and having the very standard of that coin fixed in the act, the highest point of vantage had been reached.

One device, however, and only one, remained by which the money of the payment could be still further increased in value, and this device did not escape the watchful eye or cunning hand of the public creditors.

They clearly saw that if by legislative enactment they could secure the rejection of one of the money-metals they would succeed in enormously increasing the value of the metal retained. This they accomplished by the demonetization of silver, and thus by striking down one-half the automatic money of the world and devolving the money function exclusively on the other half, added thousands of millions of dollars to the burden of the debt.

THE PRETENSE TO "STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC CREDIT."

It will be observed that this anxiety to strengthen the public credit was evinced by the bondholders _after_ and not before the bonds were in their possession. No anxiety for the public credit was manifested by them at a time when the Government might be able to reap advantage from it. The Government having parted with the bonds at a heavy discount, their selling price in the market became a matter of no direct pecuniary importance to the people of the United States.

The "strengthening of the public credit" that was to be effected by the act of March 16, 1869, consisted of a rise in the price of the bonds for the benefit of the holder, at a time when they were no longer the property of the Government but of private individuals. The real effect of the act, therefore, was not in any way to benefit the Government but greatly to enrich, by an increment unearned and unbargained for, a few men who had already been greatly enriched by their dealings with the United States. The t.i.tle of the act should have read "An act to strengthen the bank account and credit of the holders of United States bonds."

The excuse and apology for the act was that by its pa.s.sage the refunding process then contemplated, and afterward provided for by the refunding act of 1870 might be rendered more certain of success; but if any advantage accrued from that cause, it was lost, and much more with it, by the increase which the act of 1869 effected in the burden of the bonded obligation, by pledging the nation to a payment in a medium much more valuable than the medium provided for in the contract. And, again, in 1873 when all the bonds provided for by the refunding act of 1870 had been sold and had pa.s.sed out of the hands of the Government, another act was pa.s.sed, intended by the money-lenders again to strengthen the public credit, and again to the disadvantage of the people and to the exclusive and enormous advantage of the bondholders. It bore the innocent t.i.tle of "An act revising and amending the laws relative to the mints, a.s.say offices, and coinage of the United States." This act, bearing on its face no suggestion of any change more serious than that of regulating the petty details of mint management, has proved to be an act of momentous consequence to the people of this country. This is the act that demonetized the silver dollar, which it did by merely omitting that coin from the enumeration of the coins of the United States.

DEMONETIZATION WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIABLE.

Among all the explanations that have been made to account for that demonetization by a Congress of the United States, I have never heard any reason advanced which const.i.tuted a justification for it. To my mind, in view of all the circ.u.mstances--in the face of the herculean difficulties by which the nation was surrounded, in the face of the sacrifices which our citizens had made to preserve the Republic, and in the face of all that had already been done by an over-generous people, proud of their national strength, and jealous of their national honor, to satisfy the rapacious demands of the money-lenders--in view, I say, of all these facts, the demonetization of silver by the United States must be regarded as one of those historic blunders that are worse than crimes. It was the child of Ignorance and Avarice, and is already the prolific parent of enforced idleness, poverty, and misery.

It is to undo as far as possible the effects of the blunder of 1873 that new legislation is now imperatively demanded by the people. While the past can not be recalled, the present is ours, and the pressing duty of to-day is to provide for the future. The demand comes from all sections of the country that a remedy for the depressed industrial conditions caused by the legislation of 1873, be applied at the earliest moment.

And what better remedy could be applied than absolutely to reverse that legislation and to put the monetary position of this country back to exactly where it was when that wrong was committed?

Some twelve years ago an attempt was made to apply a remedy, but the attempt was only partially successful. Instead of resulting in free coinage, it resulted in the pa.s.sage of the bill which authorized the coinage of not less than two nor more than four million dollars' worth of silver per month. On that occasion a financial debate of great interest and importance was had in this Chamber and in the other House of Congress. The proposition to remonetize silver or to increase the silver coinage was vigorously opposed, but the arguments then presented by the advocates of remonetization never have been, and never can be, refuted.

In fact, but rarely has there been any attempt made to answer those arguments. Puerile attempts at wit, and diatribes of abuse are all that the silver men have heard in sixteen years in answer to the contentions they have made in favor of the remonetization of silver.

EDUCATIONAL EFFECT OF DISCUSSION.

With that debate, Mr. President, long pending and eagerly maintained on both sides, there began in this country an educational movement among the ma.s.ses, that is destined to have far-reaching consequence. The public attention was fastened, as it had never been fastened before, on the subject of money, and on the forces which govern its value, and up to this time that attention has never flagged. As a result we find the great body of our people to-day--the farmers and artisans of the country--after years of reflection and discussion in their lyceums and trade organizations, adopting to a large extent the views then presented by the advocates of an increased money volume--views which at the time were contemptuously derided by the advocates of contraction and of gold.

The cry for relief appropriately now comes from the farmers, the artisans, and the laboring cla.s.ses, as well as from the young, the enterprising, the thoughtful, of all cla.s.ses, who have not inherited wealth, but are hewing out for themselves the rugged path to success. It is they who have had to bear the exactions of the system which has prevailed. It is from the proceeds of their labor that the extortions have been paid. If objection be made that the character of relief proposed is not indorsed in financial circles, or by the literary guild or professional political economists that surround them, the sufficient reply is that the world can not wait for the correction of abuses by those who are profiting by them. In the nature of things, all movements for reform must be initiated by those who can not lose by the installation of justice.

But there are others besides the laboring ma.s.ses who are working in the cause of humanity. There are n.o.ble, unselfish, and altruistic men in all the countries of civilization, who see the wrong and are indefatigable in their efforts to set it right.

