thou n.o.blest denizen of earth; yea, how art thou cast down to the ground. But a little ago we believed thee a spiritual being; that thou hadst a nature too n.o.ble to rot with the beasts among the clods; that thou wast made fit to live with angels and thy Creator, G.o.d. But a little ago we believed thee possessed of a psychical life--a soul; that thou wouldst live forever beyond the stars; and that this soul's life was wholly occupied in the consideration of "heavenly and divine things." A little ago we believed in holiness, and that thou, consecrating thyself to pure and loving employments, shouldst become purer and more beautiful, n.o.bler and more lovely, until perfect love should cast out all fear, and thou shouldst then see G.o.d face to face, and rejoice in the sunlight of his smiling countenance. But all this is changed now. Our belief has been found to be a cheat, a bitter mockery to the soul. We have sat at the feet of the English sage, and learned how dismally different is our destiny. Painful is it, oh reader, to listen; and the words of our teacher sweep like a sirocco over the heart; yet we cannot choose but hear.

"The pyschical life"--the life of the soul, "the immortal spark of fire,"--and the physical life "are _equally_ definable as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." We had supposed that intelligence in its highest forms was wholly occupied with the contemplation of G.o.d and his laws, and the great end of being, and all those tremendous questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the activities of a spiritual person. We are undeceived now. We find we have shot towards the pole opposite to the truth. Now "we perceive that this which we call Intelligence shows itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time or s.p.a.ce; that _every advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science_ are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so coordinated as _exactly to tally_ with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally." In such relations consists the life of the "caterpillar." In such relations, _only a little "more complex,"_ consists the life of "the sparrow." Such relations only does "the fowler" observe; such only does "the chemist" know. This is the path by which we are led to the last, the highest "truth" which man can attain. Thus do we learn "that what we call _truth_, guiding us to successful action, and the consequent maintenance of life, is _simply_ the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while error, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence of such accurate correspondence." What a n.o.ble life, oh, reader, what an exalted destiny thine is here declared to be! The largest effort of thine intelligence, "the highest achievement of science," yea, the total object of the life of thy soul,--thy "psychial" life,--is to attain such exceeding skill in the construction of a shelter, in the fitting of apparel, in the preparation of food, in a word, in securing "the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations," and thus in attaining the "_truth_" which shall guide "us to successful action and the consequent maintenance of life," that we shall secure forever our animal existence on earth. Study patiently thy lesson, oh human animal! Con it o'er and o'er. Who knows but thou mayest yet attain to this acme of the perfection of thy nature, though it be far below what thou hadst once fondly expected,--mayest attain a perfect knowledge of the "_truth_," and a perfect skill in the application of that truth, _i.

e._ in "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; and so be guided "to successful action, and the consequent maintenance of life," whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless hunter who pursues thee,--the grim man-stalker, the skeleton Death. But when bending all thy energies, yea, all the powers of thy soul, to this task, thou mayest recur at some unfortunate moment to the dreams and aspirations which have hitherto lain like golden sunlight on thy pathway. Let no vain regret for what seemed thy n.o.bler destiny ever sadden thy day, or deepen the darkness of thy night. True, thou didst deem thyself capable of something higher than "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; didst often occupy thyself with contemplating those "things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard"; didst deem thyself a son of G.o.d, and "a joint-heir with Jesus Christ," "of things incorruptible and undefiled, and which fade not away, eternal in the heavens"; didst sometimes seem to see, with faith's triumphant gaze, those glorious scenes which thou wouldst traverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure spiritual life with other spirits, where all earthliness had been stripped off, all tears had been wiped away, and perfect holiness was thine through all eternity. But all these visions were only dreams; they wholly deluded thee. We have learned from the lips of this latest English sage that thy G.o.d is thy belly, and that thou must mind earthly things, so as to keep up "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." Such being thy lot, and to fulfil such a lot being "the highest achievement of science," permit not thyself to be disturbed by those old-fashioned and sometimes troublesome notions that "_truth_" and those "achievements" pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual relations to G.o.d as the moral Governor of the Universe; that man was bound to know the truth and obey it; that his "errors" were violations of perfect law,--the truth he knew,--were _crimes_ against Him who is "of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, and cannot look upon sin with the least degree of allowance"; that for these crimes there impended a just penalty--an appalling punishment; and that the only real "failure" was the failure to repent of and forsake the crimes, and thus escape the penalty. Far other is the fact, as thou wilt learn from this wise man's book. As he teaches us, the only "error" we can make, is, to miss in maintaining perfectly "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,"--is to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding at dinner, or to wear too scanty or too thick clothing, or to expose one's self imprudently in a storm, or by some other carelessness which may produce "the absence of such accurate correspondence" as shall secure unending life, and so lead to his only "failure"--the advance "towards death." When, then, oh reader! by some unfortunate mischance, some "error" into which thine ignorance hath led thee, thou hast rendered thy "failure" inevitable, and art surely descending "towards death," hesitate not to sing with heedless hilarity the old Epicurean song, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

