The fundamental principle of philosophical Pantheism is either _the unity of substance_, as taught by Spinoza, or _the ident.i.ty of existence and thought_, as taught, with some important variations, by Fichte, Sch.e.l.ling, and Hegel. The Absolute is conceived of, not as a living Being to whom a proper personality and certain intelligible attributes may be ascribed, but as a vague, indeterminate _somewhat_, which has no distinctive character, and of which, in the first instance, or prior to its development, almost nothing can be either affirmed or denied. But this absolute existence, by some unknown, inherent necessity, develops, determines, and limits itself: it becomes being, and const.i.tutes all being: the infinite pa.s.ses into the finite, the absolute into the relative, the necessary into the contingent, the one into the many; all other existences are only so many modes or forms of its manifestation.

Here is a theory which, to say the very least, is neither more intelligible, nor less mysterious, than any article of the Christian faith. And what are the proofs to which it appeals, what the principles on which it rests? Its two fundamental positions are these; that finite things have no distinct existence as realities in nature, and that there exists only one Absolute Being, manifesting itself in a variety of forms. And how are they demonstrated? Simply by the affirmation of universal "Ident.i.ty." But what if this affirmation be denied? What if, founding on the clearest data of consciousness, we refuse to acknowledge that _existence_ is identical with _thought_?[141] What if we continue to believe that there are objects of thought which are distinct from thought itself, and which must be _presented_ to the mind before they can be _represented_ by the mind? What if, while we recognize the idea both of the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute, the contingent and the necessary, we cannot, by the utmost effort of our reason, obliterate the difference between them, so as to reduce them to one absolute essence? Then the whole superstructure of Pantheism falls along with the Idealism on which it depends; and it is found to be, not a solid and enduring system of truth, but a frail edifice, ingeniously constructed out of the mere abstractions of the human mind.

The advocates of this system a.s.sume that the relations which subsist between _beings_ are the same as the relations which subsist between our _ideas_, and infer that _logic_ is sufficient to construct a system of _metaphysic_. But Professor Nicolas has well said, that "while it is certain we cannot know things but by the notions which we have of them, and a certain parallelism may thus be established between _what exists_ and _what we think_ of that which exists, yet from this to the _ident.i.ty of being and thought_, such as Pantheism requires, there is a vast distance, and we have no ground for believing that the _logical relations_ of our ideas are identical with the _real relations_ of beings. Speculative Pantheism is wholly built on this a.s.sumption. It describes the relations of being according to the logical relations of our thought; and it takes _logic_ for a kind of _metaphysic_. It confounds the laws of thought with the laws of being. It seeks to solve the question, What is the first Being, and what are its relations to other beings? That Being must necessarily be the condition of all other beings, and must virtually contain them all; nay, it must be capable of becoming all things. It must therefore be simple, indeterminate, indifferent, possessing no essential character, resembling nothing that we actually know. All this is true of our _ideas_, but not of _beings_.

The highest idea,--that which is the logical condition of all others, and also the most general, the most abstract, the most indeterminate,--this idea contains all others, and by receiving this or that determination, it becomes this or that particular idea. But what is true of the _idea_ is not true of the _being_; no such vague, indeterminate, indifferent being exists; and yet Pantheism confounds _the idea_ with _the being_, and rests entirely on that confusion of thought."

In bringing our review of Modern Pantheism to a close, we may offer a few remarks ill.u.s.trative of its _nature and tendency_, whether considered as a system of speculative thought, or as a subst.i.tute for religious belief.

