At first success attended the rebellion, but it never spread beyond the unsettled eastern provinces, and after three years it ineffectually smoulders on, the leader cooped up by the Sultan's forces near the coast, though the Sultan is not strong enough to stamp it out.

By those whose knowledge of the country is limited to newspaper news a much more serious state of affairs is supposed to exist, a "pretender"

collecting his forces for a final coup, etc. Something of truth there may be in this, but the situation is grossly exaggerated. The local rising of a few tribes in eastern Morocco never affected the rest of the Empire, save by that feeling of unrest which, in the absence of complete information, jumps at all tales. Even the so-called "rout"

of an "imperial army" three years ago was only a stampede without fighting, brought about by a clever ruse, and there has never been a serious conflict throughout the affair, though the "Rogi" is well supplied with arms from Algeria, and his "forces" are led by a Frenchman, M. Delbrel. Meanwhile comparative order reigns in the disaffected district, though in the north, usually the most peaceful portion of the Empire, all is disturbed.

There a leader has arisen, Rasuli by name, who obtained redress for the wrongs of tribes south of Tangier, and his own appointment as their kad, by the astute device of carrying off as hostages an American and an Englishman, so that the pressure certain to be brought to bear by their Governments would compel the Sultan to grant his demands. All turned out as he had hoped, and the condign punishment which he deserves is yet far off, though a local struggle continues between him and a small imperial force, complicated by feuds between his sometime supporters, who, however, fight half-heartedly, for fear of killing relatives pressed into service on the other side. Those who once looked to Rasuli as a champion have found his little finger thicker than the Sultan's loins, and the country round Tangier is ruined by taxation, so that every one is discontented, and the district is unsafe, a species of civil war raging.

The full name of this redoubtable leader is Mulai Ahmad bin Mohammed bin Abd Allah er-Rasuli, and he is a shareef of Beni Aros, connected therefore with the Wazzan shareefs; but his prestige as such is low, both on account of his past career, and because of his acceptance of a civil post. His mother belonged to Anjera, near Tangier, where he was born about thirty-six years ago at the village of Zeenat, being well educated, as education goes in Morocco, with the Beni M'sawah. But falling into bad company, he first took to cattle-lifting, afterwards turning highwayman, as which he was eventually caught by the Abd es-Sadok family--various members of which were kads from Ceuta to Azila--and consigned to prison in Mogador. After three or four years his release was obtained by Haj Torres, the Foreign Commissioner in Tangier, but when he found that the Abd es-Sadoks had sequestrated his property, he vowed not to cut his hair till he had secured their disgrace. Hence, with locks that many a woman might envy, he has plotted and hara.s.sed till his present position has been achieved. But as this is only a means to an end, who can tell what that may be?

Rasuli is allowed on all hands to be a peculiarly able and well-bred man, full of resource and determination. Though his foes have succeeded in kidnapping even his mother, it will certainly be a miracle if he is taken alive. Should all fail him, he is prepared to blow his brains out, or make use of a small phial of poison always to hand. It is interesting to remember that just such a character, Abd Allah Ghalan, held a similar position in this district when Tangier was occupied by the English, who knew him as "Guyland," and paid him tribute. The more recent imitation of Rasuli's tactics by a native free-booter of the Ceuta frontier, in arresting two English officers as hostages wherewith to secure the release of his brother and others from prison, has proved equally successful, but as matters stand at present, it is more than doubtful whether the Moorish Government is in a position to bring either of these offenders to book, and the outlook in the north is decidedly stormy. It is, indeed, quite in accordance with the traditions of Moorish history, throughout which these periods of local disorganization have been of constant recurrence without danger to the State.

[Ill.u.s.tration: _Photograph by Dr. Rudduck._ THE KAD.

A MOORISH KAD AND ATTENDANTS.]

In the south things are quiet, though a spirit of unrest pervades the people, especially since it has been seen that the Sultan no longer either collects the regular taxes or maintains the regular army. There the immediate result of the failure to collect the taxes for a year or two was that the people had more to spend on cattle and other stock, which rapidly rose in price, no one needing to sell unless he wished.

Within the last two years, however, the kads have recommenced their oppressive treatment, under the pretext of a levy to put down the rising in the eastern provinces. Men and money were several times furnished, but though now more difficult to raise, the demands continue. The wonder is that the people remain so quiet, but they are of a more peaceable nature than the Berbers of the north.

