Since Saddam Hussein's statue was brought down in Firdos Square in March 2003, the United States' goals-replacing Saddam's government with one that did not attack its neighbors, or develop WMDs, and was respectful of the country's diverse ethnic and religious minorities-had migrated into a more ambitious effort. Bush administration officials increasingly spoke about the imperative of creating a democracy, particularly after it was discovered that Saddam Hussein didn't have the ready stockpiles of WMD our intelligence community believed we would uncover. This shift in emphasis suggested that Iraq's intentions and capability for building WMD had somehow not been threatening. Many Americans and others around the world accordingly came to believe that the war had been unnecessary.

The Bush administration should have pointed out that, while Saddam Hussein did not have WMD stockpiles, he did in fact maintain dual-use facilities that could produce chemical and biological weapons. Given Saddam's record of using chemical weapons against his own people, those facilities were effectively as dangerous as stockpiles. The Duelfer Report, the product of the Iraq Survey Group that examined Saddam's WMD programs after the war, carefully doc.u.ments the scope of his ambitions. Saddam wanted to "[preserve] the capability to reconst.i.tute his weapons of ma.s.s destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted."1 He remained intent on reconst.i.tuting his WMD programs and kept many of them "on the shelf," which would allow him to begin producing biological and chemical weapons within several weeks' time. He remained intent on reconst.i.tuting his WMD programs and kept many of them "on the shelf," which would allow him to begin producing biological and chemical weapons within several weeks' time.2 Instead of pointing out these facts, the White House decided not to dispute the matter to avoid "relitigating" the past and changed the subject to democracy promotion. Some a.s.sumed that the justification for the war and the need to remove Saddam were self-evident. "[O]ne of the biggest mistakes of the Bush years," senior Bush adviser Karl Rove later acknowledged, was not "engaging" with administration critics, which "let more of the public come to believe dangerous falsehoods about the war: that Bush lied, that Saddam Hussein never had and never wanted WMD, that we claimed Iraq had been behind 9/11." Instead of pointing out these facts, the White House decided not to dispute the matter to avoid "relitigating" the past and changed the subject to democracy promotion. Some a.s.sumed that the justification for the war and the need to remove Saddam were self-evident. "[O]ne of the biggest mistakes of the Bush years," senior Bush adviser Karl Rove later acknowledged, was not "engaging" with administration critics, which "let more of the public come to believe dangerous falsehoods about the war: that Bush lied, that Saddam Hussein never had and never wanted WMD, that we claimed Iraq had been behind 9/11."3 The damage from this error in judgment was substantial. It allowed critics to whitewash Saddam's record and political opponents to build a deceitful narrative about the rationale for going to war. The damage from this error in judgment was substantial. It allowed critics to whitewash Saddam's record and political opponents to build a deceitful narrative about the rationale for going to war.

In the weeks leading up to Saddam's death in December 2006, Democrats who had gained control of Congress were poised to finally succeed in their efforts to cut offwar funding, which would bring U.S. involvement in Iraq to a forced end. President Bush knew that if they prevailed, it would ensure the defeat of the U.S.-led coalition and victory for the jihadists, insurgents, and other enemies of a potentially peaceful and responsible Iraq. He believed that the outcome would be not only a military calamity, but would also force the United States to endure the humiliation of a precipitous withdrawal while plunging Iraq into a further humanitarian disaster.

Bush realized that a political strategy with the new Congress was now as important as a military strategy. The President was frustrated that progress was too slow, but he believed that with some additional time and patience, the situation could improve. His challenge was to convince the opposition party, led by incoming House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, that the administration had developed a promising new approach and deserved additional time. The President undoubtedly hoped that the sweeping personnel changes underway-new commanders at CENTCOM and in Iraq and a new secretary of defense-offered a concrete demonstration to the public that the commander in chief was pursuing a different course. Accordingly, President Bush took one of the boldest political and strategic maneuvers in recent American history: the 2007 surge.

Talk of executing a surge of additional U.S. troops began in November 2006 with a White House review of Iraq strategy led by J. D. Crouch and Bill Luti, both of whom had come to the NSC from the Defense Department. At the same time, officials in the Pentagon were undertaking our own review. a.s.sistant Defense Secretary Peter Rodman and I sought to develop a DoD position that recognized the approach we had taken over the last year was not working "well enough or fast enough."4 Though I had largely removed myself from policy making after the announcement of my resignation, I continued to oversee this review in the hope that the administration's new course would have the support of the country's top military officials. Though I had largely removed myself from policy making after the announcement of my resignation, I continued to oversee this review in the hope that the administration's new course would have the support of the country's top military officials.

We drew up a working paper in early December summarizing the options that the Pentagon's civilian and military leaders were considering. "[F]ailure in Iraq will place the American people in even greater danger," my cover memo for the paper began.5 We suggested further accelerating the buildup of the Iraqi Security Forces and renewed efforts at befriending the Sunnis, now that the Awakening movement in Anbar province was blossoming. We suggested further accelerating the buildup of the Iraqi Security Forces and renewed efforts at befriending the Sunnis, now that the Awakening movement in Anbar province was blossoming.6 We also suggested new efforts to curb Iran's hostile involvement, particularly its training of sectarian Shia militia death squads and its clandestine attacks on U.S. troops. We also suggested new efforts to curb Iran's hostile involvement, particularly its training of sectarian Shia militia death squads and its clandestine attacks on U.S. troops.

The Defense Department's summary paper was developed from a memo I had written the previous month to provide Bush with some "ill.u.s.trative new courses of action." One proposed course was to "[i]ncrease Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially."7 Since a surge of military forces still lacked support among military leaders, that suggestion was placed in my memo "below the line"-in other words, as a less favored option. Since a surge of military forces still lacked support among military leaders, that suggestion was placed in my memo "below the line"-in other words, as a less favored option.8 Generals Abizaid and Casey were still uneasy with the idea of deploying more troops without a clear and agreed military mission for them. The Joint Chiefs also had questions about surging more troops into Iraq without a parallel surge by the State Department and other civilian agencies. Army Chief of Staff Pete Schoomaker and Marine Corps Commandant Michael Hagee were concerned about the toll more combat tours would take on their ground forces. Surging more U.S. troops would mean that some units' tours would need to be extended to fifteen months-a step that could not be taken lightly. The senior military leadership had the proper concern that military power alone could not solve Iraq's problems. I agreed with them that any surge of U.S. forces would have to be accompanied by more effective diplomatic and economic surges from other departments and agencies, and, of critical importance, by considerably greater political progress by Iraq's elected leaders.

