APPENDIX I.

Orion, St Helen's Roads, 30th December 1796.

MY LORD,

I HAVE had it in contemplation for some time past, to lay before your Lordships the enclosed plan for the establishment of a Marine Artillery for the service of the Navy, but was prevented from doing it by the late prospect of a peace; at present, as the haughtiness of our enemies seems to have removed that desirable object to a distant period, and as a further augmentation to our forces may in consequence take place, it may not appear unseasonable.

If it has the good fortune to meet with your Lordship's approbation, I shall think myself amply recompensed for the time I have bestowed upon it.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient And very humble servant, JAMES SAUMAREZ.

A PLAN FOR FORMING A CORPS OF ARTILLERY FOR HIS MAJESTY'S NAVAL SERVICE.

"In consequence of the present great increase of the royal navy, it becomes from time to time necessary to augment proportionably that very useful body of men, the Marines,--but that very respectable corps would be rendered of far greater importance to the service, were they trained up and exercised in the management of the great guns; for which purpose it is humbly submitted, that a division be established at either Woolwich or Deptford, to be composed of drafts from the divisions of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, in order to be instructed in the exercise and use of artillery; and thereby become expert gunners when ordered to be embarked on board His Majesty's ships; their numbers to consist of one man to every four guns in each line-of-battle ship, which would compose about one third of their present complement. In addition to which, two companies should be quartered at the other three divisions, to complete such vacancies as occasionally would occur on board the fleet.

"The great utility of this corps must appear obvious when it is considered that the only person supposed to be qualified and experienced in gunnery on board His Majesty's ships, is the gunner, who, too often ignorant of his own duty, is totally unable to instruct others. In the quarter bills of most ships, it is well known that a very small proportion of the marines are reserved for musketry, the greater part being in general divided on the different batteries. With what advantage would they not go to their quarters, after having been well practised and exercised as artillery-men; and how soon would not the rest of the ship's company become also expert gunners in emulating their example.

"These men would also be found particularly useful on expeditions abroad, in landing or making a descent on the enemy's coast, when a well-served artillery is often of the greatest importance.

"The officers might be appointed from the other divisions, and should consist of those who, from their age and services, were incapable of being engaged in actual duty;--they would here find a comfortable asylum during life, and end their days in the service of their country.

"The expenses incurred by this establishment would be inconsiderable; and no doubt can be entertained of its proving a lasting advantage to His Majesty's service, and adding strength to the great bulwark of this country,--the Royal Navy.

"JAMES SAUMAREZ, Orion."

"The Right Honourable Earl Spencer, &c. &c. &c."

"Admiralty, 2nd January 1797.

"DEAR SIR,

"I hazard a line in the uncertainty whether you may not have sailed before this reaches Portsmouth, to thank you for your paper on the establishment of a Corps of Artillery for the naval service. The idea is one which I have often heard discussed, and in many points of view a very good one; but I fear that there would be so many difficulties in point of official arrangements to overcome in carrying it into execution, that no very sanguine hopes can be entertained of its succeeding.

"It is, however, a subject well worthy of attention, and which, at a less pressing moment, it may perhaps be worth while to renew.

"I am, "Dear sir, "With great regard, "Your very obedient, humble servant, "SPENCER."

"To Sir James Saumarez."

APPENDIX K.

"Madrid, 10th March 1797.

"The following account of the action with the British squadron, on the 14th day of February last, has been received by D. Juan de Langara, in a letter addressed to his Excellency by D. Joseph de Cordova, commander-in-chief of the Squadron, dated del Oceano, the 2nd of March, at the entrance of Cadiz Bay.

"From the instant of my proceeding to sea, after securing the gun-boat at Algeziras, I had the winds E.N.E. to S.E. that drove me to the lat.i.tude of Cape St. Vincent; however, on the morning of the 14th, it changing to the west, I steered to the E.S.E., and formed in three separate columns, in the order of sailing with convoy. Several vessels from the left, at nine o'clock in the morning, observing a strange sail, I ordered the Principe de Asturias to chase; shortly after, the St. Firmin and the Pearl frigate discovered the number to increase to eight sail, and although the foggy weather prevented their being seen from the Trinidad, I forced the whole squadron to a press of sail; but counting already at ten o'clock from fifteen to eighteen of the enemy's ships, besides several frigates, I ordered our squadron to form immediately the line of battle, in the best manner possible, on the larboard tack, to maintain the weather gage. In tacking, the ships Principe, Conde-de-Regla, and Oriente, fell so much to leeward, that they were unable to join in the line without the risk of being cut off by the enemy, that now, but at a short distance and under a press of sail, met us in the most regular order: in consequence, I ordered these vessels to tack that they might fall in the rear of the line, which, although done by the two first, could not be effected by the Oriente, and she ran to leeward of the enemy.

