Calcutta, September 9th, 1862.

[Sidenote: Lord Canning's policy.]

A doubt naturally suggests itself as to whether the received notion respecting the relations which Canning sought to establish between the native chiefs and the British Government in India be altogether correct, or, (as it perhaps would be more accurate to say) altogether complete--whether, in short, that portion of it which was a policy of circ.u.mstance has been duly distinguished from that which was a policy of principle: a doubt by no means unimportant, now that this policy, whatever it be, is crowned by the double aureole of success and death; so that while, on the one hand, it is naturally set up as an example for imitation, on the other, we have not the author to refer to when difficulties arise respecting its application.

[Sidenote: (1) Clemency.]

In approaching the consideration of this very momentous question we must, in the first place, be careful lest we suffer ourselves to draw erroneous conclusions from the warm expressions of grat.i.tude and affection lavished upon Canning by the natives generally. If I were to venture to compare great things with small, I should say that their feelings towards him were due to causes somewhat similar to those which earned for me the good will and confidence of the French Canadians in Canada. Both he and I adopted on some important points views more favourable to the subject races than those which had been entertained by our respective predecessors. So far we established legitimate and substantial claims on their regard. But it was not so much the intrinsic merit of those views, still less was it the extent to which we acted upon them, which won for us the favour of those races; we owed that mainly to the uncompromising hostility, the bitter denunciations, and the unmeasured violence which the promulgation of those views provoked from those who were regarded by them as their oppressors. I used often to say to my Scotch friends in Lower Canada, when they were heaping every indignity upon me, and even resorting to open violence (for there they did not hold their hands off), 'You are playing my game. I want to win the confidence of the French Canadians; but I know the nature of that people: they are touchy and suspicious as races who feel that they are inferior, and believe that they are oppressed; invariably are. By measures of simple justice towards them (and beyond that line I do not intend to proceed an inch), I despair of being able to effect my object; but if you continue for a year to act as you are now acting, denouncing me as your enemy and their friend, and proving the sincerity of your belief by outrage and violence, you will end by convincing them that I am to be trusted, and I shall win the day.'--The result proved the accuracy of this prediction.

The feeling of the natives of India towards Canning was in some measure due to a similar cause. The clamour for blood and indiscriminate vengeance which raged around him, and the abuse poured upon him because he would not listen to it, imparted in their eyes to acts which carried justice to the verge of severity the grace of clemency.

[Sidenote: (2) Consideration for native chiefs.]

I could give you plenty of proofs of this.... The following sentences occur in a letter written from Delhi during our recent panic, by an officer.... 'The native force here is much too small to be a source of anxiety, and unless they take the initiative it is my opinion that there can be no important rising. The Mussulmans of Delhi are a contemptible race. Fanatics are very rare on this side of the Sutlej.

The terrors of that period when every man who had two enemies was sure to swing are not forgotten. The people declare that the work of Nadir Shah was as nothing to it. His executions were completed in twelve hours. But for months after the last fall of Delhi, no one was sure of his own life or of that of the being dearest to him for an hour.' The natives not unnaturally looked with grat.i.tude to the man who alone had the will and power to put an arrest on this course of proceeding, and to prevent its extension all over the land. No doubt, as I have said, Canning earned a substantial claim to the grat.i.tude of the native chiefs by adopting a more liberal and considerate policy towards them than that pursued by his predecessor. It was perhaps not surprising that he should have done so. Situated as we are in this country--a small minority ruling a vast population that differs from us in blood, civilisation, colour and religion, monopolising in our own territories all positions of high dignity and emolument, and exercising even over States ostensibly independent a paramount authority--it is manifest that the question of how we ought to treat that cla.s.s of natives who consider that they have a natural right to be leaders of men and to occupy the first places in India, must always be one of special difficulty. If you attempt to crush all superiorities, you unite the native populations in a h.o.m.ogeneous ma.s.s against you. If you foster pride of rank and position, you encourage pretensions which you cannot gratify, partly because you dare not abdicate your own functions as a paramount power, and, partly, because you cannot control the arrogance of your subjects of the dominant race. Scindiah and Holkar are faithful to us just in proportion as they are weak, and conscious that they require our aid to support them against their own subjects or neighbours: and among the bitterest of our foes during the Mutiny were natives who had been courted in England.... Canning saw the evils which the crushing policy of his predecessor was entailing, and he reversed it. It was a happily timed change of policy. The rebellion broke out while it was yet recent; and no doubt, the hopes and gratification inspired by it had their effect in inducing a certain number of chiefs to pause and to require more conclusive proof that the British Raj was to kick the beam, before they cast their weight into the opposite scale of the balance.

