Pulling On Our Boots: Challenges and Controversies Beyond the War Zones

Annapolis, MarylandJULY 4, 2006 I was expecting fireworks on Independence Day, but not at 2:30 in the afternoon and not from a despot in North Korea. The multistage Taepo-Dong 2 missile had been on its pad in the northeast corner of the ironically named Democratic People's Republic of Korea for several days. Overhead reconnaissance indicated it was being fueled and possibly prepared for ignition. Smaller, medium-range missiles were in place at other launch sites. We couldn't be sure where any of them were aimed, when they might be launched, what types of warheads they were equipped with, or exactly how far they could go. Military and intelligence officials judged Alaska and Hawaii to be almost certainly within striking distance of North Korea's long-range ballistic missiles. was expecting fireworks on Independence Day, but not at 2:30 in the afternoon and not from a despot in North Korea. The multistage Taepo-Dong 2 missile had been on its pad in the northeast corner of the ironically named Democratic People's Republic of Korea for several days. Overhead reconnaissance indicated it was being fueled and possibly prepared for ignition. Smaller, medium-range missiles were in place at other launch sites. We couldn't be sure where any of them were aimed, when they might be launched, what types of warheads they were equipped with, or exactly how far they could go. Military and intelligence officials judged Alaska and Hawaii to be almost certainly within striking distance of North Korea's long-range ballistic missiles.

The leaders of the so-called Hermit Kingdom had a penchant for rattling sabers around American holidays. In the weeks running up to July 4 there had been some speculation that the North Korean regime might fire a long-range missile. No one was certain of their intentions, but the possibilities included a simple test, a demonstration firing, or a launch to place an object in s.p.a.ce. The North Koreans could do something even more provocative, and our allies in South Korea and j.a.pan didn't want to be ill prepared in case missiles were aimed toward their territory. The erratic Kim Jong Il might even swing for the fences and attempt to hit our country.

President Bush came into office vowing not to put our country at risk of blackmail by ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear, biological, chemical, or conventional warheads. Since late 2001, when America withdrew from the ABM Treaty and began installing a missile defense system, we had made solid strides in putting a developmental system in place. More than a dozen interceptors were in the ground in Alaska and California that could be launched at a moment's notice. Though critics continued to downplay the capability of our system-some said it was like "hitting a bullet with a bullet"-the program wasn't science fiction anymore.1 Tests had proven that our interceptors could locate, track, hit, and destroy incoming ballistic missiles. Tests had proven that our interceptors could locate, track, hit, and destroy incoming ballistic missiles.2 The President and I were pleased with the progress that had been made. We had overcome the legal obstacles of the ABM Treaty by withdrawing. We had overcome the diplomatic obstacles by offering a.s.surances to allies that we were no longer developing a national missile defense system but one that could be fashioned to deter and defend them as well. We had overcome the technical obstacles and consistent a.s.sertions from critics that it couldn't be done by continuing research and development After it was installed; though it wouldn't be a perfect system, it could continue to be improved and calibrated through testing over time.

One of the more challenging obstacles was figuring out the arrangements to actually issue the order-the first in history-to launch an interceptor to destroy an incoming intercontinental ballistic missile. President Bush and I had had many discussions about the precise procedures and delegations of authority for how, when, and by whom the trigger could be pulled. We both appreciated that launching an interceptor in a real-world situation could have grave or unexpected consequences. If the interceptors missed or were launched too late or not at all, an incoming missile could destroy an American city. If the interceptor did hit an incoming missile, deadly debris could spread out over a large area. Given the short time available to make such decisions-every second would be critical After an enemy missile was launched-the President and I concluded that it made sense for him to delegate the launch authority to the secretary of defense.

I had been spending that July Fourth holiday weekend in St. Michaels, Maryland, some seventy miles outside of Washington. Joyce had wisely insisted we find a place outside the capital so I would be away from the Pentagon on some weekends, which would give the staff a respite from the grueling twelve-hours-per-day, seven-days-a-week schedule I had established After 9/11. Joyce and I-with our two miniature dachshunds, Reggie and Chester-had found the old redbrick house on a small branch off the Chesapeake Bay a welcome haven.

But it was not a haven that weekend, as the probability of a North Korean missile launch left a long shadow over the holiday. I was receiving frequent updates over a secure phone on the latest developments. I had with me a Defense Department communications officer-someone able to put me in touch over a secure line with the President and combatant commanders anywhere in the world. He was never more than yards away in times of high alert. At night a security agent with the secure line waited in a car in our driveway, prepared to sprint inside if NORTHCOM-the combatant command for missile defense for the United States-needed me to make the decision on whether to launch our interceptors.

After lunch on Sunday, July 4, Joyce and I left St. Michaels to go to a holiday party. We drove northwest along Route 50, our three-car convoy making good time toward the Chesapeake Bay Bridge. Just After crossing it, we pulled over to the shoulder. The communications officer had Admiral Tim Keating at U.S. Northern Command and Marine General James "Hoss" Cartwright at U.S. Strategic Command on the line. They advised that a long-range Taepo-Dong 2 missile had just been launched from its pad. If it appeared to be on a trajectory toward the United States, I was prepared to give the order to launch our interceptors, which were on high alert. We understood that such an action could invite retaliatory moves from North Korea.

As it turned out, I didn't have to fire that day. The North Korean ballistic missile failed forty-two seconds After launch and fell back on North Korean territory. Later in the Afternoon North Korea fired a half-dozen shorter-range missiles, which splashed into the Pacific. Though I did not have to make the call to send our interceptors into s.p.a.ce to destroy an incoming ballistic missile, the United States was the first nation in the world to have the ability to make that decision.

The uncertain situation with North Korea was one in a series of challenges that faced the Department of Defense, even as it was engaged in difficult wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of those challenges were easy to foresee, while others came with much shorter notice, such as an ominous gathering of winds off the sh.o.r.es of New Orleans.