Three of the Sultan's brothers have been for some time camped in as many centres, engaged in collecting funds, but tribe after tribe has refused to pay, declaring that they have been exempted by their lord, and until he returns they will submit to no kad and pay no dues. It is only in certain districts that some of the funds demanded have been forthcoming, and the kads have full authority, but these are officials of long standing and great repute, whose jurisdiction has been much extended in consequence. Changes among the less important kads have been continual of late. One man would buy the office and struggle to establish himself, only to find a new man installed over his head before he was settled, which has frequently led to local disorders, fighting and plundering. In this way the Government has quite lost prestige, and a strong hand is awaited.

The Moors would have preferred another Ismal the Bloodthirsty, who could compel his will, and awe all other rascals in his dominions, to the mild and well-intentioned youth now at the helm. Some would even welcome any change that would put an end to present insecurity, but only the French _proteges_ desire to see that change effected by France, and only those under the German flag already would hail that with joy. The Jews alone would welcome any, as they have good cause to do.

Such was already the condition of things when the long-threatening clouds burst, and the Anglo-French Agreement was published in April, 1904. Rumours of negotiations for the sale of British interests in Morocco to France had for some time filled the air, but in face of official denials, and the great esteem in which England was held by the Moors, few gave credence to them. Mulai Abd el Aziz had relied especially on Great Britain, and had confidently looked to it for protection against the French; the announcement of the bargain between them broke him down.

It may have been inevitable; and since an agreement among all the Powers concerned was so remote a possibility, an understanding between the three most interested may have been the wisest course, in view of pending internal troubles which would certainly afford excuses for interference. It was undoubtedly good policy on their part to decide who should inherit the vineyard, and on what terms, that conflict between them might be avoided. But on the unconsulted victim it came a cruel blow, unexpected and indefensible. It is important not to forget this.

But the one absorbing thought of all for nearly a year past has been the drought and consequent famine. Between November, 1904, and October, 1905, there was practically no rainfall over a large portion of the country, and agriculture being interfered with, grain rose to five times its normal price. Although relief has now come, it will be months before the cattle are in proper condition again, and not till after next year's harvest in May and June, should it prove a good one, will contentment be restored. Under such conditions, though more ready than ever to grumble, the people have had no heart to fight, which has, to some degree, a.s.sisted in keeping them quiet. The famine has, however, tried them sore, and only increased their exasperation.

Added to this, the general feeling of dissatisfaction regarding the Sultan's foreign predilections, and the slumbering fanaticism of the "learned" cla.s.s, there is now a chronic lack of funds. The money which should have been raised by taxation has been borrowed abroad and ruthlessly scattered. Fortunes have been made by foreigners and natives alike, but the Sultan is all but bankrupt. Yet never was his entourage so rich, though many who to-day hold houses and lands were a few years ago penniless.

As for the future, for many years the only answer possible to tediously frequent inquiries as to what was going to happen in Morocco has been that the future of the Shareefian Empire depended entirely on what might happen in Europe, not to any degree on its own internal condition. The only way in which this could affect the issue was by affording an excuse for outside interference, as in the present case.

Corrupt as the native administration may be, it is but the expression of a corrupt population, and no native government, even in Europe, is ever far in advance of those over whom it rules. In spite, too, of the pressure of injustice on the individual here and there, the victim of to-day becomes the oppressor of to-morrow, and such opportunities are not to be surrendered without a protest. The vast majority is, therefore, always in favour of present conditions, and would rather the chances of internecine strife than an exotic peace. No foreign ruler, however benign, would be welcome, and no "penetration," however "pacific," but will be endured and resented as a hostile wound. Even the announcement of the Anglo-French Agreement was sufficient to gravely accentuate the disorders of the country, and threaten immediate complications with Europe, by provoking attacks on Europeans who had hitherto been safe from interference save under exceptional circ.u.mstances. A good deal of the present unrest is attributable to this cause alone.

It is, therefore, a matter of deep regret that the one possible remedy--joint action of the Powers in policing the Moors, as it were, by demanding essential reforms in return for a united guarantee of territorial integrity--was rendered impossible by the rivalries between those Powers, especially on the part of France. Great Britain's step aside has made possible the only alternative, the surrender of the coveted task to one of their number, in return for such _quid pro quo_ as each could obtain. Had the second-cla.s.s Powers been bargained with first, not only would they have secured substantial terms, which now it is no use their asking, but the leading Powers could have held out for terms yet undreamed of.

