Shortly afterwards he writes to Lord Grey:--

It is not for me to dispute the point with free-traders, when they allege that all parts of the Empire are suffering from the effects of free-trade, and that Canadians must take their chance with others. But I must be permitted to remark, that the Canadian case differs from others, both as respects the immediate cause of the suffering, and still more as respects the means which the sufferers possess of finding for themselves a way of escape. As to the former point I have only to say that, however severe the pressure in other cases attendant on the transition from protection to free-trade, there is none which presents so peculiar a specimen of legislative legerdemain as the Canadian, where an interest was created in 1843 by a Parliament in which the parties affected had no voice, only to be knocked down by the same Parliament in 1846. But it is the latter consideration which const.i.tutes the specialty of the Canadian case. What in point of fact _can_ the other suffering interests, of which the _Times_ writes, do? There may be a great deal of grumbling, and a gradual move towards republicanism, or even communism; but this is an operose and empirical process, the parties engaged in it are full of misgivings, and their ranks at every step in advance are thinned by desertion. Not so with the Canadians. The remedy offered to them, such as it is, is perfectly definite and intelligible. They are invited to form a part of a community, which is neither suffering nor free- trading, which never makes a bargain without getting at least twice as much as it gives; a community, the members of which have been within the last few weeks pouring into their multifarious places of worship, to thank G.o.d that they are exempt from the ills which afflict other men, from those more especially which afflict their despised neighbours, the inhabitants of North America, who have remained faithful to the country which planted them.

Now, I believe, that if these facts be ignored, it is quite impossible to understand rightly the present state of opinion in Canada, or to determine wisely the course which the British Government and Parliament ought to pursue. It may suit the policy of the English free-trade press to represent the difficulties of Canada as the consequence of having a fool for a Governor-General; but, if it be permitted me to express an opinion on a matter of so much delicacy, I venture to doubt whether it would be safe to act on this hypothesis.

My conviction on the contrary is, that motives of self-interest of a very gross and palpable description are suggesting treasonable courses to the Canadian mind at present, and that it is a political sentiment, a feeling of grat.i.tude for what has been done and suffered this year in the cause of Canadian self-government, which is neutralising these suggestions.

Again, on December 29,1849, he writes as follows:--

[Sidenote: Free navigation.]

I believe that the operation of the free navigation system will be what you antic.i.p.ate, to a great extent at least, and that it will tend materially to equalise prices on the two sides of the line. At the same time I do think, that there are circ.u.mstances in this country which falsify, in some degree, the deductions at which one arrives from reasoning founded on the abstract principles of political economy. One of these circ.u.mstances is the power which the farmers in the Western States, having no rents to pay, have of holding back their grain when prices do not suit them. You must have observed what h.o.a.rds they poured forth when they were tempted by the famine prices of 1847; and I cannot but think that this power of h.o.a.rding, coupled with an indifferent harvest, must account for the great disparity of price, which has obtained during the course of the present year in the New York market for bonded grain, and grain for the home consumption. I fully expect, however, to see the price of Canadian grain, bonded at New York, rise, now that it can be exported to Liverpool in the New York liners, which will carry it for ballast. Nevertheless, I think that Sir Robert Peel's _dictum_ with respect to the Repeal of the Corn Laws, on the day on which he retired last from office, when he observed that thenceforward, even when the poor suffered from the high price of bread, they would not ascribe that suffering to the fact of their bread being taxed, applies with at least equal force to the reciprocity question as affecting the Canadian farmers. For sure am I that, so long as there is a duty on their produce when it enters the States, and none on the introduction of United States produce into England, they will ascribe to this cause alone the differences of price that may occasionally rule to their disadvantage.

The history of the two measures which Lord Elgin so ardently desired, and which in the foregoing and many similar letters he so urgently pressed, was eminently characteristic of the two Legislatures, through which they had respectively to be carried.

[Sidenote: Repeal of Navigation Laws.]

In England, the repeal of restrictive Navigation Laws was contended for by thoughtful statesmen on grounds of public policy. The protective and conservative instincts of the old country, fortified by the never-absent spirit of party, resisted the change. When fairly beaten by force of argument in the House of Commons, they entrenched themselves ha the House of Lords; and it was only after a hot struggle that the Act was pa.s.sed in June 1849, of which one effect was, by lowering freights, to increase the profits of the Canadian trade in wheat and timber, and thus to advance, in a very important degree, the commercial prosperity of the colony.

[Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaty.]

The delays which r.e.t.a.r.ded the settlement of the Reciprocity Treaty were due to causes of another kind. The difficulty was to induce the American Congress to pay any attention at all to the subject. In the vast multiplicity of matters with which that a.s.sembly has to deal, it is said that no cause which does not appeal strongly to a national sentiment, or at least to some party feeling, has a chance of obtaining a hearing, unless it is taken up systematically by 'organizers' outside the House. The Reciprocity Bill was not a measure about which any national or even party feeling could be aroused. It was one which required much study to understand its bearings, and which would affect different interests in the country in different ways. It stood, therefore, especially in need of the aid of professional organizers; a kind of aid of which it was of course impossible that either the British or the Canadian Government should avail itself. Session after session the Bill was proposed, scarcely debated, and set aside. At last, in 1854, after the negotiations had dragged on wearily for more than six years, Lord Elgin himself was sent to Washington in the hope--'a forlorn hope,' as it seemed to those who sent him--of bringing the matter to a successful issue. It was his first essay in diplomacy, but made under circ.u.mstances unusually favourable. He was personally popular with the Americans, towards whom he had always entertained and shown a most friendly feeling. They appreciated, moreover, better perhaps than it was appreciated at home, the consummate ability, as well as the rare strength of character, which he had displayed in the government of Canada; and the prestige thus attaching to his name, joined to the influence of his presence, and his courtesy and _bonhomie_, enabled him in a few days to smooth all difficulties, and change apathy into enthusiasm. Within a few weeks from the time of his landing he had agreed with Mr. Marcy upon the terms of a Treaty of Reciprocity, which soon afterwards received the sanction of all the Governments concerned.

The main concessions made by the Provinces to the United States in this treaty were, (1) the removal of duties on the introduction, for consumption in the Provinces, of certain products of the States; (2) the admission of citizens of that country to the enjoyment of the in-sh.o.r.e sea-fishery; (3) the opening-up to their vessels of the St. Lawrence and ca.n.a.ls pertaining thereto.

A good deal of misconception prevailed at the time as to the amount of the concession made under the second head. The popular impression on this point was, that a gigantic monopoly was about to be surrendered; but this was far from being the case. The citizens of the United States had already, under the Convention of 1818, access to the most important cod-fisheries on the British coasts. The new treaty maintained in favour of British subjects the monopoly of the river and freshwater fisheries; and the concession which it made to the citizens of the United States amounted in substance to this, that it admitted them to a legal partic.i.p.ation in the mackerel and herring fisheries, from illegal encroachments on which it had been found, after the experience of many years, practically impossible to exclude them.[3]

The duration of the Treaty was limited to ten years, and has not been extended; but it is not too much to hope that it has had some effect in engendering feelings of friendliness, and of community of interest, which may long outlast itself.

[Sidenote: Views of Government.]

It has been already noticed that the 'annexation movement' of 1849 died away without serious consequences; and extracts which have been given above sufficiently show to what cause Lord Elgin attributed its extinction. The powerful attraction of the great neighbouring republic had been counteracted and overcome by the more powerful attraction of self- government at home. The centrifugal force was no longer equal to the centripetal. To create this state of feeling had been his most cherished desire; to feel that he had succeeded in creating it was, throughout much obloquy and misunderstanding, his greatest support.

[Sidenote: Duty of supporting authority,]

From the earliest period of his entrance into political life he had always had the strongest sense of the duty inc.u.mbent on every public man of supporting, even in opposition, the authority of Government. The bitterest reproach which he cast upon the Whigs, in his first Tory 'Letter to the Electors of Great Britain' in 1835, was that when they found they could not carry on the government themselves, they tried to make it impossible for any other party to do so. Nor was he less severe, on another occasion, in his reprehension of 'a certain high Tory clique who are always cavilling at royalty when it is const.i.tutional; circulating the most miserable gossip about royal persons and royal entertainments,' &c.; busily 'engaged in undermining the foundations on which respect for human inst.i.tutions rests.'

