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THE ATTACK

"Surprise is at all times the a.s.sailant's strongest weapon."--"Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920).

The aim of every commander who possesses the power of manoeuvre is to seek out the enemy and destroy his organised forces. The Attack is the culminating point of all manoeuvres to this end, and every commander will endeavour to achieve his aim by a sudden and unexpected a.s.sault on a part of the enemy's defences.

The achievement of this aim is only possible when a commander has a.s.sembled a sufficient force for his purpose, and has obtained, by reconnaissance and by fighting, information as to the vulnerability of the hostile position. The commander will then endeavour to break the enemy's formation so suddenly as to disconcert all his plans; to retain a compact force with which to follow up the blow without giving the enemy a moment's breathing s.p.a.ce; to drive a wedge into the heart of his disordered ma.s.ses, forcing his wings asunder; and to pursue and annihilate the scattered forces of the enemy.

"Unless a decision is quickly obtained in the opening weeks of a modern campaign the opposing armies tend to become immobile, chiefly owing to the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments. The armies will then be distributed in great depth, and the attackers are faced with the necessity of breaking through not one position only, but a series of positions, extending back to a depth of several miles"

("Infantry Training, 1921").

Penetration, followed by the sundering of the Franco-British Armies, was clearly the intention of the German {52} High Command in the _Second Battle of the Somme_, which opened on March 21, 1918. The German Armies had entrenched themselves after the First Battle of the Marne (September, 1914), and for 43 months had been confronted by the Allied Nations of Britain, France, and Belgium, reinforced at the close by Portuguese troops and by the National Army of the United States.

Within the investing lines of the Western Front the German Armies were besieged, the barrier reaching from the Belgian coast to the frontier of Switzerland, while the armies of Austria-Hungary were similarly penned in by the army of Italy, from Switzerland to the Adriatic. The internal collapse of Russia, in 1917, enabled von Hindenburg to a.s.sume the offensive, with upwards of 1,500,000 men released from the Eastern Front, and part of this reserve power was projected, with the Austro-Hungarian Armies, in a fierce attack on the Italian lines. The success of this manoeuvre continued until reinforcements were dispatched from other parts of the Allied lines, and a diversion in the region of Cambrai by the British III. Army, under Sir Julian Byng (November 20, 1917), prevented the dispatch of further German reserve power to the Italian Front, and necessitated a counter-thrust in France. The battlefields of France again resumed their importance as the vital point in the theatre of operations, and in the spring of 1918, profiting by the improved positions and prospects in the West, Ludendorff attempted to break through the investing lines on a 50-mile front. The attack was heralded by a terrific bombardment, and culminated in a desperate thrust against the British Armies north and south of the River Somme, the points of penetration aimed at being the British right, where it was linked up with the French on the River Oise, in the neighbourhood of La Fere, and the British line of communications in the neighbourhood of Amiens. The whole British line opposite the thrust was hurled back and the territory regained by the Franco-British {53} advance on the Somme in July, 1916, was recaptured by the German Armies. But this was not a battle for towns or territory, as the German hammer blows were intended to drive a wedge between the British and French Armies, to roll up the British flank northwards to the sea-coast and the French flank southwards to Paris, and to capture the main line of communication between these Northern and Southern Armies. By skilful reinforcement of threatened points, Marshal Haig frustrated the primary object of the attack, and by the aid of the French Armies the whole line fell back, disputing the ground with the utmost resolution, and maintaining the line without losing touch between the south and north. The German wedge was thrust in, but every attempt to effect a breach and to pour through the line was frustrated by the Allies. During the battle the French and British Armies became intermingled, and to preserve unity of control a Generalissimo was appointed in the person of General Foch, who had commanded the French IX. Army at the First Battle of the Marne in September, 1914, and the French Armies of the Somme during the advance in July, 1916. General Pershing, commanding the Army of the United States, gave a free hand to the Generalissimo to incorporate American troops wherever they might be needed in the field, and Marshal Haig and General Retain remained in command of the British and French Armies.