CHAPTER 42

Katrina and the Challenge of New Inst.i.tutions"A lie will go round the world while the truth is pulling its boots on."-As quoted in Rumsfeld's Rules

Tropical storm Katrina intensified to a category 5 hurricane on August 28, 2005, while it was still several hundred miles out in the Gulf of Mexico. Expecting landfall in the next forty-eight hours, the new NORTHCOM commander, Admiral Tim Keating, began issuing orders and alerts to military units across the United States.* He deployed an advance headquarters to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and created a staging area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The Department of Defense activated a hurricane operations cell in the Pentagon to monitor developments. Search-and-rescue aircrews were alerted that they might soon be needed. Navy ships with relief capabilities were ordered to proceed to the area. He deployed an advance headquarters to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and created a staging area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The Department of Defense activated a hurricane operations cell in the Pentagon to monitor developments. Search-and-rescue aircrews were alerted that they might soon be needed. Navy ships with relief capabilities were ordered to proceed to the area.1 Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard, began alerting state Guard forces. Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard, began alerting state Guard forces.

Katrina thundered into Louisiana and Mississippi just before dawn on the following day. As the storm's fiercest wind gusts-approaching 150 miles per hour-died down, Army National Guard and Coast Guard helicopters began rescue operations. Available DoD a.s.sets were pushed toward the Gulf Coast. Hundreds of active-duty troops and thousands of National Guardsmen began arriving in Louisiana and Mississippi.

Because the Department of Defense is by law a supporting department, not the lead agency in the case of a catastrophic domestic event, the U.S. military was not in charge of coordinating the federal response.2 Instead, the responsibility for managing the federal government's response rested with the ma.s.sive new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Instead, the responsibility for managing the federal government's response rested with the ma.s.sive new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).3 DHS was established with little, if any, input from anyone outside a small circle of White House aides and congressional staffers. The first I heard of the plan was in a phone call from White House Chief of Staff Andy Card in early 2002, the night before it was announced publicly.

Card said officials at the White House-he didn't say who-had quietly worked with key members of Congress to establish a new department and that the President would be making the announcement the next day. DHS promised to be a sizable organization and would absorb a number of components of existing departments and agencies, including, I was told, several from the Department of Defense. This would be among the most extensive reorganizations of the federal government since the National Security Act of 1947.

Card was not asking for my views. He was informing me of the plan on the eve of the announcement. I was surprised. Clearly a decision had been made to put the proposal on the fast track. Because DHS was created in secrecy and haste, there were bound to be unforeseen consequences. I knew how slowly the federal bureaucracy moved, even on a good day. A new cabinet department would need its own facilities and thousands of personnel. It would have to manage relations with labor unions, weed through a thicket of federal regulations, and incorporate a host of agencies that had long been accustomed to different rules, regulations, and modes of operation. These changes would take a long time-likely years, not weeks or months. I also knew that despite its charter, the new department would not have the resources to meet its new statutory responsibilities in the case of a truly catastrophic natural disaster. As I had written in a memo more than a year before Hurricane Katrina struck: DoD currently will not be called until all of the first responders-sheriffs, police, FEMA, FBI, Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, etc.-have tried and failed.... Then and only then will the phone ring at the Department of Defense.... We know that DoD, whatever its ultimate role in homeland security, will always be called in late, [and] will be imperfectly equipped....4 These would prove to be the foreseeable results of the creation of a new federal inst.i.tution made up of a patchwork of existing organizations from other departments and agencies. Good intentions had abounded. Wisdom had been in shorter supply.

Many perceived the response to Katrina as a slow train wreck. Most of the blame for the shortcomings was quickly placed on Washington. The most powerful nation in the world seemed unable to cope with high winds and floodwaters. While some of the unfolding criticism was warranted, much of it was not.

On the day the storm came ash.o.r.e, I was in San Diego attending ceremonies commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of V-J Day, but I left before noon to return to Washington. Over the next few days, we had numerous meetings. President Bush was deeply engaged in the federal response. As usual, he peppered the relevant officials, including Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and FEMA personnel, with detailed questions. Chertoffwas a capable cabinet secretary, but it was painfully clear that his department's resources were limited. Understaffed and underequipped, DHS was heavily dependent on hiring private-sector contractors to perform urgent tasks such as restoring electricity and establishing communications. But in a disaster of this magnitude, private contractors were quickly overwhelmed.

Some state and local officials, notably in Louisiana, did not help matters. Governor Kathleen Blanco was reluctant to relinquish command of the thousands of National Guardsmen in her state, as President Bush had urged her to do. Her actions led to an unnecessary delay in the crucial early hours over the issue of who could organize and direct the Guardsmen. The U.S. military knew how to mount a humanitarian operation with precision, speed, and efficiency. It was increasingly clear that the governor of Louisiana did not.

In light of Governor Blanco's unwillingness to cede control of the National Guard, President Bush was faced with two difficult choices: first, whether to federalize the Guardsmen, which would take away Blanco's authority over them, and, second, whether to invoke the Insurrection Act, which would suspend posse comitatus-the longstanding American law that bars federal military forces from conducting law and order missions on U.S. soil. These steps had not been taken over the objections of a state governor since the civil rights movement, when federal troops were deployed to the South to restore order and enforce desegregation. Confronted with images of civil disorder and media reports depicting chaos in New Orleans, White House officials discussed whether Bush should take those steps.

As troubling as Blanco's leadership was, I was concerned that invoking the Insurrection Act and federalizing the National Guard in the Gulf states against the Governor's will could set an unfortunate precedent. The practical consequences were also worrisome. If the President invoked the Insurrection Act and ordered the Defense Department to use active-duty forces for law enforcement missions, we could have nineteen-year-old Marine lance corporals trained to fight in Iraq patrolling the streets of New Orleans as policemen. Because DHS, not DoD, was authorized by statute to deal with domestic problems, our military had not been organized, trained, or equipped to conduct law enforcement in American cities. A mistake or two could make a bad situation worse.

I sensed it was a close call for the President. He ultimately decided against invoking the act and against federalizing the National Guard. Though he was never much of a second-guesser, in the weeks and months After Katrina, he may well have wondered whether he should have taken those measures. From my vantage point, President Bush made the right call.

Without formally stripping Blanco of her authorities, the President had us send as many troops as rapidly as we could to the region to a.s.sist DHS. We sent forty-five hundred active-duty troops from the 82nd Airborne and Marines from the First and Second Marine Expeditionary Forces. General Blum effectively worked around state officials to restore order with National Guard troops. Instead of overruling the law on posse comitatus by performing law enforcement missions, thousands of active-duty troops could support the National Guard by delivering humanitarian aid and rescuing stranded victims.5 Their very presence had the effect of reducing crime and disorder. Their very presence had the effect of reducing crime and disorder.

