Still, as I was glad to acknowledge, I did come to a nugget here and there; though not, so far as my experience went, in the discussions on the philosophy of the physical sciences, but in the chapters on speculative and practical sociology. In these there was indeed much to arouse the liveliest interest in one whose boat had broken away from the old moorings, and who had been content "to lay out an anchor by the stern" until daylight should break and the fog clear. Nothing could be more interesting to a student of biology than to see the study of the biological sciences laid down, as an essential part of the prolegomena of a new view of social phenomena. Nothing could be more satisfactory to a worshipper of the severe truthfulness of science than the attempt to dispense with all beliefs, save such as could brave the light, and seek, rather than fear, criticism; while, to a lover of courage and outspokenness, nothing could be more touching than the placid announcement on the t.i.tle-page of the "Discours sur l'Ensemble du Positivisme," that its author proposed

"Reorganiser, sans Dieu ni roi, Par le culte systematique de l'Humanite,"

the shattered frame of modern society.

In those days I knew my "Faust" pretty well, and, after reading this word of might, I was minded to chant the well-known stanzas of the "Geisterchor"--

"Weh! Weh!

Die schone welt.

Sie sturzt, sie zerfallt Wir tragen Die Trummern ins Nichts hinuber.

Machtiger Der Erdensohne, Prachtiger, Baue sie wieder In deinem Busen baue sie auf."

Great, however, was my perplexity, not to say disappointment, as I followed the progress of this "mighty son of earth" in his work of reconstruction. Undoubtedly "Dieu" disappeared, but the "Nouveau Grand-etre Supreme," a gigantic fetish, turned out bran-new by M.

Comte's own hands, reigned in his stead. "Roi" also was not heard of; but, in his place, I found a minutely-defined social organization, which, if it ever came into practice, would exert a despotic authority such as no sultan has rivalled, and no Puritan presbytery, in its palmiest days, could hope to excel. While, as for the "culte systematique de l'Humanite," I, in my blindness, could not distinguish it from sheer Popery, with M. Comte in the chair of St. Peter, and the names of most of the saints changed. To quote "Faust" again, I found myself saying with Gretchen,--

"Ungefahr sagt das der Pfarrer auch Nur mit ein bischen andern Worten."

Rightly or wrongly, this was the impression which, all those years ago, the study of M. Comte's works left on my mind, combined with the conviction, which I shall always be thankful to him for awakening in me, that the organization of society upon a new and purely scientific basis is not only practicable, but is the only political object much worth fighting for.

As I have said, that part of M. Comte's writings which deals with the philosophy of physical science appeared to me to possess singularly little value, and to show that he had but the most superficial, and merely second-hand, knowledge of most branches of what is usually understood by science. I do not mean by this merely to say that Comte was behind our present knowledge, or that he was unacquainted with the details of the science of his own day. No one could justly make such defects cause of complaint in a philosophical writer of the past generation. What struck me was his want of apprehension of the great features of science; his strange mistakes as to the merits of his scientific contemporaries; and his ludicrously erroneous notions about the part which some of the scientific doctrines current in his time were destined to play in the future. With these impressions in my mind, no one will be surprised if I acknowledge that, for these sixteen years, it has been a periodical source of irritation to me to find M. Comte put forward as a representative of scientific thought; and to observe that writers whose philosophy had its legitimate parent in Hume, or in themselves, were labelled "Comtists" or "Positivists" by public writers, even in spite of vehement protests to the contrary. It has cost Mr. Mill hard rubbings to get that label off; and I watch Mr. Spencer, as one regards a good man struggling with adversity, still engaged in eluding its adhesiveness, and ready to tear away skin and all, rather than let it stick. My own turn might come next; and, therefore, when an eminent prelate the other day gave currency and authority to the popular confusion, I took an opportunity of incidentally revindicating Hume's property in the so-called "New Philosophy," and, at the same time, of repudiating Comtism on my own behalf.[13]

The few lines devoted to Comtism in my paper on the "Physical Basis of Life" were, in intention, strictly limited to these two purposes. But they seem to have given more umbrage than I intended they should, to the followers of M. Comte in this country, for some of whom, let me observe in pa.s.sing, I entertain a most unfeigned respect; and Mr. Congreve's recent article gives expression to the displeasure which I have excited among the members of the Comtian body.