The President understood his surge proposal already ran against the conventional wisdom of the foreign policy establishment, his State Department, and congressional Democrats as well as some Republicans in Congress. Without support from senior military leaders, it would be fatally wounded before it was ever proposed.9 Gradually, opinions were changing at the Pentagon. Pace had a.s.sembled a council of colonels to conduct a military review for the Joint Chiefs. The colonels, many of whom had spent more than one deployment in Iraq, were open to the idea of sending several additional brigades if they had a clear mission. Pace and I worked to allay any concerns Casey, Abizaid, and the Joint Chiefs might have. For instance, to address the Army's and Marine Corps' concerns about stress on their forces from continued deployments, the President endorsed an increase in the size of both services.

The skepticism of senior military leaders, however, was mild in comparison with the opposition within the State Department. Rice argued that surging more U.S. troops would further antagonize American allies and erode domestic political support. State Department officials recommended reducing U.S. troop levels and redeploying what forces were left on the ground into large bases away from the fighting.10 On December 13, 2006, President Bush came to the Pentagon for a meeting on Iraq. Present were the incoming secretary of defense, Bob Gates, and the senior military and civilian Defense Department leadership. The President urged everyone at the table to propose anything that could "show noticeable change in the situation in Baghdad."11 "What I want to hear from you," Bush said firmly, "is how we're going to win, not how we're going to leave."12 The President knew that if he were to avoid a congressionally mandated defeat in Iraq, he needed a political and military game changer that would give the progress underway a chance to develop fully. Though I was a latecomer in supporting the surge, by the time I left the Pentagon I felt that there were solid arguments for its two main military features: a somewhat heavier U.S. footprint and a new operational approach that centered on securing the population.

The new commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, had distilled the lessons of counterinsurgency warfare after a year of research at Fort Leavenworth, where he had been a.s.signed after his second tour in Iraq. He believed it was time to emphasize protecting the population now that the Sunni tribal leaders had decided to break with al-Qaida and needed the U.S. military to shield them from the jihadists' retribution. In 2005 and 2006, local commanders had tried some of the cla.s.sic counterinsurgency techniques, such as living in small outposts and cordoning off neighborhoods with cement barriers to protect the population, but not in Baghdad, where violence was escalating. Petraeus proposed to take back the capital city from al-Qaida, radical Shia militias, and death squads by securing the local population block by block.

To ensure that these gains would last, Petraeus requested and received an additional twenty thousand troops that began deploying in January 2007. More troops, however, were not the sole reason for the success of the surge. In 2005 we had twice increased U.S. troops by twenty thousand. Yet the 2005 surges did not lead to the impressive progress that was achieved in 2007. The 2007 surge coincided with seismic shifts in the Iraqi political landscape. The Sunni Awakening, which had begun in the late summer of 2006 in Anbar province, was by then a full-fledged ant.i.terrorist movement.

Sunni Iraqis were reclaiming their towns from al-Qaida one by one. Sunni leaders in Anbar, like Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, were willing to risk violent death-al-Qaida murdered Rishawi in 2007-to finally disavow the extremists that had taken sanctuary in their towns and villages. Muqtada al-Sadr declared a cease-fire against the coalition and the government, effectively ending a latent Shia rebellion. An elected government, seated in mid-2006, had finally formed, and its leaders were gaining enough confidence to take on the extremists, even within their own religious sect. Shia leaders like Nouri al-Maliki were prepared to win back Basra by defeating Iran-funded Shia militias. Perhaps most important, the surge also coincided with the time when the Iraqi security forces had finally reached a critical ma.s.s in number and capability. By December 2006, some 320,000 Iraqis had been trained, equipped, and deployed, producing the forces needed to help hold difficult neighborhoods; they joined in patrols with the surge troops, putting an Iraqi face on the new strategy.

The surge recognized these major political and military changes in the environment and adopted a new approach to take advantage of them. But ultimately, the true genius of the surge was the political effect it had in the United States, where the conflict's true center of gravity had migrated. The surge began first and foremost with a major shift in the administration's political strategy at home, by tempering the defeatist mood on Capitol Hill.* Petraeus' embedding of U.S. forces with Iraqi troops in violent neighborhoods also gave Iraqis a renewed confidence that the United States stood with them. It improved intelligence collection, with more tips and cooperation coming from Iraqi citizens. As more neighborhoods became calm, citizens started moving back, reopening their businesses, and once again taking their children to neighborhood parks. The terror that had aided the insurgents' cause began to subside. Petraeus' embedding of U.S. forces with Iraqi troops in violent neighborhoods also gave Iraqis a renewed confidence that the United States stood with them. It improved intelligence collection, with more tips and cooperation coming from Iraqi citizens. As more neighborhoods became calm, citizens started moving back, reopening their businesses, and once again taking their children to neighborhood parks. The terror that had aided the insurgents' cause began to subside.

While Petraeus brought a new operational approach to Iraq, ultimately he continued the existing strategy: building up Iraqi capabilities while containing the violent threats to the new political order so Iraqis would soon be able to take charge of their own problems. This was the same sensible and modest strategy we had set out before the war. It was the same strategy that-though altered with the establishment of a longer-term Coalition Provisional Authority-we reaffirmed in our October 2003 strategic review, when I intervened to bring an early end to the CPA. It is the strategy that President Barack Obama continued to pursue in the first years of his presidency.

As I had repeatedly argued in the Defense Department and in interagency meetings, success should not be defined as our solving all of Iraq's problems. Our strategy was not to create (for the first time in its history) a noncorrupt, prosperous democracy, with all the protections afforded by due process. Such goals were desirable, but not within the limits of American capabilities or patience. Because Iraq would be plagued for years by some level of violence, ethnic tensions, and a poor economic infrastructure, I thought our strategy should be to try to contain those problems and build up the abilities of Iraqis to deal with them so that they could manage their own affairs and not be a security problem for the region, the United States, or our allies.

I have been asked on occasion if I believed the war was worth the costs, particularly since WMD stockpiles were not found. It is a fair question. Any calculation of the costs and benefits of the Iraq war has to take into account what Iraq and the world might look like if Saddam and his sons were still in power. While the road not traveled always looks smoother, the cold reality of a Hussein regime in Baghdad most likely would mean a Middle East far more perilous than it is today: Iran and Iraq locked in a struggle to field nuclear weapons, which could give rise to a regional arms race among Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria; continued support for terrorists from an Iraqi regime enriched by rising oil prices; wars of aggression launched against neighboring countries in the Gulf; the torture and death of thousands more Iraqis suspected of opposing the regime; and a United Nations even more discredited than it is today, as its sanctions crumbled. Our failure to confront Iraq would have sent a message to other nations that neither America nor any other nation was willing to stand in the way of their support for terrorism and pursuit of weapons of ma.s.s destruction.