In this view, it is important to observe, first of all, that the theory of "Idealism," and the doctrine of "Ident.i.ty," which const.i.tute the groundwork of the more spiritual form of Pantheism, are not more adverse to our belief in the existence and personality of G.o.d, than they are to our belief in the reality of an external world, or in the existence and personality of man himself. They stand equally related to each of these _three_ topics; and, if they be accepted at all, they must be impartially applied, and consistently carried out into all their legitimate consequences, as the only philosophical solution of the whole question of Ontology. Perhaps this is not understood; certainly it has not been duly considered by the more superficial _litterateurs_, who have been slightly tinctured with Pantheism; but it will be acknowledged at once by every consistent Idealist, who understands his own philosophy, and who is honest or bold enough to carry it out into all its practical applications. He knows very well, and, if sufficiently candid, he will frankly confess, that the principles on which he founds, if they be conclusive against the existence of a living, personal G.o.d, are equally conclusive against the reality of an external world, and against the doctrine of our own personality or that of our fellow-men.

With most minds, this consideration would be of itself a powerful counteractive to all that is most dangerous in the theory of Idealism, were it only clearly apprehended and steadily kept in view; for an argument which proves too much is justly held to prove nothing, and that theory which leaves us no right to believe in the existence of Nature, or in the distinct personality of our fellow-men, can scarcely be held sufficient to disprove the existence of G.o.d.

It may be observed, further, that Ideal Pantheism has a strong tendency to engender a spirit either of Mysticism, on the one hand, or of Skepticism on the other. It terminates in Mysticism when, seeking to avoid Skepticism, it takes refuge in the doctrine of an "intellectual intuition," such as gives an immediate knowledge of the Absolute: and it terminates in Skepticism when, seeking to avoid Mysticism, it rejects the doctrine of "intellectual intuition," and discovers that it has no other and no higher claims to our confidence than such as are equally possessed by any one of our common faculties, whose testimony the Idealist has been taught to distrust and doubt.

It is further worthy of remark, that the philosophy of the Absolute, as taught in the German schools, has been applied to the whole circle of the Sciences, not less than to Theology, and that it has given birth to numerous speculative systems, in Physics, in Chemistry, in Ethics, in History, and in Politics, all strongly marked by the same characteristic feature--the subst.i.tution of _a priori and deductive_ speculation for the more sober and legitimate method of Inductive inquiry. The province of Natural Science, in which, if anywhere, we should be guided by the light of experience and observation, has been rudely invaded by this transcendental philosophy, which offers to construct a theory of universal knowledge on the basis of a certain self-development of the Absolute. We are indebted to Mr. Morell for a specimen,[142] alike amusing and instructive, of Sch.e.l.ling's speculations on this subject. We shall not attempt to interpret its meaning, for, in sooth, we do not pretend to understand it: but one thing is clear, the laws of Matter, of Dynamics, of Organic structure and life, the laws of Knowledge, of Action, and of Art, are all exhibited as mere deductions or corollaries from the "idea of the Absolute;" and in the name of Natural Science, not less than on behalf of Theology, we protest against this vicious method of Philosophy, and do most earnestly deprecate the subst.i.tution of Fichte, Sch.e.l.ling, and Hegel, in the place of our own Bacon, and Boyle, and Newton, as models of scientific thought.

The _practical influence_ of Pantheism, in so far as its peculiar tendencies are not restrained or counteracted by more salutary beliefs, must be deeply injurious, both to the individual and social welfare of mankind. In its Ideal or Spiritual form it may be seductive to some ardent, imaginative minds; but it is a wretched creed notwithstanding; and it will be found, when calmly examined, to be fraught with the most serious evils. It has been commended, indeed, in glowing terms, as a creed alike beautiful and beneficent,--as a source of religious life n.o.bler and purer than any that can ever spring from the more gloomy system of Theism: for, on the theory of Pantheism, G.o.d is manifest to all, everywhere, and at all times; Nature, too, is aggrandized and glorified, and everything in Nature is invested with a new dignity and interest; above all, Man is conclusively freed from all fantastic hopes and superst.i.tious fears, so that his mind can now repose, with tranquil satisfaction, on the bosom of the Absolute, unmoved by the vicissitudes of life, and unscared even by the prospect of death. For what is death?

