As the crisis continued, Ford asked my views on his options. In a meeting on May 14, I presented the President with a memorandum outlining what I saw as the possible courses of action.12 We understood that American forces would need to take the island where we believed the Khmer Rouge held the hostages, but I suggested that we plan to get all American troops out within forty-eight hours to avoid drifting into a longer term presence there. Vice President Rockefeller suggested that B-52s bomb targets on the mainland. I suggested we not use the ma.s.sive, four-engine bombers, since they were a.s.sociated with damage inflicted across Vietnam and had caused negative reactions in the region and in America. I thought a better approach would be to see if we could use Navy aircraft from the USS Coral Sea, Coral Sea, which was headed toward the area. Carrier-based aircraft could strike with precision and reduce the potential of civilian casualties. which was headed toward the area. Carrier-based aircraft could strike with precision and reduce the potential of civilian casualties.13 "The longer the delay," I cautioned, "the weaker the U.S. looks, the greater the danger to the lives of the people, and the greater the likelihood that the critics will get into the act."

That afternoon the President gave the order for a three-p.r.o.ng attack: a Marine helicopter a.s.sault on Koh Tang Island; strikes on the mainland by attack aircraft from the USS Coral Sea; Coral Sea; and a naval interdiction operation to try to recapture the and a naval interdiction operation to try to recapture the Mayaguez. Mayaguez.14 U.S. Marines stormed the beach on Koh Tang and encountered withering fire from entrenched Khmer Rouge positions. U.S. Marines stormed the beach on Koh Tang and encountered withering fire from entrenched Khmer Rouge positions.

An hour or two into the operation, we received word from Schlesinger that the destroyer USS Holt Holt near Koh Tang had been approached by a Thai fishing boat. The boat held men waving their clothing, in lieu of white flags. It was the crew of the near Koh Tang had been approached by a Thai fishing boat. The boat held men waving their clothing, in lieu of white flags. It was the crew of the Mayaguez. Mayaguez. The Khmer Rouge, undoubtedly fearing more reprisals, had released all of the crew. The Khmer Rouge, undoubtedly fearing more reprisals, had released all of the crew.

While the crew was being rescued and the Mayaguez Mayaguez recovered, the Marines were engaging the enemy on Koh Tang. By the end of the mission, eighteen U.S. Marines had been killed. The names of the American military who died are etched into the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C. The official total of American dead in the entire Vietnam conflict stands at 58,261. recovered, the Marines were engaging the enemy on Koh Tang. By the end of the mission, eighteen U.S. Marines had been killed. The names of the American military who died are etched into the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C. The official total of American dead in the entire Vietnam conflict stands at 58,261.

President Ford's actions over the Mayaguez Mayaguez were the first steps toward rebuilding American credibility. were the first steps toward rebuilding American credibility.15 When I became his secretary of defense months later, I remembered the When I became his secretary of defense months later, I remembered the Mayaguez Mayaguez crisis and its lessons. To our enemies, post-Vietnam America looked like a weakened nation, which encouraged them to act in provocative ways. crisis and its lessons. To our enemies, post-Vietnam America looked like a weakened nation, which encouraged them to act in provocative ways.

CHAPTER 15

Turning On the Lights.

As I prepared to meet with the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee who would vote on my confirmation as secretary of defense, I telephoned Senator Barry Goldwater for advice. In the years since his unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1964 and our awkward encounter in my congressional district, I'd come to know and respect him. He had become a senior statesman in the Senate and was one of the congressional leaders who, in the final days of Watergate, helped Nixon face the reality that he would have to resign.

I asked Goldwater how he thought my nomination was being received. "Don, it's going to be fine," Goldwater replied. "I have been talking to some of the senators."

"Do you foresee any problems?" I asked.

"There are a few who have questions," he conceded. Some, for example, were worried that as the youngest secretary of defense in history, I wouldn't be tough enough to hold my own against Kissinger.1 "Well, what are you saying to persuade those folks?" I asked him.

"Don, I'm telling them the truth," Goldwater responded, his voice a soft growl. "I'm telling them that you're going to be the best d.a.m.n secretary of defense they've ever seen, and that if you aren't, I'll kick your a.s.s up between your shoulder blades."

On Wednesday, November 12, 1975, I entered room 1114 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, which was named for my old Illinois colleague in the Congress, to testify at my confirmation hearing to become the nation's thirteenth secretary of defense.* The hearing was dominated by the urgent national security issue of the day: the Cold War. Millions of Americans have since come of age without knowing the fear of a nuclear exchange between two superpowers. But as I went through the confirmation process, the Soviet Union posed what was widely considered, as President Kennedy had put it, a "clear and present danger." The hearing was dominated by the urgent national security issue of the day: the Cold War. Millions of Americans have since come of age without knowing the fear of a nuclear exchange between two superpowers. But as I went through the confirmation process, the Soviet Union posed what was widely considered, as President Kennedy had put it, a "clear and present danger."

In antic.i.p.ation of a possible nuclear attack, a number of American homes were built with bunkers in which families could seek refuge from nuclear fallout. Children practiced survival drills in schools in the event of a nuclear strike. The U.S. Capitol building had so-called safe areas stored with supplies of food in the event of an attack. Many public officials believed, as I did, that the Soviet Union's ambitions were aggressive, its agents were global, and its supporters were on the offensive.

