Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers.

by Anonymous.

PREFACE

The Lectures in this volume are based upon the official Text-books issued by the Imperial General Staff and upon the works of recognised authorities on the Art of Warfare.

The aim of the Author is to examine the Principles which underlie the Art of Warfare, and to provide ill.u.s.trations from Military History of the _successes_ which have attended knowledge and intelligent application of Text-book Principles, and of the _disasters_ which have accompanied ignorance or neglect of the teaching provided by the Text-books. The "dry bones" of the official publications are clothed with materials which may be supplemented at will by the student of Military History, and the Lectures may thus, it is hoped, be of a.s.sistance to Infantry Officers, either in the course of their own studies, or as a convenient groundwork upon which the instruction of others may be based.

The scope of the work may be gathered from the Table of Contents and from the Index, and it will be seen that the general Principles underlying the Art of Warfare are included in the scheme, while advantage has been taken of the revision of the official Text-books to incorporate in the Lectures the lessons gained from the experience of leaders in the Great War.

Upwards of 230 citations are made of "Battle incidents," and, as an example of the Author's methods, attention may perhaps be directed to the reinforcement of the Text-book Principle of co-operation and mutual support by the citation of an instance, on the grand {viii} scale, by Army Corps (during the _First Battle of the Marne_), and on the minor scale, by tanks, bombers, aircraft, and riflemen (during the _First Battle of the Somme_); to the successful application of established Principles by the Advanced Guard Commander at _Nachod_, and to the neglect of those Principles by "Jeb" Stuart at _Evelington Heights_, and by the Prussian Advanced Guard Commanders in 1870; and to the value of Musketry Training by instancing the successes achieved at the _Heights of Abraham_, at _Bunker Hill_, _Coruna_, and at _Fredericksburg_, which were repeated during the _Retreat from Mons_ and at the _Second Battle of the Somme_.

While every effort has been made to achieve accuracy in citation, and to avoid ambiguity or error in the enunciation of Principles, the Author will be very grateful if his readers will notify to him (at the address of the Publishers) any inaccuracies or omissions which may come under their notice.

LONDON, March, 1922.

LECTURES ON LAND WARFARE

THE ART OF WARFARE

"The Art of War, like every other art, possesses its theory, its principles; otherwise, it would not be an art."--MARSHAL FOCH.

The Art of War, like any other art, is based upon certain fixed principles, and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his goal. The long and laborious line of study is the only safe way, and there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road. One of these pitfalls is dug by those who maintain, whenever a new war breaks out, that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the sc.r.a.p-heap and attention paid only to the problems of the hour. Another is the alluring trap that Warfare is "merely a matter of common sense"; and a third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the General, and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the Subaltern Officer.

KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL.--With regard to the first of these difficulties, the opinions of recognised authorities on the Art of Warfare may be consulted. "The cardinal principles on which the art of war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of morality; but their application varies with the theatre of the war, the genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed"

(General R. Taylor, C.S. Army). "Although the manifold inventions of modern times have given to warfare {2} a wider scope and fresh materials, it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past; but it applies these laws with means more numerous, more powerful, and more delicate" (Marshal Foch). "This war has given us no new principles; but different mechanical appliances--and in particular the rapid improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast quant.i.ties of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expansion of artillery, and the provision of great ma.s.ses of motor transport--have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services. Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working" (Marshal Haig).

The laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but their successful application on the field of battle requires that they should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. "The mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "A lifelong experience of military study and thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be instinctive. I know that in putting the Science of War into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part of one's flesh and blood. In war there is little time to think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash--it must present itself to the mind as perfectly _obvious_" (Marshal French).

The same idea is expressed by the Generalissimo of the largest victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind. "Generally speaking, grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect.

It is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in order to make war or even to understand {3} war. No study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one _can_ in order to apply what one knows. In order to _do_ even a little one has to know a great deal, and to know it well. . . . The right solution imposes itself; namely, the application, according to circ.u.mstances, of fixed principles. . . . Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circ.u.mstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all"

(Marshal Foch); and in the words of Napoleon's own maxim: "The only way to learn the art of war is to read and _re-read_ the campaigns of the great captains."

THE "COMMON-SENSE" FALLACY.--The fallacy that warfare is "merely a matter of common sense" has been exposed by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in his contrast of the conduct of the American Civil War of 1861-1865, when it was controlled by President Lincoln and his Cabinet in Washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a professional soldier in the field (General Grant). Few mortals have possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than Abraham Lincoln, and yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans, which were frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like hindrance of the Confederate generals by Jefferson Davis this well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more disastrous.