Mr. Congreve, in a peroration which seems especially intended to catch the attention of his readers, indignantly challenges me to admire M.

Comte's life, "to deny that it has a marked character of grandeur about it;" and he uses some very strong language because I show no sign of veneration for his idol. I confess I do not care to occupy myself with the denigration of a man who, on the whole, deserves to be spoken of with respect. Therefore, I shall enter into no statement of the reasons which lead me unhesitatingly to accept Mr. Congreve's challenge, and to refuse to recognise anything which deserves the name of grandeur of character in M. Comte, unless it be his arrogance, which is undoubtedly sublime. All I have to observe is, that if Mr. Congreve is justified in saying that I speak with a tinge of contempt for his spiritual father, the reason for such colouring of my language is to be found in the fact, that, when I wrote, I had but just arisen from the perusal of a work with which he is doubtless well acquainted, M. Littre's "Auguste Comte et la Philosophic Positive."

Though there are tolerably fixed standards of right and wrong, and even of generosity and meanness, it may be said that the beauty, or grandeur, of a life is more or less a matter of taste; and Mr. Congreve's notions of literary excellence are so different from mine that, it may be, we should diverge as widely in our judgment of moral beauty or ugliness.

Therefore, while retaining my own notions, I do not presume to quarrel with his. But when Mr. Congreve devotes a great deal of laboriously guarded insinuation to the endeavour to lead the public to believe that I have been guilty of the dishonesty of having criticised Comte without having read him, I must be permitted to remind him that he has neglected the well-known maxim of a diplomatic sage, "If you want to damage a man, you should say what is probable, as well as what is true."

And when Mr. Congreve speaks of my having an advantage over him in my introduction of "Christianity" into the phrase that "M. Comte's philosophy, in practice, might be described as Catholicism _minus_ Christianity;" intending thereby to suggest that I have, by so doing, desired to profit by an appeal to the _odium theologic.u.m_,--he lays himself open to a very unpleasant retort.

What if I were to suggest that Mr. Congreve had not read Comte's works; and that the phrase "the context shows that the view of the writer ranges--however superficially--over the whole works. This is obvious from the mention of Catholicism," demonstrates that Mr. Congreve has no acquaintance with the "Philosophie Positive"? I think the suggestion would be very unjust and unmannerly, and I shall not make it. But the fact remains, that this little epigram of mine, which has so greatly provoked Mr. Congreve, is neither more nor less than a condensed paraphrase of the following pa.s.sage, which is to be found at page 344 of the fifth volume of the "Philosophie Positive:"[14]--

"La seule solution possible de ce grand probleme historique, qui n'a jamais pu etre philosophiquement pose jusqu'ici, consiste a concevoir, en sens radicalement inverse des notions habituelles, _que ce qui devait necessairement perir ainsi, dans le catholicisme, c'etait la doctrine, et non l'organisation_, qui n'a ete pa.s.sagerement ruinee que par suite de son inevitable adherence elementaire a la philosophie theologique, destinee a succomber graduellement sous l'irresistible emanc.i.p.ation de la raison humaine; _tandis qu'une telle const.i.tution, convenablement reconstruite sur des bases intellectuelles a la fois plus etendues et plus stables, devra finalement presider a l'indispensable reorganisation spirituelle des societes modernes, sauf les differences essentielles spontanement correspondantes a l'extreme diversite des doctrines fondamentales_; a moins de supposer, ce qui serait certainement contradictoire a l'ensemble des lois de notre nature, que les immenses efforts de tant de grands hommes, secondes par la perseverante sollicitude des nations civilisees, dans la fondation seculaire de ce chef-d'oeuvre politique de la sagesse humaine, doivent etre enfin irrevocablement perdus pour l'elite de l'humanite sauf les resultats, capitaux mais provisoires, qui s'y rapportaient immediatement. Cette explication generale, deja evidemment motivee par la suite des considerations propres a ce chapitre, sera de plus en plus confirmee par tout le reste de notre operation historique, _dont elle const.i.tuera spontanement la princ.i.p.ale conclusion politique."_

Nothing can be clearer. Comte's ideal, as stated by himself, is Catholic organization without Catholic doctrine, or, in other words, Catholicism _minus_ Christianity. Surely it is utterly unjustifiable to ascribe to me base motives for stating a man's doctrines, as nearly as may be, in his own words!