While America had been preoccupied in Southeast Asia, the Soviets had broadened their empire-building efforts to nearly every continent of the world. The Soviets still held a firm grip on the occupied nations behind the Iron Curtain. They were funneling arms to nations and to anti-democratic revolutionary groups in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Around the time of my confirmation, the African nation of Angola took center stage. Supported by money and weapons from the Soviet Union and thousands of Cuban troops, Marxists threatened to seize control of the country. In late November 1975, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger made a strong public push for official support of pro-Western forces in Angola. Congress responded by doing exactly the opposite. They pa.s.sed an amendment effectively prohibiting the United States from providing a.s.sistance to Angola.2 Ford was outraged. Ford was outraged.

Without American a.s.sistance to fend off the Marxist rebels, Angola became a Communist dictatorship. More worrisome, the Soviet Union came away believing it had a free hand on the continent of Africa, and possibly elsewhere. Nations friendly to America began to wonder, as the South Vietnamese and their neighbors had, whether American a.s.surances of aid and security were reliable. Indeed, within the next few years, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, Grenada, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan would come under Communist domination. "The general crisis of capitalism is continuing to deepen," Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed in 1976.4 A period of heightened concern over espionage preoccupied our allies in Europe. Intelligence officials saw Soviet influence behind desertions in the Dutch army. There were concerns about reports that Soviet sleeper cells in Western Europe were waiting to be activated by Communist powers in the Warsaw Pact.5 "There is afoot an enterprise of demoralization of armies on a French and European level," the French Secretary of State for Defense warned. "There is afoot an enterprise of demoralization of armies on a French and European level," the French Secretary of State for Defense warned.6 Soviet leaders were speaking soothingly, if deceptively, of their hope for reconciling with the West. Brezhnev, for example, had declared in the 1960s, "The Soviet Union is ready to develop Soviet-American relations in the interests of our peoples, in the interests of strengthening peace."7 Important segments of the American public-including some in Congress, academics, and opinion leaders-believed him. Sympathy for the Soviets was a longstanding sentiment among the American elite. Important segments of the American public-including some in Congress, academics, and opinion leaders-believed him. Sympathy for the Soviets was a longstanding sentiment among the American elite.*

In the quest for a warmer relationship with the Soviets, a new word entered the popular lexicon: detente, a French word for relaxation or thaw. Though the word became identified with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the policy had been introduced earlier, during the mid-1960s, when the Johnson administration sought to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union as America escalated the conflict in Vietnam. Nixon decided it was worth exploring whether detente with the Soviets was a realistic policy. This led to a series of summit meetings and treaty signings. They were public relations coups for both sides, but the photo ops rarely, if ever, resulted in improved Soviet behavior.

Though President Ford was considerably more savvy about the Soviets than he was given credit for, he leaned toward continuing the Nixon strategy Kissinger advocated. Schlesinger, by contrast, was less enthusiastic. Like Schlesinger, I was not necessarily opposed to high-level meetings between Soviet and American leaders. However, I was concerned that projecting a relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union could leave the wrong impression with the American people and our allies. It might feed the perception that we could minimize the Soviet Union's global ambitions, which in turn could lead the American people and the Congress to believe that the defense budget could be reduced-even while we knew that the Soviets were increasing theirs.

My confirmation hearing quickly became an airing of differences over detente within the Ford administration, the Congress, and the country. A number of conservative senators wanted to have me on record opposing Kissinger's policy. Others hoped that I'd signal a greater affinity than Schlesinger had for the Kissinger view. I told the members of the committee that I believed detente had become a code word for both the proponents and opponents of the policy.9 The Soviets weren't incapable of reason, but we needed to understand that they looked at the world differently than Americans did. Because they were accountable to no one, the Soviet leaders had no obligation to tell the truth to their citizens, to us, or to the world. It seemed dangerous to me to try to predict their actions or their strategy based on thinking it would be a mirror image of how we in our free system might act if we were in their circ.u.mstances. By the end of the hearing, most senators were left with the accurate impression that my views were not dissimilar from Schlesinger's. The Soviets weren't incapable of reason, but we needed to understand that they looked at the world differently than Americans did. Because they were accountable to no one, the Soviet leaders had no obligation to tell the truth to their citizens, to us, or to the world. It seemed dangerous to me to try to predict their actions or their strategy based on thinking it would be a mirror image of how we in our free system might act if we were in their circ.u.mstances. By the end of the hearing, most senators were left with the accurate impression that my views were not dissimilar from Schlesinger's.

Only two senators voted against my confirmation-Jesse Helms, a conservative Republican from North Carolina, and Richard Stone, a Democrat of Florida.* I entered the Department of Defense in 1975 with the feeling that I had good support in the Congress. The department would need that support badly, because, in the aftermath of America's withdrawal from Saigon, the morale of our military was at a low point. I entered the Department of Defense in 1975 with the feeling that I had good support in the Congress. The department would need that support badly, because, in the aftermath of America's withdrawal from Saigon, the morale of our military was at a low point.

Though no doubt a large portion of the country remained proud of our military in the aftermath of Vietnam, some of the loudest voices equated members of our armed forces with ma.s.s murderers and war criminals. In ways that would have been unheard of during World War II and that would not be countenanced today, some Americans hurled obscenities or spit at men and women in uniform. Even with America's withdrawal from Vietnam, protests and marches continued against the military.

