On November 13, 2001, the day Kabul was taken by the Northern Alliance, President Bush issued a military order formally appointing the secretary of defense as the "detention authority" for captured prisoners and for establishing the outlines of a justice system to try them.4 The order was the product of a series of discussions between White House and Justice Department lawyers. The order was the product of a series of discussions between White House and Justice Department lawyers.

The President's order required that the Defense Department establish facilities to house suspected terrorists and conduct "military commissions to sit at any time and any place, consistent with such guidance regarding time and place as the Secretary of Defense may provide."5 The order was based directly on decisions that had been made by presidents of both political parties during wartime, most recently by Franklin Roosevelt during World War II. Indeed, much of the language was taken verbatim from Roosevelt's order establishing military commissions in 1942, which had been upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court of the United States. The order was based directly on decisions that had been made by presidents of both political parties during wartime, most recently by Franklin Roosevelt during World War II. Indeed, much of the language was taken verbatim from Roosevelt's order establishing military commissions in 1942, which had been upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court of the United States.6 The relevant sentences of the President's order were brief, but the tasks they set out were colossal. They would require the work of thousands of people for hundreds of thousands of hours. Bush was delegating wartime responsibilities to the Department of Defense that had not been used by our government in more than half a century.

I agreed with the President's decision to shift from a peacetime approach, which treated terrorist acts as law enforcement problems, to a wartime footing, which deemed terrorism as an act of war. This fundamental change in philosophy was challenged by some who preferred trying terrorists in civilian courts of law After the fact and treating them as common criminals. The reality was that America had tried that approach for decades, and it had proven inadequate for stopping terrorist attacks before they occurred. Treating the conflict as a war-coupled with Congress' september 18, 2001 authorization of the use of all "necessary and appropriate force" in the fight against terrorists-was the proper way to move beyond a reactive policy of retaliation and achieve the President's goal of establishing proactive measures to prevent terrorist attacks against America.

Still I questioned whether our military was the appropriate inst.i.tution to hold captured enemy combatants. From World War II through Korea and Vietnam to the first Gulf War, it was true that the military had shouldered the responsibility for the detention of captured enemy forces. But as I saw it, this unconventional conflict-against an amorphous enemy and with no finite duration-did not fit neatly within the laws of war pertaining to conventional conflicts. When it came to detention, our military had been schooled in holding enemies of regular armed forces-that is, lawful combatants ent.i.tled to prisoner of war (POW) status. Our armed forces did not have experience or established procedures for dealing with captured terrorists who, under the laws of war, were not ent.i.tled to the privileges of POWs.

What the President directed us to undertake required the advice of attorneys familiar with U.S. statutes and our international agreements. One of the notable changes I had observed from my service in the Pentagon in the 1970s was the prevalence of lawyers-in almost every office and in nearly every meeting. By the time I returned as secretary in 2001, there were a breathtaking ten thousand lawyers, military and civilian, involved at nearly every level of the chain of command across the globe. That the Department of Defense could function at all with ten thousand lawyers parsing its every move is astounding.

The number of laws and regulations relevant to the Defense Department had exploded correspondingly. Most elements of warfare in the twenty-first century were governed by complex legal requirements, from tactical rules of engagement to strategic issues involving negotiations over the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. It was a considerably bigger challenge than two and a half decades earlier, but we needed to ensure that the Department was always in compliance with the law.

Many fine attorneys worked on detainee affairs, including Harvard law graduate and former Army Captain William "Jim" Haynes II, who as general counsel was the Pentagon's chief legal adviser. Haynes spared no effort to protect the interests of the armed forces while ensuring the Department's activities were respectful of our nation's laws. He and his large staffseized the nettle of detention issues from the outset. Haynes was aided by Dan Dell'Orto, a talented career civil servant and retired Army lawyer who had served in the Pentagon during the Clinton administration. The breadth and complexity of the issues Haynes, Dell'Orto, and the general counsel's staffdealt with on any given day-personnel, procurement, courts-martial, promotions, intelligence, contracting, international law, and treaties-rivaled the workload of any government legal office.

The President's November 13 order required that the Defense Department establish new rules for wartime detention. The guidance handed down by the President was that all detainees in U.S. custody were to be treated humanely, regardless of their legal status.7 In a separate Department of Defense order to the combatant commanders on January 19, 2002, I echoed the President's order and directed all personnel to "treat [al-Qaida and Taliban detainees] humanely" and "in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions." In a separate Department of Defense order to the combatant commanders on January 19, 2002, I echoed the President's order and directed all personnel to "treat [al-Qaida and Taliban detainees] humanely" and "in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions."8 Though isolated cases of abuse and mistreatment of detainees have occurred in every war, American military forces have a long record of restraint and professionalism when it comes to holding captured enemies. After his army's success on the frozen fields outside Princeton, New Jersey, George Washington issued unequivocal orders on the treatment of captured British soldiers: "Treat them with humanity, and Let them have no reason to Complain of our Copying the brutal example of the British army in their Treatment of our unfortunate brethren."9 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs d.i.c.k Myers and I wanted to make sure that the military upheld this high tradition. Even while fighting an enemy whose use of brutality was the norm, we insisted on aligning our military's conduct with the humane principles on which our Republic was founded. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs d.i.c.k Myers and I wanted to make sure that the military upheld this high tradition. Even while fighting an enemy whose use of brutality was the norm, we insisted on aligning our military's conduct with the humane principles on which our Republic was founded.

In November 2001, a violent rebellion of Taliban and al-Qaida detainees in northern Afghanistan brought into focus the dangers and difficulties of managing fanatical killers in custody. General Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek Northern Alliance commander, as well as a powerful and tough warlord, held several hundred Taliban and al-Qaida foot soldiers in Qala-i-Jangi, a nineteenth-century mud-and-brick fortress near Mazar-e-Sharif.* Among the Qala-i-Jangi prisoners that November was an English-speaking man who looked out of place. His name was John Walker Lindh, and he would become known as "the American Taliban." Among the Qala-i-Jangi prisoners that November was an English-speaking man who looked out of place. His name was John Walker Lindh, and he would become known as "the American Taliban."