After the rebellion was suppressed, the inducement to persevere in this line of policy was still more stringent. To grant to native Potentates who were trembling in their shoes, and ready to receive the boon on any terms which you might prescribe, the reversion of States which had become vacant because you had, of your own authority and mere motion, hanged their chiefs, and declared them to be escheated, was a wise, a graceful, and under the circ.u.mstances a perfectly safe policy. The same may be said of the measures taken to put the talookdars of Oude on their legs, and which were preceded by the confiscation of all their properties. I believe that this policy, like the policy of Clemency, was sound and right in principle; but in forming a just estimate of its success and of its applicability to all seasons and emergencies, it is necessary to take into account the specialities of the time to which I have referred.

[Sidenote: (3) a.s.sertion of British sovereignty.]

What then was the scope and extent of application which Canning in action was prepared to give to this policy? Here is the important question, and it is not altogether an easy one to answer. For like most wise administrators, Canning dealt with the concrete rather than the abstract, and it would not be difficult to cull from his decisions sentiments and sentences which seem to clash. When you meet with an individual ruling which appears not to tally with what you have a.s.sumed to be his general principles, you say it is 'unnatural.' This is one way out of the difficulty. But is it the right way? My own opinion is, that Canning never intended to let the chiefs get the bit into their mouths, or to lose his hold over them. It is true that he rode them with a loose rein, but the pace was so killing during the whole of his time, that it took the kick out of them, and a light hand and silken thread were all that was required. His policy of deference to the authority of native chiefs was a means to an end, the end being the establishment of the British Raj in India; and when the means and the end came into conflict, or seemed likely to do so, the former went to the wall. Even in the case of the chieftainship of Amjherra, he looked, as the Yankees say, 'ugly,' when Scindiah, having got what he wanted, showed a disposition to withhold the grants to loyal individuals which he had volunteered to make from the revenues of the chieftainship. It is true that the ostensible ground of Canning's dissatisfaction was the violation of a promise, but what t.i.tle had he to claim this promise, or to exact its fulfilment, if the escheat belonged as of right to Scindiah? Again, when I came to this country, I found that he was walking pretty smartly into a parcel of people in Central India who were getting up a little rebellion on their own account, a tempest in a teapot, not against us, but against their own native rulers. In this instance he interfered, no doubt, as head policeman and conservator of the peace of all India. But observe, if we lay down the rule that we will scrupulously respect the right of the chiefs to do wrong, and resolutely suppress all attempts of their subjects to redress their wrongs by violence, which, in the absence of help from us, is the only redress open to them, we may find perhaps that it may carry us somewhat far--possibly to annexation--the very bugbear from which we are seeking to escape. Holkar, for instance, unless common fame traduces him, has rather an itching for what Mr.

Laing calls 'hard rupees.' His subjects and dependents have decided, and not altogether unintelligible, objections to certain methods which he adopts for indulging this propensity. When they--those of them more especially who have Treaty claims to our protection, come to us to complain, and to ask our help--are we to say to them:--'We have too much respect for Holkar's independence to interfere. Bight or wrong you had better book up, for we are bound to keep the peace, and we shall certainly be down upon you if you kick up a row'? In the anomalous position which we occupy in India, it is surely necessary to propound with caution doctrines which, logically applied, land us in such dilemmas.

[Sidenote: Problems for a time of peace.]