At the forefront of some of the demonstrations were two Catholic priests, the Berrigan brothers.10 In the 1960s they had picketed the homes of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. They led efforts to chain themselves to the doors of the Pentagon and to throw blood at the entrance. In the 1960s they had picketed the homes of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. They led efforts to chain themselves to the doors of the Pentagon and to throw blood at the entrance.11 The week before Easter, 1976, Philip Berrigan brought a group of protesters to our house near the Washington-Maryland border. For days they demonstrated around the clock on the sidewalk, shouting, "Murderer!" We worried about our younger children, Marcy and Nick, going back and forth to school through the aggressive demonstrators. At one point, Joyce opened our windows and played Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" at the highest volume to keep up her spirits and to try to drown out the protesters' chants. When they started digging a grave in our front yard, Joyce called the police. Three were arrested for destroying private property.12 At the Berrigans' trial, Joyce's only support in the courtroom was our eldest daughter, Valerie, who was home from Connecticut College for Easter.* Valerie was conflicted in a way I expect was typical of many young people at the time. She had been part of a student group at college that had invited Daniel Berrigan to speak about the war (although it had not been her choice to invite him). To her surprise, she had found his remarks not unreasonable. But though she walked across the courtroom and shook hands with him at the hearing, Valerie believed the Berrigan brothers' destruction of our property had crossed a line well beyond lawful dissent. A public official ought not to have to serve as a doormat for every malcontent with a gripe against the government. Thanks to Joyce, the protesters were convicted. Valerie was conflicted in a way I expect was typical of many young people at the time. She had been part of a student group at college that had invited Daniel Berrigan to speak about the war (although it had not been her choice to invite him). To her surprise, she had found his remarks not unreasonable. But though she walked across the courtroom and shook hands with him at the hearing, Valerie believed the Berrigan brothers' destruction of our property had crossed a line well beyond lawful dissent. A public official ought not to have to serve as a doormat for every malcontent with a gripe against the government. Thanks to Joyce, the protesters were convicted.

In the grim atmosphere of the post-Vietnam period, the Cold War, and the relentless demonstrations, I tried to lift the spirits of the twenty-three thousand military and civilian personnel who worked in the Pentagon. I made an early effort to take in the daunting physical terrain of the building by walking through it. I found the experience depressing. To save energy, many of the sockets in the long hallways lacked bulbs. Much of the seventeen miles of dark corridors had bare walls, making the atmosphere dreary at best.13 Though they had every reason to be proud of its history and their service, there was little to inspire the men and women of the department into feeling that they were working in a great and historic inst.i.tution. Though they had every reason to be proud of its history and their service, there was little to inspire the men and women of the department into feeling that they were working in a great and historic inst.i.tution.

I decided to turn on the lights-literally, with new bulbs and bright hallways. I asked that paintings depicting scenes of U.S. military history be dusted off, brought up from bas.e.m.e.nt storage rooms, and hung on the mostly naked walls. We dedicated corridors to commemorate historic moments, missions, and people. My former NATO colleague, Secretary General Joseph Luns, traveled from Belgium to partic.i.p.ate in the official opening of a new corridor honoring the NATO alliance.

In an attempt to demystify the Department of Defense, I had the Pentagon opened up for public tours, much like the White House and Capitol building. The tours allowed people from across the world to get a sense of what was taking place there and what the men and women of the armed forces had achieved.

Unfortunately, as I a.s.sumed my duties, I did not enjoy the support of outgoing Secretary Schlesinger who, understandably, was hurt by his removal. Our relationship previously had been friendly.* But the inaccurate rumors that I had been involved in masterminding his firing were gathering steam and no doubt contributed to our uneasy relationship. But the inaccurate rumors that I had been involved in masterminding his firing were gathering steam and no doubt contributed to our uneasy relationship.

I also found myself in an uncomfortable relationship with the number two at the department, Deputy Secretary Bill Clements, who had hoped to be appointed secretary of defense himself. Clements had on occasion bypa.s.sed Schlesinger in his dealings with the White House and the State Department, even boasting to reporters that he had greater influence at the White House on defense policy than his boss.14 Heading into a presidential campaign, I could not make significant personnel changes-particularly with someone as politically well connected as Clements. Fortunately, the Pentagon at the time had statutory positions for two deputy secretaries, and the second slot was vacant. I recommended former congressman and NATO amba.s.sador Bob Ellsworth to fill it. His princ.i.p.al responsibility would be to deal with DoD's share of issues that resulted from the ongoing congressional investigations of the intelligence community. Fortunately, the Pentagon at the time had statutory positions for two deputy secretaries, and the second slot was vacant. I recommended former congressman and NATO amba.s.sador Bob Ellsworth to fill it. His princ.i.p.al responsibility would be to deal with DoD's share of issues that resulted from the ongoing congressional investigations of the intelligence community.

While some Americans questioned everything the military did, there was another segment of the country that was inclined to do the opposite. There was a tendency to be so proud of the men and women in uniform that we thought of military leaders as infallible. Having served for close to twenty years in the regular Navy and the reserve, I had a healthy respect for the military and an appreciation for military advice.* But as secretary of defense my role was different. "The U.S. Secretary of Defense is not a super General or Admiral," I wrote in Rumsfeld's Rules. "His task is to exercise leadership and civilian control over the Department for the Commander-in-Chief and the country." But as secretary of defense my role was different. "The U.S. Secretary of Defense is not a super General or Admiral," I wrote in Rumsfeld's Rules. "His task is to exercise leadership and civilian control over the Department for the Commander-in-Chief and the country."