Writing, in May 1850, to Mr. Gumming Bruce, a Tory and Protectionist, he said--

I shall not despair for England whether Free-traders or Protectionists be in the ascendant, unless I see that the faction out of power abet the endeavours of those who would make the Government of the country contemptible. Read Montalembert's speeches. They are very eloquent and instructive. He had as full a faith in his religion, and what he considered due to his religion, as you can have in your Corn Laws. Yet observe how bitterly he now repents having aided those who have undermined in the French public all respect for authority and the powers that be.

If all that your Protectionist friends want to do is to put themselves, or persons in whom they have greater confidence than the present Ministry, in office, their object is, I confess, a perfectly legitimate one. What I complain of is the system of what is termed damaging the Government, when resorted to by those who have no such purpose in view; or at least no honest intention of a.s.suming responsibilities which they are endeavouring to render intolerable to those who are charged with them.

[Sidenote: especially in Colonies.]

But if this 'political profligacy' was, in his judgment, the bane of party government at home, a still stronger but, perhaps, more excusable tendency to it threatened to defeat the object of responsible government in Canada.

Accustomed to look abroad for the source and centre of power, a beaten minority in the Colonial Parliament, instead of loyally accepting its position, was never without a hope of wresting the victory from its opponents, either by an appeal to opinion in the mother-country, always ill-informed, and therefore credulous, in matters of colonial politics, or else by raising a cry of 'separation' or 'annexation.'

The evil effects of this state of things need hardly be pointed out. On the one hand the constant reference to opinion in England, not in the shape of const.i.tutional appeal but by ex-parte statements, produced a state of chronic irritation against the mother-country. 'There is nothing,' wrote Lord Elgin, 'which makes the colonial statesman so jealous as rescripts from the Colonial Office, suggested by the representations of provincial cliques or interests, who ought, as he contends, to bow before the authorities of Government House, Montreal, rather than those of Downing Street.' On the other hand it was not easy to know how to deal with politicians who did not profess to own more than a qualified and provisional allegiance to the const.i.tution of the Province and the Crown of England. The one hope in both cases was to foster a 'national and manly tone' of political morals; to lead all parties alike to look to their own Parliament, and neither to the London press nor the American hustings, for the solution of all problems of Provincial government.

But while thus zealously defending, the fortress of British connection committed to his care, Lord Elgin was dismayed to find that its walls were crumbling round him? undermined by the operations of his own Mends; that there had arisen at home a school of philosophic statesmen, strong in their own ability, and strengthened by the support of the Radical economists, according to whom it was to be expected and desired that every colony enjoying const.i.tutional government should aim at emanc.i.p.ating itself entirely from allegiance to the mother-country, and forming itself into an independent Republic. With such views he had no sympathy. The 'Sparta'

which had fallen to his lot was the position of a colonial governor, and that position he felt it his duty to 'adorn' and to maintain. Moreover, believing firmly in the vitality of the monarchical principle, as well as in its value, he contended that it is an error to suppose that a const.i.tutional monarchy, in proportion as it becomes more liberal, tends towards republicanism; and further, that if such tendency existed it would be retrograde rather than progressive.

The views of Colonial Government, its objects and its difficulties, which have been here briefly epitomised, are displayed in full in the following letters, together with a variety of opinions on kindred topics. They are given as characteristic of Lord Elgin; but they may, perhaps, have an interest of their own, as bearing on important questions which still await solution.

_To the Earl Grey._

November 16,1849.

[Sidenote: Maintenance of British connection.]

Very much, as respects the result of this annexation movement, depends upon what you do at home. I cannot say what the effect may be if the British Government and press are lukewarm on the subject. The annexationists will take heart, but in a tenfold greater degree the friends of the connection will be discouraged. If it be admitted that separation _must_ take place, sooner or later, the argument in favour of a present move seems to be almost irresistible. I am prepared to contend that with responsible government, fairly worked out with free-trade, there is no reason why the colonial relation should not be indefinitely maintained. But look at my present difficulty, which may be increased beyond calculation, if indiscreet expressions be made use of during the present crisis. The English Government thought it necessary, in order to give moral support to their representative in Ireland, to a.s.sert in the most solemn manner that the Crown never would consent to the severance of the Union; although, according to the O'Connell doctrine, the allegiance to the Crown of the Irish was to be unimpaired notwithstanding such severance. But when I protest against Canadian projects for dismembering the empire, I am always told 'the most eminent statesmen in England have over and over again told us, that whenever we chose we might separate. Why, then, blame us for discussing the subject?'