At a future time, if I live, and remain here, it is possible that I may take the liberty of submitting to you some views of my own on these questions. It may perhaps turn out that a time of peace is better fitted than one of revolution for the discovery of the true theory according to which our relations with native States ought to be conducted; or, it may be, for the discovery that no theory can be framed sufficiently elastic to fit all those relations and the complications which arise out of them, and that, after all, we must in a great measure rely on the rule of common sense and of the thumb.

When the circ.u.mstances of the time are such that it is deemed right and proper to abrogate all law, and to establish over the land a reign of terror and of the sword--to pour out, in deference to the paramount claims of the safety of the state, public money, whether obtained from present taxation or the mortgage of posterity, with profusion absolutely uncontrolled--to decree confiscation on a scale of unprecedented magnitude; it is obvious that a reputation for clemency, economy, and respect for the native rights of property, is obtainable under conditions that are not strictly normal. If you want to ascertain whether your system will stand in all weathers, you must test it when the rule of law and order have replaced that of arbitrary will--when men present themselves, not as the scared recipients of bounty, but as the a.s.sertors of admitted rights. We shall see how far, in such piping times, it may be possible for the Governor-General to enforce on the British local authorities the claims of public economy, without resorting to any interference which can be supposed to militate against the hypothesis that the said authorities understand a great deal better than he does what their wants are, and how they ought to be supplied; or to maintain the peace of India without questioning the indefeasible t.i.tle of the native chiefs to do what they like with their own.

Meanwhile all I want as regards this matter is, to learn what Canning's policy really was, and to follow it out faithfully. It is neither fair to him nor to the cause, that we should misjudge its character by founding our estimate of it on a partial or incomplete induction.

_To Sir Charles Wood._

Calcutta, December 23rd, 1862.

[Sidenote: Consideration of the natives.]

As to consideration of the natives, I can only say that during a public service of twenty years I have always sided with the weaker party, and it is so strongly my instinct to do so, that I do not think the most stringent injunctions would force me into an opposite course of action. But I am quite sure that it is not true kindness to the weaker party, to give the stronger an excuse for using to the utmost the powers of coercion which they possess, by seeming to be unwilling to listen to any statement of grievances which they may desire to make, or to suspect their motives when they suggest remedies.... It is quite possible that such views as you instance may prevail to a considerable extent with our agitating people; but it is equally certain that many who join them would indignantly repudiate the imputation of being actuated by any motives of the kind. My study always is, to keep those who _profess_ moderate and reasonable views right, and to prevent them from going over arms and baggage to the enemy, by taking for granted that they mean what they profess, and, when they propose objectionable remedies, arguing against them on their own premises. Some, of course, would rather abandon their sound premises than their illogical conclusions, when they are driven in this way to the wall; but a large number come over to the right side when they find that the consideration of their alleged grievances is approached without any prepossession against them. Of course, this is all a matter of tact, and cannot be reduced to any definite formula.

But you speak of our Press as hopeless on some of these subjects. Have you observed the comparative mildness of its tone lately, notwithstanding the action of Government in the matter of the Waste Lands, and Contract Law? Does not that argue a better state of feeling in the European Community; and do not you think that it is for the benefit of the Ryots, that their interloping landlords should not be in a humour to employ vindictively the vast powers which, whether you disallow Contract Laws or not, they, as proprietors, possess over them?

[1] Vide _supra_, p. 329.

[2] It was sometimes complained that on these occasions he was so little communicative: drawing out the opinions of others, without expressing his own. But it requires very little reflection to see that this complaint is really a commendation.

[3] He died in London from the effects of a fever caught in the East.

CHAPTER XVI.

INDIA.

DUTY OF A GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO VISIT THE PROVINCES--PROGRESS TO THE NORTH- WEST--BENARES--SPEECH ON THE OPENING OF THE RAILWAY--CAWNPORE--GRAND DURBAR AT AGRA--DELHI--HURDWAR--ADDRESS TO THE SIKH CHIEFS AT UMBALLA-- KUSSOWLIE--SIMLA--LETTERS: SUPPLY OF LABOUR; SPECIAL LEGISLATION; MISSIONARY GATHERING; FINANCE; SEAT OF GOVERNMENT; VALUE OF TRAINING AT HEAD-QUARTERS; ARISTOCRACIES; AGAINST INTERMEDDLING--THE SITANA FANATICS-- HIMALAYAS--ROTUNG Pa.s.s--TWIG BRIDGE--ILLNESS--DEATH--CHARACTERISTICS-- BURIAL PLACE.