Control wasn't what a lot of people had in mind, however. I quickly faced what successive secretaries of defense have faced: a powerful set of forces known as the iron triangle-a network of entrenched relationships among the military and civilian bureaucracies in the Defense Department, the Congress, and the defense industry. With more or less permanent positions, those in the iron triangle knew that the secretary of defense and the department's political appointees of either party were temporary. They could delay and simply wait out policies they did not favor. One responsibility in serving as head of the Defense Department is to look as far down the road as possible, point the department in the direction it needs to go, and then, to the extent possible, build momentum that will be hard to reverse.

Among the most important issues that faced us at the Pentagon in the mid-1970s was the selection of a new main battle tank for the Army. At the time, the expectation was that the new tank would be used to defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. As amba.s.sador to NATO, I had worked to achieve a higher level of standardization of military equipment among our NATO allies as a way to save taxpayer dollars and improve logistical efficiencies. NATO standardization also helped to off set the Soviets' advantage of a free hand to standardize weapons systems among the Warsaw Pact countries. Early in my tour at the Pentagon, I issued a memorandum to the department that set forth the importance I placed in standardization, and that I expected planners working on the new main battle tank to follow that lead.15 The Pentagon, however, was going in a different direction. Late in the afternoon of July 20, 1976, Deputy Secretary Clements and Secretary of the Army Martin Hoffmann asked to see me, along with a number of other senior officials. They were in sharp disagreement over competing tank proposals from Chrysler and General Motors.

The Army leadership strongly recommended the General Motors tank design, which had a standard diesel engine and a 105 millimeter Howitzer cannon, the weapon size the Army had used for years. The Army had no doubts its position would prevail. Its leaders seemed to a.s.sume my role in the decision would be to approve their recommendation. In fact, they were so certain of their position that they had already sent out a press release to members on the relevant congressional committees announcing that General Motors had won the contract. It was a cla.s.sic example of the iron triangle in action.

However, Deputy Secretary Clements and Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Dr. Malcolm Currie had come to a different conclusion. They favored Chrysler's design: It could be filled with a larger, 120 millimeter cannon and it had, for the first time, a turbine engine instead of a diesel. They pointed out that our major NATO allies-including the British, French, and West Germans-had tanks with 120 millimeter cannons. They also argued that the turbine engine would be more agile and efficient than the diesel.

I listened to both sides in the a.s.sembled group in complete amazement. This was the biggest weapons decision for the Army in years. Yet they had arrived in my office with conflicting positions without giving me any advance warning or briefing to allow me the time to make an informed decision. Further, both sides insisted that I decide that complicated issue, which would have such long-term consequences for our country's fighting force, then and there. I was notably unhappy about being put in that impossible position. After listening to their arguments, I told them I was going to delay a decision for a period of weeks until I could make an informed judgment. I needed more than fifteen minutes to decide the fate of a major weapons system that would serve the country for many decades.

Army officials were stunned at my reaction. "This can't be delayed," they argued. "The press releases announcing the decision are already out. Everyone's going to be furious. Capitol Hill will explode." Of course, I knew they were right. Angry contractors would take their grievances to Congress and the press. Members of Congress on both sides of the issue would be outraged.

I replied: "I'd rather deal with an explosion on Capitol Hill and in the press than with the problems our country will have if we make the wrong decision." I told the Army to pull back its premature press releases. I added that I would release a statement of my own announcing that the decision would be delayed.*

Soon, various reports appeared in the press that civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense had defied the advice of the United States Army. That had the benefit of being true, except that it wasn't nameless "civilians," it was one civilian in particular.16 This led to a ferocious pushback from elements in the Army, active and retired, as well as in the Congress and the media. This led to a ferocious pushback from elements in the Army, active and retired, as well as in the Congress and the media.17 As I studied the issues in the days ahead, I concluded that Clements and Currie had been right in opposing the Army's recommendation. Although some were still steaming, Hoffmann and some of his senior Army tank officials began to pull together to help move my decision forward. Not surprisingly, some on Capitol Hill were less than persuaded. A number of congressional districts and states stood to benefit from one or the other tank, and their representatives in Congress aggressively argued their positions. Threats of issuing congressional subpoenas for testimony were tossed around.18 Accepting all the pyrotechnics, I tried to make sure the goal remained clear: to get the tank that would best serve our armed forces and our country well into the next century. Accepting all the pyrotechnics, I tried to make sure the goal remained clear: to get the tank that would best serve our armed forces and our country well into the next century.

The XM-1 tank contract taught me that overruling a recommendation by the military services would almost certainly lead to upheaval and come at the cost of additional scar tissue. It also proved the rule that "if you do something, someone won't like it." But the decision to delay was the right one.

The contract with Chrysler was announced on November 12, 1976, fourteen weeks after that meeting in my office. The episode over the XM-1 tank, now known as the M-1 Abrams tank, was an important lesson in reexamining fundamental a.s.sumptions on which we based our decisions. Over time, the turbine engine proved to be successful. And the additional benefit of NATO standardization on the 120 millimeter cannon served to strengthen our collective security and to reduce costs. Some fifteen years later, the main battle tank I had authorized in 1976 was used in battle for the first time-except not in Western Europe as had been contemplated, but in Kuwait and Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. The tank performed brilliantly.