_To the Earl Grey._

January 14,1850.

[Sidenote: Colonial interests the sport of home parties.]

I am certainly less sanguine than I was as to the probability of retaining the colonies under free-trade. I speak not now of the cost of their retention, for I have no doubt but that, if all parties concerned were honest, expenses might be gradually reduced. I am sure also that when free-trade is fairly in operation it will be found that more has been gained by removing the causes of irritation which were furnished by the constant _tinkering_ incident to a protective system, than has been lost by severing the bonds by which it tied the mother-country and the colonies together. What I fear is, that when the mystification in which certain questions of self-interest were involved by protection is removed, factions both at home and in the colonies will be more reckless than ever in hazarding for party objects the loss of the colonies.[4] Our system depends a great deal more on the discretion with which it is worked than the American, where each power in the state goes habitually the full length of its tether: Congress, the State legislatures, Presidents, Governors, all legislating and _vetoing_, without stint or limit, till pulled up short by a judgment of the Supreme Court. With us factions in the colonies are clamorous and violent, with the hope of producing effect on the Imperial Parliament and Government, just in proportion to their powerlessness at home. The history of Canada during the past year furnishes ample evidence of this truth. Why was there so much violence on the part of the opposition here last summer, particularly against the Governor-General? Because it felt itself to be weak in the province, and looked for success to the effect it could produce in England alone.

And how is this tendency to bring the Imperial and Local Parliaments into antagonism, a tendency so dangerous to the permanence of our system, to be counteracted? By one expedient as it appears to me only; namely, by the Governor's acting with some a.s.sumption of responsibility, so that the shafts of the enemy, which are intended for the Imperial Government, may fall on him. If a line of demarcation between the questions with which the Local Parliaments can deal and those which are reserved for the Imperial authority could be drawn, (as was recommended last session by the Radicals), it might be different; but, as it is, I see nothing for it but that the Governors should be responsible for the share which the Imperial Government may have in the policy carried out in the responsible-government colonies, with the liability to be recalled and disavowed whenever the Imperial authorities think it expedient to repudiate such policy.

_To the Duke of Newcastle._

Quebec: February 18, 1853.

[Sidenote: Distribution of honours.]

Now that the bonds formed by commercial protection and the disposal of local offices are severed, it is very desirable that the prerogative of the Crown, as the fountain of honour, should be employed, in so far as this can properly be done, as a means of attaching the outlying parts of the empire to the throne. Of the soundness of this proposition as a general principle no doubt can, I presume, be entertained. It is not, indeed, always easy to apply it in these communities, where fortunes are precarious, the social system so much based on equality, and public services so generally mixed up with party conflicts. But it should never, in my opinion, be lost sight of, and advantage should be taken of all favourable opportunities to act upon it.

There are two principles which ought, I think, as a general rule to be attended to in the distribution of Imperial honours among colonists.

Firstly, they should appear to emanate directly from the Crown, on the advice, if you will, of the Governors and Imperial Ministers, but not on the recommendation of the local executives. And, secondly, they should be conferred, as much as possible, on the eminent persons who are no longer actively engaged in political life. If these principles be neglected, such distinctions will, I fear, soon lose their value.

_To the Earl Grey._

Toronto: March 23,1850.

[Sidenote: Speech of Lord J. Russell.]

[Sidenote: Colonial existence not provisional.]