France did well to begin with Great Britain, but it was an egregious diplomatic error to overlook Germany, which was thereby promoted to the hitherto unhoped-for position of "next friend" and trusted adviser of Morocco. Up to that point Germany had played a waiting game so patiently that France fell into the trap, and gave her all she wanted.

It is inconceivable how the astute politicians of the Quai d'Orsay committed such a blunder, save on the a.s.sumption that they were so carried away by the ease with which they had settled with Great Britain, that they forgot all other precautions--unless it was that they feared to jeopardize the conclusion of the main bargain by delay in discussing any subsidiary point.

When the Agreement was made known, the writer pointed out in the _Westminster Review_, that, "Portugal, Italy and Austria have but to acquiesce and rest a.s.sured of the 'most favoured nation' treatment, as will all the other Powers save one. That one, of course, is Germany, _whose sole interest in Morocco is the possibility of placing a drag on France_. She will have to be dealt with. Having disposed of England, which had real interests at stake, in the command of the straits and the maintenance of Gibraltar, France should be able to accomplish this as well. Five and twenty years ago Germany had not even a commercial interest in Morocco. Great Britain did three-fourths of the trade, or more, France about a tenth, Spain and others dividing the crumbs between them. But an active commercial policy--by the encouragement and support of young firms in a way that made Britishers envious, and abusive of their own Foreign Office--has secured for Germany a growing share of the trade, till now she stands next to Great Britain, whose share is reduced to one-half."[24]

[24: It is curious, indeed, how little the German Empire or its component States figure in the history of diplomatic relations with Morocco. One has to go back to the time of Rudolf II., in 1604, to find an active policy in force with regard to Moroccan affairs, when that remarkable adventurer or international diplomatist, Sir Anthony Sherley, was accredited to Abd el Aziz III., the last of the Moorish rulers to bear the same name as the present one. This intrepid soldier, a man after the Kaiser's own heart, had been accredited to Germany by the great Shah of Persia, Abbas, whose confidence he had won to a marvellous degree, and he appears to have made as great an impression on Rudolf, who sent him as his envoy to Morocco. Arrived there, he astonished the natives by coolly riding into the court of audience--a privilege still reserved to the Sultan alone. But the Ameer, as he was called in those days, was too politic or too polite to raise the question, only taking care that the next time the "dog of a Christian" should find a chain stretched across the gateway. This Sir Anthony could not brook, so rode back threatening to break off negotiations, and it affords a striking lesson as to the right way of dealing with orientals, that even in those days the Moors should have yielded and imprisoned the porter, permitting Sir Anthony's entrance on horseback thereafter. The treaty he came to negotiate was concluded, and relations with the Germans were established on a right footing, but they have been little in evidence till recent years.]

After all, the interests of Germany in Morocco were but a trifling consideration, meaning much less to her than ours do to us, and it was evident that whatever position she might a.s.sume, however she might bl.u.s.ter, she, too, had her price. This not being perceived by the ill-informed Press of this country, the prey of political journalists in Paris, Cologne and Madrid--more recently even of Washington, whence the delusive reports are now re-echoed with alarming reverberations--there was heated talk of war, and everything that newspapers could do to bring it about was done. Even a private visit of the Kaiser to Tangier, the only important feature of which was the stir made about it, was utilized to fan the flame. However theatrical some of the political actions of Wilhelm II. may have been, here was a case in which, directly he perceived the capital being made of his visit, he curtailed it to express his disapprobation. It was in Tangier Bay that he received the newspaper cuttings on the subject, and although the visit was to have extended in any case but to a few hours, he at once decided not to land. It was only when it was urged upon him what disappointment this would cause to its thirty thousand inhabitants and visitors for the occasion, that he consented to pay one short visit to his Legation, abandoning the more important part of the programme, which included a climb to the citadel and an interchange of visits with a kinsman of the Sultan. Nothing more could have been done to emphasize the private nature of the visit, in reality of no greater moment than that of King Edward to Algeria almost at the same time.