During the questioning of Lindh and his fellow prisoners, two CIA agents asked him about his background and the circ.u.mstances of his capture on the battlefield among the al-Qaida and Taliban fighters. In the middle of the interrogation, a detainee leaped toward the two American intelligence operatives, touching off a prisonwide rebellion. The ensuing battle pitted Dostum's few Northern Alliance guards, a handful of British Special Air Service (SAS) troops, U.S. Special Forces, and the two CIA agents against several hundred Taliban and al-Qaida, many committed to fighting to the death. The battle raged for three days. The prisoners managed to capture a Northern Alliance cache of weapons-including AK-47s, rocket launchers, mortars, and grenades.10 U.S. AC-130s and Black Hawk helicopters came to support the pinned-down coalition forces while Taliban and al-Qaida fighters held out in the bas.e.m.e.nt of Qala-i-Jangi. U.S. AC-130s and Black Hawk helicopters came to support the pinned-down coalition forces while Taliban and al-Qaida fighters held out in the bas.e.m.e.nt of Qala-i-Jangi.11 Only when they were flushed out of the fortress with water did the fighting end. Before the battle there had been three hundred al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners, but only eighty-six emerged to surrender. Only when they were flushed out of the fortress with water did the fighting end. Before the battle there had been three hundred al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners, but only eighty-six emerged to surrender.12 The battle led to the deaths of some forty Northern Alliance soldiers, while another two hundred were injured.13 U.S. and British Special Forces also had taken casualties. Johnny Micheal Spann, one of the two CIA officers at Qala-i-Jangi prison that weekend, was killed in action in the first minutes of the battle, becoming the first American to die in combat operations in Afghanistan. U.S. and British Special Forces also had taken casualties. Johnny Micheal Spann, one of the two CIA officers at Qala-i-Jangi prison that weekend, was killed in action in the first minutes of the battle, becoming the first American to die in combat operations in Afghanistan.14 His body was b.o.o.by-trapped with a hidden grenade by the al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners so those recovering his remains would be wounded or killed. The episode was another reminder that many of those detained were there for a reason-they were violent, vicious, and would not hesitate to kill again. His body was b.o.o.by-trapped with a hidden grenade by the al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners so those recovering his remains would be wounded or killed. The episode was another reminder that many of those detained were there for a reason-they were violent, vicious, and would not hesitate to kill again.

After the toppling of the Taliban, there was no central government in Afghanistan and no functioning criminal justice or prison systems. As coalition forces eliminated pockets of resistance in the early weeks of January 2002, the Northern Alliance was holding hundreds of suspected al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners-including the survivors of the battle at Qala-i-Jangi prison. Most detainees were vetted informally and sent home; others were permitted to join the Northern Alliance. As U.S. forces established a few large bases in Afghanistan, a growing number of detainees began to acc.u.mulate in military custody.

Some detainees were supporters of the Taliban who had joined the fight against the Northern Alliance and coalition as foot soldiers. Others were senior Taliban leaders. Still others were foreigners, many affiliated with al-Qaida. They had come to Afghanistan from various corners of the world-the Middle East, Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa-to conduct jihad against the West and to kill Americans. The origins and records of some of the Northern Alliance prisoners were unclear. These men had been picked up in bad company, and some were terrorists or the terrorists' allies. But others may have been innocent people who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. While we couldn't afford to release dangerous men with important intelligence information in their heads, we certainly didn't want to hold mere bystanders.

In a.n.a.lyzing the legal status of the detainees, government lawyers examined the Geneva Conventions. Updated and refashioned in 1949, the modern Geneva Conventions reflected the fact that Axis powers had committed horrific crimes against noncombatants during World War II. The premise of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is that a civilized and responsible nation, even while fighting and killing enemy soldiers, should abide by humane rules and mitigate the brutality of war. The Conventions regulate the way parties to Geneva are to treat enemy prisoners, setting up a system of incentives to encourage combatants to obey the laws of war and discourage the loss of innocent life.

The architects of the modern Geneva Conventions also envisioned and a.s.sumed a degree of reciprocity and mutuality of interest among the warring parties. The Conventions' drafters knew about irregular warfare, such as that of the French anti-n.a.z.i resistance, but they did not have in mind or prescribe rules for asymmetric warfare that deliberately targets civilians-like al-Qaida's large-scale use of suicide "martyrs." Al-Qaida's videos of beheadings publicly celebrate cruelty, proving beyond a doubt that al-Qaida does not treat detainees humanely, especially Americans.

George W. Bush was not the first president to face the issue of whether terrorists should be granted the protections of the Geneva Conventions. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its proxies pushed for adding rules to the Geneva Conventions that would grant such privileges to, and therefore legitimize, Soviet-backed guerrillas. President Ronald Reagan stood firmly against those revisions.15 He said the amendments giving irregular combatants the full protection of the Geneva Conventions would "undermine humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war." He said the amendments giving irregular combatants the full protection of the Geneva Conventions would "undermine humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war."16 The Reagan administration also was convinced that rewarding irregular combatants with the full rights and privileges of lawful combatants would not only make a mockery of the Geneva Conventions, but would undermine one of their key purposes, which was to protect civilians. The Reagan administration also was convinced that rewarding irregular combatants with the full rights and privileges of lawful combatants would not only make a mockery of the Geneva Conventions, but would undermine one of their key purposes, which was to protect civilians.