My readers would hardly be interested were I to follow Mr. Congreve any further, or I might point out that the fact of his not having heard me lecture is hardly a safe ground for his speculations as to what I do not teach. Nor do I feel called upon to give any opinion as to M. Comte's merits or demerits as regards sociology. Mr. Mill (whose competence to speak on these matters I suppose will not be questioned, even by Mr.

Congreve) has dealt with M. Comte's philosophy from this point of view, with a vigour and authority to which I cannot for a moment aspire; and with a severity, not unfrequently amounting to contempt, which I have not the wish, if I had the power, to surpa.s.s. I, as a mere student in these questions, am content to abide by Mr. Mill's judgment until some one shows cause for its reversal, and I decline to enter into a discussion which I have not provoked.

The sole obligation which lies upon me is to justify so much as still remains without justification of what I have written respecting Positivism--namely, the opinion expressed in the following paragraph:--

"In so far as my study of what specially characterises the Positive Philosophy has led me, I find therein little or nothing of any scientific value, and a great deal which is as thoroughly antagonistic to the very essence of science as any thing in ultramontane Catholicism."

Here are two propositions: the first, that the "Philosophie Positive"

contains little or nothing of any scientific value; the second, that Comtism is, in spirit, anti-scientific. I shall endeavour to bring forward ample evidence in support of both.

I. No one who possesses even a superficial acquaintance with physical science can read Comte's "Lecons" without becoming aware that he was at once singularly devoid of real knowledge on these subjects, and singularly unlucky. What is to be thought of the contemporary of Young and of Fresnel, who never misses an opportunity of casting scorn upon the hypothesis of an ether--the fundamental basis not only of the undulatory theory of light, but of so much else in modern physics--and whose contempt for the intellects of some of the strongest men of his generation was such, that he puts forward the mere existence of night as a refutation of the undulatory theory?[15] What a wonderful gauge of his own value as a scientific critic does he afford, by whom we are informed that phrenology is a great science, and psychology a chimaera; that Gall was one of the great men of his age, and that Cuvier was "brilliant but superficial"![16] How unlucky must one consider the bold speculator who, just before the dawn of modern histology--which is simply the application of the microscope to anatomy--reproves what he calls "the abuse of microscopic investigations," and "the exaggerated credit"

attached to them; who, when the morphological uniformity of the tissues of the great majority of plants and animals was on the eve of being demonstrated, treated with ridicule those who attempt to refer all tissues to a "tissu generateur," formed by "le chimerique et inintelligible a.s.semblage d'une sorte de monades organiques, qui seraient des lors les vrais elements primordiaux de tout corps vivant;"[17] and who finally tells us, that all the objections against a linear arrangement of the species of living beings are in their essence foolish, and that the order of the animal series is "necessarily linear,"[18] when the exact contrary is one of the best-established and the most important truths of zoology. Appeal to mathematicians, astronomers, physicists,[19] chemists, biologists, about the "Philosophie Positive," and they all, with one consent, begin to make protestation that, whatever M. Comte's other merits, he has shed no light upon the philosophy of their particular studies.

To be just, however, it must be admitted that even M. Comte's most ardent disciples are content to be judiciously silent about his knowledge or appreciation of the sciences themselves, and prefer to base their master's claims to scientific authority upon his "law of the three states," and his "cla.s.sification of the sciences." But here, also, I must join issue with them as completely as others--notably Mr. Herbert Spencer--have done before me. A critical examination of what M. Comte has to say about the "law of the three states" brings out nothing but a series of more or less contradictory statements of an imperfectly apprehended truth; and his "cla.s.sification of the sciences," whether regarded historically or logically, is, in my judgment, absolutely worthless.