From a military standpoint, the response to Katrina was considerably swifter than any previous response to a hurricane, and probably to any natural disaster in American history. During the Hurricane Andrew disaster in 1992, for example, it had taken five days to deploy roughly sixty-eight hundred troops. But within five days of Katrina's landfall, more than thirty-four thousand ground forces from the Guard and active-duty were a.s.sisting in rescue efforts.6 At the peak of our operations, we had some forty-six thousand National Guard troops-citizen soldiers who in many cases were policemen, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, engineers, and munic.i.p.al workers in their civilian jobs-on the scene. At the peak of our operations, we had some forty-six thousand National Guard troops-citizen soldiers who in many cases were policemen, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, engineers, and munic.i.p.al workers in their civilian jobs-on the scene.7 An additional twenty thousand active-duty forces were there as well. There were 350 helicopters and 21 ships conducting round-the-clock operations. An additional twenty thousand active-duty forces were there as well. There were 350 helicopters and 21 ships conducting round-the-clock operations.8 Men and women in uniform were rescuing and evacuating thousands of displaced residents and a.s.sisting FEMA in reestablishing order in the hurricane's Aftermath. Men and women in uniform were rescuing and evacuating thousands of displaced residents and a.s.sisting FEMA in reestablishing order in the hurricane's Aftermath.9 They helped to evacuate eighty-eight thousand Gulf Coast residents and rescued another fifteen thousand. Hundreds of Coast Guard helicopter and boat rescue teams provided critical a.s.sistance in the effort. They helped to evacuate eighty-eight thousand Gulf Coast residents and rescued another fifteen thousand. Hundreds of Coast Guard helicopter and boat rescue teams provided critical a.s.sistance in the effort.

From a headquarters in the New Orleans Superdome, the National Guard launched what amounted to the biggest rescue operation in American history. An active-duty Army three-star officer and gruff Cajun with ties to the region, Lieutenant General Russel Honore, took charge of the active-duty forces in the region, bringing leadership, discipline, efficiency, and confidence to the effort.

Back at the Pentagon, a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale, a former Democratic congressman from Pennsylvania and a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserves, skillfully coordinated DoD's response from the outset, working closely with DHS, FEMA, and the White House.* Because of DHS' lack of resources, McHale antic.i.p.ated the DoD a.s.sets DHS would need and helped their officials prepare the necessary requests for support. McHale had me approve these requests even before DHS had submitted them to expedite the process. Because of DHS' lack of resources, McHale antic.i.p.ated the DoD a.s.sets DHS would need and helped their officials prepare the necessary requests for support. McHale had me approve these requests even before DHS had submitted them to expedite the process.

On September 4, 2005, I visited New Orleans. The devastation was terrible. Water had risen to the heights of roofs. Whole neighborhoods were underwater. U.S. military and Coast Guard helicopters were rescuing people stranded on top of their houses. We flew over the Seventeenth Street Ca.n.a.l levee that had been topped, allowing the swollen waters of Lake Pontchartrain to flood one of America's great cities.

As the federal government mobilized to a.s.sist Katrina victims, its performance was overshadowed by media coverage of the wrenching drama that had unfolded on the ground. Along with more than eighteen hundred lives, the storm had torn away the veneer of civilization in some places. The state and local governments that had kept a lid on anarchy, crime, and violence had dissolved. There were reports of murder and gang rapes. Reflecting the panic on the ground, some reporters and their anchors in the studios became advocates, sharing in the harsh condemnation of the emergency aid workers, the federal government, state and local leaders, in fact, anyone who might bear any responsibility. This chain reaction in the media left a damaging impression that the officials coping with the disaster didn't care and that our government was incapable of mounting an effective response.10

Eight months After Katrina I wrote a memo to the President: "The charge of 'incompetence' against the U.S. Government should be easy to rebut, were people to understand the extent to which the current system of government makes competence next to impossible."11 After five years back in government, wrestling with natural and man-made disasters as well as two wars, it became clear to me that our government inst.i.tutions were proving inadequate to the challenges of the twenty-first century and the information age. Efforts After 9/11 to refashion and create inst.i.tutions such as DHS and the director of national intelligence (DNI) had led to suboptimal results: new layers of bureaucracy with the underlying challenges not well addressed. After five years back in government, wrestling with natural and man-made disasters as well as two wars, it became clear to me that our government inst.i.tutions were proving inadequate to the challenges of the twenty-first century and the information age. Efforts After 9/11 to refashion and create inst.i.tutions such as DHS and the director of national intelligence (DNI) had led to suboptimal results: new layers of bureaucracy with the underlying challenges not well addressed.*

We needed to refashion our government inst.i.tutions and develop new capabilities to respond to the challenge posed by terrorism and other non-conventional threats. For example, we were losing, or at least not winning, the battle of ideas against Islamist extremists. The State Department and other departments and agencies were not fulfilling their promises of political and economic support for reconstruction in places like Iraq and Afghanistan for a variety of reasons, including a lack of both funds and deployable personnel. The threads of national power-military, financial, intelligence, civic, communications-were sometimes working at cross-purposes, much as the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force had in the era before the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in 1986 mandated the creation of a joint force.13 The idea that our government might not be up to the new challenges had preoccupied my thoughts for some time.14 Just what to do about it occurred to me in an unlikely place from an unlikely source: a Democrat who had inherited the U.S. presidency in 1945. Just what to do about it occurred to me in an unlikely place from an unlikely source: a Democrat who had inherited the U.S. presidency in 1945.