I will read a cable dispatch recently addressed to me by Mr. Henry H.

Gibbs, formerly governor of the Bank of England, and now president of the Bimetallic League of Great Britain:

LONDON, _May 6_.--The friends of silver deeply regret the death of Senator Beck, whose services in the cause of monetary reform are warmly appreciated on this side of the Atlantic. The bimetallist party of the United Kingdom, now including over one hundred members of the House of Commons, attach the greatest value to the debate about to commence in your ill.u.s.trious chamber. We fully recognize not only that the support afforded to silver by your legislation during the last twelve years has helped the protect the industrial world from an acute monetary crisis, but also that the debates in Congress have served more than all else to educate our people to recognition of the important issues involved. We believe also that the increase and coinage of silver contemplated by Congress will restore, wholly or considerably, your coinage rates, and will thus make international settlement of this complex question comparatively easy. We antic.i.p.ate further and with much confidence, that the advance in the price of silver which must follow your action will stimulate both the export and the other trades of your country, and, while tending to the prosperity of your agricultural cla.s.ses, will also a.s.sist the manufacturing industries of the United Kingdom and the whole body of our wage-earners.

Mr. Moreton Frewen, of London, an able writer on economic subjects, whose recent work on the "The Economic Crisis" I commend to the careful perusal of Senators, says:

It may, indeed, be affirmed, without fear of contradiction, that legislation arranged in the interest of a certain cla.s.s, first by Lord Liverpool in this country, and again by Sir Robert Peel at the instigation of Mr. Jones Loyd and other wealthy bankers, which was supplemented recently by simultaneous anti-silver legislation in Berlin and Washington at the instance of the great financial houses--this legislation has about doubled the burden of all national debts by an artificial enhancement of the value of money.

The fall of all prices induced by this cause has been on such a scale that while in twenty years the National debt of the United States quoted in dollars has been reduced by nearly two-thirds, yet the value of the remaining one-third, measured in wheat, in bar iron, or bales of cotton, is considerably greater--is a greater demand draft on the labor and industry of the nation than was the whole debt at the time it was contracted. The aggravation of the burdens of taxation induced by this so-called "appreciation of gold," which is no natural appreciation, but has been brought about by cla.s.s legislation to increase the value of the gold which is in a few hands, requires but to be explained to an enfranchised democracy, which will know how to protect itself against further attempts to contract the currency and to force down prices to the confusion of every existing contract.

Of all cla.s.ses of middle-men, bankers have been by far the most successful in intercepting and appropriating an undue share of produced wealth. While the modern system of banking and credit may be said to be even yet in its infancy, that portion of the a.s.sets of the community which is to-day in the strong boxes of the bankers would, if declared, be an astounding revelation of the recent profits of this particular business; and not only has the business itself become a most profitable monopoly, but its interests in a very few hands are diametrically opposed to the general interests of the majority. By legislation intended to contract the currency and force down all prices, including wages, the price paid for labor, the money owner has been able to increase the purchase power of his sovereign or dollar by the direct diminution of the price of every kind of property measured in money.

UNFULFILLED PROPHECIES.

During the debate on the limited coinage bill, not content with abuse of the advocates of the measure; with flimsy criticism of it and specious arguments against it, its opponents in and out of Congress indulged in diverse prophecies and predictions. They pictured forth the lamentable results that would follow its pa.s.sage, and the direful consequences that would ensue from an increase of the circulating medium of the country.

Among the results confidently predicted were the following: that the silver would not circulate at all, and again that it would circulate to the exclusion of gold, which metal, we were informed, would flow out of this country with a velocity and in a volume theretofore unknown; that we should be unable to redeem our paper money in gold; that we should be precipitated into a silver vortex; that an inflation of the currency would follow, which would ruinously raise prices of all commodities and that this inflation would result in an unprecedented contraction. We were charged with forcing upon the public creditors a dollar worth only ninety cents. We were warned that the pa.s.sage of the bill would indefinitely postpone the refunding of the public debt, and would lower the price and impair the value of our national securities. It was charged that we were setting on foot a new and irrepressible conflict between two great sections of the country--the East and the West. We were charged with uttering a debased coin; with lowering the standard of American credit; with tarnishing the integrity and honor of our country before foreign nations, and with unprecedented moral turpitude in setting an example of flagrant and shameless national dishonesty.

The men of the far West, and of the Pacific slope especially, were the particular targets of this abuse. They were denounced by some as "lunatics," by others as dangerous and unworthy demagogues, because, as was charged, their const.i.tuents, if not themselves, were directly interested in the restoration of the ancient right of silver to full recognition as one of the money metals. For their benefit resort was had to every epithet which the English language afforded. In holding them up to public scorn the rich and varied vocabulary of odium and opprobrium was exhausted.

These prophecies of disaster were united in by the professors of political economy in all the Eastern colleges, by the President of the United States, by the Secretary of the Treasury, by the leading American newspapers, by the princ.i.p.al public men and journals of Great Britain, if not of all Europe; and, of course, by all bankers, money-lenders, and professional financiers the world over.

And now, Mr. President, how many of all those alarming prognostications by all these distinguished prophets have been fulfilled? Not one! On the contrary, it is not too much to say that the public credit of the United States is to-day the highest in the world. It does not stand merely in line with that of other first-rate powers; it stands at the head. Our gold, silver, and paper money stand at a parity with each other. If a full measure of relief was not realized by the pa.s.sage of that bill it is because the coinage of $4,000,000 a month was left optional with the Secretary of the Treasury, instead of being made mandatory on him.