Lord John's speech on the colonies seems to have been eminently successful at home. It is calculated too, I think, to do good in the colonies; but for one sentence, the introduction of which I deeply deplore--the sting in the tail. Alas for that sting in the tail! I much fear that when the liberal and enlightened sentiments, the enunciation of which by one so high in authority is so well calculated to make the colonists sensible of the advantages which they derive from their connection with Great Britain, shall have pa.s.sed away from their memories, there will not be wanting those who will remind them that, on this solemn occasion, the Prime Minister of England, amid the plaudits of a full senate, declared that he looked forward to the day when the ties which he was endeavouring to render so easy and mutually advantageous would be severed. And wherefore this foreboding? or, perhaps, I ought not to use the term foreboding, for really to judge by the comments of the press on this declaration of Lord John's, I should be led to imagine that the prospect of these sucking democracies, after they have drained their old mother's life-blood, leaving her in the lurch, and setting up as rivals, just at the time when their increasing strength might render them a support instead of a burden, is one of the most cheering which has of late presented itself to the English imagination. But wherefore then this antic.i.p.ation--if foreboding be not the correct term? Because Lord John and the people of England persist in a.s.suming that the Colonial relation is incompatible with maturity and full development. And is this really so incontestable a truth that it is a duty not only to hold but to proclaim it? Consider for a moment what is the effect of proclaiming it in our case. We have on this continent two great empires in presence, or rather, I should say, two great Imperial systems. In many respects there is much similarity between them. In so far as powers of self-government are concerned it is certain that our colonists in America have no reason to envy the citizens of any state in the Union. The forms differ, but it may be shown that practically the inhabitants of Canada have a greater power in controlling their own destiny than those of Michigan or New York, who must tolerate a tariff imposed by twenty other states, and pay the expenses of war undertaken for objects which they profess to abhor. And yet there is a difference between the two cases; a difference, in my humble judgment, of sentiment rather than substance, which renders the one a system of life and strength, and the other a system of death and decay. No matter how raw and rude a territory may be when it is admitted as a state into the Union of the United States, it is at once, by the popular belief, invested with all the dignity of manhood, and introduced into a system which, despite the combativeness of certain ardent spirits from the South, every American believes and maintains to be immortal. But how does the case stand with us? No matter how great the advance of a British colony in wealth and civilisation; no matter how absolute the powers of self-government conceded to it, it is still taught to believe that it is in a condition of pupilage from which it must pa.s.s before it can attain maturity. For one I have never been able to comprehend why, elastic as our const.i.tutional system is, we should not be able, now more especially when we have ceased to control the trade of our colonies, to render the links which bind them to the British Crown at least as lasting as those which unite the component parts of the Union.... One thing is, however, indispensable to the success of this or any other system of Colonial Government. You must renounce the habit of telling the Colonies that the Colonial is a provisional existence. You must allow them to believe that, without severing the bonds which unite them to Great Britain, they may attain the degree of perfection, and of social and political development, to which organised communities of free men have a right to aspire.

Since I began this letter I have, I regret to say, confirmatory evidence of the justice of the antic.i.p.ations I had formed of the probable effect of Lord John's declaration. I enclose extracts from two newspapers, an annexationist, the _Herald_ of Montreal, and a _quasi_ annexationist, the _Mirror_ of Toronto. You will note the use they make of it. I was more annoyed however, I confess, by what occurred yesterday in council. We had to determine whether or not to dismiss from his offices a gentleman who is both M.P.P., Q.C., and J.P., and who has issued a flaming manifesto in favour, not of annexation, but of an immediate declaration of independence as a step to it. I will not say anything of my own opinion on the case, but it was generally contended by the members of the Board, that it would be impossible to maintain that persons who had declared their intention to throw off their allegiance to the Queen, with a view to annexation, were unfit to retain offices granted during pleasure, if persons who made a similar declaration with a view to independence were to be differently dealt with. Baldwin had Lord John's speech in his hand. He is a man of singularly placid demeanour, but he has been seriously ill, so possibly his nerves are shaken--at any rate I never saw him so much moved. 'Have you read the latter part of Lord J. Russell's speech?' he said to me. I nodded a.s.sent. 'For myself,' he added, 'if the antic.i.p.ations therein expressed prove to be well founded, my interest in public affairs is gone for ever. But is it not hard upon us while we are labouring, through good and evil report, to thwart the designs of those who would dismember the Empire, that our adversaries should be informed that the difference between them and the Prime Minister of England is only one of time? If the British Government has really come to the conclusion that we are a burden to be cast off whenever a favourable opportunity offers, surely we ought to be warned.'