The dissolution of any living organism is but one stage in the process of its further development; and whether it pa.s.ses into a new form of self-conscious life, or is reabsorbed into the infinite, it still forms an indestructible element in the vast sum of Being. We may, therefore, or, rather, we must, leave our future state to be determined by Nature's inexorable laws, and we need, at least, fear no Being higher than Nature, to whose justice we are amenable, or whose frown we should dread.[143] But, even as it is thus exhibited by some of its warmest partisans, it appears to us, we own, to be a dreary and cheerless creed, when compared with that faith which teaches us to regard G.o.d as our "Father in heaven," and that "hope which is full of immortality." It is worse, however, than dreary; it is destructive of all religion and of all morality. If it be an avowed antagonist to Christianity, it is not less hostile to Natural Theology and to Ethical Science. It consecrates error and vice, as being, equally with truth and virtue, necessary and beneficial manifestations of the "infinite." It is a system of Syncretism, founded on the idea that error is only an incomplete truth, and maintaining that truth must necessarily be developed by error, and virtue by vice. According to this fundamental law of "human progress,"

Atheism itself may be providential; and the axiom of a Fatalistic Optimism--"Whatever is, is best"--must be admitted equally in regard to truth and error, to virtue and vice.

It may be further observed, that modern Pantheism, whether in its Material or Ideal form, is nothing else than the revival of some of the earliest and most inveterate Principles of Paganism,--the same Paganism which still flourishes among the "theosophic" dreamers of India, and which exhibits its practical fruits in the horrors of Hindoo superst.i.tion. For Pantheism, although repeatedly revived and exhibited in new forms, has made no real progress since the time when it was first taught in the Vedanta system, and sublimed in the schools of Alexandria.

Christianity, which encountered and triumphed over it in her youth, can have nothing to fear from it in her mature age,[144] provided only that she be faithful to herself, and spurn every offered compromise. But there must be no truce, and no attempt at conciliation between the two.

The Pantheists of Germany have made the most impudent claims to the virtual sanction of Christianity; they have even dared to make use of Bible terms in a new sense, and have spoken of Revelation, Inspiration, Incarnation, Redemption, Atonement, and Regeneration, in such a way as to adapt them to the Pantheistic hypothesis. Common honesty is outraged, and the conscience of universal humanity offended, by the conduct of individuals--some of them wearing the robes of the holy ministry--who have subst.i.tuted the dreams of Pantheism for the doctrines of Jesus Christ, and a.s.sailed, both from the pulpit and the press, the sacred cause which they had solemnly vowed to maintain. But even in Germany itself a powerful reaction has commenced; and the learning and labors of such men as Olshausen, and Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, may be hailed as the dawn of a better and brighter day.

It may be observed, _finally_, that Pantheism stands directly opposed to Christian Theism in several distinct respects. The following are the princ.i.p.al points of collision between the two:

1. Pantheism denies,--Christian Theism affirms, the existence of a _living, personal G.o.d_, distinct from Nature, and superior to it.

2. Pantheism supersedes,--Christian Theism reveals, the doctrine of a real creation.

3. Pantheism contests,--Christian Theism confirms, the doctrine of the constant providence and moral government of G.o.d.

4. Pantheism disowns,--Christian Theism declares, the doctrine of _a conscious, personal immortality_.

5. Pantheism rejects,--Christian Theism receives, the whole scheme of Revelation, considered as a supernatural code of Divine truth. The one accounts for its origin on the principle of natural development, the other on that of supernatural interposition.

6. Pantheism has no living, self-conscious, personal G.o.d, no loving Father, no watchful Providence, no Hearer of Prayer, no Object of confiding trust, no Redeemer, no Sanctifier, no Comforter: it leaves us with nothing higher than Nature as our portion here, and nothing beyond its eternal vicissitudes as our prospect hereafter.

FOOTNOTES:

[103] AMAND SAINTES, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza, Fondateur de l'Exegese et de la Philosophie Modernes."