President Bush made the decision to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein knowing there would be consequences that neither he nor anyone else could foresee. We had discussed many of the potential risks, but there are no methodologies or formulas that can subst.i.tute for judgment and intuition in dealing with the challenges of statecraft. There are always factors that turn out to be important, but were unantic.i.p.ated. I have no doubt that given the facts that were available to President Bush in 2003, I would have made the same decision. Further, knowing what we later learned and recognizing the costs, there is not a persuasive argument to be made that the United States would be in a stronger strategic position or that Iraq and the Middle East would be better offif Saddam were still in power. In short, ridding the region of Saddam's brutal regime has created a more stable and secure world.

In 2010, Iraq had the twelfth fastest growing economy in the world.14 Though al-Qaida still has the ability to pull off spectacular attacks, it no longer finds sanctuary in any corner of that country. Over the coming years, with a moderate, representative government, Iraq has the potential to become a positive influence in the Middle East, a region that is sorely in need of good influences. It could become a valued long-term partner of the United States and a bulwark against Iran, a role that will prove critical if Tehran continues on its belligerent path toward a nuclear a.r.s.enal. Though al-Qaida still has the ability to pull off spectacular attacks, it no longer finds sanctuary in any corner of that country. Over the coming years, with a moderate, representative government, Iraq has the potential to become a positive influence in the Middle East, a region that is sorely in need of good influences. It could become a valued long-term partner of the United States and a bulwark against Iran, a role that will prove critical if Tehran continues on its belligerent path toward a nuclear a.r.s.enal.

Any optimistic prognosis for Iraq is quite a change from how things looked in 2006. But making policy and formulating strategy are not exact sciences in which outcomes are certain and measurable. Though it makes officials in both the executive and legislative branches of government uncomfortable, strategic thinking requires acknowledgment of the inevitability of considerable uncertainty.

Postulating a world in which Saddam Hussein remained in power is of course a theoretical exercise. It involves numerous known unknowns and undoubtedly some unknown unknowns. The only known certainty is that those who made the decisions with imperfect knowledge will be judged in hindsight by those with considerably more information at their disposal and time for reflection. Indeed, my own a.n.a.lysis-and criticisms-in this book benefit from both.

It is of note that during Bob McNamara's confirmation hearing to become secretary of defense in 1961, not a single U.S. senator asked him a question about Vietnam. In d.i.c.k Cheney's confirmation hearing in 1989, not a single U.S. senator asked him about Iraq. In my confirmation hearing in 2001, not a single U.S. senator asked me about Afghanistan. Yet in each case, the questions not asked dominated our tenures. The lesson is that we should learn to expect to be surprised. The limits of intelligence-of both human intellect and the products of our government's intelligence agencies-are a reality that should make us all humble. We need to be confident but also intellectually flexible to alter course as required. Being prepared for the unknown and agile enough to respond to the unforeseen is the essence of strategy.

Over my years in both the public and private sectors, I have come to see strategy and decision making as a four-step process that requires periodic recalibration and adjustment. At its most fundamental level, grand strategy is setting large, longer-term goals that are realistic and can be balanced with the means available to achieve them. It requires continual review of the goals in light of the means and of new circ.u.mstances as they come to light.

The first step of strategy is precisely defining one's goals. "If you get the objectives right," George Marshall is widely reported to have said, "a lieutenant can write the strategy." Setting clear goals may sound obvious, but it is remarkable how rarely governments-or other organizations, for that matter-take the time and care to start a policy-making process by formulating strategic goals precisely and in writing. Failure to do so can doom an enterprise before it begins. There is a tendency to deal with challenging situations by plunging into discussions of options or courses of action. That approach takes for granted that the goals are self-evident and shared by everyone involved, and that the options to be considered are appropriate to the goals. When officials fail to define their objectives with care, it's difficult for the entire government to make and execute decisions that advance them. Without a well-understood strategy, decisions can be random and even counterproductive. Setting priorities and defining limits can help to avoid what the military calls "mission creep"-the tendency to gradually increase a commitment without fully understanding the consequences and costs of doing so.

The number of goals has to be limited. Listing more than four or five means they are probably not at the strategic level. In early 2005, for example, I suggested to President Bush the three major goals in the struggle against Islamist terrorists: defending the homeland; disrupting terrorist networks abroad; and countering ideological support for terrorism.15 We had to make some hard choices about what to leave off that list-things that would have been desirable but that I ultimately concluded were not essential and could have become distracting, such as eradicating terrorist funding through the narcotics trade or promoting democracy. Without identifying which goals are the most important, one ends up with little more than a wish list that will not provide critical strategic direction. Strategy begins by planting a clear, recognizable flag in the distance that others can see and work toward. We had to make some hard choices about what to leave off that list-things that would have been desirable but that I ultimately concluded were not essential and could have become distracting, such as eradicating terrorist funding through the narcotics trade or promoting democracy. Without identifying which goals are the most important, one ends up with little more than a wish list that will not provide critical strategic direction. Strategy begins by planting a clear, recognizable flag in the distance that others can see and work toward.

The second step of strategy is identifying the major a.s.sumptions a.s.sociated with the challenge at hand, always recognizing that they are based on imperfect information that can change or even turn out to have been incorrect. For an entrepreneur, a major a.s.sumption might be that a company's newly developed product will receive patent protection from compet.i.tion for a period of time. A major a.s.sumption in planning military action might be that a foreign country will cooperate by granting basing or overflight rights to an air force. These a.s.sumptions can turn out to be wrong. In war, for example, a common mistake is creating a picture of the battlefield based on a static picture of the enemy that fails to recognize that the enemy has a brain and will react and change his strategy, which in turn will require changing a.s.sumptions and plans.

The third step is evaluating the possible courses of action in light of the a.s.sumptions. At the upper levels of policy making almost all possible courses of action entail negative consequences that need to be weighed. This is particularly so when it comes to ones that must be made by a president. By the time he engages on an issue, most if not all of the good options often have been attempted by others at lower levels. In July 2001, for example, when I wrote the other members of the NSC suggesting various courses of action we should consider with respect to Iraq, none were ideal.16 Ending the UN-imposed no-fly zones could embolden Saddam. Terminating the UN sanctions could give him the s.p.a.ce to rebuild his WMD programs. Engaging with him could legitimize and prolong his regime. Pushing for regime change could alienate some of our traditional allies. Ending the UN-imposed no-fly zones could embolden Saddam. Terminating the UN sanctions could give him the s.p.a.ce to rebuild his WMD programs. Engaging with him could legitimize and prolong his regime. Pushing for regime change could alienate some of our traditional allies.