At that time, the Washington Post Washington Post lauded President Reagan's position in an editorial ent.i.tled, "Hijacking the Geneva Conventions." lauded President Reagan's position in an editorial ent.i.tled, "Hijacking the Geneva Conventions."17 The The Post Post approvingly quoted Reagan: "[W]e must not, and need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law." The approvingly quoted Reagan: "[W]e must not, and need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law." The New York Times New York Times editorial board agreed, calling the proposal "a shield for terrorists." It added: editorial board agreed, calling the proposal "a shield for terrorists." It added: President Reagan has faced more important but probably no tougher decisions than whether to seek ratification of revisions to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. If he said yes, that would improve protection for prisoners of war and civilians in wartime, but at the price of new legal protection for guerrillas and possible terrorists. He decided to say no, a judgment that deserves support.18 By 2002, both the New York Times New York Times and the and the Washington Post Washington Post editorial boards had swung a full 180 degrees in the opposite direction. editorial boards had swung a full 180 degrees in the opposite direction.19 Consistent with the Reagan administration precedent, there was broad consensus in the Bush administration and, at least initially, among legal experts across the political spectrum, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al-Qaida terrorists in U.S. custody.* The logic was simple: Al-Qaida was not a nation-state and was not a party to the Geneva Conventions. The logic was simple: Al-Qaida was not a nation-state and was not a party to the Geneva Conventions. Its fighters also did not meet the four fundamental requirements for lawful combatant and prisoner of war status in the Third Geneva Convention: operating with a responsible command structure; wearing identifiable uniforms; carrying their arms openly; and obeying the laws of war. Al-Qaida terrorists, by contrast, bombed marketplaces posing as merchants and shop-goers-with explosives under their clothes, in their car trunks, or hidden on children. The nineteen 9/11 hijackers posed as businessmen in suits and commandeered civilian airliners to attack civilians, killing three thousand Americans and citizens from ninety other nations. Such deliberate, surprise attacks on civilian targets demonstrated nothing but contempt for the Geneva Conventions. Its fighters also did not meet the four fundamental requirements for lawful combatant and prisoner of war status in the Third Geneva Convention: operating with a responsible command structure; wearing identifiable uniforms; carrying their arms openly; and obeying the laws of war. Al-Qaida terrorists, by contrast, bombed marketplaces posing as merchants and shop-goers-with explosives under their clothes, in their car trunks, or hidden on children. The nineteen 9/11 hijackers posed as businessmen in suits and commandeered civilian airliners to attack civilians, killing three thousand Americans and citizens from ninety other nations. Such deliberate, surprise attacks on civilian targets demonstrated nothing but contempt for the Geneva Conventions.

I agreed that if the United States automatically accorded the privileges of POW status to every individual captured on the battlefield (or more privileges, such as the right to appeal their detention in U.S. courts), regardless of their compliance with the Geneva Conventions, there would no longer be any incentive whatsoever for enemies to abide by the Geneva rules. Terrorists could have the best of both worlds: all of the advantages of being irregular, unlawful combatants but without any of the consequences. If accorded POW status, terrorists would not be required to give up any intelligence they possessed. Under the Third Geneva Convention, POWs are only obligated to provide name, rank, serial number, and date of birth-the most basic information-when questioned.* That means that even a number of the interrogation methods used every day in police stations across the United States are forbidden. The Geneva Conventions also require that POWs be given access to athletic uniforms, musical instruments, alcohol, tobacco, and the military justice system used by the detaining force. That means that even a number of the interrogation methods used every day in police stations across the United States are forbidden. The Geneva Conventions also require that POWs be given access to athletic uniforms, musical instruments, alcohol, tobacco, and the military justice system used by the detaining force.

Because neither Taliban forces nor al-Qaida terrorists met the unambiguous requirements for POW status, they were not ent.i.tled to its special protections. This determination was not "abandoning" or "bypa.s.sing" the Geneva Conventions as many have erroneously alleged.23 It was, in fact, adhering to the letter and spirit of the Conventions. President Bush directed that as a matter of policy the treatment of al-Qaida and Taliban detainees would meet a high standard. He saw this not so much as a legal obligation, but as simply the right thing to do. It was, in fact, adhering to the letter and spirit of the Conventions. President Bush directed that as a matter of policy the treatment of al-Qaida and Taliban detainees would meet a high standard. He saw this not so much as a legal obligation, but as simply the right thing to do.

The plain words of the Geneva Conventions support the position he ordered, as did the written words of his most prominent administration officials. Indeed, in February 2002, William Taft IV, the senior legal adviser to Secretary of State Powell, advised White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales: "The lawyers all agree that al Qaeda or Taliban soldiers are presumptively not POWs."24 Powell apparently felt strongly enough in this case to put his thoughts in writing. His preferred option, he wrote, entailed announcing "publicly" that "members of al Qaeda as a group and the Taliban individually or as a group are not ent.i.tled to Prisoner of War status under the Convention." Powell apparently felt strongly enough in this case to put his thoughts in writing. His preferred option, he wrote, entailed announcing "publicly" that "members of al Qaeda as a group and the Taliban individually or as a group are not ent.i.tled to Prisoner of War status under the Convention."25

Though it was clear that the privileges of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to terrorists, there was serious debate about whether the Geneva Conventions applied in any way to America's conflict with the Taliban regime. The Taliban were the de facto government of Afghanistan, a country that was a party to the Geneva Conventions. However, officials and lawyers in the Justice Department concluded that even though Afghanistan had ratified the Geneva Conventions some years before, the Taliban had not been recognized as that country's government, either by the United States or by most other countries, nor did they actually control a viable nation-state. Because Afghanistan was deemed a "failed state," Attorney General John Ashcroft and Justice Department officials maintained that the President was not required by law to apply the Geneva Conventions to America's war against the Taliban.26 Those of us in the Defense Department did not address Justice's legal position, but we had a different view as a matter of policy, perhaps none more strenuously than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One day in late January 2002, General Myers strode purposefully into my office with a concerned look on his face. Several days before, White House legal memos leaked to the press had given the impression that President Bush might be considering not applying the Geneva Conventions at all in Afghanistan, based on the Department of Justice's legal opinion.27 Myers felt strongly that it would be a mistake not to apply the Conventions to the Taliban. We couldn't risk the perception that we were discarding long-established rules of international law and our treaty obligations. Myers felt strongly that it would be a mistake not to apply the Conventions to the Taliban. We couldn't risk the perception that we were discarding long-established rules of international law and our treaty obligations.

I concluded that Myers was correct. Knowing that administration lawyers were weighing in, I wanted to make sure President Bush heard the Chairman's and the Defense Department's views.28 I asked Rice to set up an NSC meeting on the subject so that we could make the Department's case. I asked Rice to set up an NSC meeting on the subject so that we could make the Department's case.

At the NSC meeting on February 4, 2002, Myers and Doug Feith presented our position, which was based on the language and purposes of the Geneva Conventions. We contended that the U.S. government should not use a legal argument to avoid applying the Geneva Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan. The memo we brought to the meeting set out our position: A "pro-Convention" position reinforces [the US Government]'s key themes in the war on terrorism.

The essence of the Convention is the distinction between soldiers and civilians (i.e., between combatants and non-combatants).

Terrorists are reprehensible precisely because they negate that distinction by purposefully targeting civilians.

The Convention aims to protect civilians by requiring soldiers to wear uniforms and otherwise distinguish themselves from civilians.