METHODS OF ATTACK.--The object of every attack is to break down the enemy's resistance by the weight and direction of fire and to complete his overthrow by a.s.sault, by the delivery of a decisive blow with as large a portion as possible of the attacking force against a selected point or portion of the enemy's position. The term "Decisive Attack"

does not imply that the influence of other attacks is indecisive, but rather that it is the culmination of gradually increasing pressure relentlessly applied to the enemy from the moment when contact with him is first obtained.

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TWO PLANS OF ATTACK.--There are two plans of attack. In the first, the direction in which the decisive blow is to be delivered is determined beforehand; an adequate force is detailed and pushed forward for this purpose, and at the same time another part of the force is detailed to attack another portion of the enemy's position, to keep his attention there, to pin his troops in position, to prevent him sending reinforcements to the part mainly threatened, and ultimately to drive home with the successful a.s.sault of the main attack. The rest of the force is small and is retained in General Reserve to meet emergencies.

In the second plan, a general action is developed by a part of the attacking force and the remainder is retained in General Reserve, to be thrown in when the opportunity arrives, at the right time and in the right place. In this case, the "remainder" is not less than half the available force.

The first plan can be adopted when the commander of the attacking force has definite information as to the extent of the enemy's position, when he knows where its flanks rest and when he knows the approximate strength of the forces arrayed against him. It must also be possible, without undue risk, to divide the attacking force into parties of such strength that neither can be overwhelmed by the enemy in detail, and it is to be noted that in the case of a serious check there is only a small General Reserve to restore the battle. The second plan can be adopted when information is incomplete, and owing to the strong force retained by the commander in General Reserve, the situation can be exploited and developed by fighting without undue risk.

STRENGTH OF THE ATTACK.--It must always be remembered that a commander can never be too strong when making an attack, for he can never be perfectly sure of what force he may encounter, or at what moment the adversary may make a counter-attack. An attack {55} on an enemy presupposes a superiority of force at the place where the attack is made, for war is but the art of being stronger than the enemy at the right place at the right time, and for an attack to have a reasonable hope of success the attackers, at the point where the penetration takes place, must be superior.

DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS.--Each phase of the Attack will normally require three separate bodies of troops for its execution: a _Forward Body_ to seek out for, and when located attack, the enemy along the whole front of the sector allotted to it and by relentless pressure to wear down the enemy's resistance in order to discover the weak portions of the defence; _Supports_ to penetrate the weak portions of the defence and forthwith to attack the flanks and rear of those portions of the defence which are holding up the Attack; with Local Reserves for dealing with local counter-attacks; and a _General Reserve_ by means of which the commander exploits success or retrieves failure.

THE FORWARD BODY, THE SUPPORTS, AND THE LOCAL RESERVES.--The paramount duty of all leaders in the firing line is to get their troops forward, and if every leader is imbued with the determination to close with the enemy, he will be unconsciously a.s.sisting his neighbour also, for, as a rule, the best method of supporting a neighbouring unit is to advance.

But an attack is often held up by well-directed machine-gun fire, and by determined and well-trained riflemen in concealed or well-prepared positions. The tactics to be pursued under these circ.u.mstances are thus outlined in "Infantry Training, 1921": "When forward troops are held up by the enemy's organised fire at close ranges they must keep him pinned to his ground and absorb his attention by maintaining a vigorous fire and working their way closer when opportunity offers. It will be the duty of the Supports to turn the flank of, and enfilade, that portion of the enemy's defences where a garrison is opposing {56} the Forward Body. To achieve this, Supports may have to quit their direct line of advance and follow in the wake of a neighbouring unit, which is able to advance. It must constantly be borne in mind that pressure should be brought on the enemy by supporting troops in places where the attack is progressing rather than where it is held up, never by the mere reinforcement or thickening up of a line of troops who have been unable to advance. There must be no slackening of pressure, meanwhile, by the forward troops who are temporarily held up, or the defenders will be able to turn their attention to the flanking attacks which are being directed against them." The Local Reserves are for local counter-attacks by fire or movement against similar efforts by the Local Reserves of the enemy. In modern campaigns this work is effectively carried out by the overhead fire of machine guns distributed in depth, and the mobile Local Reserves may thus consist of smaller units detached for the purpose by the Forward Body or by the Supports. During the great German offensive in the spring of 1918 the _Attacks on the Somme and the Lys_ were constantly held up by the vigour and tenacity of the Franco-British defence, and to meet the necessities of the case the following instructions were issued by the German General Staff: "If the a.s.saulting troops are held up by machine-gun fire they are to lie down and keep up a steady rifle fire, while Supports in the rear and on the flank try to work round the flanks and rear of the machine-gun nests which are holding up the Attack. Meanwhile, the commander of the battalion which is responsible for the Attack is to arrange for artillery and light trench-mortar support, and should protect his own flanks from machine-gun fire by means of smoke."