In the spring of 2006, I visited the Harry S. Truman presidential library outside St. Louis, Missouri, to deliver a speech comparing our struggle against violent extremists to the decades-long challenges of the Cold War.15 Before my remarks, I spent some time touring the library. It was a treasured opportunity for someone who admired the blunt, no-nonsense midwesterner. I was taken into his private office, which was largely untouched since his death. Inside I glimpsed a wall of books, many of which he'd received from friends and contemporaries, including Winston Churchill. Hanging not far from his office was a large copy of an invitation to his inauguration. The invitation had inadvertently been extended to the President himself. Scrawled at the bottom was Truman's RSVP: "Weather permitting, I hope to attend. HST." Before my remarks, I spent some time touring the library. It was a treasured opportunity for someone who admired the blunt, no-nonsense midwesterner. I was taken into his private office, which was largely untouched since his death. Inside I glimpsed a wall of books, many of which he'd received from friends and contemporaries, including Winston Churchill. Hanging not far from his office was a large copy of an invitation to his inauguration. The invitation had inadvertently been extended to the President himself. Scrawled at the bottom was Truman's RSVP: "Weather permitting, I hope to attend. HST."

I was a junior in college when President Truman left office. He was deeply unpopular. Truman was a fierce partisan and rather cantankerous man. But what I have come to understand-and what came back vividly to me during my visit-was how central a role he and his administration had in the international challenges of the second half of the twentieth century.

As World War II ended and America entered the Cold War, it fell to the Truman administration to fashion an entirely new construct for an uncertain era. Largely overlooked and certainly underappreciated at the time, his administration crafted many of the inst.i.tutions and policies that proved crucial to fighting and prevailing in the long conflict against the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan, for example, provided needed resources to the war-ravaged economies of Western Europe and helped to keep them from sliding into the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. The containment strategy was pursued over many decades. Many Truman-era international inst.i.tutions, designed to b.u.t.tress the democracies of the world and encourage the rise of others, are still with us today: the World Bank, NATO, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization of American States, among them. At home, the Truman administration created the NSC, the CIA, and the U.S. Information Agency, and merged the Navy and War departments into the Department of Defense. All of that occurred at the inflection point at the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. The George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations had similar opportunities to fashion new policies and inst.i.tutions for a new era: The inflection point at the end of the Cold War and the twenty-first-century challenges of the information age.

When I returned to Washington I put these thoughts together in a memorandum for President Bush: "Today the world requires new international organizations tailored to our new circ.u.mstances."16 I noted that many of the most pressing threats we faced were global and transnational in scope-terrorism, proliferation, cybercrime, narcotics, piracy, hostage taking, and criminal gangs. By their nature, they could not be dealt with successfully by any one nation-not even the United States-and, as such, required the cooperation of many nations. I noted that many of the most pressing threats we faced were global and transnational in scope-terrorism, proliferation, cybercrime, narcotics, piracy, hostage taking, and criminal gangs. By their nature, they could not be dealt with successfully by any one nation-not even the United States-and, as such, required the cooperation of many nations.

I believed that in important ways, existing international inst.i.tutions-including some whose origins dated back to the days of FDR and Truman-were proving inadequate to the times. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were working to bring development funds to impoverished countries, but a nontrivial portion failed to reach the intended people because of inefficiency and corruption. I was also thinking of the United Nations, which was heavy on anti-American and anti-Israel diatribes and comparatively light on accomplishments. NATO, too, had its shortcomings. Because it was designed as a European defense organization against the Soviets, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization did not have linkages with some of the world's important democracies outside of Europe, such as j.a.pan, South Korea, Israel, and Australia. NATO also required unanimity among twenty-eight member nations that included some occasionally contrarian members, making it difficult to deal with new challenges. The demographics of Western Europe-with aging populations and declining investments in their militaries-did not promise a robust alliance.

I suggested that new international organizations might be needed to bring competence in areas where existing organizations proved to be less well suited to the twenty-first century-areas such as developing and utilizing quick-reaction forces, a.s.sisting in military and military police training in foreign countries, counterproliferation, capacity building for the rule of law, and helping to strengthen domestic government ministries. Too often the United States was called on to do the work alone that other countries could, and should, help with. Because ours was the only military in the world that could deal with a serious crisis rapidly, America relieved the pressure on other countries to step forward, which left our forces burdened with the responsibility.17 I proposed that the President start a national discussion on this subject and offered a few suggestions of initiatives. The list included such things as a peacekeeping and governance corps that would have a standing capability to respond rapidly to problems abroad before they spun out of control. That could have been useful to handle unrest in Liberia and Haiti, possibly heading off civil strife before it began. Civilian teams could also bolster our military's expanding humanitarian efforts, such as when the ma.s.sive tsunami struck coasts in the Indian Ocean in December 2004, killing 185,000, and when a 7. 6 magnitude earthquake in October 2005 left the Pakistani region of Kashmir devastated, with 80,000 dead and nearly 3 million homeless.

Our humanitarian a.s.sistance efforts brought about a noticeable transformation of opinion within those important parts of the Muslim world. We did well for America by doing good. After Defense Department tsunami relief efforts, polls in Indonesia showed that 65 percent of its citizens had a more favorable impression of the United States. Osama bin Laden's approval ratings in Indonesia-the largest Muslim nation in the world-dropped from 58 percent before the disaster to 23 percent Afterward.18 In Pakistan, a country not known for its favorable views toward America, our rescue operations in the wake of their earthquake changed many minds. By November 2005, more than 46 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable view of the United States-more than double the percentage that had held that view six months earlier. In Pakistan, a country not known for its favorable views toward America, our rescue operations in the wake of their earthquake changed many minds. By November 2005, more than 46 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable view of the United States-more than double the percentage that had held that view six months earlier.19 The favorite toy among Pakistani children quickly became small models of the American Chinook helicopters that had been so visible in delivering American relief supplies to those left homeless. The Chinooks were referred to in the Pashtun dialect as "Angels of Mercy." The favorite toy among Pakistani children quickly became small models of the American Chinook helicopters that had been so visible in delivering American relief supplies to those left homeless. The Chinooks were referred to in the Pashtun dialect as "Angels of Mercy."

I also recommended some form of maritime organization to which countries with significant naval forces, such as India and j.a.pan, could contribute to combating piracy on the high seas. Because strong and growing economies tended to stem the rise of violent extremism, I suggested that the President consider a new market-oriented inst.i.tution to provide grants and support to entrepreneurs in developing countries in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America that would bypa.s.s the government level, where waste and corruption in poor countries were often a serious problem. I thought it might be useful to conduct a rea.s.sessment of how our country disperses foreign aid-perhaps using microfinance to promote individual entrepreneurship instead of ma.s.sive block grants to governments, often for large construction projects.