The Convention creates an incentive system for good behavior. The key incentive is that soldiers who play by the rules get POW status if they [are] captured.

The US can apply the Convention to the Taliban (and al-Qaida) detainees as a matter of policy without having to give them POW status because none of the detainees remaining in US hands played by the rules.29 The DoD memo concluded by summing up what we thought the U.S. position should be: Humane treatment for all detainees.

US is applying the Convention. All detainees are getting the treatment they are (or would be) ent.i.tled to under the Convention.

US supports the Convention and promotes universal respect for it.

The Convention does not squarely address circ.u.mstances that we are confronting in this new global war against terrorism, but while we work through the legal questions, we are upholding the principle of universal applicability of the Convention.30 Though the Justice Department offered its well-considered legal view, we noted that the Taliban was effectively the government of a country that was a party to Geneva. Our position was that it was "[h]ighly dangerous if countries make application of [the] Convention hinge on subjective or moral judgments as to the quality or decency of the enemy's government."31 Powell's position, as outlined in his January 25 memorandum, was in line with ours. Powell's position, as outlined in his January 25 memorandum, was in line with ours.32 The discussion was the sort of thing that I thought would have done the drafters of the Geneva Conventions proud. Justice Department officials were doing their jobs: defining the President's flexibility within the law. And the policy makers in the Department of Defense were doing theirs: making clear that while it is mandatory to stay within the law, not everything that is lawful is necessarily the best policy. The discussion was the sort of thing that I thought would have done the drafters of the Geneva Conventions proud. Justice Department officials were doing their jobs: defining the President's flexibility within the law. And the policy makers in the Department of Defense were doing theirs: making clear that while it is mandatory to stay within the law, not everything that is lawful is necessarily the best policy.

President Bush was apparently persuaded by Myers and Feith's arguments, and on February 7, he set forth his conclusions in a memo.33 While he didn't challenge the Justice Department's legal reasoning, he seemed to feel that it risked putting the administration in a position where it could be criticized for not respecting the Geneva Conventions. Ironically, of course, the Bush administration came under exactly that unfair criticism, notwithstanding the fact that the President had explicitly decided that his administration would take a proGeneva Conventions stance. While he didn't challenge the Justice Department's legal reasoning, he seemed to feel that it risked putting the administration in a position where it could be criticized for not respecting the Geneva Conventions. Ironically, of course, the Bush administration came under exactly that unfair criticism, notwithstanding the fact that the President had explicitly decided that his administration would take a proGeneva Conventions stance.

In a conventional war, detention issues would have fallen under the responsibility of the military commanders in each theater of operations. But CENTCOM commander Franks was reluctant to have hundreds of those captured remain in the theater as his command's responsibility. There were no existing satisfactory Afghan prisons that he could use, nor were there easily discernible front lines behind which detainees could be safely held. The rebellion at the Qala-i-Jangi prison demonstrated the challenge vividly. Additionally, Franks and I agreed that frontline American troops would be better used for counterterrorism missions than as prison guards or interrogators.

I thought it preferable to have Afghanistan take on the responsibility of holding detainees captured on its soil. Then, with our a.s.sistance, Afghans could begin to seek the swift transfer of non-Afghans to their countries of origin for detention there.34 If a limited number of detainees were going to have to be in U.S. custody, I preferred to hand over major detention responsibilities to another department or agency. Suffice it to say that there were no departments of the government eagerly coming forward to a.s.sist. Another possibility I considered was to create an entirely new ent.i.ty with the explicit purpose of administering detention policy and operations, running tribunals and trial proceedings, negotiating with other countries around the world for the further detention of individuals, and coordinating competing interagency interests. There was no enthusiasm for this approach either, and DoD was selected. If a limited number of detainees were going to have to be in U.S. custody, I preferred to hand over major detention responsibilities to another department or agency. Suffice it to say that there were no departments of the government eagerly coming forward to a.s.sist. Another possibility I considered was to create an entirely new ent.i.ty with the explicit purpose of administering detention policy and operations, running tribunals and trial proceedings, negotiating with other countries around the world for the further detention of individuals, and coordinating competing interagency interests. There was no enthusiasm for this approach either, and DoD was selected.

President Bush's November 2001 military order provided for the detention of enemy combatants "at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States." To comply with the order, a number of locations were discussed, including some in the United States. The crumbling federal prison on Alcatraz Island or the maximum security Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, were considered. So were other possibilities-such as a ship that could be permanently stationed in the Arabian Sea and island military bases in the Pacific and Indian oceans.35 Attention then turned to the U.S. military facility near the southeastern tip of Cuba. Attention then turned to the U.S. military facility near the southeastern tip of Cuba.

Christopher Columbus sailed into the narrow stretch of bay named Guantanamo on his second trip to the New World in 1494. In the wake of the Spanish-American War, President Theodore Roosevelt signed a treaty with the Cuban government establishing the U.S. Navy base on Cuban soil, and leasing the land for two thousand dollars annually. I traveled to the sleepy base twice in the 1950s, as a midshipman aboard U.S. Navy battleships, and later as a naval aviator for training. With palm trees and beaches, the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, or "Gitmo" as it was called, was a low-key facility used to refuel and resupply Navy ships and aircraft patrolling the Caribbean.

When asked by journalists why Gitmo was chosen to house detainees, I described it as "the least worst place."36 Grammar aside, the phrase conveyed my uneasy feelings about the entire detainee dilemma. We had made the best possible choice among a number of unattractive options. It was chosen because it was far from the ever-shifting battlefield in Afghanistan, where U.S. troops had to guard against the possibility of enemy a.s.saults and attempted escapes. It was controlled entirely by the United States military, even though it was not then subject to American legal jurisdiction. It had some existing infrastructure, including a naval hospital. Its use would not further complicate diplomatic relations with a host nation, since our relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba were poor at best. Grammar aside, the phrase conveyed my uneasy feelings about the entire detainee dilemma. We had made the best possible choice among a number of unattractive options. It was chosen because it was far from the ever-shifting battlefield in Afghanistan, where U.S. troops had to guard against the possibility of enemy a.s.saults and attempted escapes. It was controlled entirely by the United States military, even though it was not then subject to American legal jurisdiction. It had some existing infrastructure, including a naval hospital. Its use would not further complicate diplomatic relations with a host nation, since our relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba were poor at best.