[Sidenote: Duty of a Governor-General to visit the Provinces.]

At a very early period of his stay in India, Lord Elgin formed the opinion, which was indeed strongly impressed upon him by Lord Canning, that it was 'of the greatest importance to the public interest that the Governor- General should see as much as possible of men and things, in all parts of the vast empire under his control; and that a constant residence in the narrow atmosphere of Calcutta had a tendency to impair his efficiency.'

Writing to Sir C. Wood on the 17th of September, 1862, he said:--

No man can govern India in ordinary times, such as those in which we are living, if he is to be tied by the leg to Calcutta, and prevented from visiting other parts of the Empire. Canning, although he lived in times by no means ordinary, and although he was compelled by circ.u.mstances to be more stationary than he would otherwise have been, was as clear on this point as anyone. He urged me most strongly to proceed northwards at the earliest moment at which I could contrive to do so. When I referred to the difficulty which the a.s.sembling of the Council for legislative purposes might occasion, he a.s.sured me that he had never intended to make himself a slave of the Council; that he had taken the chair at the commencement of the proceedings, but that he should certainly have objected to the establishment of the principle that his presence was indispensable to its deliberations. He was especially anxious that I should tour, in order that I might satisfy myself as to how his arrangements affecting natives, &c., worked, before modifying them in any degree. And, apart from Canning's opinion altogether, this is a point on which I have had some personal experience. I have been now steadily in Calcutta for a whole hot season. No man, I venture to affirm, in the situation I occupy, has ever been more accessible to those who have anything to say, whether they be civilians, soldiers, or interlopers. But there is a blot on my escutcheon which can easily be hit by anyone dissatisfied with a judgment p.r.o.nounced in my name. It can always be said: "What does Lord Elgin know of India? He has never been out of Calcutta. He is acquainted only with Bengal civilians and other dwellers in (what is irreverently styled) 'the ditch.'" Indeed, I fear that I am exposed to the same reproach in your circle. I see no remedy for this evil, if I am to remain constantly here.

[Sidenote: Projected tour.]

Starting from these premises he came to the conclusion, that 'it was better to organise a tour on a comprehensive scale, even though it involved a long absence from Calcutta, than to attempt to hurry to distant places and back again during successive winters.' Accordingly, it was arranged that as soon as the business of the Legislative Council was concluded, he should start for the north, and travel by easy stages to Simla, visiting all the places which he ought to see on his way. After spending the hot weather at the Hills, he was to proceed early in the next winter to the Punjab, inspecting it thoroughly, and returning before the summer heats either to Simla again, or to Calcutta, as public business might determine. For the Session, if so it might be called, of 1863-4, he was to summon his councillors to meet him somewhere in the north-west, at some capital city, 'not a purely military station, but where the Council might obtain some knowledge of local and native feeling such as did not reach Calcutta.' The spot ultimately fixed upon was Lah.o.r.e, the capital of the large and loyal province of that name.

The earlier part of the tour was to be made chiefly by railway, with a comparatively small retinue; but for the latter part of it he was to be accompanied by a camp, furnished forth with all the pride, pomp, and circ.u.mstance belonging to the progress of an Eastern Monarch, and necessary therefore in order to produce the desired effect on the minds of the natives.

[Sidenote: Railway to Benares.]

It was on the 5th of February, 1863, that the Vice-regal party left Calcutta. They travelled by railway to Benares, which they reached on the evening of the 6th. The first phenomenon which struck them, as Lord Elgin afterwards wrote, was the 'very sensible change of climate which began to make itself felt at some 250 miles from Calcutta.'

The general character (he said) of the country continued to be as level as ever; but the air became more bracing, the surface of the soil more arid, and the vegetation less rank. Hot mid-days, and cold nights and mornings, are subst.i.tuted for the moist and comparatively uniform temperature of Lower Bengal, to a greater and greater degree with every step that the traveller takes towards the north.