THE GENERAL RESERVE.--In a modern campaign against civilised troops it will seldom, or never, happen that the efforts of the Forward Body, Supports, and Local Reserves will annihilate the enemy and so prevent him from regaining cohesion and fighting power. Even if {57} every part of the position against which an a.s.sault is delivered is captured and held, the enemy will not, by that means alone, cease to exist as a fighting force, and if he is permitted to withdraw with a semblance of order and moral the work of the Attacking Force will be of little avail. The destruction of the enemy and not the mere capture of the ground of the encounter is the ultimate aim of the commander. He will, therefore, accept the best available opportunity for the destruction of the enemy by overwhelming them in some part of the battlefield during the successful operations of his Attacking Force. It may, however, happen that the efforts of the Attacking Force are generally unsuccessful and the enemy may be on the point of gaining the upper hand. By means of the General Reserve the commander exploits the success or retrieves the failure of the Attacking Force. The commander will have selected some point or position in the enemy's defensive system against which he can direct his decisive attack. This point cannot, as a rule, be determined until it has been revealed by the successes of the Forward Body and the Supports, and when it has been selected it must be struck unexpectedly and in the greatest possible strength. While, therefore, the Forward Body, Supports, and Local Reserves must be adequate in numbers for the task allotted to them, a commander will generally retain about half his available force for the delivery of the Decisive Attack, and when this decisive blow has been delivered the Reserve will carry on the pursuit of the beaten enemy until such time as other Infantry, or Cavalry, or Tanks, have caught up and pa.s.sed them. If the attacking troops fail to obtain their objective the commander has at his disposal the means of relieving exhausted troops and of dealing with the "decisive counter-attack" of the enemy.

THE COMMANDER'S PLANS.--Once troops are committed to the a.s.sault the commander is powerless to divert them to another purpose. His control is exercised in {58} the correct interpretation or adaptation of his original plan by his subordinate commanders. Before launching his troops to the attack in accordance with the decisions arrived at from information received, the commander will a.s.semble his subordinates and the representatives of co-operating arms or formations in order that his plans may be explained. This conference should be held at such a time as will enable his subordinates to explain their _role_ to the sub-unit commanders. Wherever possible the conference should be preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the ground over which the attack is to be made, otherwise a map of the district concerned must be subst.i.tuted for the actual view.

The commander will be influenced in his plans by the state of the campaign at the time of the decision to attack. In the opening stages of a campaign in a thickly populated country, and generally throughout a campaign in less settled districts, a war of manoeuvre will lead to the "Encounter Battle," and the objective to be aimed at will be limited only by the power of endurance of his troops, the weather conditions, and the possibility of supplying his victorious troops with ammunition and food. Under other conditions, the objective will be subject to further limitations, as the defensive position will be organised in great depth, and while effective penetration will thus be more difficult to achieve it must, of necessity, be accompanied by widening in proportion to its depth in order that s.p.a.ce for manoeuvre and facility for communication may be secured. The Infantry Attack will be conducted on the same lines in both forms of battle, but the greater the organisation of the defensive position the more limited will be the depth to which the attack can be carried on and the greater difficulty will there be in launching reserves in pursuit.