The fourth and final stage in formulating strategy is executing the chosen course of action. And this too can change based on circ.u.mstances. For example, we had to make multiple adjustments to our a.s.sumptions about the formation, development, focus, and deployment of Iraqi security forces as the situation changed over time, but we remained consistent in our emphasis on helping them develop their own capabilities. No matter how careful the preparation, fortune plays a role in all plans and necessitates the recalibration or abandonment of key a.s.sumptions, and therefore major changes in the plan. Oversight of these constant adjustments requires careful balance to avoid the extremes of disengagement and micromanagement. Kissinger once described Anwar Sadat, one of the most impressive men I have ever met, as "free of the obsession with detail by which mediocre leaders think they are mastering events, only to be engulfed by them."17 Strategy is not linear. It is never completed until the challenge at hand has been resolved. The means must be continually reviewed to see whether they still serve the goals, and if the goals are sensible and realistic in light of one's means and unfolding events. There is a danger that policies and courses of action can acquire a momentum of their own. Continuing them without adjustment or reconsideration is often easier than developing new ones. Inertia can be an obstacle to formulating and maintaining sound strategy.

In wartime, strategy and statesmanship require a clear-eyed understanding of the enemy and its ideology and a clear articulation of both by the nation's leaders. After 9/11, though, our government never came to such an understanding. With the benefit of nearly a decade of hindsight, we ought to have more precisely labeled our enemies as violent Islamists. President Bush and others were properly careful not to foster or be seen as fostering the idea that Islam-a faith observed by more than one billion people across the world-was our enemy. To succeed we would require the a.s.sistance of millions of Muslims-the only ones who could forcefully reject, marginalize, and ultimately defeat the extremist elements within their faith who are our enemies. We did not want to unintentionally antagonize the overwhelming majority who shared our views. But we were wrong not to forcefully communicate that we are fighting an extremist ideology rooted in Islam.

Islamists who preach and lay the foundations for jihadist violence pose a serious challenge to liberal democracy. Paradoxically, America's finest traits-our respect for religion and individual liberty-make our country particularly vulnerable to an enemy whose ideology is based in religion. But reluctance to face up to Islamism, to confront it directly and work actively to counter it, has been and remains even at this writing a serious and costly hesitation in our body politic since 9/11.

According to their own utterances, writings, and propaganda, Islamists seek to reestablish the caliphate, an empire that stretched from Spain to India in the tenth century, and expand it around the globe. The network of our terrorist enemies comprises a diverse group of people, but what links them are totalitarian, expansionist, and revolutionary distortions of Islam. Some Islamist ideals are represented by Shia ayatollahs in Iran; others by bin Laden and Sunni al-Qaida terrorists in Pakistan. All Islamists, however, promote replacement of the world's international system of nation-states with a single theocratic empire that imposes and enforces sharia (Muslim holy law). Islamist ideology rejects democracy, civil liberties, and laws made by men. Those of us who embrace such practices are despised and detested as an insult to Allah. Though his statement was mocked and ridiculed by some, President Bush was correct-profoundly so-when he said that the terrorists who struck on 9/11 "hate our freedoms-our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and a.s.semble and disagree with each other."18 Still, we never successfully translated that basic vision into a message that explained to Americans and the world who we were fighting and why they had attacked us. In fact, we often seemed to do the opposite, out of fear of being labeled anti-Muslim-a pattern that the Obama administration has taken to a dangerous extreme in initially denying the ideological links among the terrorist plots in Times Square, Fort Hood, and Detroit.

While those of us in the Bush administration did not engage in the debate needed to identify the enemy's ideology, we did at least recognize that the challenge we faced was fundamentally ideological. "The important point is that what we face is an ideologically-based challenge," I wrote in 2004, when we were engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan. "Radical Islamists may be centered in the Middle East, but their reach is worldwide and their goals are global." My memo continued: If it is an ideological challenge, our task is not simply to defend, but to preempt, to go on the offensive, and to keep the radicals offbalance. We learned this lesson in the Soviet Union cold war case. For one thing, we will need to show the moderates in the religion that they have support.... [T]hey must take up the battle and defend their religion against those who would hijack it.... [I]deologies can be defeated. The Soviet collapse teaches us this. If Islamism's goal is the fantasy of a new "Caliphate," we can deflate it by, over time, demonstrating its certain futility. Simply by not giving in to terrorist blackmail-by not being riven out of the Middle East-we will demonstrate over time that the extremists' ideology cannot deliver.19 One of the three components of the strategy we developed in the months after 9/11 addressed how to counter the enemy's ideology. We knew that wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would not end Islamist terrorism and, in fact, in the short term could give the enemy opportunities to attract more recruits and cite the inevitable casualties as proof that the United States was warring against Islam. As long as madra.s.sas and mosques from Jakarta to Hamburg preached Islamism and justified terrorism in its service, military action could make only limited headway. After circulating our 2005 national defense strategy, the State Department objected to the inclusion of "countering ideological support" as a goal.20 While some in the administration recognized the problem, there was never any resolution and as a result we are not able to fashion and execute a plan to confront it effectively. While some in the administration recognized the problem, there was never any resolution and as a result we are not able to fashion and execute a plan to confront it effectively.

I favored a major effort to win over those Muslims who were sitting on the fence-those not supporting al-Qaida but who were not actively opposing the extremists either. Our extremist enemies did not terrorize only Westerners, but their fellow Muslims. I thought we needed a campaign to win over friends and allies in the Muslim world and "mobilize moderate Muslims," as I argued in July 2005.21 We needed to tell the truth about the Islamist extremists-about their brutality, injustice, and totalitarian political ambitions. The best way to communicate that message was not for American political leaders to do it, but to find ways to get more Muslims around the world publicly speaking out against them. But the United States and other Western countries have been notably unsuccessful in encouraging Muslim political, religious, and educational leaders to take a stand against Islamism and the preaching of violence and terror. We needed to tell the truth about the Islamist extremists-about their brutality, injustice, and totalitarian political ambitions. The best way to communicate that message was not for American political leaders to do it, but to find ways to get more Muslims around the world publicly speaking out against them. But the United States and other Western countries have been notably unsuccessful in encouraging Muslim political, religious, and educational leaders to take a stand against Islamism and the preaching of violence and terror.

This failure has been a serious deficiency in the West's struggle against the extremists. Our inability to compete in the battle of ideas and to counter our enemies' ideology has invited them to focus on communicating through the media, where they have enjoyed consistent and sustained success. This is the essence of asymmetric warfare. Instead of engaging our military forces, they engage us where we and all democracies are most vulnerable: our public will and staying power. They seek to demoralize free people and cause their nations to withdraw from the world into isolationism.