Neither such a personal visit, nor any other action should have been required to remind Great Britain and France that they and Spain alone were affected by their agreements, and that not even official notification to Morocco or the other Powers could restrict their perfect liberty of action. When, therefore, the distracted Sultan turned to Germany as the most influential Power still faithful to its undertakings, the response of Germany was perfectly correct, as was his own action. But Germany, although prepared to meet him with a smile, and not averse to receiving crumbs in the form of concessions, had no more intention of embroiling herself on his behalf than Great Britain. Extraordinary rumours, however, pervaded the country, and the idea of German intervention was hailed with delight; now general disappointment is felt, and Germany is cla.s.sed with England among the traitors.

Mulai Abd el Aziz had but one resource, to propose another conference of the Powers, a.s.sured that France and Germany would never come to an understanding, and that this would at least ward off the fatal day indefinitely. Yet now that France and Germany have agreed, it is probable that this step is regretted, and that, since the two have acted in concert, the Moorish Court has been at its wits' ends; it would now regard as a G.o.d-send anything which might prevent the conference from being held, lest it should strengthen the accord among its enemies, and weaken its own position.

The diplomatic negotiations between Fez, Berlin, and Paris have been of a character normal under the circ.u.mstances; and as the bickerings and insinuations which accompanied them were foreign to Morocco, the Sultan's invitation only serving as an opportunity for arriving at an understanding, they need not be dwelt on here. It is the French Press which has stirred up the commotion, and has misled the British Public into the belief that there has been some "Morocco Tangle." The facts are simply these: since 1880, the date of the Madrid Convention regarding the vexed question of foreign rights of protecting natives and holding property in Morocco, all nations concerned have been placed on an equal footing in their dealings with that country. The "most favoured nation" clause has secured for all the advantages gained by any in its special treaties. Nothing has since occurred to destroy this situation. In asking his "friends" to meet again in conference now, the Sultan acted wisely and within his rights. The fact that any two or three of them may have agreed to give one of their number a "free hand," should it suit her purposes to upset the _status quo_, does not theoretically affect the position, though it has suggested the advisability of further discussion. It is only in virtue of their combined might that the Powers in question are enabled to a.s.sume the position they do.

Spain, the only power with interests in Morocco other than commercial, had been settled with by a subsequent agreement in October, 1904, for she had been consulted in time. Special clauses dealing with her claims to consideration had even been inserted in the Anglo-French Agreement--

Art. VII. "This arrangement does not apply to the points now occupied by Spain on the Moorish sh.o.r.e of the Mediterranean.

Art. VIII. "The two Governments, animated by their sincerely friendly sentiments for Spain, take into particular consideration the interests she possesses, owing to her geographical position and to her territorial possessions on the Moorish sh.o.r.e of the Mediterranean, in regard to which the French Government will make some arrangement with the Spanish Government ... (which) will be communicated to the Government of His Britannic Majesty."

These Articles apply to Ceuta, which Spain withheld from the Portuguese after the brief union of the crowns in the sixteenth century; to Velez, an absolutely worthless rock, captured in 1564 by Garcia de Toledo with fifteen thousand men, the abandonment of which has more than once been seriously urged in Spain; to Alhucemas, a small island occupied in 1673; to Melilla, a huge rock peninsula captured, on his own account, by Medina Sidonia in 1497; and to the Zaffarine (or Saffron) Islands, only one of which is used, in the seizure of which the French were cleverly forestalled in 1848. All are convict stations; unless heavily fortified in a manner that at present they are not, they would not be of sufficient value to tempt even a foe of Spain. Ceuta and Melilla alone are worthy of consideration, and the former is the only one it might ever pay to fortify.

So far have matters gone. The conference asked for by Morocco--the flesh thrown to the wolves--is to form the next Act. To this conference the unfortunate Sultan would like to appeal for protection against the now "free hand" of France, but in consenting to discuss matters at all, she and her ally have, of course, stipulated that what has been done without reference to treaty shall not be treated of, if they are to take part, and as an act of courtesy to us, the United States has followed suit. Other matters of importance which Mulai Abd el Aziz desired to discuss have also been ruled out beforehand, so that only minor questions are to be dealt with, hardly worth the trouble of meeting.