THE POSITION OF a.s.sEMBLY.--A column in march formation will very rarely move to its attack position, or "jumping-off place," from column of route except {59} where there are concealed lines of approach to the spot. A Position of a.s.sembly will therefore be a.s.signed, and this will be chosen with a view to cover for the troops and facilities for the issue of food and hot drink, the distribution of ammunition and the filling of water bottles. As a general rule, it is left to the battalion commander to select Positions of a.s.sembly for each of his companies. When large bodies of troops are a.s.sembled with a view to immediate action, it must always be remembered that large forces cannot be moved by a single road if all arms are to be brought into action at the right moment. In April, 1864, General Banks, with 25,000 U.S.

troops, moved from Grand Ecore to _Pleasant Hill_ in the Red River Valley. Although lateral roads existed, his column marched on one main road only, and twenty miles separated his front and rear. As he came into action with General Forrest, of the Confederate Army, the head of his column was defeated and thrown back again and again by forces inferior in total strength, but superior on the field of the encounter.

Had General Banks used two or more parallel roads, which were available for his use, the Confederates on the spot would have been quickly overpowered.

THE ATTACKING FORCE.--The commander must decide against which portion or portions of the hostile position, or along which lines of advance, his Fire Attack shall be developed. As the object of this movement is to pin the enemy to his position, to wear down his resistance generally, and particularly at the point where the Decisive Attack is to be delivered, as well as to effect a lodgment in the position, it is clear that the greater the extent of the objective the better, and one or both flanks should be threatened if possible. But whenever a Fire Attack is developed it must be in sufficient strength to occupy the enemy's attention fully and it must be carried through with vigour once begun. One {60} to three rifles per yard of the objective to be a.s.sailed is generally regarded as the requisite strength of the Forward Body, Supports, and Local Reserves. At _St. Privat_ (August 18, 1870) a first and second line made a frontal attack and came under fire of the French cha.s.sepots, to which their own shorter-ranged rifles could make no effective reply. The lines pressed on, but were ultimately brought to a standstill through lack of reinforcements, which could have been sent up against the flank of the fire position which was holding up the attack, under cover of the fire of the troops in position, and would thus have carried the Forward Body to the a.s.sault.

Equally unsuccessful was Osman Pasha's attempt to break through the investing lines at _Plevna_ (December 10, 1877). With 15,000 troops he pierced the Russian lines, and another resolute effort would have carried the sortie through the investing forces. But the 15,000 Supports could not get out of the town as the bridges and gates were blocked with fugitives and wagons.

THE DECISIVE ATTACK.--The commander must also decide the point and direction of the Decisive Attack. This will be made on a part of the front or on a flank, and it may be predetermined in accordance with information concerning the hostile dispositions, or it may have to be ascertained by further fighting. The advantages of a _Frontal Attack_ are that, if successful, the enemy's force is broken in two parts, the separated wings may be driven back in divergent directions and overwhelmed in detail, and a decisive victory is thus obtained. The disadvantages are that the force a.s.saulting a part of the enemy's front draws upon itself the concentrated fire of the whole hostile line, and unless the Fire Attack can master this fire the decisive blow will be held up, while an unsuccessful frontal attack invites the enemy to advance and to envelop the a.s.sailants. The advantages of a _Flank Attack_ are that {61} the enemy's line of retreat is threatened, and only the threatened flank can concentrate its fire on the a.s.sailant.

The disadvantages of a Flank Attack are that the enveloping troops have to face a similar danger on their own outer flank, for upon this point the defender will almost certainly direct his counter-stroke, and for this reason a decisive blow on the enemy's flank must be followed up by strong reserves. The flank chosen for attack will be that which affords the best opportunities for converging fire from the supporting artillery, which gives the best line of advance for the infantry, and where success will have the most decisive results, the last depending mainly on the extent to which the enemy's line of retreat is threatened. Where the various requisites are in conflict, the flank affording the greatest advantages for converging fire from the artillery will be chosen. Nothing destroys the moral of men in action so speedily and effectually as a flank attack, and except by this method good infantry will seldom be beaten.

A decisive attack, to be completely successful, must be followed up by fresh troops before the a.s.saulting waves have been checked. Lee had crossed the Potomac and desired "to defeat the last army of the Federals in the east and drive the Northern Government from Washington." The battle of _Gettysburg_ lasted three days (July 1-3, 1863). On the first, the army of Northern Virginia was uniformly successful; on the second, the fortunes of battle swayed to and fro; on the third, Lee decided to make a Napoleonic decisive attack with half his available troops against Meade's centre. But the spirited attack of the first 15,000, after penetrating the line, was checked, and the remaining 15,000 did not arrive in support, so that the attack died down, was repulsed, and withdrew in disorder.