The railway, with the exception of a portion near Calcutta, is a single line; but it is perfectly constructed, and with no great regard to cost. The vagaries of the water-floods, which, during the rainy season, sometimes pour down in unmanageable force from the Ganges and sometimes rush towards it from the opposite side of the railway line, have const.i.tuted the great engineering difficulty of the work. Some very remarkable bridges and other constructions of this cla.s.s, to permit the free pa.s.sage of water under the line, have been built. The most critical point has been to obtain a secure foundation in the sandy soil for these erections; and, strange to say, the principle adopted by our engineers, under the name of the 'Sunken Well' system, is the same as that followed by the great architects who built the famous 'Taj' of Agra. It will, it is to be hoped, prove successful; and these important works will remain an enduring monument of the benefits conferred on India during the present reign. Nothing that has been done by the British in India has affected the native mind so powerfully, and produced so favourable an impression, as these railway undertakings.

[Sidenote: Durbar.]

On the day after his arrival at Benares he held a Durbar--his first truly Oriental Durbar--which, though not comprising any independent chiefs, was attended by several native gentlemen of high consideration and large possessions. In addressing them, he took the opportunity of dwelling upon the improvement which recent measures had effected in their position, and the consequent increase of their responsibilities:

'It is the desire (he said) of Her Majesty the Queen that the native gentlemen of India should be represented in the Council of the Governor-General, in order that when laws are made for India their opinions, and wishes, and feelings may receive due consideration. It is my intention and duty to do everything in my power to give effect to Her Majesty's gracious intention in this respect. Among the rajahs and gentlemen here to-day are many who have large estates in the neighbourhood and along the line of railway which we travelled over yesterday. The value of those estates will be greatly enhanced by the completion of the important work of which we are about to-day to celebrate the opening. I need hardly remind them that they will owe this advantage to the introduction of British engineering skill and British capital into this country. I trust that the consideration of this fact, and of similar facts which are of daily occurrence, will tend to produce a kindly feeling between the races, by showing them to what an extent they may be mutually useful to each other. Meanwhile, I hope that the gentlemen whom I am addressing will turn these advantages to account by doing their utmost to improve their properties, and to promote the happiness and welfare of their ryots and dependents.'

[Sidenote: Railway dinner.]

In the afternoon of the same day he was present at a dinner given in celebration of the opening of the railway from Jumalpore to Benares. In the course of a speech which he made on that occasion, after referring to the fact that both his predecessors had taken part in similar celebrations, he said:--

In looking over the published report of these proceedings a few days ago, my attention was arrested by an incident which brought forcibly home to my mind one painful circ.u.mstance in which my position here to- day contrasts sadly with that which Lord Canning then occupied. At a stage in the proceedings of the evening, corresponding to that at which we have now arrived, he departed from the routine prescribed by the programme, and invited the company to join him in drinking the health of his n.o.ble predecessor, the Marquis of Dalhousie, who had, as he justly observed, nursed the East Indian Railway in its infancy, and guided it through its first difficulties. It is not in my power to make any similar proposal to you now. A mysterious dispensation of Providence has removed from this world's stage, where they seemed still destined to play so n.o.ble and useful a part, both the proposer of this toast, and its object. The names of both are written in brilliant characters on some of the most eventful pages of the history of India, and both were removed at a time when expectation as to the services which they might still render to India was at its height. I shall not now dwell on the great national loss which we have all sustained in this dispensation; but, perhaps, I may be permitted to say that to me the loss is not only a public one, but a private and personal calamity likewise. Both of these distinguished men were my contemporaries, both, I believe I may without presumption say, my intimate friends. It is a singular coincidence that three successive Governors-General of India should have stood towards each other in this relationship of age and intimacy. One consequence is that the burden of governing India has devolved upon us respectively at different periods of our lives. Lord Dalhousie when named to the Government of India was, I believe, the youngest man who had ever been appointed to a situation of such high responsibility and trust; Lord Canning was in the prime of life; and I, if I am not already on the decline, am at least nearer to the verge of it than either of my contemporaries who have preceded me. Indeed, when I was leaving England for India, Lord Ellenborough, who is now, alas! the only surviving ex-Governor-General of India, said to me, 'You are not a very old man, but depend upon it, you will find yourself by far the oldest man in India.'