Additionally, Guantanamo had a history of use as a detention facility dating back to the Carter years, when it was first used to house Cuban and Haitian refugees. The Carter administration and its successors through the Clinton administration did not afford the refugees the same legal rights as Americans because they were neither on U.S. soil nor U.S. citizens. In 2001, Bush administration lawyers determined that foreign nationals held at Gitmo would not have automatic access to U.S. courts, which had also been the case for the refugees that had been held there by several previous administrations of both political parties.

On January 11, 2002, al-Qaida and Taliban detainees began arriving at Guantanamo Bay. Initially, they were housed at Camp X-Ray, an existing facility built during the Clinton administration for illegal immigrants. We intended this arrangement to be temporary, pending construction of appropriate, modern facilities, which were completed within a few months. Soon After the first detainees arrived, we suffered a costly self-inflicted wound. Intending to demonstrate openness to the press, and to showcase the humane treatment of the detainees, the Pentagon public affairs office released photographs taken while the detainees were still in temporary quarters at Camp X-Ray. The photographs showed prisoners wearing orange jumpsuits behind chain-link and barbed-wire fences. Some wore blacked-out goggles and had their hands tied behind their backs during transfers, so that they could not attack their guards. The photographs, with primitive facilities and conditions, became enduring images of Guantanamo. They were repeatedly referred to by critics of the Bush administration long After the permanent, state-of-the-art facilities were completed. It was another example of how little was understood about war in the information age.

Contrary to the notions suggested by those early photos, the detainees at Gitmo had warm showers, toiletries, water, clean clothes, blankets, culturally appropriate meals, prayer mats, Korans, modern medical attention equal to that provided to our troops, exercise, writing materials, and regular visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In early 2002, the U.S. military's Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) sent up, through the Pentagon's Joint Staff, a construction proposal for a permanent detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. The proposal, presented to me through General Pete Pace, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a former SOUTHCOM commander, envisioned a costly and seemingly permanent two-thousand-bed facility. Given the battlefield pressures to move detainees out of the areas of operations, military commanders wanted to move as many as possible as quickly as possible to Guantanamo Bay.

Government organizations tend to use whatever resources are available to them. I knew that if I approved such a large facility, our forces would almost certainly ship enough prisoners to fill it. I wanted to preempt that tendency. I told General Pace that I thought we would be better off with a considerably smaller facility, and that I wanted to generate downward pressure on the number of inmates to be sent to Gitmo. I said I wanted transfers of detainees to Guantanamo Bay to be kept to a minimum-to only individuals of high interest for interrogation who posed a threat to our nation's security. Pace came back with revised proposals several times. On each go-round, the size of the proposed expansion of the facility became smaller and more specialized, to handle only the toughest and most dangerous cases. It was not an easy process for General Pace, who had to balance the pressures from CENTCOM's battlefield commanders with pressures from a secretary of defense who was dead set against making it easier for them to avoid tough choices by simply sending all questionable cases off to Gitmo. Pace was getting squeezed, but typically he handled the situation with good humor. At one point, when he was preparing to present yet another version of the proposal, he showed up for our meeting wearing a flak jacket, a helmet, and a grin. Finally I agreed to build a facility that could house several hundred inmates, not the two thousand originally proposed. The facility was designed so it could be expanded, but only if I became convinced in the future that there were sound reasons to house additional terrorists there.

I instructed our commanders to develop a selection process to winnow down the number of detainees to be held for long periods. I wanted captured enemies to first be sorted out in the field according to predetermined intelligence and safety criteria rather than just being sent to Guantanamo. For all but a few of the most important and dangerous detainees, I wanted them to stay in the country and have the new Afghan government begin to exercise responsibility for them.37 I urged Powell and the State Department to encourage Afghans (and later Iraqis) to take on the responsibility for holding lower-level detainees captured in their country. I urged Powell and the State Department to encourage Afghans (and later Iraqis) to take on the responsibility for holding lower-level detainees captured in their country.38 I also called for an ongoing evaluation of the detainees. I knew we ran the risk of mistakenly releasing some people who might attack us in the future, just as is the case in our civilian prison system, but I saw this as a risk we had to take. Otherwise we risked alienating populations whose a.s.sistance we needed and do an injustice to individuals who were not actually involved in terrorism.

As the number of detainees at Gitmo rose, I pushed and prodded senior Pentagon officials on almost a weekly basis as to when and how detainees could be transferred to their home countries. "You have to get your arms around this detainee thing," I wrote in one snowflake.39 "We need to get rid of more detainees," I told Doug Feith five days later. "How do we do it?" "We need to get rid of more detainees," I told Doug Feith five days later. "How do we do it?"40 And three months later I urgently wrote again, "I do want some people out of Guantanamo sent to their own countries. I really mean it. I want that done. I would like a report every two days on what is happening on this." And three months later I urgently wrote again, "I do want some people out of Guantanamo sent to their own countries. I really mean it. I want that done. I would like a report every two days on what is happening on this."41 I repeatedly urged the State Department to try to persuade the detainees' countries of origin to take responsibility for captured combatants under sensible conditions as soon as detainees began arriving in 2002.42 In the first several years the Guantanamo Bay detention facility was open, State Department officials had little success in pressing foreign governments on the matter. Most foreign governments did not want to take suspected terrorists any more than we wanted to hold them. In the first several years the Guantanamo Bay detention facility was open, State Department officials had little success in pressing foreign governments on the matter. Most foreign governments did not want to take suspected terrorists any more than we wanted to hold them.* Despite my efforts to keep numbers down, Gitmo's detainee population ballooned beyond 650 in its first two years. Despite my efforts to keep numbers down, Gitmo's detainee population ballooned beyond 650 in its first two years.