At _Chattanooga_ (November 25, 1868) Grant's decisive attack was successful, although delivered against a part of the position which appeared to be impregnable, on account of the strength of the attack, through {62} distribution in depth; 25,000 men were hurled against the entrenchments in three lines, and the support of the third line carried the waves of the attack through the defences.

DETAILING THE UNITS.--The commander will detail the units for carrying out the Fire Attack, which will generally require one to three rifles per yard of the objective. This force will be placed under a definite commander, who will distribute it into a Forward Body to develop the attack in the firing line; Supports, to enable the Forward Body to a.s.sault the position; and Local Reserves to maintain or restore the advantages gained, their main function being to repel counter-attacks by similar bodies of the enemy and to maintain the offensive spirit.

The commander will also detail the units for carrying out the Decisive Attack, which will require three to five rifles per yard of the portion of the position against which it is projected. This force, under a definite commander, is distributed for the attack in depth, so that the strength and weight of the blow carries it home against all opposition.

The force is retained by the commander of the whole attacking troops, to be thrown in at the right time and in the right place. It also remains in hand to restore the battle in case of an unexpected check, or to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the troops if it is desired to break off the engagement.

THE ARTILLERY.--The position of the artillery will be settled in consultation with the artillery commander, the decision resting on the objects in view, which are, to a.s.sist the infantry in its advance by keeping down hostile gun and rifle fire--therefore, in the initial stages, a commanding position is required; during the decisive stage concentration on the objective of the decisive blow is required; and after the successful a.s.sault guns may be required to be hurried forward to repel {63} counter-attacks, to break down protracted opposition, and to complete the rout by hara.s.sing the fleeing enemy. When the attack is directed against a position the defence of which is known to have been elaborately organised, a pre-arranged covering fire in the form of an artillery barrage, lifted in successive stages as the attack advances, may require to be organised some time before the attack is launched. It will be necessary to detail an escort for the guns, unless the distribution of the troops for the attack already provides such protection. At the _Battle of Verneville_ (August 18, 1870) the 9th Prussian Corps Artillery had been pushed forward against the French position at Armandvillers-Folie. The fire of the French infantry caused a loss of 13 officers and 187 other ranks, and one battery was disabled, before the guns were withdrawn. There was no infantry escort to keep the attacking riflemen at a distance. At the _Battle of Colenso_ (December 15, 1899) two batteries of field artillery advanced into action without an escort, and without previous reconnaissance unlimbered on a projecting spit of land in a loop of the Tugela River.

Frontal fire from hidden trenches on the opposite bank and enfilade fire from a re-entrant flank killed all the horses and the greater part of the personnel, and although the utmost gallantry was shown by all ranks ten of the twelve guns were left in Boer hands. Infantry regimental officers and battalion commanders must be acquainted with the amount of ammunition carried by their accompanying artillery, in order that ammunition may not be wasted by calling for fire on targets of secondary importance. All reserves, whether they have been specially detailed or not for the purpose, must of their own accord make every effort to a.s.sist in getting forward guns and ammunition.

One of the outstanding lessons of the War of 1914-1918 is the possibility of placing even the heaviest artillery close behind the infantry fighting line owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction and to the security against {64} counter-attack provided by the deadly fire of the magazine rifles and machine guns of their escort, and of the Lewis guns allotted to the batteries themselves.

THE CAVALRY.--The opportunities for cavalry action in an attack depend upon the character of the defensive operations. Against a highly organised defensive position there will be no openings for mounted troops until a wide penetration gives s.p.a.ce for manoeuvre. Before the attack during an "Encounter Battle" the cavalry will have been out on reconnaissance in front of the attacking force; during the attack they may be called on to a.s.sist by dismounted fire action, and by local counter-strokes as mounted troops (against cavalry, or against infantry disorganised by the breakdown of a movement), but must not be allowed to impair their speed or freshness; after the successful a.s.sault the Pursuit is their special duty, not necessarily on the heels of the enemy, but on lines parallel to their retreat, to hamper his movements, to round up stragglers, and to threaten their communications.