Let us consider the law of "the three states" as it is put before us in the opening of the first Lecon of the "Philosophie Positive:"--

"En etudiant ainsi le developpement total de l'intelligence humaine dans ses diverses spheres d'activite, depuis son premier essor le plus simple jusqu'a nos jours, je crois avoir decouvert une grande loi fondamentale, a laquelle il est a.s.sujetti par une necessite invariable, et qui me semble pouvoir etre solidement etablie, soit sur les preuves rationelles fournies par la connaissance de notre organisation, soit sur les verifications historiques resultant d'un examen attentif du pa.s.se. Cette loi consiste en ce que chacune de nos conceptions princ.i.p.ales, chaque branche de nos connaissances, pa.s.se successivement par trois etats theoriques differents; l'etat theologique, ou fictif; l'etat metaphysique, ou abstrait; l'etat scientifique, ou positif. En d'autres termes, l'esprit humain, par sa nature, emploie successivement dans chacune de ses recherches trois methodes de philosopher, dont _le caractere est essentiellement different et meme radicalement oppose_; d'abord la methode theologique, ensuite la methode metaphysique, et enfin la methode positive. De la, trois sortes de philosophie, ou de systemes generaux de conceptions sur l'ensemble des phenomenes _qui s'excluent mutuellement_; la premiere est le point de depart necessaire de l'intelligence humaine; la troisieme, son etat fixe et definitif; la seconde est uniquement destinee a servir de transition."[20]

Nothing can be more precise than these statements, which may be put into the following propositions:--

(a) The human intellect is subjected to the law by an invariable necessity, which is demonstrable, _a priori_, from the nature and const.i.tution of the intellect; while, as a matter of historical fact, the human intellect has been subjected to the law.

(b) Every branch of human knowledge pa.s.ses through the three states, necessarily beginning with the first stage.

(c) The three states mutually exclude one another, being essentially different, and even radically opposed.

Two questions present themselves. Is M. Comte consistent with himself in making these a.s.sertions? And is he consistent with fact? I reply to both questions in the negative; and, as regards the first, I bring forward as my witness a remarkable pa.s.sage which is to be found in the fourth volume of the "Philosophic Positive" (p. 491), when M. Comte had had time to think out, a little more fully, the notions crudely stated in the first volume:--

"A proprement parler, la philosophie theologique, meme dans notre premiere enfance, individuelle ou sociale, n'a jamais pu etre rigoureus.e.m.e.nt universelle, c'est-a-dire que, pour les ordres quelconques de phenomenes, _les faits les plus simples et les plus communs ont toujours ete regardes comme essentiellement a.s.sujettis a des lois naturelles, au lieu d'etre attribues a l'arbitraire volonte des agents surnaturels_. L'ill.u.s.tre Adam Smith a, par example, tres-heureus.e.m.e.nt remarque dans ses essais philosophiques, qu'on ne trouvait, en aucun temps ni en aucun pays, un dieu pour la pesanteur. _Il en est ainsi, en general, meme a l'egard des sujets les plus compliques, envers tous les phenomenes a.s.sez elementaires et a.s.sez familiers pour que la parfaite invariabilite de leurs relations effectives ait toujours du frapper spontanement l'observateur le moins prepare_. Dans l'ordre moral et social, qu'une vaine opposition voudrait aujourd'hui systematiquement interdire a la philosophie positive, il y a eu necessairement, en tout temps, la pensee des lois naturelles, relativement aux plus simples phenomenes de la vie journaliere, comme l'exige evidemment la conduite generale de notre existence reelle, individuelle ou sociale, qui n'aurait pu jamais comporter aucune prevoyance quelconque, si tous les phenomenes humains avaient ete rigoureus.e.m.e.nt attribues a des agents surnaturels, puisque des lors la priere aurait logiquement const.i.tue la seule ressource imaginable pour influer sur le cours habituel des actions humaines.

_On doit meme remarquer, a ce sujet, que c'est, au contraire, l'ebauche spontanee des premieres lois naturelles propres aux actes individuels ou sociaux qui, fictivement transportee a tous les phenomenes du monde exterieur, a d'abord fourni, d'apres nos explications precedentes, le vrai principe fondamental de la philosophie theologique. Ainsi, le germe elementaire de la philosophie positive est certainement tout aussi primitif au fond que celui de la philosophie theologique elle-meme, quoi qu'il n'ait pu se developper que beaucoup plus tard._ Une telle notion importe extremement a la parfaite rationalite de notre theorie sociologique, puisque la vie humaine ne pouvant jamais offrir aucune veritable creation quelconque, mais toujours une simple evolution graduelle, l'essor final de l'esprit positif deviendrait scientifiquement incomprehensible, si, des l'origine, on n'en concevait, a tous egards, les premiers rudiments necessaires.