Sing and be gay The livelong day, Thinking no whit of to-morrow.

Enjoy while you may All pleasure and play, For after death is no sorrow.

Thou hast committed thine only "error" in not maintaining "the accurate correspondence"; thou hast fallen upon thine only "failure," the inevitable advance "towards death." Than death no greater evil can befall thee, and that is already sure. Then let "dance and song," and "women and wine," bestow some s.n.a.t.c.hes of pleasure upon thy fleeting days.

Delightful philosophy, is it not, reader? Poor unfortunate man, and especially poor, befooled, cheated, hopeless Christian man, who has these many years cherished those vain, deceitful dreams of which we spoke a little ago! To be brought down from such lofty aspirations; to be made to know that he is only an animal; that "Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." Do you not join with me in pitying him?

And such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from over the sea as the newly found and wonderful truth, which is to satisfy the hungering soul of man and still its persistent cry for bread. And this is the teacher, mocking that painful cry with such chaff, whom newspaper after newspaper, and periodical after periodical on this side the water, even to those we love best and cherish most, have p.r.o.nounced one of the profoundest essayists of the day. Perhaps he can give us some sage remarks upon "laughter," as it is observed in the human animal, and on that point compare therewith other animals. But, speaking in all sincerity after the manner of the Book of Common Prayer, we can but say, "From all such philosophers and philosophies, good Lord deliver us."

Few, perhaps none of our readers, will desire to see a denial in terms of such a theory. When a man, aspiring to be a philosopher, advances the doctrine that not only is "Life in its simplest form"--the animal life--"the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with certain outer physico-chemical actions," but that "_each advance to a higher form of Life_ consists in a better preservation of this primary correspondence"; and when, proceeding further, and to be explicit, he a.s.serts that not only "the physical," _but also "the psychical life_ are _equally_" but "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; and when, still further to insult man, and to utter his insult in the most positive, extreme, and unmistakable terms, he a.s.serts "that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so coordinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally,"--that is, that the highest science is the attainment of a perfect cuisine; in a word, when a human being in this nineteenth century offers to his fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy the tenet that the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal life, and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as an animal, of a little higher grade, it is true, than other animals, but not different in kind, then the healthy soul, when such a doctrine is presented to it, will reject it as instantaneously as a healthy stomach rejects a roll of tobacco.

With what a sense of relief does one turn from a system of philosophy which, when stripped of its garb of well-chosen words and large sounding, plausible phrases, appears in such vile shape and hideous proportions, to the teachings of that pure and n.o.ble instructor of our youth, that man who, by his gentle, benignant mien, so beautifully ill.u.s.trates the spirit and life of the Apostle John,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of Williams College. No one who has read his "Lectures on Moral Science," and no lover of truth should fail to do so, will desire an apology for inserting the following extract, wherein is presented a theory upon which the soul of man can rest, as at home the soldier rests, who has just been released from the Libby or Salisbury charnel-house.

"And here, again, we have three great forces with their products. These are the vegetable, the animal, and the rational life.