"At a quarter before eleven, from the position of the squadron, the enemy's headmost ship commenced the action with the nearest situated to her ahead of the Trinidad, running along the whole of our rear, and successively bearing up before the wind. The Trinidad happened to be the last of our line, and consequently the centre and van remained out of the action.

"The rear of the enemy sailed but slowly, and for this reason, as well as to benefit by some means the fire from our van, I made a signal at half-past eleven for all the ships ahead to tack, in order to come round the enemy and attack their rear. My ordering this manoeuvre appeared the most opportune for many weighty reasons; but, misunderstood by the ships to which it was directed, I now looked upon the loss of the Principe, Regla, and the whole of our rear, as unavoidable. The favourable moment for this movement being lost, I made a signal for the whole squadron to bear up at the same time, with a view to contract our distance with the enemy, and to bring into action several other ships in our centre and van. At the time of bearing up, the Trinidad was ahead in close action with the enemy, within musket-shot, and having been engaged by the whole English line, was very much damaged.

"So soon as their headmost ship had pa.s.sed athwart our stern, she tacked, followed by five or six others pa.s.sing our line to windward; the remaining ten ships, that were before on our larboard side, then bore up at the same time, and pa.s.sed through our line in different positions, and consequently remained on the other tack fighting us in great order, with a heavy and well-directed fire: this manoeuvre decided the action in their favour. I did not fail to guard against this from the commencement, and antic.i.p.ated it by ordering the ships ahead to tack and gain the enemy's rear to leeward; and if the commanders of the Principe, Regla, Oriente, and Firmin had availed themselves of the opportunity to join six or eight ships of the van, they would have placed the enemy between two fires, and terminated the action in a very different manner.

"Although the Principe and Regla were not able to fall into the rear of our line, they notwithstanding did their utmost from their situation, engaging the enemy at the time of pa.s.sing our line, till they had obtained the weather gage. The attack of the enemy was now princ.i.p.ally on the Trinidad, which, from the crippled situation of her mast and rigging, fell to leeward. By word of mouth, and by signals, the Salvador, San Josef, Soberano, and San Nicholas were ordered to shorten sail, and to form in our rear, which they executed with celerity, maintaining a severe action. The van continually remaining to windward, at two I made them a signal to shorten sail, and bear down for a general attack.

"The Mexicano formed upon our bow about three in the afternoon, and engaged the foremost ship of the enemy's line; they now for the remainder of the day fixed their whole attention against the San Josef, Mexicano, San Nicholas, and San Yisidro, which were the only ships that bore the princ.i.p.al and hottest part of the action against the whole enemy's squadron.

"In this situation it would have been highly expedient that our centre and van should have come to our support, but it was out of my power to intimate to them the necessity of this movement, the ships being in want of masts, rigging, and every necessary for making signals. I cannot refrain from giving due praise to the valour of the above-mentioned ships formed at my stern, and expressing the gallant manner in which they behaved during the engagement: but at length, being dismasted and destroyed, some struck, and others left the action. The Trinidad was attacked the whole afternoon by a three-decker, and three ships of 74 guns, that raked her fore and aft at pistol-shot; and notwithstanding her having upwards of two hundred men killed and wounded, she still continued the action for a full hour longer. Such was the dreadful situation of the Trinidad at six o'clock, after an uninterrupted engagement, when the San Pablo and Pelayo, that in the morning had been detached by my orders, and crowded every sail from the moment of observing the action, now reached the squadron.

"The reinforcement of these two ships happened at the opportune junction of the Conde-de-Regla; the Principe arrived shortly after, and the enemy, observing our van standing towards them, immediately retired together, covering the captured ships San Josef, Salvador, San Yisidro, and San Nicholas.

"No one will be surprised at the ultimate consequences of the action, when the series of misfortunes and unforeseen events from the moment of our seeing the enemy is considered; and further, that when cruising, they should sail in a readier condition to form the line of battle than could be performed by our squadron, in the order of sailing with convoy, with the wind on our quarter. For the above reason, scarcely were they discovered, than they formed in regular order of battle, and so near as to oblige my forming the line hastily, without attention to posts, or the consequences that might result from this bad position of the ships and commanders; to which must be added, that the Pelayo and San Pablo were ahead by order,--that the Firmin and Oriente remained to leeward of both lines,--that notwithstanding the exertions made by the Principe, Regla, and Firmin, they did not enter into the line till the afternoon, the latter wanting a foretop-mast. So that of all the ships of my squadron, only seventeen formed in the line of battle, the St. Domingo included in the number, loaded with quicksilver, and of very inconsiderable force. Of the seventeen above mentioned, some were in action only at intervals, and many did not fire a gun; resulting from the circ.u.mstance of the enemy's line being entirely engaged against six Spanish ships, and their defence is the more praiseworthy, as they were all in want of men. The Trinidad remaining entirely dismasted, without the power of making signals with flags or lights, I desired Lieutenant General D.