[104] M. COUSIN, "Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie," I. 403. See also "Fragmens Philosophiques," Preface, second edition, p. XXVII.; "Nouveaux Fragments," pp. 9, 160.

[105] M. AD. FRANCK, "De la Cert.i.tude," Preface, p. XXI.

[106] M. A. JAVARI, "De la Cert.i.tude," p. 509.

[107] AMAND SAINTES, "Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza,"

pp. 208, 210.

[108] ABBe MARET, "Essai sur le Pantheisme dans les Societes Modernes,"

pp. 6, 11, 31. Ibid., "Theodicee Chretienne," pp. 437, 444, 449.

[109] MR. MORELL'S "Historical and Critical View," II. 104, 153.

[110] PIERRE LEROUX, "De l'Humanite," I. vi. 3, 295.

[111] L. D. CROUSSE, "Des Principes, ou Philosophie Premiere," 2d Edition, Paris, 1846.

[112] ABBe MARET, "Theodicee Chretienne," p. 94.

[113] ABBe GOSCHLER, sur "l'Histoire du Pantheisme." ABBe MARET, "Essai," chap. IV.

[114] PIERRE LEROUX, "De l'Humanite," I. 249. M. CROUSSE, "Des Principes," pp. 199, 211, 296. BAYLE, "Pensees," III. 67. The well-known lines of the sixth aeneid, "Principio coelum, ac terras, camposque liquentes," &c. are thus applied.

[115] ABBe MARET, "Essai," pp. 152, 156, 221.

[116] DR. MERLE D'AUBIGNe, "History of Reformation," V. 84.

[117] ABBe MARET, "Essai," p. 89; "Theodicee," p. 368.

[118] FRED. VON SCHLEGEL, "Philosophy of Life," p. 417. See, also, DR.

THOLUCK'S remarks on the same point in the "Princeton Theological Essays," I. 555.

[119] MUSaeUS, "Tractatus Theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen examinatus," 1674. REGNERI A MANSVELT, "Adversus anonymum Theologico-politic.u.m, Liber singularis," 1674. FRANCOIS CUYPER, "Arcana Atheismi Revelata," 1676. JOHN BREDENBOURG, "Enervatio Tractatus Theol.-polit." CHRIST. WITTICHII, "Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen," 1690.

PIERRE POIRET, "Fundamenta Atheismi Eversa, sive Specimen Absurditatis Spinozianae." FENELON, "De l'Existence de Dieu," p. II., c. III., "Refutation du Spinozisme." HUET, "La Conformite de la Raison avec la Foi," 1692. HOWE, "Living Temple," I. 262. S. CLARKE, "Discourse on the Being and Attributes of G.o.d," pp. 25, 44, 58, 80.

[120] JEAN COLERUS, "Vie de Spinoza," reprinted by Saisset, p. 4.

[121] SPINOZA, "Ethica," Definitions III., IV., V.

[122] "Il construit le systeme entiere des etres avec ces trois seuls elements; la substance, l'attribut, et le mode."--"Voila l'idee mere de la metaphysique de Spinoza."--SAISSET.

[123] SAISSET, "Introduction," p. x.x.xIX.

[124] SPINOZA, "De Intellectus Emendatione." This treatise contains the exposition of his method.

[125] M. F. PERRON, "Essai d'une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idees Fondamentales," 1843.

[126] "Ici, a prendre les mots dans le sens ordinaire, il semble qu'il soit demontre qui _la Creation est impossible_, principe justement cher au Pantheisme; tandis qu'au fond, tout ce qui est demontre, c'est que _l'Etre en soi est necessairement incree_,--verite incontestable, dont _le Pantheisme n'a rien a tirer_."--PROF. SAISSET, Introduction, p.

XLII.

[127] M. L'ABBe DE CONDILLAC, "Traite des Sensations," 2 vols.

[128] The HON. ROBERT BOYLE, "Theological Works," II. 79.--"A Free Inquiry into the Received Notion of Nature."

[129] "Systeme de la Nature," II. 75, 110, 115.