Foremost among these is the replenishing of the Moorish exchequer by further loans, which might more easily have been arranged without a conference. Indeed, there are so many money-lenders anxious to finance Morocco on satisfactory terms, that the compet.i.tion among them has almost degenerated into a scramble. But all want some direct guarantee through their Governments, which introduces the political element, as in return for such guarantee each Power desires to increase its interests or privileges. Thus, while each financier holds out his gold-bags temptingly before the Sultan, elbowing aside his rival, each demands as surety the endors.e.m.e.nt of his Government, the price of which the Sultan is hardly prepared to pay. He probably hopes that by appealing to them all in conference, he will obtain a joint guarantee on less onerous terms, without affording any one of them a foothold in his country, should he be unable to discharge his obligations. He is wise, and but for the difficulties caused by the defection of England and France from the political circle, this request for money might alone have sufficed to introduce a reformed _regime_ under the joint auspices of all. As it is, attempts to raise funds elsewhere, even to discharge the current interest, having failed, his French creditors, who do possess the support of their Government, have obligingly added interest to capital, and with official sanction continue to roll the s...o...b..ll destined one day to overwhelm the State. In the eyes of the Moors this is nothing less than a bill-of-sale on the Empire.

A second point named by the Sultan for submission to the conference is the urgency of submitting all inhabitants of the country without distinction to the reformed taxation; a reasonable demand if the taxes were reasonable and justly a.s.sessed, but who can say at present that they are either? The exchequer is undoubtedly defrauded of large sums by the exemptions enjoyed by foreigners and their _proteges_, on account of the way in which these privileges are abused, while, to begin with, the system itself is unfair to the native. Here again is an excellent lever for securing reforms by co-operation. Let the Sultan understand that the sole condition on which such a privilege can be abandoned is the reform of his whole fiscal and judicial systems, and that this effected to the satisfaction of the Powers, these privileges will be abandoned. Nothing could do more to promote the internal peace and welfare of Morocco than this point rightly handled.

A third demand, the abolition of foreign postal services in his country, may appear to many curious and insignificant, but the circ.u.mstances are peculiar. Twenty years ago, when I first knew Morocco, there were no means of transmitting correspondence up country save by intermittent couriers despatched by merchants, whom one had to hunt up at the _cafes_ in which they reposed. On arrival the bundle of letters was carried round to likely recipients for them to select their own in the most hap-hazard way. Things were hardly more formal at the ports at which eagerly awaited letters and papers arrived by sea. These were carried free from Gibraltar, and delivered on application at the various consular offices.

At one time the Moorish Government maintained unsatisfactory courier services between two or three of the towns, but issued no stamps, the receipt for the courier's payment being of the nature of a postmark, stamped at the office, which, though little known to collectors, is the only genuine and really valuable Moorish postage stamp obtainable.

All other so-called Morocco stamps were issued by private individuals, who later on ran couriers between some two Moorish towns, their income being chiefly derived from the sale of stamps to collectors. Some were either entirely bogus services, or only a few couriers were run to save appearances. Stamps of all kinds were sold at face value, postmarked or not to order, and as the issues were from time to time changed, the profits were steady and good. The case was in some ways a.n.a.logous to that of the Yangtse and other treaty ports of China, where I found every consul's wife engaged in designing local issues, sometimes of not inconsiderable merit. In Morocco quite a circle of stamp-dealers sprang up, mostly sharp Jewish lads--though not a few foreign officials contracted the fever, and some time ago a stamp journal began to be issued in Tangier to promote the sale of issues which otherwise would not have been heard of.

Now all is changed; Great Britain, France, Spain and Germany maintain head postal offices in Tangier, the British being subject to that of Gibraltar, whose stamps are used. All have courier services down the coast, as well as despatching by steamer, and some maintain inland mails conveyed by runners. The distance from Tangier to Fez, some hundred and fifty miles, is covered by one man on foot in about three days and a half, and the forty miles' run from Tangier to Tetuan is done in a night for a dollar, now less than three shillings.

But a more enlightened Sultan sees the advantage it would be to him, if not to all parties, to control the distribution of the growing correspondence of both Europeans and natives, the latter of whom prefer to register their letters, having very little faith in their despatch without a receipt. And as Mulai Abd el Aziz is willing to join the Postal Union, provided that the service is placed in efficient European hands there is no reason why it should not be united in one office, and facilities thereby increased.