Depuis cette situation primitive, a mesure que nos observations se sont spontanement etendues et generalisees, cet essor, d'abord a peine appreciable, a constamment suivi, sans cesser longtemps d'etre subalterne, une progression tres-lente, mais continue, la philosophie theologique restant toujours reservee pour les phenomenes, de moins en moins nombreux, dont les lois naturelles ne pouvaient encore etre aucunement connues."

Compare the propositions implicitly laid down here with those contained in the earlier volume. (a) As a matter of fact, the human intellect has _not_ been invariably subjected to the law of the three states, and therefore the necessity of the law _cannot_ be demonstrable _a priori_.

(b) Much of our knowledge of all kinds has _not_ pa.s.sed through the three states, and more particularly, as M. Comte is careful to point out, not through the first, (c) The positive state has more or less co-existed with the theological, from the dawn of human intelligence.

And, by way of completing the series of contradictions, the a.s.sertion that the three states are "essentially different and even radically opposed," is met a little lower on the same page by the declaration that "the metaphysical state is, at bottom, nothing but a simple general modification of the first;" while, in the fortieth Lecon, as also in the interesting early essay ent.i.tled "Considerations philosophiques sur les Sciences et les Savants (1825)," the three states are practically reduced to two. "Le veritable esprit general de toute philosophie theologique ou metaphysique consiste a prendre pour principe, dans l'explication des phenomenes du monde exterieur, notre sentiment immediat des phenomenes humains; tandis que au contraire, la philosophie positive est toujours caracterisee, non moins profondement, par la subordination necessaire et rationnelle de la conception de l'homme a celle du monde."[21]

I leave M. Cointe's disciples to settle which of these contradictory statements expresses their master's real meaning. All I beg leave to remark is, that men of science are not in the habit of paying much attention to "laws" stated in this fashion.

The second statement is undoubtedly far more rational and consistent with fact than the first; but I cannot think it is a just or adequate account of the growth of intelligence, either in the individual man, or in the human species. Any one who will carefully watch the development of the intellect of a child will perceive that, from the first, its mind is mirroring nature in two different ways. On the one hand, it is merely drinking in sensations and building up a.s.sociations, while it forms conceptions of things and their relations which are more thoroughly "positive," or devoid of entanglement with hypotheses of any kind, than they will ever be in after-life. No child has recourse to imaginary personifications in order to account for the ordinary properties of objects which are not alive, or do not represent living things. It does not imagine that the taste of sugar is brought about by a G.o.d of sweetness, or that a spirit of jumping causes a ball to bound. Such phaenomena, which form the basis of a very large part of its ideas, are taken as matters of course--as ultimate facts which suggest no difficulty and need no explanation. So far as all these common, though important, phaenomena are concerned, the child's mind is in what M. Comte would call the "positive" state.

But, side by side with this mental condition, there rises another. The child becomes aware of itself as a source of action and a subject of pa.s.sion and of thought. The acts which follow upon its own desires are among the most interesting and prominent of surrounding occurrences; and these acts, again, plainly arise either out of affections caused by surrounding things, or of other changes in itself. Among these surrounding things, the most interesting and important are mother and father, brethren and nurses. The hypothesis that these wonderful creatures are of like nature to itself is speedily forced upon the child's mind; and this primitive piece of anthropomorphism turns out to be a highly successful speculation, which finds its justification at every turn. No wonder, then, that it is extended to other similarly interesting objects which are not too unlike these--to the dog, the cat, and the canary, the doll, the toy, and the picture-book--that these are endowed with wills and affections, and with capacities for being "good"

and "naughty." But surely it would be a mere perversion of language to call this a "theological" state of mind, either in the proper sense of the word "theological," or as contrasted with "scientific" or "positive." The child does not worship either father or mother, dog or doll. On the contrary, nothing is more curious than the absolute irreverence, if I may so say, of a kindly-treated young child; its tendency to believe in itself as the centre of the universe, and its disposition to exercise despotic tyranny over those who could crush it with a finger.

Still less is there anything unscientific, or anti-scientific, in this infantile anthropomorphism. The child observes that many phaenomena are the consequences of affections of itself; it soon has excellent reasons for the belief that many other phaenomena are consequences of the affections of other beings, more or less like itself. And having thus good evidence for believing that many of the most interesting occurrences about it are explicable on the hypothesis that they are the work of intelligences like itself--having discovered a _vera causa_ for many phaenomena--why should the child limit the application of so fruitful an hypothesis? The dog has a sort of intelligence, so has the cat; why should not the doll and the picture-book also have a share, proportioned to their likeness to intelligent things?