One of my biggest disappointments as secretary of defense was my inability to marshal the resources within our government to help persuade America and the world of the truth about Gitmo: The most heavily scrutinized detention facility in the world was also one of the most professionally run in history. Irresponsible charges leveled by human rights groups, by editorial pages, and, most shamefully, by members of the U.S. Congress who had every opportunity and reason to know better, unfairly tarnished Guantanamo's reputation-and the reputations of our country and of the men and women of the American military who served at the facility. Even worse, the inaccurate allegations were exploited by terrorists to improve their fundraising and recruitment. This, in fact, was a component of the enemy's propaganda strategy. In one al-Qaida training manual, the so-called Manchester doc.u.ment, the first lesson if captured was to "insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by State Security before the judge."43 Its second lesson was to "complain of mistreatment while in prison." Its second lesson was to "complain of mistreatment while in prison."44 The hope, of course, was that some gullible people in the West would believe their repeated fabrications. Because of the stigma that clung to Gitmo, the terrorists found it an easy case to make. The hope, of course, was that some gullible people in the West would believe their repeated fabrications. Because of the stigma that clung to Gitmo, the terrorists found it an easy case to make.

In May 2005, Newsweek Newsweek magazine wrote that U.S. guards at Gitmo had flushed a Koran down a toilet "in an attempt to rattle suspects" for interrogation purposes. magazine wrote that U.S. guards at Gitmo had flushed a Koran down a toilet "in an attempt to rattle suspects" for interrogation purposes.45 Unnamed sources, Unnamed sources, Newsweek Newsweek said, had verified the allegation. The story set off a firestorm of protest in a number of Muslim cities. Commentators denounced the troops serving at Gitmo. Demonstrations and riots erupted around the world. In Afghanistan, seventeen people died in the rioting. said, had verified the allegation. The story set off a firestorm of protest in a number of Muslim cities. Commentators denounced the troops serving at Gitmo. Demonstrations and riots erupted around the world. In Afghanistan, seventeen people died in the rioting.

After a thorough examination by the Defense Department, the individual believed to have made the original allegation recanted. We then asked Newsweek Newsweek to withdraw its story, but its editor would only express "regret that we got any part of our story wrong, and [we] extend our sympathies to victims of the violence and to the U.S. soldiers caught in its midst." to withdraw its story, but its editor would only express "regret that we got any part of our story wrong, and [we] extend our sympathies to victims of the violence and to the U.S. soldiers caught in its midst."46 A number of those to whom A number of those to whom Newsweek Newsweek extended its sympathies were already dead. And the reputations of those military personnel serving at Gitmo had been besmirched again, as was the reputation of our country-to the benefit of the terrorists. extended its sympathies were already dead. And the reputations of those military personnel serving at Gitmo had been besmirched again, as was the reputation of our country-to the benefit of the terrorists.

It was a grim irony. We deliberately made the facility transparent, which made the repeated inaccuracies all the more irresponsible. Almost from its inception, the Defense Department arranged for regular and well-attended visits by members of Congress, representatives of news organizations, opinion leaders, and other visitors and observers from around the world. In the five years After detainees began to arrive, some 145 members of Congress, Democrats and Republicans, took advantage of the Department's open invitation to visit Gitmo. There were representatives from across the executive branch-the State Department, the CIA, the FBI, the Department of Justice, and a whole host of DoD agencies and organizations-stationed there. Over time, more than one thousand U.S. and international journalists visited. We arranged for high-level European parliamentary groups to visit. Hundreds of lawyers were given access to the detainees there, as was the International Committee of the Red Cross on a regular basis.

Nearly every observer who visited Gitmo recognized that it was safer, better, cleaner, and more professionally run than most American federal, state, and local prisons, and certainly better than most foreign prisons. A senior Belgian government official said After visiting Gitmo, "At the level of the detention facilities, it is a model prison, where people are better treated than in Belgian prisons."47 More money was spent on religiously sensitive meals for detainees at Gitmo than on meals for the American troops stationed there. The average weight gain per detainee was twenty pounds. Detainees were given Korans in their native languages. Five times each day the Muslim call to prayer sounded across the facility, and numerous arrows indicated the direction of Mecca. Detainees had access to a basketball and volleyball court, ping-pong tables, and board games. Some detainees chose to take cla.s.ses in Pashtu, Arabic, and English. There were even movie nights, featuring popular Hollywood fare (which I suppose could raise a host of troubling questions). They watched sports events like the World Cup. The library had thirty-five hundred volumes available in thirteen languages (Harry Potter was the most requested). They received medical, dental, psychiatric, and optometric care-health care equal to that provided to our troops. More money was spent on religiously sensitive meals for detainees at Gitmo than on meals for the American troops stationed there. The average weight gain per detainee was twenty pounds. Detainees were given Korans in their native languages. Five times each day the Muslim call to prayer sounded across the facility, and numerous arrows indicated the direction of Mecca. Detainees had access to a basketball and volleyball court, ping-pong tables, and board games. Some detainees chose to take cla.s.ses in Pashtu, Arabic, and English. There were even movie nights, featuring popular Hollywood fare (which I suppose could raise a host of troubling questions). They watched sports events like the World Cup. The library had thirty-five hundred volumes available in thirteen languages (Harry Potter was the most requested). They received medical, dental, psychiatric, and optometric care-health care equal to that provided to our troops.48 Critics nonetheless continued to denounce Guantanamo as a "law-free zone" and "legal black hole."49 Amnesty International called it "the gulag of our times." Amnesty International called it "the gulag of our times."50 The number-two Democratic leader in the U.S. Senate, d.i.c.k Durbin, compared American behavior at Guantanamo Bay to that of "n.a.z.is, Soviets in their gulags, or some mad regime-Pol Pot or others-that had no concern for human beings." The number-two Democratic leader in the U.S. Senate, d.i.c.k Durbin, compared American behavior at Guantanamo Bay to that of "n.a.z.is, Soviets in their gulags, or some mad regime-Pol Pot or others-that had no concern for human beings."51 It would have been a disgraceful comment from someone who hadn't known better, but coming from a senior congressional leader speaking on the Senate floor, it was particularly damaging and inexcusable. It would have been a disgraceful comment from someone who hadn't known better, but coming from a senior congressional leader speaking on the Senate floor, it was particularly damaging and inexcusable.