Generally speaking, such a position as is required will be found on a flank, or slightly in advance of a flank of the attacking force.

"Cavalry make it possible for a general to adopt the most skilful of all manoeuvres, the converging attack, and properly handled, as at _Appomattox_ or _Paardeberg_, to bring about the crowning triumph of Grand Tactics, the hemming in a force so closely that it has either to attack at a disadvantage or to surrender" (Henderson). In the Mesopotamian campaign a surprise attack of General Sir S. Maude's forces on September 27-29, 1917, against the Turkish forces a.s.sembling near _Ramadie_, 65 miles north-west of Baghdad, was converted into the surrender of the Turkish commander and about 4,000 all arms by the enveloping tactics of the Anglo-Indian Cavalry Division. A similar manoeuvre on March 26, 1918, by the cavalry of the Mesopotamian Field Force (commanded at that time by General Sir W. R. Marshall, {65} who succeeded after General Maude's death from cholera), resulted in the surrender of over 5,000 Turks, including a divisional commander, 22 miles north-west of Hit. The prisoners were fugitives from the battle of _Baghdadieh_, and the cavalry were astride their communications.

"On the morning of the Armistice (November 11, 1918) two British Cavalry Divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line 10 miles in front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). The absence of cavalry at the critical moment has often decided the issue of a campaign. After the action of _Gaines's Mill_ (June 27, 1862) General J. E. B. Stuart was dispatched by Lee with the Confederate cavalry on a false scent to White House, south of the York River, to which base Lee believed McClellan to be retreating. But McClellan had shifted his base to Harrison's Landing, on the James River, and the Confederate cavalry did not regain touch with the Army of the Potomac until July 3, two days after the failure of Lee's attack on Malvern Hill. Had Stuart been available with his cavalry throughout that critical period McClellan's huge trains would have fallen an easy prey to the Confederate hors.e.m.e.n, and the roads through the forests and swamps to Malvern Hill could have been blocked. Absence of cavalry before the first day of _Gettysburg_ (July 1, 1863) hampered the Confederate leaders, and lack of information caused them to act with unnecessary caution when boldness would have carried everything before them. General Stuart had once more been sent away on a raiding expedition. After the victorious attack of General Early's division a handful of General Buford's U.S. cavalry enabled the defeated 1st Corps of Meade's army to save their guns and to retire unmolested. A thousand {66} Confederate sabres would have brushed Buford aside, and July 1 would have been disastrous to the National cause.

During the German offensive of March-July, 1918, "even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions might have driven a wedge between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). During the _Battle of Cambrai_ (November 20, 1917) a squadron of the Fort Garry Horse crossed the Scheldt Ca.n.a.l, and after capturing a German battery and dispersing a large body of infantry, maintained itself by rifle fire in a sunken road until nightfall, when it withdrew to the British lines with its prisoners. During the _Battle of Amiens_ (August 8-18, 1918) the cavalry were concentrated behind the battle front by a series of night marches, and on the first day of the battle they advanced 23 miles from their position of a.s.sembly. Throughout the battle they rendered most gallant and valuable service. During the Second _Battle of Le Cateau_ (October 6-12, 1918) cavalry were instrumental in hara.s.sing the enemy in his retreat and preventing him from completing the destruction of the railway, and when the infantry were held up by heavy machine-gun fire from Cattigny Wood and Clary "a dashing charge by the Fort Garry Horse gained a footing in Cattigny Wood and a.s.sisted our infantry to press forward. Further east, Dragoon Guards and Canadian Cavalry were instrumental in the capture of Hennechy, Reumont, and Troisvilles" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). In the early stages of the campaign in _North Russia_ (August-September, 1918) a handful of cavalry on either bank of the North Dwina River could have kept the Bolshevik forces constantly on the run, and could have prevented the successive reorganisation of their demoralised forces, which the slower progress of the pursuing infantry was unable to accomplish. A few squadrons of cavalry could have dispersed the whole {67} Bolshevik force in the Archangel Province. Tanks are usefully employed in the pursuit, as artillery, the only effective enemy of the tank, is unlikely to remain in action with the rearward troops of a disorganised enemy; and a new terror has been added to the pursuit by the advent of self-propelled, man-carrying Aircraft, armed with machine guns and bombs, and possibly even with light quick-firing artillery. During the final stages of the victorious _Allied Advance_ in November, 1918, the retreating German Armies were continuously hara.s.sed from the air. "Throughout the day (November 5, 1918) the roads, packed with the enemy's troops and transport, afforded excellent targets to our airmen, who took full advantage of their opportunities, despite the unfavourable weather.