The only limit which does arise is exactly that which, as a matter of science, should arise; that is to say, the anthropomorphic interpretation is applied only to those phaenomena which, in their general nature, or their apparent capriciousness, resemble those which the child observes to be caused by itself, or by beings like itself. All the rest are regarded as things which explain themselves, or are inexplicable.

It is only at a later stage of intellectual development that the intelligence of man awakes to the apparent conflict between the anthropomorphic, and what I may call the physical,[22] aspect of nature, and either endeavours to extend the anthropomorphic view over the whole of nature--which is the tendency of theology; or to give the same exclusive predominance to the physical view--which is the tendency of science; or adopts a middle course, and taking from the anthropomorphic view its tendency to personify, and from the physical view its tendency to exclude volition and affection, ends in what M.

Comte calls the "metaphysical" state--"metaphysical," in M. Comte's writings, being a general term of abuse for anything he does not like.

What is true of the individual is, _mutatis mutandis_, true of the intellectual development of the species. It is absurd to say of men in a state of primitive savagery, that all their conceptions are in a theological state. Nine-tenths of them are eminently realistic, and as "positive" as ignorance and narrowness can make them. It no more occurs to a savage than it does to a child, to ask the why of the daily and ordinary occurrences which form the greater part of his mental life. But in regard to the more striking, or out-of-the-way, events, which force him to speculate, he is highly anthropomorphic; and, as compared with a child, his anthropomorphism is complicated by the intense impression which the death of his own kind makes upon him, as indeed it well may.

The warrior, full of ferocious energy, perhaps the despotic chief of his tribe, is suddenly struck down. A child may insult the man a moment before so awful; a fly rests, undisturbed, on the lips from which undisputed command issued. And yet the bodily aspect of the man seems hardly more altered than when he slept, and, sleeping, seemed to himself to leave his body and wander through dreamland. What then if that something, which is the essence of the man, has really been made to wander by the violence done to it, and is unable, or has forgotten, to come back to its sh.e.l.l? Will it not retain somewhat of the powers it possessed during life? May it not help us if it be pleased, or (as seems to be by far the more general impression) hurt us if it be angered? Will it not be well to do towards it those things which would have soothed the man and put him in good humour during his life? It is impossible to study trustworthy accounts of savage thought without seeing, that some such train of ideas as this, lies at the bottom of their speculative beliefs.

There are savages without G.o.d, in any proper sense of the word, but none without ghosts. And the Fetishism, Ancestor-worship, Hero-worship, and Demonology of primitive savages, are all, I believe, different manners of expression of their belief in ghosts, and of the anthropomorphic interpretation of out-of-the-way events, which is its concomitant.

Witchcraft and sorcery are the practical expressions of these beliefs; and they stand in the same relation to religious worship as the simple anthropomorphism of children, or savages, does to theology.

In the progress of the species from savagery to advanced civilization, anthropomorphism grows into theology, while physicism (if I may so call it) develops into science; but the development of the two is contemporaneous, not successive. For each, there long exists an a.s.sured province which is not invaded by the other; while, between the two, lies a debateable land, ruled by a sort of b.a.s.t.a.r.ds, who owe their complexion to physicism and their substance to anthropomorphism, and are M. Comte's particular aversions--metaphysical ent.i.ties.

But, as the ages lengthen, the borders of Physicism increase. The territories of the b.a.s.t.a.r.ds are all annexed to science; and even Theology, in her purer forms, has ceased to be anthropomorphic, however she may talk. Anthropomorphism has taken stand in its last fortress--man himself. But science closely invests the walls; and Philosophers gird themselves for battle upon the last and greatest of all speculative problems--Does human nature possess any free, volitional, or truly anthropomorphic element, or is it only the cunningest of all Nature's clocks? Some, among whom I count myself, think that the battle will for ever remain a drawn one, and that, for all practical purposes, this result is as good as anthropomorphism winning the day.

The cla.s.sification of the sciences, which, in the eyes of M. Comte's adherents, const.i.tutes his second great claim to the dignity of a scientific philosopher, appears to me to be open to just the same objections as the law of the three states. It is inconsistent in itself, and it is inconsistent with fact. Let us consider the main points of this cla.s.sification successively:--