As the issue of detainees became increasingly politicized, even some senior administration officials, including ones who had been involved in the discussions that led to the administration's detention and interrogation policies and the establishment of Gitmo, were less than supportive.52 They were anonymously cited in news reports "on background" concurring with President Bush's opponents that Guantanamo was a stain on America's reputation and should be closed. They were anonymously cited in news reports "on background" concurring with President Bush's opponents that Guantanamo was a stain on America's reputation and should be closed.53 In late 2003, I wrote a memo to Secretary of State Powell, Attorney General Ashcroft, and National Security Adviser Rice saying: In late 2003, I wrote a memo to Secretary of State Powell, Attorney General Ashcroft, and National Security Adviser Rice saying: [T]here continues to be static concerning the handling of the detainees at Guantanamo. I suggest that: If an agency is dissatisfied with the Administration's policy, they propose a change to the policy to the NSC [or if] an agency doesn't like a particular result from the interagency process (for example, a decision on a specific detainee), they elevate their concern to the NSC and propose an alternative.54 Precious few were stepping forth to defend the President's policy and rationale. "Administration policy on detainees in GTMO is clearly an issue about which there is not unanimous agreement-in the Administration, in the Congress, in the country or in the world," I wrote in my December 2003 memo, adding: That being the case, and since, nonetheless, it is our Administration's policy, it would help if all agencies would help defend the Administration's policy and explain the reasons for it to the Congress, to the country and to the world. I don't think DoD is the best communicator of the Administration's policy on detainees, since it is seen as a legal matter. Nonetheless, we are supporting it energetically. It would be appreciated if all agencies would pitch in and help carry the message.55 I was perfectly willing to shutter the facility if a better alternative could have been found that would be as effective at obtaining intelligence and preventing terrorists from returning to the fight. But no alternative to Gitmo was proposed. Nor did I receive any replies to my memo. Meanwhile, the public drumbeat against Guantanamo Bay intensified.

Gitmo, though d.a.m.ned across the political spectrum, offered a solution-however imperfect-to the problem of keeping high-risk detainees out of circulation. What was the alternative-letting them go and then hoping to catch them as they were committing their next terrorist attack against the American people? Dedicated men and women of the U.S. armed forces performed an enormously valuable service in running a first-rate detention and interrogation operation at Guantanamo. The base has logged a proud record of professionalism and success. Detainees routinely attacked the military guards there-kicking, biting, head b.u.t.ting, and throwing "c.o.c.ktails" of feces and urine.56 The prisoners demonstrated remarkable resourcefulness in turning personal items into deadly weapons: blankets into garrotes, sinks into bludgeons, and wires into daggers. The guards demonstrated impressive restraint. In those few cases where the military guards were goaded by detainees and crossed the line, disciplinary action was taken. The prisoners demonstrated remarkable resourcefulness in turning personal items into deadly weapons: blankets into garrotes, sinks into bludgeons, and wires into daggers. The guards demonstrated impressive restraint. In those few cases where the military guards were goaded by detainees and crossed the line, disciplinary action was taken.

To date, not a single prisoner has escaped from Guantanamo, and hundreds of terrorists have been kept from returning to the fight. At Gitmo, intelligence officials have uncovered information that has helped prevent terrorist attacks-information about al-Qaida's leadership, the ident.i.ties of operatives, terrorist communication methods, training programs, travel patterns, funding mechanisms, and plans to attack the United States and our allies. Detainees have provided information on bank accounts, al-Qaida front companies, improvised explosive devices, and tactics.57 Coalition intelligence officials and our forces on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq have used this information to help protect the American people. Coalition intelligence officials and our forces on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq have used this information to help protect the American people.

Despite the more than $500 million that U.S. taxpayers have invested in state-of-the-art facilities at Gitmo, and in operations there since 9/11, both of the 2008 presidential candidates, John McCain and Barack Obama, pandered to popular misconceptions by promising to shut it down.58 On his second full day in office, President Obama vowed to close the facility "promptly." On his second full day in office, President Obama vowed to close the facility "promptly."59 Years later, however, Guantanamo remains open, undoubtedly because the Obama administration, despite its promises, has not found a practical alternative. Eventually it may be closed, but it will be closed at great financial cost. More important, the problems Guantanamo was established to address will remain. Years later, however, Guantanamo remains open, undoubtedly because the Obama administration, despite its promises, has not found a practical alternative. Eventually it may be closed, but it will be closed at great financial cost. More important, the problems Guantanamo was established to address will remain.

CHAPTER 39

The Twentieth Hijacker.

Though hundreds of thousands of vacationers and business travelers pa.s.sed through Orlando International Airport every year, there was something unsettling about the man who had just arrived from London on Virgin Atlantic Flight 15. As he approached immigration control, Muhammed al-Qahtani presented a Saudi pa.s.sport. When questioned by customs agents he revealed that he did not have a return ticket or a hotel reservation, and he refused to give the ident.i.ty of the individual he said was picking him up. Though he carried nearly twenty-eight hundred dollars in cash, he had no credit cards. Qahtani did not seem the type to visit Disney World.

"He gave me the creeps," a suspicious Immigration and Naturalization official later testified to the 9/11 Commission, saying that he had the bearing of "a hit man."1 Before long Qahtani felt he had entertained enough questioning about his travel plans. He withdrew his application for entry and caught the next flight back to London, then to Dubai, on August 4, 2001. He left the INS agent with an ominous three words: "I'll be back." Before long Qahtani felt he had entertained enough questioning about his travel plans. He withdrew his application for entry and caught the next flight back to London, then to Dubai, on August 4, 2001. He left the INS agent with an ominous three words: "I'll be back."2 That December, as winter closed in on the mountain pa.s.ses along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Qahtani made his way to the al-Qaida nest in Tora Bora. As U.S. and Northern Alliance forces stepped up their pummeling of the cave complexes, its murderous denizens, including Qahtani, fled to Pakistan's tribal areas. But along with some two dozen other terrorist suspects, he was captured by Pakistani forces, who handed him over to our military on the Afghanistan side of the border.

As he was questioned by American military interrogators and intelligence officials, Qahtani claimed he had traveled to Afghanistan to "practice falconry"-a fiction that he was later forced to abandon when he couldn't provide any details about the sport.3 Military interrogators judged him to be a high threat to our troops there and a possible threat for more terrorist attacks in the United States. Suspected of ties to senior al-Qaida figures, Qahtani was designated detainee number 063 and transported to Guantanamo Bay in February 2002. Military interrogators judged him to be a high threat to our troops there and a possible threat for more terrorist attacks in the United States. Suspected of ties to senior al-Qaida figures, Qahtani was designated detainee number 063 and transported to Guantanamo Bay in February 2002.