"Men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from a.s.suming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (Henderson, "Stonewall Jackson").

In June, 1863, the Confederate Armies were scattered from Strasburg (in the Valley) to Fredericksburg (in Spottsylvania); General Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac in the field, begged to be allowed to attack Lee's Corps in detail. Success was certain, but permission was refused. The one and only idea of the Federal Government was to keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the Federal Capital.

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THE "HIGHER RANKS" FALLACY.--The same writer has also protested vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field is confined to the higher ranks. "Every officer in charge of a detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend upon his familiarity with strategical principles" ("The Science of War"). In the same way, General Sir E. B. Hamley, in "The Operations of War Explained," points out that a commander who cannot look beyond the local situation is not competent to command a detachment, however small. In addition, it must be remembered that superior knowledge of the art of war, thorough acquaintance with duty, and large experience, seldom fail to command submission and respect. Troops fight with marked success when they feel that their leader "knows his job," and in every Army troops are the critics of their leaders. The achievements of Jackson's forces in the _Shenandoah Valley Campaign_ of 1862 were almost superhuman, but under Stonewall Jackson the apparently impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved. General Ewell, one of Jackson's commanders, stated that he shivered whenever one of Stonewall's couriers approached him. "I was always expecting him to order me to a.s.sault the North Pole! But, if he _had_ ordered, we should have done it!"

THE NECESSITY FOR STUDY.--It is not pretended by any sane writer that study alone will make a perfect officer, for it is universally recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the knowledge gained by direct and immediate a.s.sociation with troops in the field; nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant, or confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute by nature. But "the quick, {5} the resolute, the daring, deciding and acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art they are called upon to practise" ("The Science of War"). Theory, applied to the profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious sound, but it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the advice, or to take warning from the practice, of Napoleon, of Wellington, of Foch, and of many of the most famous generals of history. "A man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of Napoleon's warfare would hardly fail in all circ.u.mstances to make his enemy's communications his first objective; and if Wellington's tactical methods had become a second nature to him it would be strange indeed if he were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack. . . . The same tactical principles regulate the combat of a large force and a small, and it is the thorough grasp of the principles, combined with courage and coolness, that makes a capable leader, whether of a platoon or an army corps" ("The Science of War").

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STRATEGY AND TACTICS

DEFINITIONS.--Strategy and Tactics have often been treated by non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the soldier's profession, but while they may indeed be separately defined it will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered.

The theatre of operations is the kingdom of Strategy, the province of Tactics is the field of battle, but when the battlefield is reached it so far transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of operations that no _tactical_ end is worth aiming at in preference to striking with all available strength at the field force of the enemy, and this, it will be seen, is the goal of all _strategical_ combinations. "Strategy must ever be striving for Tactical success; Tactics must ever keep in mind the Strategical situation and must constantly aim at creating fresh Strategical opportunities. Tactics without Strategy resembles a man without legs; Strategy without Tactics is like a man without arms" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "To seek out the enemy's armies--the centre of the adversary's power--in order to beat and destroy them; to adopt, with this sole end in view, the direction and tactics which will lead to it in the quickest and safest way: such is the whole mental att.i.tude of modern war. No Strategy can henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring Tactical results, victory by fighting" (Marshal Foch).

Local successes on the _field of battle_ often have effects that are felt throughout the _theatre of operations_. Lord Roberts's advance on Pretoria relieved the pressure on Kimberley in the west and on Ladysmith in the east, and these centres are upwards of 300 miles apart. _The {7} First Battle of the Somme_ (July 1, 1916) not only relieved the pressure on Verdun but held in position large enemy forces which would otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the East. General Byng's surprise attack at Cambrai (November 20, 1917) was followed by a determined counter-attack by the Germans on November 30, which appeared to nullify the results achieved from November 20 to 25; but "there is evidence that German divisions intended for the Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable that the further concentration of German forces against Italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our Allies were making their first stand on the Piave Line" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

A tactical defeat may sometimes be risked to serve a strategic end. In June, 1864, General Hunter was operating with a Federal army in the Shenandoah Valley, and owing to shortage of supplies was forced to fall back. In so doing he uncovered the National Capital, and General Early was sent by the Confederate Commander-in-Chief to capture Washington.