Our enemies know that a single attack cannot break our will. They also know that a single attack, skillfully handled, with accompanying grisly pictures and video, can affect public opinion dramatically and quickly. In Iraq and Afghanistan our enemies' goal was to sour U.S. public opinion on the wars and cause members of Congress to do what the enemy fighters could not do: force the U.S. military to stop fighting. They worked to inflict at least a few casualties on us every day, providing more negative images and headlines for the next news cycle. They hope to achieve what they have sought since they successfully defeated the Soviet empire in Afghanistan: the humiliation of another superpower. They almost achieved exactly that in 2007, when Speaker Pelosi and Majority Leader Reid pushed to cut funding for the Iraq war. Their efforts, if successful, would have led to precisely the kind of rout the enemy hoped for-the kind I remembered all too well from the difficult days in the spring of 1975 at the end of the Vietnam War.

Though I disagreed with those who argued to end our efforts in Iraq abruptly, I continue to believe that military missions undertaken by the United States need to be realistic in intent and limited in scope. Strategy and statesmanship require recognizing and understanding that our nation's capabilities are finite. Further, the American public is not tolerant of the long-term involvement of U.S. forces in combat. Wars threaten to change free societies, which is why it is difficult for democracies to wage prolonged b.l.o.o.d.y conflicts. This laudable aversion to war makes it all the more challenging when U.S. military efforts are required and must be sustained.

For a time, a popular maxim about Iraq was "If you break it, you own it." But to be clear, the United States did not "break" Iraq. It was broken by a dictator who over twenty-five years ran his country into the ground. Nor did the United States break Afghanistan, a land that had been broken, at least by Western standards, for centuries. We can encourage, a.s.sist, and advise, but we should not take on the responsibility as the prime actor. Local Afghans and Iraqis know far better than we do how to form and at what pace to evolve their societies. Solving corruption in Afghanistan or building a secular democracy in the Middle East are not America's problems to tackle. They are not our broken societies to fix.

The futures of Afghanistan and Iraq have yet to be decided, and circ.u.mstances could still deteriorate. Afghans, Iraqis, and their elected leaders may make wrong choices in the years ahead and lose some of the hard-won gains of the U.S. military. Nonetheless, it must be said that America has given them a chance at success. Because of American sacrifice, they have been given the opportunity to build better, more secure, more prosperous, and freer societies than they ever knew under the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. They are now challenged with the responsibilities of sustaining their free societies, just as Americans are responsible for sustaining ours.

In the late 1970s, after two decades in government and my early years in business, Joyce and I had saved enough to purchase a small place in El Prado, New Mexico, just north of Taos, then a sleepy town of a few thousand people-a haven for artists, skiers, self-described free spirits, and graying hippies. For decades it had been a crossroads of Hispanic, Indian, and Western cultures, combining the millennia-old traditions of the original inhabitants of the continent with the pioneering spirit of the settlers who first headed West.

Next to our farm is the Taos Pueblo, thought to be the oldest, continuously inhabited community in North America. The Native American tribe that founded it has made the area its home for more than a thousand years, centuries before the first Europeans set sail for the New World and well before a Declaration of Independence pitted thirteen colonies against an empire. Few other places in America serve as a more vivid reminder of how young our nation is, which for me only makes even more miraculous what has been achieved in its short existence. When I am in New Mexico and see the majestic landscape and endless blue skies, I sense what this great land of ours represents: promise, possibility, and renewal.

A few years after New Mexico became part of U.S. territory, the American Civil War began. During that conflict, deep divisions between those loyal to the North and South led to skirmishes in the area, including efforts by Confederate sympathizers to take down the American flag flying over the Taos Plaza. Eventually, a group of men, including the legendary frontiersman Kit Carson, resolved to nail the Union flag to a tall wooden pole, where it was kept under twenty-four-hour watch. Though federal regulations prevented munic.i.p.alities from flying the Stars and Stripes after sundown, Congress pa.s.sed a special law authorizing Taos to be the first city in the nation allowed to fly the flag day and night. And there the flag has flown ever since, through times of war, economic despair, disease, and disaster-in the cruelest of times as well as the best of times.

Our still-young country has withstood tragedies and trauma of unimagined scope. And yet it has continued to thrive, thanks to proud and resilient citizens and leaders from both political parties who have done their best to guide the nation. "If those young Americans who have the advantage of education, perspective, and self-discipline do not partic.i.p.ate to the fullest extent of their ability," Adlai Stevenson once said, "America will stumble, and if America stumbles the world falls." He warned, "For the power, for good or evil, of this American political organization is virtually beyond measurement. The decisions which it makes, the uses to which it devotes its immense resources, the leadership which it provides on moral as well as material questions, all appear likely to determine the fate of the modern world."22 Those words remain as true and profound today as when I first heard them at my senior cla.s.s banquet at Princeton University in 1954. Those words remain as true and profound today as when I first heard them at my senior cla.s.s banquet at Princeton University in 1954.

Those who have been privileged to serve our country have been the guardians of one of the greatest achievements of mankind. Our United States of America, at once imperfect and extraordinary, has offered more opportunity and improved more lives, both at home and throughout the world, than any other nation in history. In writing this book I have looked back over a life enriched beyond measure by those opportunities. I hope readers will come away with a conviction that service to America is an obligation to be fulfilled, as well as an honor to be embraced.

Acknowledgments.

This book has been four years in the making. To help organize its writing, as well as to put order into my voluminous doc.u.mentary record and establish the supporting website, I have relied on an extraordinary team of individuals. The core group was headed by Keith Urbahn, my chief of staff and a Navy reserve intelligence officer, who has taken on historical, creative, and managerial responsibilities well beyond his years. Victoria Coates brought an academic perspective and a relentless insistence on doc.u.mentation and precision-invaluable a.s.sistance from an art historian, of all things. Matt Latimer, an attorney and former Pentagon and White House speechwriter, contributed not only his considerable knowledge and talent but also his boundless interest in Richard M. Nixon.

This group was ably supported by our outstanding staff led by our office manager, Linda Figura. Aliza Kwiatek was an intrepid and meticulous fact checker. Will Cappelletti, Pratik Chougule, and Brice Long, along with Sarah Conant, Steve Duggan, Elizabeth Goss, Lisa Ricks, and Kailey Walczak, did yeoman's duty transcribing the seemingly endless streams of dictation and interviews and fielding requests for ill.u.s.trations and doc.u.ments. Nancy Pardo, my longtime and valued a.s.sistant in Chicago, has undertaken hundreds of hours of dictation transcription and been an all-around personal oracle. The publisher at Sentinel, Adrian Zackheim and his a.s.sociates, provided experienced advice, as did Patti Pirooz and John McElroy in my reading of the audio version. Bob Barnett's unique perspective on the entire process has proved invaluable.

I have benefited from a group of stalwart if painfully honest readers, including Pete Biester, Steve Cambone, Torie Clarke, Larry Di Rita, Doug Feith, Anne Gardner, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, and Jean Edward Smith.