Over 30 guns, which bombs and machine-gun fire from the air had forced the enemy to abandon, were captured by a battalion of the 25th Division in the field near Le Presau" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.--The position and employment of the Royal Engineers will be determined by the commander who issues orders for the Attack, and as the main function of this corps in the Attack is the removal or bridging of obstacles to the advance, and the strengthening of the position when captured, the Royal Engineers will probably remain with the troops to which the decisive attack is entrusted.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.--The position of hospitals and clearing stations will be settled in consultation with the S.M.O. Aid posts and advanced dressing stations will be established under battalion arrangements in connection with the medical officer of the units concerned.

SUPPLY.--The position of the Train, with its reserve supplies of ammunition and of food for men and horses, will depend upon facilities for communication with the attacking force and upon security against artillery fire {68} or surprise attack from the air or land. The position will probably be well in rear, and at the junction of roads leading forward to the attacking troops. Rations will be brought up to units under arrangements by the commanders of the battalion or other units concerned.

THE COMMANDER'S POSITION.--The position of the commander who issues the orders for the Attack must be fixed, and must be made known to subordinate commanders, as it will be the place to which reports will be sent. In the case of a small force the commander will generally stay with the General Reserve; if the force is fairly large, and composed of all arms, he will probably be on the main artillery position; but in the case of a large force he should be well out of reach of the distraction of local incidents. If the commander of a large force moves from his stated position he must leave a senior officer of his staff to represent him on the spot and to forward urgent communications to him in his changed position. In the case of a small force a commander who vacates his stated position must arrange to leave a runner in the position stated as his headquarters, in order that messages may reach him without delay.

BATTLE REPORTS.--The successful exploitation of success depends largely on the accuracy of the information gained by the commander from all parts of the battlefield. Reports are required from all who have information to impart and they should be made out on previously prepared message cards, stating the exact position of the sender at the time of the report; the progress made by the unit under the command of the sender, or by neighbouring or other units whose action has been observed; the degree of the enemy's resistance; enemy movements; and the plans of the officer making the report and the method to be adopted in carrying out such plans.

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REORGANISATION AND PURSUIT.--Once a successful a.s.sault has been delivered, subordinate commanders must immediately regain control of their commands, and must see that the fleeing enemy is pursued by fire, while local reserves follow up and secure the position against counter-attack. Superior commanders must take steps to organise the pursuit, to cut off the enemy's line of retreat, and to complete his overthrow. No victory is ever complete if the enemy is permitted to retire unmolested from the field of battle, and given time to recover order and moral. "Never let up in a pursuit while your troops have strength to follow" was a favourite maxim of Stonewall Jackson. The pursuit is the task of the infantry until it is taken over by aircraft, cavalry, and tanks, and the limits to which the infantry will carry the pursuit will be fixed by the commander, who will bear in mind the principle that "Success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)). If the fruits of victory are to be secured the work must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still reeling under the shock of defeat. A few hours' delay gives him time to recover his equilibrium, to organise a rearguard, and to gain several miles on his rearward march. In modern warfare motor transport may enable the comparatively immobile infantry to achieve the mobility of cavalry, if arrangements for embussing them have previously been made, and in a few hours infantry may thus be transported beyond the reach of pursuit.

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FORMATION OF INFANTRY FOR THE ATTACK

"Only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won."--MARSHAL HAIG.

The formations in which Infantry move to the Attack must be such as will enable them to achieve their object by the combination of Fire and Movement. For this purpose, the forward troops must be furnished with supports belonging to the same unit as themselves, in order that a connected leading may produce a joint action of the whole.