General Grant took immediate steps to protect the capital by the dispatch of troops, and to further this end, General Lew Wallace,[1] on his own initiative, confronted Early's corps at the _Monocacy_ on July 8, 1864. He met the enemy and was defeated, but he delayed Early's corps until the troops sent by Grant were in position. "If Early had been but one day _earlier_ he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory" (Grant's "Memoirs"). A tactical success may be not only useless, but actually inopportune, if it is out of accord with the plans of the higher command. On the morning of June 18, 1815, Marshal Grouchy was in {8} pursuit of the Prussians whom Napoleon had defeated on June 16 at Ligny. Although urged "to march to the sound of the cannon" (at Waterloo), Grouchy pushed on eastwards, where he found Thielmann's Prussian Corps of 16,000 men holding the pa.s.sage across the Dyle at Wavre. The _Battle of Wavre_ was begun at 4 p.m. on June 18, and by 11 a.m. on the next day Grouchy was victorious. But his victory was barren. His tactical achievement was useless to the higher command and had exposed his own force to considerable danger. As he sat down to pen a vainglorious dispatch to the Emperor, he received the news that Napoleon was a fugitive and the Imperial Army defeated and scattered. Grouchy's feeble and false manoeuvres had permitted Blucher to join forces with Wellington. To the Emperor's dismay it was the Prussians who came from the eastward to the sound of the cannon: "C'est les Prussiens qui viennent!"

MORAL.--It is seen that Strategy may be defined as the art of concentrating troops at the required strength, at the required time, at the required place, for the purpose of overthrowing the enemy's main armies; while Tactics may be defined as the art of arranging and handling troops so concentrated for the purpose of defeating the enemy when encountered. But although Strategy may be considered as the art of bringing an opponent to battle, and Tactics as the art of defeating him in action, there are excluded from these definitions many considerations which influence a commander in the field.

The art of war does not commence with a strategical reconnaissance from the air, or the saddle, to ascertain whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, hostile troops are being concentrated.

From information so obtained, the physical force of an enemy may indeed be determined; but "in war (said Napoleon) moral force is to the physical (that is, to numbers and {9} armament) as three to one," and upwards of a hundred years later the same idea has again been expressed. "To understand war you must go beyond its instruments and materials; you must study in the book of history, conscientiously a.n.a.lysed, armies, troops in movement and in action, with their needs, their pa.s.sions, their devotions, their capacities of all kinds. That is the essence of the subject, that is the point of departure for a reasonable study of the art of war" (Marshal Foch). And while dealing with moral force it must be remembered that the moral force of opposing leaders of nations or of armies is at least as important as that of the nations or armies themselves, for a war is a struggle between human intelligences rather than between ma.s.ses of men. "There have been soldiers' battles but never a soldiers' campaign" ("The Science of War"). "It was not the Roman legions which conquered Gaul, it was Caesar. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne" (Napoleon). A commander must, therefore, take into account the character, the moral fibre, as well as the ability and the means at the disposal of his adversary. He must project his mind to his adversary's council chamber, and putting himself in his place must conjecture how a man of that character and of that ability will act under the given circ.u.mstances.

History supplies many examples of mental activity of this kind.[2]

Napoleon predicted the impetuous onset of the Russian left wing against his right at _Austerlitz_, Dec. 2, 1805, because he knew the temperament of the Tsar Alexander. At Austerlitz, the most brilliant of all his battles, Napoleon had 70,000 troops and was confronted by 80,000 Austrians and Russians drawn up on the Heights of Pratzen. His plan was to draw the weight of the Russian attack against his right--which was so disposed as to invite the headstrong and {10} self-confident Tsar "to administer a lesson in generalship to Napoleon"--and then to launch a superior attack against the Heights, which contained a village and a knoll, the key to the position; and finally to hurl his General Reserve in a decisive counter-attack on the Russians when they were involved in battle with his right wing. When the rattle of musketry and booming of the guns showed that his right was engaged, Napoleon launched Murat, Bernadotte, and Soult against the allied centre; when Soult was master of the village and the knoll, and as the broken remnants of the enemy's centre were streaming down the reverse slopes of the Pratzen Ridge, the French centre wheeled round to the right and threw itself upon the flank and rear of the Russians, who were still heavily engaged in their original attack. These operations were completely successful and over 40,000 of the opposing armies were accounted for. Wellington defeated Soult at Sauroren in the Pyrenees (July 28, 1813) by taking advantage of a minor incident. He had ridden forward to see the disposition of the French forces, and as his men cheered him all along the line, he turned to his staff and said, "Soult is a very cautious commander. He will delay his attack to find out what those cheers mean; that will give time for the Sixth Division to arrive and I shall beat him"--and the event turned out exactly as he had predicted. Generals R. E. Lee and T. J. Jackson frequently played upon the nervousness of President Lincoln for the safety of Washington, and by threatening to cross the Potomac induced him to withdraw troops that were advancing against Richmond.