"Of these, vegetable life is the lowest. Its products are as strictly conditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for vegetable, for the animal is nourished by nothing that has not been previously elaborated by the vegetable. 'The profit of the earth is for all; the king himself is served by the field.'

"Again, we have the animal and sensitive life, capable of enjoyment and suffering, and having the instincts necessary to its preservation.

_This_, as man is now const.i.tuted, _is conditional for his rational life_. The rational has its roots in that, and manifests itself only through the organization which that builds up.

"_We have, then, finally and highest of all, this rational and moral life, by which man is made in the image of G.o.d._ In man, as thus const.i.tuted, we first find a being who is capable of choosing his own end, or, rather, of choosing or rejecting the end indicated by his whole nature. This is moral freedom, _and in this is the precise point of transition from all that is below to that which is highest_. For everything below man the end is necessitated. Whatever choice there may be in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their end,--and they have one somewhat wide,--they have none in respect to the end itself. This, for our purpose, and for all purposes, is the characteristic distinction, so long sought, between man and the brute.

Man determines his own end; the end of the brute is necessitated. Up to man everything is driven to its end by a force working from without or from behind; but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself in front, and he follows it or not, as he chooses.

"In the above cases it will be seen that the process is one of the addition of new forces, with a constant limitation of the field within which the forces act.... It is to be noticed, however, that while the field of each added and superior force is narrowed, yet nothing is dropped. Each lower force shoots through, and combines itself with all that is higher. Because he is rational, man is not the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. He has also the organic life that belongs to the animal. In him none of these are dropped; _but the rational life is united with and superinduced upon all these_, so that man is not only a microcosm, but is the natural head and ruler of the world. He partakes of all that is below him, _and becomes man by the addition of something higher_.... Here, then, is our model and law. Have we a lower sensitive and animal nature? Let that nature be cherished and expanded by all its innocent and legitimate enjoyments, for it is an end. But--and here we find the limit--let it be cherished _only as subservient to the higher intellectual life_, for it is also a means."

The italics are ours.

Satisfactory, true, and self-sustained as is this theory,--and it is one which like a granite Gothic spire lifts itself high and calm into the atmosphere, standing firm and immovable in its own clear and self-evident truth, unshaken by a thousand a.s.saulting materialistic storms,--we would b.u.t.tress it with the utterances of other of the earth's n.o.ble ones; and this we do not because it is in any degree needful, but because our mind loves to linger round the theme, and to gather the concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon this subject. Exactly in point is the following--one of many pa.s.sages which might be selected from the works of that profoundest of English metaphysicians and theologians, S. T. Coleridge:--

"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this investigation are greatly increased by our not considering the understanding (even our own) in itself, and as it would be were it not accompanied with and modified by the cooperation of the will, the moral feeling, and that faculty, perhaps best distinguished by the name of Reason, of determining that which is universal and necessary, of fixing laws and principles whether speculative or practical, and of contemplating a final purpose or end. This intelligent will--having a self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light of the reason, by which its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for itself, and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the faculty of selecting and appropriating the means--seems best to account for that progressiveness of the human race, _which so evidently marks an insurmountable distinction and impa.s.sable barrier between man and the inferior animals, but which would be inexplicable, were there no other difference than in the degree of their intellectual faculties_."--_Works_, Vol. I. p. 371. The italics are ours.

The attention of the reader may with profit be also directed to the words of another metaphysician, who has been much longer known, and has enjoyed a wider fame than either of those just mentioned; and whose teachings, however little weight they may seem to have with Mr. Spencer, have been these many years, and still are received and studied with profound respect and loving carefulness by mult.i.tudes of persons. We refer to the apostle Paul, "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit." That is, who do not walk after the law of the animal nature, but who do walk after the law of the spiritual person, for it is of this great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and continually speaks. "For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the spirit, the things of the spirit. For the minding of the flesh is death, but the minding of the spirit is life and peace; because the minding of the flesh as enmity against G.o.d, for it is not subject to the law of G.o.d, neither indeed can be." _Romans_ VIII. 1, 5, 6, 7. This I say, then, "Walk in the spirit and fulfil not the l.u.s.t of the flesh. For the flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other."--_Galatians_ V. 16, 17.