I suggested consideration of a Middle East security initiative to bolster moderate states in the region and to help shield them from threats posed by nations like Iran, as well as consideration of an Asian security organization-in a sense, an organization with some of the attributes of NATO-to engage the United States in building stronger partnerships with our friends and allies in that region. I thought we needed to expand free trade agreements beyond our immediate neighbors to friends and allies around the world.

Here at home, I proposed a review of the executive and legislative branch inst.i.tutions that were organized and arranged for an earlier era. We needed adjustments so that agencies and departments could function with the speed and agility the new century and the information age demanded. The compartmentalized organization of the executive branch, with its separate elements and the lack of a coordination mechanism, was equally true in Congress, with its separate committees and subcommittees. It was and remains exceedingly difficult to pull all the strands of American power through a single needle eye to create coherent national policy.

I suggested consideration of a new U.S. agency for global communication that could serve as a channel to inform, educate, and compete worldwide in the battle for ideas. We found ourselves engaged in the first protracted war in an era of e-mail, Twitter, blogs, phone cameras, a global internet with no inhibitions, cell phones, handheld video cameras, talk radio, twenty-four-hour news broadcasts, and satellite television.20 By 2006, it was clear that our government's efforts to counter extremist ideology through public diplomacy and strategic communications were proving an abject failure. We didn't have global communications agencies to engage in a strategic effort to counter the ideology and propaganda of Islamists, as inst.i.tutions such as the U.S. Information Agency and Radio Free Europe had combated Communist ideology. By 2006, it was clear that our government's efforts to counter extremist ideology through public diplomacy and strategic communications were proving an abject failure. We didn't have global communications agencies to engage in a strategic effort to counter the ideology and propaganda of Islamists, as inst.i.tutions such as the U.S. Information Agency and Radio Free Europe had combated Communist ideology.

Meanwhile, our enemies were successfully hammering home their messages via the internet and satellite television. With media relations committees that met to discuss ways to achieve their violent objectives, terrorist groups such as al-Qaida had proven effective at persuading many credulous observers-Muslims and non-Muslims alike-that they were the exasperated victims of Western oppression rather than the stormtroopers of a totalitarian political movement with a brutal will to power. Our enemies had skillfully adapted to fighting wars in the twenty-first-century media age. But the U.S. government and the West remained-and still remains-pitifully far behind.*

As I wrote my memo, I realized that the many suggestions I was proposing to President Bush were long-term strategic ideas that would require deliberation and discussion, perhaps even trial and error. They would take political capital, which by 2006 was in short supply. What I was proposing transcended any one department. To examine some of these recommendations and conduct a wholesale review of our government's organization, I proposed a bipartisan presidential commission of distinguished officials modeled on the Hoover Commission of 1947. After I handed the President my memorandum, he told me the ideas were worth discussing. However, to my knowledge, there was never a high-level meeting on my proposals. That was not surprising in an administration that at that point was fighting two wars and was under siege by the Congress and the press. Nonetheless, I believed we missed a significant opportunity. Perhaps they were ideas whose time had not yet come.

CHAPTER 43

Gardening"The way to keep weeds from overwhelming you is to deal with them constantly and in their early stages."-George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph Turmoil and Triumph While Afghanistan and Iraq commanded the focus of national security officials, there were 190 other countries that also needed monitoring and attention. Some of those nations, of course, were friendly to the United States, some less so, but all had daily interaction with our government at some level. Even officials from international pariahs such as Iran and North Korea were meeting with lower-level American diplomatic and intelligence officials and our intermediaries.

With our various economic and trade relationships and diplomatic and military reach, America does not have the luxury of pursuing policies of isolationism or neglect. We had to keep our attention on the world's many significant activities, meeting constantly with foreign leaders, forging diplomatic and trade agreements, and standing firm and responding as necessary when unfriendly nations provoked our country. George Shultz referred to this kind of daily maintenance with foreign governments as "gardening."1 Throughout the Bush administration, while waging two wars and being on guard for another attack on our sh.o.r.es, many in the administration worked hard to be effective "gardeners"-with varying degrees of success. Throughout the Bush administration, while waging two wars and being on guard for another attack on our sh.o.r.es, many in the administration worked hard to be effective "gardeners"-with varying degrees of success.

When it came to personal diplomacy, George W. Bush was an active and productive, if publicly underestimated, a.s.set. His decidedly informal brand of diplomacy was novel for some foreign leaders. What he chose to dispense with in polish, he made up for in persistence and reliability. In meeting After meeting, I saw the President put his foreign interlocutors at ease. This personal rapport paid dividends with leaders as diverse as Spain's Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, Jordan's King Abdullah, and Australia's John Howard. His relationships translated into closer ties between our countries and tangible support for initiatives like the ninety-country Proliferation Security Initiative and on-the-ground a.s.sistance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One of the administration's important strategic successes was in our own hemisphere: helping to keep a democracy of forty-five million people from succ.u.mbing to the longest-running, best-financed, and most violent insurgency in Latin America. For more than a decade, the United States had been waging a war against drugs in Colombia. I thought that stopping the flow of drugs into our country, while important, was fated to be unsuccessful as long as the powerful demand for illegal drugs persisted. The Colombian government could spray coca fields and interdict drug runners, but as long as there were millions addicted to drugs around the world, people would find a way to produce and sell what the market demanded. Since the late 1990s, the Clinton administration's $5 billion Plan Colombia had been a bipartisan antidrug initiative demonstrating that our government was doing something about the drug problem.

By 2001, Colombia was teetering on the edge of becoming a failed state, a refuge for drugs and terrorists. The instability was fueled by the narcotics trade and Marxist guerrillas known as the FARC. The guerrillas controlled an area of Colombia larger than Switzerland. It was a safe haven for coca cultivation, kidnapping, murder, extortion, and Communist-inspired terrorism. Many had written off the Colombian government's war against the insurgency as a doomed effort. Some 60 percent of Colombians believed that the FARC would win. If that proved true, a stalwart democracy to our south would be replaced by a narco-terrorist dictatorship.