At Guantanamo, the pieces began to fall together. Qahtani, investigators learned, had trained at the al-Faruq training camp near Kandahar "for the purpose of partic.i.p.ating in jihad, which he deemed a religious obligation."4 He was trained to fire small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. Intelligence officials then discovered Qahtani's failed attempt to enter the United States at the Orlando airport shortly before 9/11. They learned that the man who had been waiting to meet him there was Muhammed Attah, ringleader of the 9/11 attacks. He was trained to fire small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. Intelligence officials then discovered Qahtani's failed attempt to enter the United States at the Orlando airport shortly before 9/11. They learned that the man who had been waiting to meet him there was Muhammed Attah, ringleader of the 9/11 attacks.5 Investigators also uncovered that Qahtani had placed several phone calls with a calling card a.s.sociated with Muhammed Attah, to another Saudi, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, a financier of the attacks. Investigators also uncovered that Qahtani had placed several phone calls with a calling card a.s.sociated with Muhammed Attah, to another Saudi, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, a financier of the attacks.6 Hawsawi had dropped Qahtani off at the airport in Dubai. Hawsawi had dropped Qahtani off at the airport in Dubai.7 American intelligence officials came to believe Qahtani had been trained to become a weapon himself-as the fifth and final "muscle" hijacker on United Flight 93.8 Through the courage and heroism of the pa.s.sengers who attacked the hijackers...o...b..ard-and possibly in part because that team of terrorists was one man short-Flight 93 crashed into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, rather than its likely objective of the White House or the U.S. Capitol building. Had the immigration officer not been sharp enough to dissuade Qahtani from entering the United States just weeks before, the Flight 93 hijacking might have succeeded in finding its target. Through the courage and heroism of the pa.s.sengers who attacked the hijackers...o...b..ard-and possibly in part because that team of terrorists was one man short-Flight 93 crashed into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, rather than its likely objective of the White House or the U.S. Capitol building. Had the immigration officer not been sharp enough to dissuade Qahtani from entering the United States just weeks before, the Flight 93 hijacking might have succeeded in finding its target.

Qahtani's story is a vivid example of the complex moral questions that we faced in developing interrogation policies for prisoners in U.S. custody. A senior al-Qaida operative implicated in the worst terrorist attack in history was in DoD custody. Qahtani potentially possessed a treasure trove of intelligence information, including perhaps facts about future attacks planned against Americans. But like many senior al-Qaida officials, he was proving resistant to questioning. The issue ultimately made its way to my office.

By the late fall of 2002, the first anniversary of 9/11 had come and gone without another act of terrorism on American soil-a fact that in itself was a marvel, and in my view a result of President Bush's effort to go on offense against the enemy. Still intelligence sources around the world were warning of new attacks. Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's top deputy, released a tape recording in which he pledged to "continue targeting the keys of the American economy."9 Al-Qaida terrorists launched attacks in Tunisia and Pakistan over the summer. In September, FBI agents outside of Buffalo, New York, arrested a group of Yemeni Americans, soon called the Lackawanna Six, who were later convicted of providing material support to al-Qaida. In October, bombs tore through nightclubs in Bali, killing 202 and injuring hundreds more. In the Washington, D.C., area, the so-called D.C. snipers terrorized the region; for three weeks no one knew whether or not their attacks were connected in some way to overseas terror groups. The system, in the parlance of the intelligence community, was "blinking red." But little intelligence was being obtained from military detainees. Al-Qaida terrorists launched attacks in Tunisia and Pakistan over the summer. In September, FBI agents outside of Buffalo, New York, arrested a group of Yemeni Americans, soon called the Lackawanna Six, who were later convicted of providing material support to al-Qaida. In October, bombs tore through nightclubs in Bali, killing 202 and injuring hundreds more. In the Washington, D.C., area, the so-called D.C. snipers terrorized the region; for three weeks no one knew whether or not their attacks were connected in some way to overseas terror groups. The system, in the parlance of the intelligence community, was "blinking red." But little intelligence was being obtained from military detainees.

The Defense Department was neither organized nor trained to elicit information from terror suspects. During the decade of lean defense budgets in the 1990s our government had not only cut combat forces, it also had furloughed military interrogators and experts in human intelligence. Because of the urgency and importance of obtaining information from detainees to help us prevent future 9/11s, the task was to develop interrogation guidelines, clarify rules and regulations, and improve our human intelligence-gathering capabilities to fit the unconventional and protracted first war of the twenty first century.

Military interrogators at Guantanamo first used traditional interrogation methods honed in conventional conflicts and designed for use with POWs protected by the Third Geneva Convention. Since the privileges of Geneva POW status did not apply to unlawful combatants such as war on terrorism detainees, interrogators had more flexibility.

Army Field Manual 3452 prescribed guidelines and broad doctrines governing interrogation but did not prescribe specific techniques. It gave broad lat.i.tude for interrogators in some areas-arguably too much-while little in others. The American military's approach for decades was to try to build trust with enemy prisoners. Military interrogators were trained in a combination of rapport-building techniques through which the prisoners might eventually choose of their own free will to provide useful information. By early 2002, however, it became clear that rapport-building techniques were not succeeding with key al-Qaida terrorists. "We saw firsthand in Afghanistan how ineffective schoolhouse methods were in getting prisoners to talk," two military interrogators concluded.10 Some of the detainees had clearly undergone interrogation-resistance training. Al-Qaida fighters by and large scoffed at the efforts of Americans to promote rapport, except if they could use those efforts for deception. Some of the detainees had clearly undergone interrogation-resistance training. Al-Qaida fighters by and large scoffed at the efforts of Americans to promote rapport, except if they could use those efforts for deception.

Al-Qaida operatives also knew that the barbaric methods they employed-burning victims with cigarettes, electrocution, and cutting off people's heads with knives-were not employed by the United States. Thus, there was little incentive for detained terrorists to provide useful information to us, and every reason for them to stonewall and delay.

But delay held risks for us in the post-9/11 environment. The American intelligence community's ability to collect reliable information through interrogations of captured enemies could be the difference between success and failure in preventing more attacks and defeating our Islamist extremist enemies. Interrogations led to some of the most impressive successes in the war on terror, including: the capture of Saddam Hussein; the capture of two dozen terrorists in Germany who were plotting an attack against Ramstein Air Base; and the death of the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A revelation by a single detainee could be the key to preventing multiple attacks against the United States and our allies.

On October 11,