Upon these pa.s.sages it should be remarked, by way of explanation, that our translators in writing the word spirit with a capital, and thus intimating that it is the Holy Spirit of G.o.d which is meant, have led their readers astray. The apostle's repeated use of that term, in contrasting the flesh with the spirit, appears decisive of the fact that he is contrasting, in all such pa.s.sages, the animal nature with the spiritual person. But if any one is startled by this position and thinks to reject it, let him bear in mind that the law of the spiritual person in man and of the Holy Spirit of G.o.d is _identical_.

The reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind will have already accomplished--the construction in our own terms, and the contrasting of the system above embodied with that presented by Mr.

Spencer. The human being, Man, is a twofold being, "flesh" and "spirit,"

an animal nature and a spiritual person. In the animal nature are the Sense and the Understanding. In the spiritual person are the Reason, the spiritual Sensibilities, and the Will. The animal nature is common to man and the brutes. The spiritual person is common to man and G.o.d. It is manifest, then, that there is "an insurmountable distinction and impa.s.sable barrier" not only "between man and the inferior animals," but between man as spiritual person, and man as animal nature, and that this is a greater distinction than any other in the Universe, except that which exists between the Creator and the created. What relation, then, do these so widely diverse natures bear to each other? Evidently that which President Hopkins has a.s.signed. "Because he is rational, man is not the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity.

He has also the organic life that belongs to the plant, and the sensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal." Thus far his life "is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with certain outer physico-chemical actions,"--undoubtedly "consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; and being the highest order of animal, his life "consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments" than that of any other animal. What, then, is this life for? "This, as man is now const.i.tuted, is _conditional for his rational life_." "The rational life is united with and _superinduced upon all these_." As G.o.d made man, and in the natural order, the "flesh," the animal life, is wholly subordinate to the "spirit," the spiritual life.

And the spirit, or spiritual person of which Paul writes so much,--does this also, this "Intelligence in its highest form," consist "in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"? Are the words of the apostle a cheat, a lie, when he says, "For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the spirit"--_i. e._ by living with the help of the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the law of the spiritual person--"do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live?"

And are Mr. Spencer's words, in which he teaches exactly the opposite doctrine, true? wherein he says: "And lastly let it be noted that what we call truth," &c., (see _ante_, p. 168,) wherein he teaches that "if ye live after the flesh," if you are guided by "_truth_," if you are able perfectly to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations," "ye shall not surely die," you will attain to what is _successful action_, the preservation of "life," of "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," of the animal life, and thus your bodies will live forever--the highest good for man; but if you "mortify the deeds of the body," if you pay little heed to "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,"

you will meet with "_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards death,"--the death of the body, the highest evil which can befall man,--and so "ye shall" not "live." Proceeding in the direction already taken, we find that in his normal condition the spiritual person would not be chiefly, much less exclusively, occupied with attending to "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," but would only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the body as the ground through which, in accordance with the present dispensation of G.o.d's providence, that person may exert himself and employ his energies upon those objects which belong to his peculiar sphere, even the laws and duties of spiritual beings. The person would indeed employ his superior faculties to a.s.sist the lower nature in the preservation of its animal life, but this only as a means. G.o.d has ordained that through this means that person shall develop and manifest himself; yet the life, continuance in being, of the soul, is in no way dependent on this means.

Strip away the whole animal nature, take from man his body, his Sense and Understanding, leave him--as he would then be--with no possible medium of communication with the Universe, and he, the I am, the spiritual person, would remain intact, as active as ever. He would have lost none of his capacity to see laws and appreciate their force; he would feel the _bindingness_ of obligation just as before; and finally, he would be just as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an ultimate end, though he would be unable to make a single motion towards putting that choice into effect. The spiritual person, then, being such that he has in himself no element of decomposition, has no need, for the preservation of his own existence, to be continually occupied with efforts to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations." Yet activity is his law, and, moreover, an activity having objects which accord with this his indestructible nature. With what then will such a being naturally occupy himself? There is for him no danger of decay. He possesses within himself the laws and ideals of his action. As such, and created, he is near of kin to that august Being in whoso image he was created. His laws are the created person's laws. The end of the Creator should be that also of the created. But G.o.d is infinite, while the soul starts a babe, an undeveloped germ, and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge.