Pa.s.sing from these personal topics, after noticing the good fortune which had placed the formation of the railway system of India in the hands of a man who had in a special manner made that subject his own, he proceeded to speak of the future of Indian Railways, insisting especially on a point about which he felt very strongly, the necessity of their ceasing to depend on a Government guarantee, and adding some practical hints for their development and extension:

[Sidenote: Future of Indian railways.]

But, Gentlemen, however interesting it may be to refer to the past and to dwell upon the present, the most important questions which we have to answer relate to the future, and the most important of all in my opinion is this--to what agency are we henceforward to look if we would desire to extend as widely as possible, to all parts of India, the benefit of this potent instrument of modern civilisation? I have no hesitation in affirming at once, in answer to this question, that we must not look to an indefinite extension of a system of Government guarantees for the accomplishment of this object. In the first place, it would be wholly unjustifiable for any one object, however important, to place such a strain upon our finances as this policy would involve. In the second place, however justifiable and necessary a system of Government guarantees may be in certain circ.u.mstances, it is essentially an expensive one, because by securing to shareholders a minimum rate of interest on their capital it weakens in them the motives to economy, and because by dividing the responsibility for expenditure between Government and Railway Officials, it diminishes in the latter the sense of responsibility. Moreover, the indefinite extension of a system of Government guarantees is wholly incompatible with the endeavour to bring private enterprise largely into play for the execution of these works; while there is an unlimited call for capital for works enjoying the protection of a Government guarantee, it is not to be expected that capital will be forthcoming to any extent for similar works which have not that protection. For the accomplishment, therefore, of the great object to which I am referring, we must henceforward, I apprehend, look to private enterprise; not perhaps to private enterprise wholly unaided by the State, but at any rate, to private enterprise not protected by Government guarantee. But if so, what are the conditions which will ent.i.tle railway enterprises of this cla.s.s to the countenance and encouragement of the Government? I lay it down as a fundamental principle, that we ought to look to the eventual establishment of one uniform railway gauge for the whole of India. The experience of England is conclusive as to the inconvenience of a double or conflicting railway gauge. After the expenditure of an untold amount of money in Parliamentary conflicts, the broad gauge of England has been compelled to take the narrow gauge on its back, and the whole capital expended upon the former may be said to have been thrown away.

But what does this resolution in favour of an uniform gauge imply? It will, I think, be admitted that the main object of an uniform railway gauge is to enable the several railway lines to exchange their plant in order to avoid transhipment of freight. But if the plant of the subsidiary line is to be transported along the main lines, it must be sufficiently well finished to be fitted to travel in safety at high speed; and if the plant of the main lines is to travel along the subsidiary lines, the latter must have rails sufficiently heavy, and works of construction sufficiently substantial, to support it.

Moreover, where streams or rivers are encountered they must be bridged. In short, the subsidiary lines must be built in a manner which would make them nearly as expensive as the main lines; in other words, railways must not be introduced into any part of India where we cannot afford to spend from 13,000_l_. to 15,000_l_. a mile upon them.

I am not prepared to accept this conclusion. I have been a good deal in America, and I know that our practical cousins there do not refuse to avail themselves of advantages within their reach, by grasping at those which are beyond it. In 1854, I travelled by railway from New York to Washington. We had several ferries to cross on the way, but we found that the railway with the ferries was much better than no Railway at all. In short, in America where they cannot get a _pucka_ railway, they take a _kutcha_ one instead. This, I think, is what we must do in India. There are many districts where railways costing 3,000_l_. or 4,000_l_. a mile might be introduced with advantage, although they would not justify an expenditure of from 10,000_l_. to 15,000_l_. a mile. We have only to be careful that _kutcha_ lines are not mistaken for _pucka_ ones--that they are not allowed to set up a rival system as against the main lines, or to occupy ground which should be appropriated by the latter.