NATIONAL MORAL.--The moral fibre of the nation and of the troops must also be taken into consideration. "The common theory that, in order to win, an army must have superiority of rifles and cannon, better bases, more wisely chosen positions, is radically false. For it leaves out of account the most important part of the {11} problem, that which animates it and makes it live, man--with his moral, intellectual, and physical qualities" (Marshal Foch).

DISCIPLINE AND MORALITY.--The discipline, courage, and endurance of the troops, as well as the cause for which they are fighting, are at least of equal importance to their armament and numbers. "If their discipline and leading be defective, Providence seldom sides with the big battalions . . . and troops that cannot march are untrustworthy auxiliaries" ("The Science of War"). "An army which cannot march well is almost certain to be outmanoeuvred. A general whose strategy is based upon time calculations that are rendered inaccurate by the breakdown of the marching power of his troops runs grave risk of disaster. It is therefore necessary that the question of marching should be studied, not only by generals and staff officers, but by regimental officers and men. It is on the latter that the hardships and exertions fall, and their cheerful endurance can best be ensured by teaching them the great results attainable by an army which can move faster and further than its adversary, as well as the dangers incurred by an army which allows itself to be out-marched. . . . Superior mobility alone enabled Frederick the Great to move 'like a panther round an ox' so as to place his army across the enemy's flank. The discipline of his troops enabled him to apply the principles of combination" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "Nothing compensates for absence of discipline; and the constant watchfulness that is necessary in war, even when danger seems remote, can only be secured by discipline, which makes of duty a habit" (General R. Taylor, C.S.

Army). At the _Battle of Hastings_ (Oct. 14, 1066) lack of discipline and disobedience of orders changed the fate of the English nation and brought about the Norman Conquest. Harold, the English king, had defeated the forces of Harold Hadraade, {12} King of Norway, at Stamford Bridge in Yorkshire (Sept. 25, 1066). Four days later, Duke William of Normandy landed in Pevensey Bay, with 60,000 horse and foot.

Harold hastened south to meet him with troops exhausted by battle and marching. After halting six days in London to collect reinforcements, the English force entrenched itself on the hill of Sautlache and awaited attack. The Normans were unable to penetrate the abattis, but they gained the victory which changed the whole history of the English race by the stratagem of a feigned retreat. Harold's undisciplined auxiliaries, contrary to direct orders (which were obeyed by the "regular" troops in the centre), swarmed out of the palisades in pursuit of the fleeing Normans, who suddenly turned about and penetrated the English lines mingled with the discomfited auxiliaries.

Had the "irregulars" shown the same sense of discipline as the "regulars" there had been no Norman Conquest.

With regard to marching, General T. J. Jackson once observed, in reply to an allusion to his severe marching, that "it is better to lose one man in marching than five in fighting." Acting on this principle he invariably surprised his enemy, the most notable instances being his surprise of Milroy at McDowell, of Banks and Fremont in the Valley, of McClellan's right at Gaines's Mill, of Pope at the Second Mana.s.sas, and his last and greatest of Hooker at Chancellorsville.

TIME.--Time is often a supreme factor in warfare, and the superior mobility of troops will gain for their commander a great strategical advantage. Reserves are of little value if they cannot be concentrated at the right spot at the right moment, and steamships, railways, and mechanical transport thus play an important part in war. The mobility of infantry is often the deciding factor in battle, and campaigns have been won by the legs of soldiers as much as by their arms.

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WEATHER.--The weather is an important factor in war, and its influence appears to have increased in modern times. Mists and fogs militate against observation by aircraft, and poor visibility interferes with the work of artillery. Roads are broken up by the weight of modern traffic, and in a sh.e.l.led area the craters become impa.s.sable after a few days rain, making the supply of food, stores and ammunition a serious problem. Such conditions multiply the difficulties of attack, as the ground of the encounter consists princ.i.p.ally of hastily dug trenches which become running streams of mud; and they a.s.sist the defence, as the pursuit is delayed, while the ground behind the defending force is less liable to be churned up by sh.e.l.l fire. The bad weather of September, 1916, caused a delay in the Allied advance against Sailly-Saillesel and Le Transloy and made it necessary to abandon the plan at the moment when previous successes seemed to have brought it within the grasp of the commanders. As the season advanced and the bad weather continued the plans of the Allies had to be reduced, and the brilliant successes already achieved afforded some indication of what might have been accomplished had the weather permitted the plans to be carried out as originally intended.