CHAPTER 16

Hold the SALT: Tension over Detente.

By 1976, the national security team that President Ford had inherited and then rea.s.sembled proved to be a capable group. It included several figures who would leave their imprint on American foreign and defense policies for decades: Secretary of State Kissinger, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, CIA Director George H. W. Bush, and White House Chief of Staff d.i.c.k Cheney.

While Kissinger emerged from the Ford cabinet shake-up unenthusiastic about losing his second hat as national security adviser, he characteristically found humor in his situation. While briefing congressional Republican leaders on foreign aid around that time, he joked, "I've been so busy figuring out what jobs I have left that I haven't had time to study this."1 In truth, President Ford's surprise moves flummoxed the wily Kissinger-a man not easily flummoxed. So entrenched was his well-deserved reputation as a master strategist who could predict the actions of leaders like moves on a chessboard, that some people even a.s.sumed he had to be the one behind the Halloween ma.s.sacre, to eliminate me as an obstacle in the White House. In truth, President Ford's surprise moves flummoxed the wily Kissinger-a man not easily flummoxed. So entrenched was his well-deserved reputation as a master strategist who could predict the actions of leaders like moves on a chessboard, that some people even a.s.sumed he had to be the one behind the Halloween ma.s.sacre, to eliminate me as an obstacle in the White House.2 Surely, some reporters contended, Ford's moves had to have been part of some grand Kissinger plan. And if it was not Kissinger's plan, then it must have been Rumsfeld's. Once again, the conspiracy theorists prevailed in the press, and the conventional wisdom didn't give Ford the credit he deserved. Surely, some reporters contended, Ford's moves had to have been part of some grand Kissinger plan. And if it was not Kissinger's plan, then it must have been Rumsfeld's. Once again, the conspiracy theorists prevailed in the press, and the conventional wisdom didn't give Ford the credit he deserved.

Privately, Kissinger thought it was "scary" to, as he put it, "monkey around with the whole NSC machinery when things are going reasonably well."3 Kissinger, who had worked for Vice President Rockefeller and knew him to be his unfailingly strong ally in the Ford White House, at first believed Rockefeller's a.s.sertions that I was behind his removal from the NSC post. Kissinger, who had worked for Vice President Rockefeller and knew him to be his unfailingly strong ally in the Ford White House, at first believed Rockefeller's a.s.sertions that I was behind his removal from the NSC post.

"The guy that cut me up inside this building isn't going to cut me up any less in Defense," Kissinger told Treasury Secretary Bill Simon immediately after the shake-up.4 If in fact Kissinger was angry, it did not last. Indeed, one of Ford's stated reasons for moving me to the Department of Defense was that Kissinger and I were able to work together. If in fact Kissinger was angry, it did not last. Indeed, one of Ford's stated reasons for moving me to the Department of Defense was that Kissinger and I were able to work together.

My relationship with Kissinger changed when I moved to the Pentagon. As secretary of defense, I was now a statutory member of the NSC. Since the days he had elbowed out Bill Rogers as secretary of state in the Nixon administration, Kissinger had become accustomed to making national security decisions with the President pretty much alone. As Kissinger knew well, my relationship with Ford went back to our days in Congress. I also wasn't hesitant to express my views. Perhaps because Kissinger wasn't either, the presumption, particularly in the press, was that we would be in constant conflict.

Though differences did exist, they were not many and they were on substance. One point of tension was unavoidable. Kissinger and I led inst.i.tutions that were different in mission and makeup: One focused on sustained diplomatic engagement; the other focused on preparing for, deterring, and, when necessary, engaging in military conflict. Given the different perspectives, I thought it particularly important that Kissinger and I base our dealings on a common understanding of the facts and an open flow of information. This led to an early test of our relationship. As a former amba.s.sador and State Department official, I knew that the distribution of sensitive cables sent to Washington from overseas posts would often be narrowly restricted by the Department of State, despite the fact that some needed to be read by a wider group of senior national security officials. I asked my staff to prepare a chart that tracked the flow of the restricted-distribution cables from the State Department to the Pentagon.5 The tracking chart made clear that the sensitive cable traffic to DoD had decreased precipitously. The tracking chart made clear that the sensitive cable traffic to DoD had decreased precipitously.

With the chart in hand, I met with Kissinger and not too subtly suggested that he open the flow of information to the Pentagon. He knew well that information was power. Kissinger seemed, or more likely acted, surprised by the statistics and vowed to improve the situation. Still, there never was the free exchange of information that I sought. It was a sign that even our good personal relationship had its limits.