Juan Joachim Moreno to reestablish the line of battle close on the larboard tack, and gave orders that jury-masts should be fixed on the Trinidad and the Moredes frigate, to protect her to Cadiz, profiting by the wind and the situation of the enemy at night-fall.

"I embarked in consequence, with my Major General and Adjutants, on board the Diana frigate, and ordered several frigates along the line, that they should observe the order given, and repair the damages with all haste in order to return again to action. The squadron remained the whole night on the larboard tack, with the wind at W. to W.N.W.

till six o'clock A.M. of the 15th, when I formed on the other tack, close hauled to the wind.

"My next attention was to inquire by signal the situation of the ships for action,--and it proved that the Concepcion, Mexicano, and Soberano _were not in a state to renew the action_; and that the Regla, Oriente, San Pablo, Pelayo, and San Antonio _could enter into action_, without my being able to gain any information regarding the others.

Nevertheless I continued my course towards the enemy, that to the number of twenty ships had been seen since eight o'clock at S.S.W. My opinion as to the state of the ships of the squadron remaining still indecisive, in the afternoon I desired to know _if it was advisable to attack the enemy_; the ships Concepcion, Mexicano, San Pablo, Soberano, San Domingo, San Ildefonso, Nepomuceno, Atlante, and Firmin replied in the negative; the Gloriose, Pablo, Regla, and Firmin, _that it was advisable to delay the attack_; and only the Principe, Conquistador, and Pelayo, positively a.s.serted that _the attach was advisable_. From the diversity of opinion, and considering the reply of each commander as an indication of the true state of his respective ship, I did not think it proper to force a press of sail towards the enemy, having likewise been informed that the Mexicano, San Domingo, and Soberano were considerably damaged, and the Atlante in want of men, which was general in every ship.

"At three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy was still to the E.S.E. I directed our course S.E. and varied it at five, to S.E. 74 S. to double Cape St. Vincent; and that every exertion should be made by day and night to repair the ships that were not very considerably damaged, I ordered the line at half-past eleven to close on the starboard tack.

On the 16th some of the enemy's cruisers were seen to the S.E. 74 S.

which route I followed at seven o'clock in the evening, with light winds at S.W. with hopes to see them again the next day, supposing their destination for Gibraltar. But at ten o'clock in the morning the Concepcion made a signal that the enemy were at anchor on the left side of the coast, and informed me she had seen four large ships in Lagos Bay. Believing that all the enemy's squadron might be likewise there, I ordered the line to form close on the starboard tack, and then despatched the Brigida frigate to reconnoitre; she returned, acquainting me that she had counted the whole force of the enemy at anchor in the bay.

"The squadron remained, close in-sh.o.r.e the whole afternoon, and part of the night, when the wind changing to S.E. I left it under an easy sail.

"No regular account has been received of the killed and wounded, not having obtained the respective returns from the commanders at the time of writing: but it was known that in the Conde-de-Regla a cannon ball at the commencement of the action killed the Xefe de Esquadra, Conde d'Amblemont, and the splinters wounded the commander, Brigadier D.

Geronime Bravo, and H.D. Cadlos Sellery.

Soberano Killed, Captain de Fragata D. Francisco Luis, Lieutenant Bernardino Antillon, and another officer, name unknown.

Mexicano Mortally wounded, and died on the 4th day, her Commander, Brigadier D. Fernando Herravay Crurat.

Trinidad Killed, second Lieutenant D. Herculas Guchi, and a Midshipman; wounded, Captain of Fragata, D. Franco Alvarez, two Lieutenants de Fragata, the Master, and an inferior officer."

"By advices from Brigadier D. Pebra Poneda, late Commander of the San Josef, the following account is likewise received relating to the captured ships:--

San Josef Killed, second Lieutenant D. Miguel de Doblas.--Mortally wounded, Xefe de Esquadra, D. Francisco Wenthysen, who lost both legs ten minutes after the action commenced, and died the same night; the Master D. Santiago Campomar.

Slightly wounded, two second Lieutenants, and 152 seamen killed and wounded.

Salvador Killed, the Commander, Brigadier Antonio de Tepes, two Lieutenants, and two other officers.