France, however, in joining the conference, has quite another end in view than helping others to bolster up the present administration, and that is to obtain a formal recognition by all concerned, including Morocco, of the new position created by her agreement with Great Britain. That is to say, without permitting her action to be questioned in any way, she hopes to secure some show of right to what at present she possesses only by the might of herself and her friends.

She has already agreed with Germany to recognize her special claim for permission to "police" the Morocco-Algerian frontier, and those who recall the appropriation of Tunisia will remember that it originated in "policing" the Khomar--known to the French as "Kroumirs"--on the Tunisian frontier of Algeria.

It is, indeed, a curious spectacle, a group of butchers around the unfortunate victim, talking philanthropy, practising guile: two of the strongest have at last agreed between themselves which is to have the carcase, but preparations for the "pacific" death-thrust are delayed by frantic appeals for further consultation, and by the refusal of one of their number who had been ignored to recognize the bargain.

Consultation is only agreed to on conditions which must defeat its object, and terms are arranged with the intervener. Everything, therefore, is clear for the operation; the tender-hearted are soothed by promises that though the "penetration" cannot but be painful, it shall at least not be hostile; while in order that the contumacious may hereafter hold their peace, the consultation is to result in a formal but carefully worded death-warrant.

Meanwhile it is worth while recalling the essential features of the Madrid Convention of 1880, mainly due to French claims for special privileges in protecting natives, or in giving them the rights of French citizens. This was summoned by Spain at the suggestion of Great Britain, with the concurrence of Morocco. Holland, Sweden and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, France, Germany, the United States, Italy, Brazil, and Austria-Hungary accepted the invitation in the order named, but Brazil was ultimately unrepresented. Russia was also invited as an after-thought, but did not consider it worth while accepting. The scope of the conference was limited to the subject of foreign protection, though the question of property was by mutual consent included.

The representatives of the conferring Powers accredited to the Spanish Court were nominated as members--the English Plenipotentiary acting for Denmark--as it was felt that those accredited to Morocco already held too decided views of the matter. The Moorish Foreign Minister attended on behalf of Morocco, and Senor Canovas, President of the Council, represented Spain. Seventeen meetings were held, under the presidency of Senor Canovas, between May 19 and July 3, the last being purely formal. The Convention then signed contained little that was new, but it re-stated clearly and harmonized with satisfactory results rights previously granted to one and another. In several particulars, however, its provisions are faulty, and experience of their working has long led to demands for revision, but conflicting interests, and fears of opening up larger issues, have caused this to be postponed.

Now that the time has arrived for a re-definition of the whole position and rights of foreigners and their Governments in Morocco, it is earnestly to be hoped that the opportunity may not be lost. The great fault of the Madrid Convention is that while it recognizes the right of foreigners to acquire land in Morocco, it stipulates for the previous consent of the native authorities, which is only to be obtained, if at all, by liberal "presents." But the most pressing need is the establishment of an international tribunal for the trial of cases involving more than one nationality, to replace the present anarchy, resulting from the conflict in one case of any of the thirteen independent jurisdictions at present in force in Morocco.

Such a measure would be an outcome of more value than all possible agreements to respect the independence and integrity of Morocco till it suited the purpose of one party or another to encroach thereon.

In lands knowing but one jurisdiction it is hard to conceive the abuses and defeats of justice which result from the confusion reigning in Morocco, or those which existed in Egypt previous to the establishment of international tribunals there. For instance, plaintiff, of nationality A., sues defendants, of nationalities B., C., and D., for the return of goods which they have forcibly carried off, on the ground that they were pledged to them by a party of nationality E., who disputes their claim, and declares the goods sold to original plaintiff. Here are five jurisdictions involved, each with a different set of laws, so that during the three separate actions necessitated, although the three defendants have all acted alike and together, the judgment in the case of each may be different, _e.g._ case under law B. dismissed, that under law C. won by plaintiff, while law D. might recognize the defendants' claim, but condemn his action.

Needless to follow such intricacies further, though this is by no means an extreme case, for disputes are constantly occurring--to say nothing of criminal actions--involving the several consular courts, for the most part presided over by men unequipped by legal training, in which it is a practical impossibility for justice to be done to all, and time and money are needlessly wasted.

x.x.xI

FRANCE IN MOROCCO

"Who stands long enough at the door is sure to enter at last."