I knew I had to do all I could to persuade Congress and the public that the United States had to bolster its military capabilities if we were to deter the Soviets in the years ahead. We needed to ensure peace not only by being strong, but by being perceived as strong by those who would do harm to our country and our allies. I was all for fiscal responsibility, but in this case I was certain that an increase in the U.S. defense budget had to be the administration's highest priority. This effort was controversial in some circles-even within the White House and Pentagon. knew I had to do all I could to persuade Congress and the public that the United States had to bolster its military capabilities if we were to deter the Soviets in the years ahead. We needed to ensure peace not only by being strong, but by being perceived as strong by those who would do harm to our country and our allies. I was all for fiscal responsibility, but in this case I was certain that an increase in the U.S. defense budget had to be the administration's highest priority. This effort was controversial in some circles-even within the White House and Pentagon.6 As I campaigned to increase defense investment, there was a consensus within the Democratic-controlled Congress that the proposed defense budget would be cut by $5 billion to $6 billion, or about 5 or 6 percent. As I campaigned to increase defense investment, there was a consensus within the Democratic-controlled Congress that the proposed defense budget would be cut by $5 billion to $6 billion, or about 5 or 6 percent.7 During my first weeks at the Pentagon, I met with Andy Marshall, the Defense Department's Director of Net a.s.sessment, the Pentagon's internal think tank, which examined the relative strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union.* Marshall demonstrated that the Soviet Union had been gaining ground relative to the United States. America had been slipping toward a position of rough equivalence. The projections of future trend lines did not bode well for the United States. Marshall demonstrated that the Soviet Union had been gaining ground relative to the United States. America had been slipping toward a position of rough equivalence. The projections of future trend lines did not bode well for the United States.

I compiled the data into a booklet called Defense Perspectives that provided an easy to understand set of statistics, charts, and graphs-numbers of personnel, tanks, helicopters, submarines, ships, and the like. The data told an important story: While the United States and the USSR were still roughly equivalent in their respective capabilities, the trend lines were clearly adverse to America, and if our respective levels of investment were to continue, we would drop below the band of rough equivalence.9 In addition to the Defense Perspectives booklet, I organized briefings, which I led along with John Hughes, a respected, long-serving intelligence officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Hughes had briefed President Kennedy and his national security team during the Cuban Missile Crisis.* He prepared cla.s.sified overhead photography from U.S. satellites and other sources that showed in vivid, powerful pictures the Soviet military buildup. The Hughes presentations-at varying degrees of cla.s.sification, depending on the audience-gave an impressive visual texture to the data we had a.s.sembled. He prepared cla.s.sified overhead photography from U.S. satellites and other sources that showed in vivid, powerful pictures the Soviet military buildup. The Hughes presentations-at varying degrees of cla.s.sification, depending on the audience-gave an impressive visual texture to the data we had a.s.sembled.10 Beginning in early 1976, I began to host early evening briefings for small groups of senators and congressmen in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, directly across from the Oval Office. We called them "smokers" back in those days, since many of us still smoked cigars or pipes. Our invitations to the White House for a private, cla.s.sified briefing were well received. Attendance was excellent. President Ford and other senior national security officials would drop by, giving the briefings added weight and a sense of unanimity within the administration.11 After one of the briefings, Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin, a Democrat and senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, walked out impressed. An opponent of increasing military investment, he muttered, "I can see I'll have to invent a new set of arguments."12 We conducted uncla.s.sified briefings for a variety of influential Americans-labor leaders, business leaders, religious leaders, and public policy experts with national security backgrounds. I knew that more opinion leaders needed to know the facts about the Soviets' military capabilities if I was to successfully convince them of the imperative for more investment in our military.*

Moscow began to take notice of our efforts. The Soviets condemned my briefings as "disgraceful." In the fall of 1976, after the Senate moved toward increasing the defense budget, I received an intelligence cable from American officials in Moscow that cited a report in the Soviet government's news service that condemned me "for justifying the US military build-up on the basis of the 'hackneyed myth about the 'Soviet threat'...despite repeated Soviet a.s.surances that the USSR threatens no one, does not increase its defense expenditures from year to year and seeks instead a reduction of all nations' defense budgets."13 The record is now clear that the Soviets lied about their defense budget. The Soviet government was attempting to achieve strategic military superiority over the United States at the expense of the nonmilitary sectors of its economy. The Soviets were successful in this approach for a period of time, but they now were rattled by having their buildup revealed to the world. The Soviets' strong and disingenuous reaction was powerful evidence to me that we were on the right track.

I could feel we were gaining traction. The Ford administration proposed an increase in the defense budget for fiscal year 1977, and Congress appeared to be moving in our direction. While the increase was modest, it was a marked change from the earlier series of decreases, and it was the first increase in real terms in the U.S. defense budget in almost a decade.14 It was a rea.s.suring achievement, especially for an administration that was under fire from all sides in an election year, and with the Congress controlled by the opposition party. The powerful facts we had marshaled and presented proved to be persuasive. Had President Ford been reelected, I have no doubt that our defense buildup would have continued. As it happened, however, after four years of the Carter administration's inattention, it was left to Ronald Reagan to increase defense investments appreciably. It was a rea.s.suring achievement, especially for an administration that was under fire from all sides in an election year, and with the Congress controlled by the opposition party. The powerful facts we had marshaled and presented proved to be persuasive. Had President Ford been reelected, I have no doubt that our defense buildup would have continued. As it happened, however, after four years of the Carter administration's inattention, it was left to Ronald Reagan to increase defense investments appreciably.

My situation as a new secretary at the Department of Defense was made more complicated because of the approaching presidential primary and general election campaign. I felt that a secretary of defense should not involve himself in domestic politics. That was easier said than done in a gripping and contentious primary challenge that hinged on national security issues.

Ronald Reagan declared his candidacy against the President two days after I was confirmed. Having become acquainted with California Governor Reagan when I was director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, I knew his campaign was not to be dismissed lightly. He was an effective executive, had an impressive talent for communication, an able staff led by Ed Meese and Judge Bill Clark, and was developing a growing list of influential supporters around the country.