As part of the response to 9/11, I recommended to President Bush that, in addition to authorizing strikes in Afghanistan, he consider a plan to provide military a.s.sistance to Colombia's efforts against the insurgents-not just the drug traffickers. Visibly a.s.sisting Colombia, I argued, would reflect the truth that the campaign against terrorists was global, and that we were not targeting only Islamist extremists.

There was, however, an Islamist terrorist element even in Latin America. Islamist extremists, many affiliated with Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, were taking advantage of ungoverned areas in several locations in the region to operate and raise money. If a government would not or could not govern its own territory, that was an invitation for adventurers of various types-terrorists, political revolutionaries, drug dealers, and other criminals-to enter and take advantage of the vacuum. Such weeds thrive where the atmosphere of authority is thin, and they can spread aggressively.

President Bush was eager to a.s.sist Colombia. Our efforts received an unexpected boost in 2002, when Alvaro Uribe was elected president. FARC rebels had killed his father and attempted to kill Uribe on no less than fifteen different occasions over his political career. As a presidential candidate he campaigned fearlessly against the FARC and vowed to reclaim Colombian territory from the drug lords. After his election he kept track of what he considered the key measures of his war's success, including the numbers of monthly kidnappings, homicides, acres of land taken back from the FARC, and even the number of kilometers Colombians traveled on their holidays, since for many years traveling on some roads was a death sentence. When I met with Uribe, he would invariably have a yellow note card in his jacket pocket, listing his benchmarks.

In our first visit in June 2002, weeks After the Colombian elections, I told Uribe we might be willing to lend a hand by offering a.s.sistance in an integrated counterinsurgency campaign that strategically combined American and Colombian political, intelligence, economic, and military a.s.sets. If we were going to do more than just focus on trying to intercept drug shipments and spraying coca fields, there was one major hurdle: the U.S. Congress. Fearing direct American involvement in a guerrilla war in Latin America, Congress had imposed strict limits on intelligence sharing and military activities with the Colombians. The only authorized missions were those designed to reduce drug production, and there was even a congressionally imposed limit on the number of American military personnel to be allowed in Colombia at any given time.

Working with policy officials Doug Feith, Peter Rodman, and Roger Pardo-Maurer, we were able to reorient our a.s.sistance to Colombia toward counterterrorism and targeting the FARC guerrillas. The Congress agreed to change our authorities to allow for more than just the narrow focus on drugs. Our goal was to help the government of Colombia a.s.sert control-effective sovereignty, as we called it-over its entire territory.

In President Alvaro Uribe, we had the most skillful partner we could have hoped for. Una.s.suming and slight in build, Uribe was unafraid to take on the FARC and reclaim Colombian territory (he also commanded the overwhelming support of the Colombian people, reaching a 91 percent approval rating at one point).2 With expanded authorities and intelligence cooperation, we could take the fight to the enemy. An energetic Army Reserve Special Forces noncommissioned officer who had fought alongside the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s, Pardo-Maurer aggressively sought interagency and bipartisan support. Without adding a dollar to our budget, we made our aid far more effective than it had been before. Drug production decreased, and hundreds of thousands of acres of land were taken back from the FARC. The campaign to win back Colombia from the terrorists proved to be a major success. With expanded authorities and intelligence cooperation, we could take the fight to the enemy. An energetic Army Reserve Special Forces noncommissioned officer who had fought alongside the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s, Pardo-Maurer aggressively sought interagency and bipartisan support. Without adding a dollar to our budget, we made our aid far more effective than it had been before. Drug production decreased, and hundreds of thousands of acres of land were taken back from the FARC. The campaign to win back Colombia from the terrorists proved to be a major success.

Another significant success involved one of the most worrisome nations in the world-the Libya of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The State Department had long listed Libya as a leading sponsor of international terrorism. Libya was also notorious for its multiyear pursuit of weapons of ma.s.s destruction. The Gaddafiregime was responsible for the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland, which killed 270 people, including 189 Americans.

After 9/11, the Bush administration had a rare opportunity to persuade Libya-and perhaps some other terrorist-supporting or WMD-pursuing regimes-to choose a different path. I believed that if we put sufficient pressure on Afghanistan and Iraq, other countries might recognize that their interests in self-preservation meant that they too needed to end their support for terrorism and their WMD programs. This was the case with Gaddafi, who, After we invaded Iraq, reportedly told Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi that he did not want to become the next Saddam Hussein. It was not mere coincidence that only a few days After Hussein was plucked in such a degraded state from his subterranean spider hole and imprisoned in Iraq, Libya's dictator acknowledged and agreed to dismantle his country's long-running nuclear and chemical weapons programs.3 Though our activities elsewhere in the Middle East were gaining few headlines-we wanted it that way-the United States and its partners were also capturing and killing terrorists outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. Sensitive operations involving the CIA and U.S. special operations forces were ongoing in the Horn of Africa, Northern Africa, Pakistan, and Yemen, where terrorists had fled After we put pressure on them in their former sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Iraq. By developing relationships and establishing a presence in those countries beforehand, we made it harder for fleeing terrorists to find refuge there.4 Since 9/11 we had made manhunting and the skills needed to track (find), isolate (fix), and capture or kill (finish) individuals a priority for our military. By 2006, we had become quite successful using highly cla.s.sified intelligence operations to track down our enemies in countries around the world. These counterterrorism efforts in ungoverned areas required not only careful military preparation and training, but skillful diplomatic support. Since 9/11 we had made manhunting and the skills needed to track (find), isolate (fix), and capture or kill (finish) individuals a priority for our military. By 2006, we had become quite successful using highly cla.s.sified intelligence operations to track down our enemies in countries around the world. These counterterrorism efforts in ungoverned areas required not only careful military preparation and training, but skillful diplomatic support.

Our administration's gardening record was not perfect, however. Certainly my "old Europe" comment was not a model of deft alliance management. And in other cases too, our stewardship in foreign affairs left something to be desired, especially in Bush's second term.

Shortly After his reelection, President Bush rearranged his national security team. Colin Powell departed as secretary of state. National Security Adviser Condi Rice took over Powell's post. Her longtime deputy, Steve Hadley, moved up to become national security adviser. CIA Director George Tenet had departed the administration several months earlier and had been replaced by Florida Congressman Porter Goss.