I also consulted directly with a.s.sociates who partic.i.p.ated in many of the events I describe, so that I could take into account their distinct perspectives as well. They include some of the most honorable and patriotic men I've had the privilege of serving alongside-men who dedicated their careers to serving our nation in the uniform of the U.S. military: Lt. Gen. David BarnoLt. Gen. Steven BlumLt. Gen. Jerry BoykinCol. Steven BucciAdm. Vern ClarkGen. Bantz CraddockLt. Gen. Michael DeLongGen. Tommy FranksGen. John HandyVice Adm. Staser HolcombLt. Gen. Michael MaplesGen. Richard MyersGen. Jack KeaneAdm. Timothy KeatingGen. Peter PaceLt. Gen. Gus PagonisGen. Gene RenuartGen. Peter SchoomakerAdm. James StavridisCapt. Troy StonerVice Adm. Stan Szemborski They also include other colleagues, patriots, and friends who have served their country in many ways: Karen BallardBrad BerksonMarshall BillingsleaFrank CarlucciLee CaseyLynne CheneyDavid ChuJ. D. CrouchJames DennyFrancois DeRoseAnthony DolanRaymond DuBoisJaymie DurnanEric EdelmanRobert EllsworthBob GardnerPeter GerenJack GoldsmithAlan GreenspanRichard HaverJim HaynesRyan HenryCharles HillAndy HoehnMarty HoffmannRon JamesNed JannottaReuben JefferyJerry JonesZalmay KhalilzadHenry KissingerKen KriegBruce LaddArt LafferRichard LawlessLewis LibbyWilliam LutiJames MacDougallPaul McHaleThomas MillerNewt MinowJeb NadanerJohn NegroponteLuke NichterRoger Pardo-MaurerMichael PillsburyRobert RangelPaul ResterDavid RivkinEric RuffBenjamin RunkleSuzanne SchaffrathWilliam J. SchneiderAbram ShulskyGeorge ShultzLaurence SilbermanDaniel StanleyS. Frederick Starrd.i.c.k StevensCully StimsonChristopher StraubMarin StrmeckiMarc ThiessenTed VogtJames WadeBill WalkerJoe Wa.s.selRuth WedgewoodRobert WilkieBrenda WilliamsChristopher WilliamsPaul WolfowitzFrank Zarb One drawback to living so long is that there are friends and colleagues who are no longer with us. I first considered writing a book in the 1990s in consultation with John Robson, a friend of more than fifty years. While John died before this iteration of the project was launched, his guidance and recommendations have stayed with me-particularly his knack for getting me to look at issues from different viewpoints and his admonition to keep living life to the fullest regardless of age or infirmity. Three other friends stand out who were with us at the outset of this project but were not able to see the final product: Peter Rodman, who encouraged me to make full use of my archival material; Bill Safire, who shared his friendship and superb writing expertise; and Bob Goldwin, who was the same intellectual sounding board he had been during the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Thanks are also due to Margaret McAleer, John Haynes, and the staff of the Library of Congress, where the bulk of my papers are on deposit. Bob Storer of the Defense Department's Washington Headquarters Services has been an invaluable help with my DoD records. I also appreciate the contributions of David Horrocks and Bill McNitt and the staff at the Gerald R. Ford Library as well as a.s.sistance from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, the Richard M. Nixon Library, the Ronald Reagan Library, and the George W. Bush Presidential Center. Pulitzer Prizewinning photographer David Hume Kennerly contributed not only the front and back jackets of this book, but also unpublished photographs for the ill.u.s.tration sections.

Finally, I want to acknowledge my great fortune in having a family that has been a source of encouragement and inspiration: my two loving parents, George and Jeannette Rumsfeld, and my sister, Joan Ramsay. I am most of all indebted to the person to whom this memoir is dedicated. As well as her love, Joyce has brought insight, grace, and her trademark joy to my life for our now more than fifty-six years together. She and our three children, Valerie, Marcy, and Nick, have been with me every step of the way with their support and always with good-humored perspective. This memoir is, after all, their story as well as mine.

Even given the hundreds of hours of consultation, research, and review as well as the extensive doc.u.mentation employed, I recognize it is inevitable that some errors have crept into a book of this scale. As regrettable as it is to accept this human reality, the responsibility for them is mine.

My proceeds from the project will go to the programs my foundation supports for the men and women in uniform, including the wounded and their families. If this book does nothing else but reflect my respect and appreciation for them, that will be enough.

List of Acronyms ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile Anti-Ballistic Missile AID: Agency for International Development Agency for International Development ANA: Afghan National Army Afghan National Army AOR: military area of responsibility military area of responsibility BRAC: base realignment and closure base realignment and closure CBW: chemical or biological weapon chemical or biological weapon CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command U.S. Central Command CERP: Commander's Emergency Response Program Commander's Emergency Response Program CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CLC: Cost of Living Council Cost of Living Council COIN: counterinsurgency counterinsurgency CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq Defcon: Defense condition DHS: Department of Homeland Security Department of Homeland Security DNI: director of national intelligence director of national intelligence DoD: Department of Defense EFP: explosively formed penetrator explosively formed penetrator EPA: Environmental Protection Agency Environmental Protection Agency FAA: Federal Aviation Administration Federal Aviation Administration FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FCC: Federal Communications Commission Federal Communications Commission FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Emergency Management Agency FOIA: Freedom of Information Act Freedom of Information Act GI: General Instrument Corporation General Instrument Corporation HEW: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ICC: International Criminal Court International Criminal Court IED: improvised explosive device improvised explosive device IGC: Iraqi Governing Council Iraqi Governing Council IIA: Iraqi Interim Authority Iraqi Interim Authority INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.