What n.o.bler, what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could this being, endowed with the faculties of a G.o.d, find, than to employ all his power in the contemplation of the eternal laws of the Universe, _i. e._ to the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance with himself and G.o.d; and to bend all his energies to the realization by his own efforts of that part in the Universe which G.o.d had a.s.signed him, _i. e._, to accord his will entirely with G.o.d's will. This course of life, a spiritual person standing in his normal relation to an animal nature, would pursue as spontaneously as if it were the law of his being. But this which we have portrayed is not the course which human beings do pursue. By no means.

One great evil, at least, that "the Fall" brought upon the race of man, is, that human beings are born into the world with the spiritual person all submerged by the animal nature; or, to use Paul's figure, the spirit is enslaved by the flesh; and such is the extent of this that many, perhaps most, men are born and grow up and die, and never know that they have any souls; and finally there arise, as there have arisen through all the ages, just such philosophers as Sir William Hamilton and Mr.

Spencer, who in substance deny that men are spiritual persons at all, who say that the highest knowledge is a generalization in the Understanding, a form of a knowledge common to man and the brutes, and that "the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so coordinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally." It is this evil, organic in man, that Paul portrays so vividly; and it is against men who teach such doctrines that he thunders his maledictions.

We have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse from, superior to, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. This is his _position_ in the logical order. We have also spoken of him as submerged under the animal nature, as enslaved to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to express the awfully degraded _condition_ in which every human being is born into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural degradation. Let us then, as philosophers, carry our examination one step farther and ask: In this state of things what would be the fitting occupation of the spiritual person. Is it that "continuous adjustment"? He turns from it with loathing. Already he has served the "flesh" a long and grievous bondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with all his might to regain his normal condition to become naturally good as well as morally good,--he should fill his soul with thoughts of G.o.d, and then he should make every rational exertion to induce others to follow in his footsteps.

We attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. "The highest achievements of science" for us, our "truth," guiding us "to successful action," is that pure _a priori_ truth, the eternal law of G.o.d which is written in us, and given to us for our guidance to what is truly "successful action,"--the accordance of our wills with the will of G.o.d.

What we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered of this chapter, is that pa.s.sage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, as he believes, a new principle of philosophy, a principle which will symmetrize and complete the Hamiltonian system, and thus establish it as the true and final science for mankind. Since we do not view this principle in the same light with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to turn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish that with it, there might arise a feeling in many minds that the whole pa.s.sage should be quoted, that there might be no doubt as to his meaning. This we should willingly do, did our s.p.a.ce permit. Yet it seems not in the least necessary. That part of the pa.s.sage which contains the gist of the subject, followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and ill.u.s.trations, would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently full presentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which we might safely build our criticism. These then will be given.

"There still remains the final question--What must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds everything but the relative; or must we also believe in something beyond the relative?

"The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure negation, or as a non-existence. 'The _absolute_ is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,' writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The _Absolute_ and the _Infinite_,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the _Inconceivable_ and the _Imperceptible_, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.' From each of which extracts may be deduced the conclusion, that, since reason cannot warrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable only as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything beyond phenomena.

"Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave error. If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be admitted; but the premiss, in the form presented by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages, the arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute is unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet there remains to be stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise necessitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate its more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these propositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, or rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak specifically:--Besides that _definite_ consciousness of which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an _indefinite_ consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.

"Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there _is_ an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn _what_ the Absolute is, there lies hidden the a.s.sumption _that_ it is; and the making of this a.s.sumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon, everywhere named as the ant.i.thesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable." After carrying on this train of argument a little further, he reaches this just and decisive result.

"Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a _definite_ consciousness of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite consciousness of it." Carrying the argument further, he says: "Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the necessary conditions of thought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of this which transcends distinct consciousness, is to a.n.a.lyze our conception of the ant.i.thesis between Relative and Absolute." He follows the presentation of certain "antinomies of thought" with an extract from Sir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician enounces his doctrine that in "correlatives" "the positive alone is real, the negative is only an abstraction of the other"; or, in other words, the one gives a substance of some kind in the mind, the other gives simply nothingness, void, absolute negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is unquestionably right in saying: "Now the a.s.sertion that of such contradictories 'the negative is _only_ an abstraction of the other'--'is _nothing else_ than its negation'--is not true. In such correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that the negative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive one; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from consciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir William Hamilton is, that the like holds, even with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word."

Proceeding with his argument, he establishes, by ample ill.u.s.tration, the fact that a "something const.i.tutes our consciousness of the Non-relative or Absolute." He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, "that both Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel do," in certain places, "distinctly imply that our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, is positive not negative." Further on he argues thus: "Though Philosophy condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; though it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that; though in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as it arises; yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness, there ever remains behind an element which pa.s.ses into new shapes. The continual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited."

Thus he brings us to "the ultimate difficulty--How can there possibly be const.i.tuted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?"

This he accounts for by by hypostatizing a "raw material" in consciousness which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion as follows: "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence." ...

"To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:--We have seen how, in the very a.s.sertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is Relative, there is involved the a.s.sertion that there exists a Non-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument by which this doctrine is established, the same a.s.sumption is made. We have seen how, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real Non-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that actuality."

The approval which has been accorded to certain of the arguments adduced by Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial point, that the Absolute is a positive somewhat in consciousness, and to that point as established, must not be supposed to apply also to that hypothesis of "indefinite consciousness" by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his former teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter to show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy.

As against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, Mr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably be deemed decisive. Admitting the logical accuracy of their reasoning, he very justly turns from the logical to the psychological aspect of the subject, takes exception to their premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives an approximate, though unfortunately a very partial and defective presentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue which must now be made with him is whether the position he has here taken, and which he puts forth as that peculiar element in his philosophical system, that new truth, which shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of human nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, and all that he has before written, and so does not annihilate them. It will be our present endeavor to show that such is the result.

Perhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory than, first, to take up what we believe to be the element of truth in it, and carry out this to its logical results; and afterwards to present what seem to be the elements of error, and show them to be such.

1. "We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of"

"the Absolute." Without criticizing his use here of consciousness as if it were a faculty of knowledge, and remembering that we cannot have a consciousness of anything without having a knowledge commensurate with that consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's a.s.sertion is tantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is.

It does not seem that he himself can disallow this. Grant this, and our whole system follows, as does also the fallacy of his own. Our argument will proceed thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and is mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it is law for all intellect, for G.o.d as well as man. But three positions can be taken.

Either it is true for the Deity, or else it is false for him, or else it has no reference to him. In the last instance G.o.d is Chaos; in the second he and man are in organic contradiction, and he created man so; the first is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses refute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains but the position taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on G.o.d and man. One of those laws is, that, if any a.s.sertion is true, all that is logically involved in it is true; in other words, all truth is in absolute and perfect harmony. This is fundamental to the possibility of Logic. Now apply this law to the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of expression would be, The absolute Being is. It follows then that he is in a _mode_, has a _formal_ being. But three hypotheses are possible. He is in no mode, he is in one mode; he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there is no form, no order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is Chaos. Chaos is not G.o.d, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, and men are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in all modes, he is in a state of utter contradiction. G.o.d "is all in every part." He is then all infinite, and all finite. Infinity and finiteness are contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. G.o.d is wholly possessed of contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities, which is more than unthinkable--it is absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us pause here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established, from Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that G.o.d _is limited_. He must be in one mode to the exclusion of all other modes. He is limited then by the necessity to be what he is; and if he could become what he is not, he would not have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being. Other beings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and subordinate to him.