At first, Reagan avoided direct attacks on Ford, focusing instead on the administration's policies and, more specifically, on Henry Kissinger.15 Reagan took direct aim at the administration's foreign policy by forcefully redefining "detente" as an American concession to, and accommodation of, the expansionist Soviet Union. As Reagan mounted his offensive, the term "detente" was becoming poisonous. To conservative critics the term encapsulated American f.e.c.klessness and a sense that America was a declining power in the world. Reagan took direct aim at the administration's foreign policy by forcefully redefining "detente" as an American concession to, and accommodation of, the expansionist Soviet Union. As Reagan mounted his offensive, the term "detente" was becoming poisonous. To conservative critics the term encapsulated American f.e.c.klessness and a sense that America was a declining power in the world.

Well into the primary campaign, the President stubbornly kept using the term even when he knew it was hurting him politically. Ford eventually realized that his spirited defense of detente was not worth the damage it was causing his election chances. "[L]et me say very specifically that we are going to forget the use of the word detente," he said. "The word is inconsequential. What happens in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, what happens in the negotiations between the People's Republic of China and the United States-those are the things that are of consequence."16 The primary election season did not start out well for Governor Reagan. Written off by the Eastern establishment and short on funds, Reagan lost most of the early primaries. The Californian seemed to be headed for his last stand in the March 1976 North Carolina primary. Reagan seized on what initially had seemed a relatively obscure issue: the negotiations to turn over the Panama Ca.n.a.l to the Panamanian government. Reagan said, "[W]e bought it, we paid for it, it's ours, and...we going to keep it!"17 The line drew loud applause, perhaps because it represented a rea.s.sertion of American will that many felt had gone missing since the fall of Saigon. The North Carolina results-Reagan beat the sitting president of his own party by six points-startled the political pundits and the Ford campaign team. And it soon put me in an awkward position. The line drew loud applause, perhaps because it represented a rea.s.sertion of American will that many felt had gone missing since the fall of Saigon. The North Carolina results-Reagan beat the sitting president of his own party by six points-startled the political pundits and the Ford campaign team. And it soon put me in an awkward position.

Building on his success, the California governor fashioned yet another issue that resonated with many Americans who felt the United States was slipping into a position of weakness. In the face of the Soviet threat, Reagan said, "The evidence mounts that we are Number Two in a world where it's dangerous, if not fatal, to be second best."18 What Reagan could not have known was that he had zeroed in on the issue at the center of an ongoing internal debate Kissinger and I had been having in front of Ford. What Reagan could not have known was that he had zeroed in on the issue at the center of an ongoing internal debate Kissinger and I had been having in front of Ford.

Six days after Reagan's victory in North Carolina, I met with the President and Kissinger in the Oval Office to discuss this very issue. Kissinger disagreed with any public admission of the unpleasant facts I was marshaling; namely, that after nearly three decades in the Cold War, the U.S. military capability trend lines relative to the capabilities of the Soviet Union were adverse to us, and the Soviets' overall capability was now roughly equivalent to ours. Absent a clear and sustained shift in our defense investment, the trend lines, favorable to the Soviets, would put them in a position of superiority in the years ahead.

"The impression that we are slipping is creating a bad impression around the world," Kissinger avowed. I also wondered at the time if he took Reagan's criticism personally, since he had presided over most national security issues for the past seven years.19 "But it's true," I reb.u.t.ted.

"Then we have to define our goals," Henry said. "It is inevitable that our margin since '60 has slipped. Are we trying to maintain the same margin as we had in 1960 or to maintain adequate forces?"

"We have been slipping since the '60s from superiority to equivalence," I countered. "And if we don't stop, we'll be behind."

I believed Reagan's incendiary claim that America was the "number two" power was not yet technically correct, but it was clear to me that absent increases in our overall defense investment, his a.s.sertion would eventually become true.

Kissinger's immediate goals and mine were in conflict here. Kissinger wanted the perception of American superiority to aid his negotiating positions and to rea.s.sure our allies, and for the strong diplomatic position it would provide as he worked on arms agreements with the Soviets. In contrast, I needed us to acknowledge the truth of the U.S. decline in our relative capability so that the American people and Congress would support the increases in defense investments necessary to reverse the adverse trends.

President Ford listened intently to our back-and-forth discussion. This was the type of spirited, open exchange that was healthy and needed, and which had been missing on foreign and defense policies in the past.

"I don't think [I] should say we are slipping," Ford finally decided. "I can say we need to redouble our efforts. I don't want to say we are getting behind. I'll say we have a challenge, we have rough equivalence and we've got to keep up." The President also decided to criticize the Democratic Congress for its reductions in defense spending.

"I think the posture to take is that Reagan doesn't know what he's talking about and he's irresponsible," Kissinger advised.20 Even though Kissinger was bothered by the California governor's unrelenting attacks, I thought Reagan was making a critically important point. The only thing irresponsible would be to dismiss it.

Kissinger and I also found ourselves in different corners on his negotiations with the Soviets over a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).* The debates over the arms-control agreement sometimes made me feel, as I later described it, "like the skunk at the garden party." The debates over the arms-control agreement sometimes made me feel, as I later described it, "like the skunk at the garden party."21 Ford hoped to sign a second treaty before the end of his term and, I suspected, before the presidential election in November. Ford hoped to sign a second treaty before the end of his term and, I suspected, before the presidential election in November.