Department of State ISAF: International Security a.s.sistance Force-Afghanistan International Security a.s.sistance Force-Afghanistan ISF: Iraqi Security Forces Iraqi Security Forces ISG: Iraq Survey Group Iraq Survey Group JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff JSOC: Joint Special Operations Command Joint Special Operations Command JSTARS: Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System LAF: Lebanese armed forces Lebanese armed forces MARSOC: Marine Corps Special Operations Command Marine Corps Special Operations Command MCA: Military Commission Act of 2006 Military Commission Act of 2006 MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force Marine Expeditionary Force MNF: multinational force multinational force MRAP: mine resistant ambush protected vehicle mine resistant ambush protected vehicle NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO: nongovernmental organization nongovernmental organization NIC: National Intelligence Council National Intelligence Council NIE: national intelligence estimate national intelligence estimate NMCC: National Military Command Center National Military Command Center NORAD: North American Aeros.p.a.ce Defense Command North American Aeros.p.a.ce Defense Command NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command U.S. Northern Command NSA: National Security Agency National Security Agency NSC: National Security Council National Security Council NSPD: national security policy directive national security policy directive ODA: Operational Detachment Alpha Operational Detachment Alpha OEO: Office of Economic Opportunity Office of Economic Opportunity OLC: Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice OMB: Office of Management and Budget Office of Management and Budget OPLAN: operation plan operation plan ORHA: Office Of Reconstruction And Humanitarian a.s.sistance-Iraq Office Of Reconstruction And Humanitarian a.s.sistance-Iraq OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense PA&E: program a.n.a.lysis and evaluation program a.n.a.lysis and evaluation PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party Kurdistan Workers' Party POW: prisoner of war prisoner of war PRC: People's Republic of China People's Republic of China PRT: provincial reconstruction team provincial reconstruction team ROTC: Reserve Officers' Training Corps Reserve Officers' Training Corps RPG: rocket-propelled grenade rocket-propelled grenade SAS: British Special Air Service British Special Air Service SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SLRG: Senior Level Review Group, U.S. Department of Defense Senior Level Review Group, U.S. Department of Defense SOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command U.S. Special Operations Command SOF: U.S. Special Operations Forces U.S. Special Operations Forces SOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command U.S. Southern Command SVTC: secure video teleconference secure video teleconference TPFDD: time-phased force and deployment data time-phased force and deployment data UAV: unmanned aerial vehicle unmanned aerial vehicle WMD: weapons of ma.s.s destruction weapons of ma.s.s destruction