HEALTH.--"Wars may be won or lost by the standard of health and moral of the opposing forces. Moral depends to a very large extent upon the feeding and general well-being of the troops. Badly supplied troops will invariably be low in moral, and an army ravaged by disease ceases to be a fighting force. The feeding and health of the fighting forces are dependent upon the rearward services, and so it may be argued that with the rearward services rests victory or defeat" (Marshal Haig).

HUMAN NATURE.--Human nature is affected by discipline, fear, hunger, confidence in or distrust of leaders, and by a variety of other influences, and human {14} nature is more important than armament and numbers. "No great deeds have ever been performed by an army in which the qualities of courage and steadfast endurance are wanting" (General Sir E. B. Hamley), and the steadfast endurance of a nation and of its leaders is also a factor of supreme importance. Time occupied in preparation for battle, or in manoeuvring for the "weather gauge," is seldom wasted; but it involves the risk of a weak-kneed executive yielding to popular clamour. Against the strategical and tactical genius of Hannibal, Quintus Fabius Maximus invoked the aid of time to afford him opportunities to strike. His "Fabian Tactics" have become proverbial, and earned for him at the time the opprobrious epithet "Cunctator," which the epigram[3] of Ennius has immortalised in his honour. Popular clamour led to a division of authority with Varro, and to the disaster of _Cannae_ (B.C. 216). General G. B. McClellan was recalled from the Army of the Potomac on account of his failure to convert the drawn battle of the _Antietam_ (Sept. 17, 1862) into a victory, and the army was handed over to General Burnside, who suffered defeat at _Fredericksburg_ (Dec. 13, 1862) with terrible slaughter.

"But the stout heart of the American nation quickly rallied, and inspired by the loyal determination of Abraham Lincoln the United States turned once more to their apparently hopeless task" (Colonel G.

F. R. Henderson). McClellan's forte was organisation, and although at first slow in the field, he had a.s.sembled and trained a magnificent fighting force, with which he was "feeling his way to victory." He suffered defeat indeed at _Gaines's Mill_ (June 27, 1862), the first act in the drama of the _Seven Days' Battle around Richmond_. Day after day he fell back through swamp and forest, battling with Lee's victorious troops. But there was no further disaster. Under the most adverse and dispiriting circ.u.mstances the Army of the Potomac fairly held their own until {15} they reached the impregnable position of Malvern Hill. There McClellan turned at bay and repulsed with heavy slaughter the disjointed attacks of the Army of Northern Virginia. He had withdrawn his army intact and had effected a change of base, unknown to the Confederate General Staff, from the York River to the James. This proved his strategic power, as did the dispositions at _Malvern Hill_ (July 1, 1862) his tactical ability, and his work was accomplished in spite of the intrigues of politicians and the opposition of the executive, and in face of the military genius of Generals R. E. Lee and T. J. Jackson. At the Antietam he forced the Confederates to give battle, and although tactically indecisive, the engagement caused the withdrawal of Lee's army into Virginia.

McClellan's successors were far less competent, and the magnificent Army of the Potomac met with frequent disasters, until it formed the solid nucleus of the forces of General Meade, which inflicted upon Lee his first defeat and saved the Union at _Gettysburg_ (July 1-3, 1863), and finally under Grant, in conjunction with the Armies of the West, crushed the life out of the Confederacy at _Appomattox_.

General G. H. Thomas, in command of the U.S. Army of the c.u.mberland, refused battle with the Confederates in Nashville until he had prepared cavalry and made every other arrangement for pursuit. Constancy of purpose was the salient feature of Thomas's military character. He would not fight until he was ready. The civil authorities urgently demanded that he should advance. So great was the tension that Grant finally sent General J. A. Logan to supersede Thomas; but before Logan arrived Thomas had won the _Battle of Nashville_ (Dec. 15-16, 1864), the most crushing victory of the war.

Lord Roberts landed in Cape Town on Jan. 10, 1900, and popular expectation was degenerating into impatience when a co-ordinated advance of French's cavalry and the Sixth and Ninth Infantry Divisions {16} resulted in the relief of beleagured cities distant from the field of battle, and in the surrender on the field of Cronje's force at _Paardeberg_ (Feb. 27, 1900), on the anniversary of Majuba.