I hoped that these changes might improve the way interagency meetings were planned and run and the way decisions were summarized and implemented. I also hoped that State's new leadership would make the department more supportive of the President's policies. I thought the quiet competence of Steve Hadley might help the interagency process by providing Bush with clear options and ensuring his decisions were carried out. If so, Hadley would be less inclined to seek the forced consensus or bridging approach that I found ineffective in the first term. I hoped he would be more willing to move contentious issues up to the President for decision, where they belonged. I was particularly encouraged by his choice of a deputy, J. D. Crouch, who had served in the Defense Department before becoming the amba.s.sador to Romania.

I thought Rice could be a good secretary of state in that she was close and loyal to the President. To get the benefit of the skills and resources of the State Department, a president needs someone to lead it who is intent on having that often independent-minded agency follow his strategic guidance. I was confident Rice would be inclined and might even be able to do just that; she had an opportunity to become a secretary of state in the mold of Henry Kissinger and George Shultz by bringing the President's agenda to the State Department rather than the world's agenda, as reflected through our diplomats, to the President. Yet despite the realignment inside the Bush administration, 2005 and 2006 witnessed some diplomatic failures.

On the steps of the U.S. Capitol at his second inauguration, President Bush proclaimed an ambitious goal for the nation: "ending tyranny in our world." The State Department's interpretation of the President's conviction about the benefits of democracy led to complications with nations we needed as friends and partners. Promoting democracy and human rights in closed societies is laudable, and often serves U.S. interests. But sometimes the rhetoric came across as lecturing, and it could on occasion hurt our friends without actually improving human rights. I made a practice of asking whether the United States had any real leverage that might persuade foreign rulers to follow a different course to establish freer political and economic systems. Sometimes berating countries feels good to the beraters and wins domestic political points, but scolding them can often come at the expense of losing critical cooperation and alienating foreigners who see the United States as a bully.

Instead of labeling countries as good or bad-democratic or nondemocratic, prohuman rights or antihuman rights-I thought a better way of categorizing countries was to consider the direction in which they were heading. If a country that had been a longtime abuser of human rights and a foe of democracy was making steps toward freer political and economic systems, I believed we should calculate whether continued progress in the right direction was likelier to be achieved by encouraging rather than publicly chiding its leadership. I recognized the U.S. interest-practical as well as moral-in having other countries respect basic human rights and function democratically. But I saw that interest of ours as one of several that needed to be considered in the making of U.S. policy. It was not the sole interest, and it did not necessarily trump all others.

After Rice became secretary of state in 2005, she made it a priority to push Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf toward more democratic practices. Rice publicly called for Musharraf, the senior army officer, to seek democratic elections and relinquish his military uniform-a symbolic step designed to promote civilian rather than military leadership in Pakistan.5 Musharraf was trying to hold together a weak government, filled with elements that did not share his affinity for the United States. We were dependent on Pakistan's logistic support for our efforts in Afghanistan; the country also had a formidable a.r.s.enal of nuclear weapons that could fall into the wrong hands if Musharraf's government fell to a radical Islamist element. I questioned whether it was for U.S. officials to dictate what clothes Musharraf wore to work. I was disappointed but not surprised when only months After he complied with Rice's request, he could no longer a.s.sert control over the military and was forced by various political forces to step down. The alternatives to Musharraf were, in my view, not likely to be better, and that has proven to be the case. Musharraf was trying to hold together a weak government, filled with elements that did not share his affinity for the United States. We were dependent on Pakistan's logistic support for our efforts in Afghanistan; the country also had a formidable a.r.s.enal of nuclear weapons that could fall into the wrong hands if Musharraf's government fell to a radical Islamist element. I questioned whether it was for U.S. officials to dictate what clothes Musharraf wore to work. I was disappointed but not surprised when only months After he complied with Rice's request, he could no longer a.s.sert control over the military and was forced by various political forces to step down. The alternatives to Musharraf were, in my view, not likely to be better, and that has proven to be the case.

A similar situation presented itself in Uzbekistan. In the days After 9/11, Uzbekistan had provided important cooperation for our activities in Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2006, I traveled there several times and met with Uzbek officials elsewhere. By his own admission, President Islam Karimov was not an American-style democrat-there were few if any in the region-but he had shown no hostility toward U.S. interests. In fact, to Russia's displeasure, he had allowed U.S. forces to use his Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airfield, a key link by which many tens of thousands of tons of supplies and aid, as well as our military forces poured into Afghanistan. We were working closely with the Uzbek military and their helpful minister of defense, Kodir Gulyamov. He was a physicist by training and the first civilian minister of defense in the former Soviet Union. In the spring of 2005, all of that changed, and it led to what I thought was one of the most unfortunate, if unnoticed, foreign policy mistakes of our administration, one that was aided and abetted by a bipartisan group in Congress.

The facts as best as can be determined are: In the early morning hours of May 13, 2005, in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan, heavily armed men stormed the town prison. It appeared that the goal of the a.s.sault was to release members of an Islamic extremist group accused of seeking to establish an Islamic state, a caliphate, in eastern Uzbekistan.6 The rebels attacked the town's government center and took officials hostage, killing some of them. The rebels attacked the town's government center and took officials hostage, killing some of them.7 Before long, Uzbek government forces ma.s.sed to put an end to the situation. A firefight between the insurgents and government forces ensued, and innocent bystanders, including human shields used by the rebels, were caught in the crossfire. Before long, Uzbek government forces ma.s.sed to put an end to the situation. A firefight between the insurgents and government forces ensued, and innocent bystanders, including human shields used by the rebels, were caught in the crossfire.8 The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency speculated that "[s]ecurity forces probably lost control of the situation and fired on noncombatants." The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency speculated that "[s]ecurity forces probably lost control of the situation and fired on noncombatants."9 But information remained sketchy. But information remained sketchy.