List of Ill.u.s.trations First Insert 1. Donald and Joan Rumsfeld, c. 1938. (Rumsfeld Collection) 2. Lt. George Rumsfeld and Jeannette Rumsfeld, Coronado, California, c. 1944. (Rumsfeld Collection) 3. The Philmont Scout Ranch guides, Cimarron, New Mexico, 1949. (Rumsfeld Collection) 4. The Princeton University Varsity wrestling team, Princeton, New Jersey, 1953. (Bric-A-Brac [1954], Prince ton University Archives.) 5. Donald Rumsfeld and Joyce Pierson, Princeton, New Jersey, June 15, 1954. (Rumsfeld Collection) 6. The crew of a Navy S2F, Naval Air Station Glenview, Glenview, Illinois, c. 1961. (Rumsfeld Collection) 7. Marcy, Joyce, Valerie, and Donald Rumsfeld, Glenview, Illinois, 1962. (Rumsfeld Collection) 8. Donald Rumsfeld, Ned Jannotta, et al., Rumsfeld for Congress headquarters, Winnetka, Illinois, April 10, 1962. (Courtesy of Chicago History Museum, ICHi-62635, Photographer: Chicago Daily News Chicago Daily News) 9. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Donald Rumsfeld, 1962. (Rumsfeld Collection) 10. Donald Rumsfeld and Gerald Ford, U.S. Capitol Building, 1964. (Norman Matheny, 1964, The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Monitor, www.CSMonitor.com) 11. Donald and Marcy Rumsfeld, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and Virgil Grissom, U.S. Capitol Building, c. 1965. (U.S. Government) 12. Donald Rumsfeld, President Lyndon Baines Johnson, et al., East Room of the White House, April 11, 1968. (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Photograph by Yoichi Okamoto) 13. President Richard Nixon, Donald Rumsfeld, Joyce Rumsfeld, Nick Rumsfeld, et al., Rose Garden, the White House, May 26, 1969. (Bettmann Collection, Corbis Images) 14. Donald Rumsfeld, Office of Economic Opportunity office, Washington, D.C., c. 1969. (Office of Economic Opportunity, U.S. Government) 15. Bryce Harlow, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Donald Rumsfeld, Washington, D.C., c. 1970. (Official White House photograph) 16. Donald and Joyce Rumsfeld and Henry Kissinger, the White House, August 4, 1970. (Official White House photograph, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum) 17. Donald Rumsfeld and El Cordobes (Manuel Benitez Perez), outside Cordoba, Spain, May 1972. (U.S. Government) 18. President Richard Nixon, Donald Rumsfeld, John Mitch.e.l.l, John Erlichman, Charles Colson, Bryce Harlow, Bob Haldeman, and Bob Finch, Key Biscayne, Florida, November 7, 1970. (Official White House photograph by Byron Schumacher, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum) 19. President Richard Nixon, Vice President Spiro Agnew, Donald Rumsfeld, and members of the Taos Pueblo Indian Tribal Council, Cabinet Room, the White House, July 8, 1970. (Official White House photograph, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum) 20. John McCloy, Robert Murphy, Donald Rumsfeld, Elliot Richardson, and Anwar al-Sadat, Cairo, United Arab Republic, October 2, 1970. (Rumsfeld Collection) 21. Donald and Nick Rumsfeld and President Richard Nixon, Oval Office, the White House, February 13, 1973. (Official White House photograph by Ollie Atkins, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum) 22. President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Donald Rumsfeld, NATO headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, June 26, 1974. (NATO handout, Corbis Images) 23. Joyce and Marcy Rumsfeld, Greece, August 1974. (Rumsfeld Collection) 24. Donald and Valerie Rumsfeld, Greece, August 1974. (Rumsfeld Collection) 25. Herman Kahn, Donald Rumsfeld, and President Gerald Ford, Oval Office, the White House, October 28, 1974. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by David Hume Kennerly) 26. Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, the White House, March 5, 1975. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by Jack Kightlinger) Second Insert 27. Larry Eagleburger, Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, and d.i.c.k Cheney, Air Force One, Arizona, October 21, 1974. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by David Hume Kennerly) 28. David Kennerly, Donald Rumsfeld, and President Gerald Ford, the White House tennis court, July 16, 1975. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by Ricardo Thomas) 29. Secretary of Treasury Bill Simon, Ron Nessen, President Gerald Ford, d.i.c.k Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Alan Greenspan, Vail, Colorado, December 27, 1974. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by David Hume Kennerly) 30. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Donald Rumsfeld, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, President Gerald Ford, et al., Okeansky Sanitarium, Vladivostok, USSR, November 24, 1974. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by David Hume Kennerly) 31. Donald Rumsfeld, Leona Goodell, and President Gerald Ford, Air Force One, September 5, 1975. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by David Hume Kennerly) 32. President Gerald Ford, Donald Rumsfeld, et al., Hotel St. Francis, San Francisco, California, September 22, 1975. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by David Hume Kennerly) 33. Jeannette, Joyce, Nick, Marcy, and Valerie Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, November 20, 1975. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by David Hume Kennerly) 34. Joyce and Nick Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, November 20, 1975. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by David Hume Kennerly) 35. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Vice Adm. Staser Holcomb, Donald Rumsfeld, Joe Sisco, et al., Blair House, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1976. (Ron Sachs/CNP/ Sygma Collection/Corbis Images) 36. Donald Rumsfeld, President Gerald Ford, Amba.s.sadors Andre de Staerke, Francois de Rose, David Bruce, et al., the Pentagon, March 29, 1976. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by William Fitz-Patrick) 37. Valerie, Marcy, Nick, and Joyce Rumsfeld, Betty Ford, Donald Rumsfeld, and President Gerald Ford, Oval Office, the White House, January 19, 1977. (Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Library, White House photograph by Ricardo Thomas) 38. Jim Denny, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Robson, G. D. Searle & Co. headquarters, Skokie, Illinois, c. 1979. ( Jonathan Daniel) 39. U.S. Amba.s.sador Mike Mansfield, Donald Rumsfeld, and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Tokyo, j.a.pan, December 1982. (Rumsfeld Collection) 40. President Ronald Reagan and Donald Rumsfeld, Oval Office, the White House, November 3, 1983. (Ron Sachs/CPN/Corbis Images) 41. Jack Kemp, Howard Baker, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld, Dole for President campaign plane, 1996. (Rumsfeld Collection) 42. Elk herd at the Rumsfeld farm, El Prado, New Mexico, c. 2007. (Pete French) 43. d.i.c.k Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, et al., c. 1970. (Rumsfeld Collection) 44. Vice President d.i.c.k Cheney, Judge Larry Silberman, President George W. Bush, Donald and Joyce Rumsfeld, Oval Office, the White House, January 26, 2001. (Department of Defense photograph by Robert D. Ward) 45. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President d.i.c.k Cheney, and Condi Rice, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, c. March 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 46. The Pentagon, September 11, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 47. Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, September 12, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 48. Donald Rumsfeld, September 12, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 49. Doug Feith, Gen. Jim Jones, Donald Rumsfeld, President George Bush, Condi Rice, Gordon England, Gen. Hugh Shelton, Gen. Jack Keane, Adm. Vern Clark, et al., the Pentagon, September 12, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 50. Gen. d.i.c.k Myers, Donald Rumsfeld, et al., press briefing room, the Pentagon, c. 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 51. Donald Rumsfeld, Ground Zero, New York City, November 14, 2001. (Photograph by Karen Ballard) 52. Vice President d.i.c.k Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Reggie, Rumsfeld residence, Washington, D.C., October 6, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 53. Steve Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz, Larry Di Rita, Donald Rumsfeld, and Torie Clarke, office of the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, October 7, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) Third Insert 54. Afghan Northern Alliance fighters at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, December 16, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 55. Abandoned Soviet-made aircraft at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, December 16, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 56. Hamid Karzai and Donald Rumsfeld, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, December 16, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 57. Ismail Khan, Donald Rumsfeld, and Zalmay Khalilzad, Herat Airport, Afghanistan, April 27, 2002. (Department of Defense photograph by Robert D. Ward) 58. Donald Rumsfeld, President George Bush, and Gen. Tommy Franks (on SVTS), situation room, the White House, October 25, 2001. (Photograph by Eric Draper, courtesy of the George W. Bush Presidential Center) 59. Larry Di Rita, Donald Rumsfeld, Amba.s.sador Zalmay Khalilzad, Gen. David Barno, et al., Mazar-e-Sharif, December 4, 2003. (Photograph by Karen Ballard) 60. Combatant commanders and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President, cabinet room, the White House, February 28, 2002. (Photograph by Eric Draper, courtesy of the George W. Bush Presidential Center) 61. Donald Rumsfeld, et al., town hall meeting in Camp Buehring, Kuwait, December 8, 2004. (Department of Defense photograph by Master Sgt James M. Bowman, U.S. Air Force) 62. Donald Rumsfeld and L. Paul Bremer, Baghdad Airport, Iraq, December 6, 2003. (Photograph by Karen Ballard) 63. President George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, Istanbul, Turkey, June 28, 2004. (Getty Images) 64. Vice Adm. Jim Stavridis, Donald Rumsfeld, Larry Di Rita, Gen. George Casey, and Bill Luti, American emba.s.sy, Baghdad, Iraq, February 11, 2005. (David Hume Kennerly) 65. Gen. Ray Ordierno, Donald Rumsfeld, et al., Kirkut Air Base, Iraq, December 6, 2003. (Photograph by Karen Ballard) 66. Gen. David Petraeus, Donald Rumsfeld, et. al., Baghdad, Iraq, July 27, 2005. (Joe Raedle/Pool/Corbis Images) 67. Torie Clarke, Marc Theissen, Doug Feith, Donald Rumsfeld, Vice Adm. Ed Giambastiani, Delonnie Henry, et al., onboard a C-17 en route to Uzbekistan, October 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 68. Donald Rumsfeld, Sultan Qaboos, et al., Oman, October 4, 2001. (David Hume Kennerly) 69. Donald Rumsfeld with Kazakh officials, Astana, Kazakhstan, April 28, 2002. (Rumsfeld Collection) 70. Donald Rumsfeld and "Montana," Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, October 22, 2005. (Department of Defense photograph by Master Sgt. James M. Bowman, U.S. Air Force) 71. Republic of Korea Minister of Defense Yoong Kw.a.n.g Ung, Gen. d.i.c.k Myers, Richard Lawless, Donald Rumsfeld, et al., the Pentagon, October 22, 2004. (Department of Defense photograph by Master Sgt. James M. Bowman, U.S. Air Force) 72. Donald Rumsfeld and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov, the Pentagon, January 11, 2005. (Department of Defense photograph by Helene C. Stikkel) 73. PRC Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, Robert Rangel, Peter Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, Gen. Gene Renuart, et al., the Pentagon, December 8, 2005. (Department of Defense photograph) 74. Gen. Peter Pace, Donald Rumsfeld, and Lady Margaret Thatcher, office of the Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon, September 12, 2006. (Department of Defense photograph by Staff Sgt. D. Myles Cullen) 75. Donald and Joyce Rumsfeld, Falcon Stadium, United States Air Force Academy, May 31, 2006. (Department of Defense photograph by Petty Officer 1st Cla.s.s Chad J. McNeeley, U.S. Navy) 76. Joyce Rumsfeld, fire department, Vail, Colorado, March 4, 2006. (Department of Defense photograph by Petty Officer 1st Cla.s.s Chad J. McNeeley, U.S. Navy) 77. Joyce and Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, December 2004. (Department of Defense photograph by Helene C. Stikkel) 78. Gen. Peter Pace and Donald Rumsfeld, outside the Oval Office, the White House, October 23, 2006. (Photograph by Eric Draper, courtesy of the George W. Bush Presidential Center) 79. Donald Rumsfeld with World War II veterans, Naval Air Station North island, Coronado, California, August 30, 2005. (Department of Defense photograph by Tec