I was concerned that the Soviet Union had not proven to be true to its word in previous negotiations. The Soviets were not forthcoming about the level of their defense expenditures. They also appeared to have been violating at least the spirit of the first SALT by concealing missile silos and other military infrastructure. All of this was to say nothing of their aggressive activities on several continents that threatened international peace and security and seemed designed to undermine American interests.

I was certainly comfortable delaying a new treaty if a satisfactory resolution to my concerns could not be reached. This of course had the effect of making me the administration's hawk, and positioning me as out of step with Kissinger and his allies, Rockefeller and Scowcroft. My reluctance to sign on to Kissinger's positions in obtaining an agreement without the Department of Defense's support proved frustrating for him. Kissinger was used to the Pentagon's opposition to his proposals, but they had not been much of a problem for him in the past given the tepid relationship between Ford and Schlesinger. He was unhappy that I was putting doubts into the President's mind, and he accused me of using delaying tactics to scuttle his negotiations with the Soviets. "Rumsfeld was skillful at deflecting every controversial issue into some bureaucratic bog or other," Kissinger noted later, giving more weight to what he considered my bureaucratic skills than the substantive merit of my arguments.22 He thought that was a criticism of me. I felt it was a compliment when it came to the risk of an arms control agreement that, in my view, was not in our country's best interest. He thought that was a criticism of me. I felt it was a compliment when it came to the risk of an arms control agreement that, in my view, was not in our country's best interest.

The discussions within the administration over SALT were even more difficult for me in light of my relationship with Rockefeller. At one meeting in mid-February 1976, we listened to a long presentation by Kissinger on the status of the SALT negotiations, which Rockefeller responded to by banging the table in approval.

When I laid out the Department of Defense's position, Rockefeller kept interrupting me. He had a well-developed practice of trying to throw people off with bullying tactics. Now that he was a lame-duck vice president, he was even more caustic. A couple of times, as I was speaking, he snapped, "Don, what's your point?"

Exasperated, I finally said, "Mr. Vice President, I've been listening for one hour and fifteen minutes, and I am proceeding in my own way to lay out my points." And I continued to do so. Rockefeller's behavior laid bare the tensions over the hoped-for deal with the Soviets favored by the liberal wing of the party, for which Rockefeller was the poster boy.

A key, if controversial, issue in the debates over SALT was the fate of America's cruise missiles.* Cruise missiles varied in ranges, could be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads, and could be launched from land, sea, or air. Their unusual flexibility made them particularly attractive as a weapons system. It also made them a serious complicating factor in negotiations to limit the size of our nuclear a.r.s.enal. Cruise missiles varied in ranges, could be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads, and could be launched from land, sea, or air. Their unusual flexibility made them particularly attractive as a weapons system. It also made them a serious complicating factor in negotiations to limit the size of our nuclear a.r.s.enal.

America had a measurable lead in cruise missile technology. The Soviets would have to expend large amounts of their resources to keep up with us, so the Soviets wanted us to promise to curtail our cruise missile development in a SALT II treaty. An agreement could have been achieved if Ford had been willing to acquiesce to these demands. Kissinger and Rockefeller, and others eager to sign a treaty with the Soviets, were ready to agree to that. I was uncomfortable agreeing to limit an advantage, the exact nature of which, at that time, we could not predict.23 In one meeting Kissinger tried to blame the Joint Chiefs for intransigence on the cruise missile issue. They were not the impediment, I told him-I was.24 I urged the President to delay any treaty that required restricting our cruise missile technologies as part of the deal. The Defense Department needed more time to a.s.sess the merits of the treaty's specific provisions before agreeing to them. I urged the President to delay any treaty that required restricting our cruise missile technologies as part of the deal. The Defense Department needed more time to a.s.sess the merits of the treaty's specific provisions before agreeing to them.

That Kissinger and I had differing views on the arms treaty with the Soviets posed a problem for Ford. The President needed support from the conservative wing of his party and a few hawks in the Democratic Party, like Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson of Washington state, to get a treaty ratified in the Senate. If the Joint Chiefs testified against the treaty or the Secretary of Defense resigned because he could not support it, its prospects for ratification would be dim.

Ford made clear to me that he was unhappy with our position in the Defense Department. Undeterred, Ford approached the Soviets with a proposal to continue negotiations while pushing the final status of cruise missiles for a separate discussion at a later date. Brezhnev rejected Ford's suggestion outright, calling it a "step backward." The Soviet leader wrote in March 1976 that "someone is deliberately trying to put roadblocks on the way to reaching an agreement."25 I had little doubt who the Soviet leader meant by "someone." The U.S.-initiated talks collapsed. I had little doubt who the Soviet leader meant by "someone." The U.S.-initiated talks collapsed.

American public opinion leaned heavily in favor of arms reductions. Those who didn't support agreements with the Soviets tended to be characterized in the press as advocates of confrontation with the Communist empire. Paradoxically, I thought Soviet aggression and confrontation could become more likely if we pa.s.sed a SALT II treaty that conceded too much. The Soviets might be emboldened by our weakness.

In 1979, two years after he had left office, Gerald Ford came to visit me in Chicago. I drove to the airport to pick him up. He was bringing Joyce and me one of the golden retriever puppies from his dog, Misty. He also had just completed his memoir, A Time to Heal. A Time to Heal. Sitting in the backseat of the car on the way to my house, Ford handed me an autographed copy of his book. Sitting in the backseat of the car on the way to my house, Ford handed me an autographed copy of his book.