Self-proclaimed human rights advocates with longstanding records of opposition to the Uzbek government quickly got into the act. By 2001, "human rights" had become a sizable global industry. For some it was a cause, for some a profession. Many seemed interested in embarra.s.sing the United States and Israel while ignoring human rights abuses by oppressive regimes such as Cuba and Zimbabwe. The facts were often mangled in the process. In spite of the fact that video filmed at the time showed the attackers in Uzbekistan to be heavily armed, the group Human Rights Watch declared them peaceful "protesters" who had come under attack by government forces for being "especially pious" Muslims.* In the Western press, estimates of the number killed by the government ranged from 175 to well over 1,000. Comparisons were made to the ma.s.sacre of Chinese citizens in Tiananmen Square, and stories circulated of a deliberate ma.s.sacre of civilians peacefully demonstrating in the street. In the Western press, estimates of the number killed by the government ranged from 175 to well over 1,000. Comparisons were made to the ma.s.sacre of Chinese citizens in Tiananmen Square, and stories circulated of a deliberate ma.s.sacre of civilians peacefully demonstrating in the street.11 The Uzbek government-which was not accustomed to the demands of a free press-didn't exactly help its case by refusing to provide much information about its side of events. The Uzbek government-which was not accustomed to the demands of a free press-didn't exactly help its case by refusing to provide much information about its side of events.

Some members of Congress began a campaign of condemnation of the Uzbek government. Two weeks After the events in Andijan, Republican Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham traveled to the capital of Tashkent to deliver a public rebuke. "[H]istory shows that continued repression of human rights leads to tragedies such as the one that just took place," McCain lectured.12 Around the same time, I received a letter from McCain, cosigned by five other senators, insisting that America not pay the $23 million we owed the government from our military's use of the Uzbek air base at K2. "[G]overnment security forces in the city of Andijan ma.s.sacred hundreds of peaceful demonstrators," they wrote. "We strongly object to making a payment to Uzbekistan at this time." Around the same time, I received a letter from McCain, cosigned by five other senators, insisting that America not pay the $23 million we owed the government from our military's use of the Uzbek air base at K2. "[G]overnment security forces in the city of Andijan ma.s.sacred hundreds of peaceful demonstrators," they wrote. "We strongly object to making a payment to Uzbekistan at this time."13 I replied to the senators, "The bills we have from the Uzbeks are for services rendered in the war on terrorism. Our national policy, as a general rule, is to pay legitimate bills presented for goods and services by other nations."14 Paying our bills, though occasionally politically difficult, was the right thing to do. Paying our bills, though occasionally politically difficult, was the right thing to do.15 What's more, failing to pay for the services we had requested and received and the goods we consumed would send a harmful message to all of the other nations helping us that the United States could not be relied on. What's more, failing to pay for the services we had requested and received and the goods we consumed would send a harmful message to all of the other nations helping us that the United States could not be relied on.16 After the facts were uncovered and eyewitness reporting was gathered, it was clear that Uzbek authorities had confronted an effort intended to overthrow the local government. The government's security forces and public affairs officials functioned poorly, but this was not a simple case of soldiers slaughtering innocents, as had been widely alleged and misreported. At a princ.i.p.als meeting in the middle of the crisis, I argued for a more measured handling of Uzbekistan, to encourage Uzbek leaders to move in the right direction, toward freer political and economic policies. I did not favor berating them and shoving them back in the wrong direction-particularly when we lacked a clear understanding of what actually had taken place.17 Before calling for draconian sanctions and making public statements criticizing the government, I thought we needed to first find out the facts and then balance our clear interests in promoting freer political systems and human rights with national security interests. I argued further that if we handled the human rights issue incorrectly and damaged our relationship with Uzbekistan, we could make their human rights situation even worse, as the Uzbek regime would likely clamp down against those who had been closest to the United States and the West. Before calling for draconian sanctions and making public statements criticizing the government, I thought we needed to first find out the facts and then balance our clear interests in promoting freer political systems and human rights with national security interests. I argued further that if we handled the human rights issue incorrectly and damaged our relationship with Uzbekistan, we could make their human rights situation even worse, as the Uzbek regime would likely clamp down against those who had been closest to the United States and the West.* Any incentives Karimov once had to move toward a more open society would be undermined. Further, I knew that it would seriously damage our efforts in Afghanistan. Any incentives Karimov once had to move toward a more open society would be undermined. Further, I knew that it would seriously damage our efforts in Afghanistan.

My arguments did not prevail. At an NSC meeting, Condi Rice responded to me by declaring, "Human rights trump security." I wondered if she had really thought that through. She seemed to be saying that if a country didn't behave as we did or as we expected, it would be shunned, even if turning it away from us took a toll on our nation's security, and to make matters worse, it arrested their progress on human rights. If we took such a good and evil view of the world, we wouldn't be able to count on support from any non-democratic country. "We made a clear choice, and that was to stand on the side of human rights," senior State Department official Nick Burns echoed in the press.18 Karimov didn't appreciate the recitation of complaints he heard in meetings with U.S. officials. Uzbek government officials also a.s.serted that the State Department ignored their requests to renegotiate the base lease for the U.S. air base at K2, the critically important lifeline into Afghanistan. On July 29, 2005, two months After the riots at Andijan, the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a letter to the U.S. emba.s.sy in Tashkent, indicating that we were no longer going to be able to use the air base.19 The Karimov government gave us six months to pack up, which left those of us in the Defense Department scrambling to try to come up with alternatives, all of which were considerably more expensive. Our eviction from Uzbekistan came at a critical time, just when it appeared that the Taliban was mounting a renewed offensive After three years of relative calm. American-Uzbek military-to-military relations were cut off abruptly, ending a relationship that, beginning in 2001, had exposed Uzbeks to democratic values and principles, such as freedom of speech and civilian control of the military. The Karimov government gave us six months to pack up, which left those of us in the Defense Department scrambling to try to come up with alternatives, all of which were considerably more expensive. Our eviction from Uzbekistan came at a critical time, just when it appeared that the Taliban was mounting a renewed offensive After three years of relative calm. American-Uzbek military-to-military relations were cut off abruptly, ending a relationship that, beginning in 2001, had exposed Uzbeks to democratic values and principles, such as freedom of speech and civilian control of the military.

Uzbek leaders then began to strengthen ties with nations that would not berate them regarding democracy and human rights-such as Russia and China. Karimov signed a formal treaty of friendship with Russia in November 2005, a marked reversal in att.i.tude from when I had met with him four years earlier.

"Russia was and remains for us the most