Since he is superior to all other beings he must be in the highest possible mode of being. Personality is the highest possible mode of being. This will appear from the following considerations. A person, possesses the reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act, within himself, and is thus a _final cause_. No higher form of being than this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony a hypothesis of any other must be excluded. G.o.d is then a person.

We have now brought the argument to that point where its connection with the system advocated in this treatise is manifest. If the links are well wrought, and the chain complete, not only is this system firmly grounded upon Mr. Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, he has in this his special point given partial utterance to what, once established, involves the fallacy not only of all he has written before, but as well of the whole Limitist Philosophy. It remains now to remark upon the errors in his form of expressing the truth.

2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. He speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite consciousness." Let us examine these in their order.

_a._ He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. In this he uses the term in the inexact, careless, popular manner, rather than with due precision. As has been observed on a former page, consciousness is the light in which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling is affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, and of this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical expression to say "I am conscious of the feeling." The full form being "I am conscious that I know the feeling." Thus is it with all man's activities. Applying this to the case in hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the Absolute, but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual faculty, the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the absolute Person is, and through this presentation--intuition--the spiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, our position: consciousness is the indivisible unity, the light in which the person sees all his faculties and capacities act; and so is to be considered as different in kind from them all as the peculiar and unique endowment of a spiritual person.

_b._ Mr. Spencer speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite consciousness." The expression "vague consciousness" being a popular and very common one, deserves a careful examination, and this we hope to give it, keeping in mind meantime the position already attained.

The phrase is used in some such connection as this, "I have a vague or undefined consciousness of impending evil." Let us a.n.a.lyze this experience. In doing so it will be observed that the consciousness, or rather the seeing by the person in the light of consciousness, is positive, clear, and definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling.

Again, the feeling is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread, of threatening danger. What, then, is vague--is undefined? This. That cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach of the cognitive faculties, and of course cannot be known; because what produces the feeling is unknown, the intellectual apprehension experiences a sense of vagueness; and this it instinctively carries over and applies to the feeling. Yet really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of the cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not consciousness that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's "_indefinite_ consciousness, which cannot be formulated," has no foundation in fact.

But this may be shown by another line of thought. Consciousness is commensurate with knowledge, _i. e._, man can have no knowledge except he is conscious of that knowledge; neither can he have any consciousness except he knows that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness is, _i. e._, what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it is only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our knowledge of an object is indefinite, we mean that we partly know its characteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. Thus then also the result above stated follows; and what Mr. Spencer calls "_indefinite_ consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we partly know, and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration.

In the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under consideration, Mr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary a.s.sertion respecting consciousness, which, when examined in the light of the positions we have advocated, affords another decisive evidence of the fallacy of his theory. We quote it again, that the reader may not miss of giving it full attention. "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally _the unconditioned consciousness_, or _raw material of thought_, to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence." Upon reading this pa.s.sage, the question spontaneously arises, What does the writer mean? and it is a question which is not so easily answered. More than one interpretation may be a.s.signed, as will appear upon examination. A problem is given. To find what the "raw material of thought" is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in him the "raw material of thought"--the crude thought-ore which he smelts down in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, giving forth in its stead the refined metal--exact thought. We must then proceed to attain our answer by a.n.a.lyzing man's natural organization.

Since man is a complex, const.i.tuted being, there is necessarily a logical order to the parts which are combined in the complexity. He may be considered as a substance in which a const.i.tution inheres, _i. e._, which is organized according to a _set_ of fixed laws, and that set of laws may be stated in their logical order. It is sufficient, however, for our purpose to consider him as an organized substance, the organization being such that he is a person--a selfhood, _self-active_ and capable of self-examination. The raw material of _all_ the activities of such a person is this organized substance. Take away the substance, and there remains only the set of laws as _abstract_ ideas.

Again, take away the set of laws, and the substance is simple, unorganized substance. In the combining of the two the person becomes.

These, then, are all there is of the person, and therefore in these must the raw material be. From this position it follows directly that any capacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, is the substance acting in accordance with the law which determines that form of the activity. To explain the term, form of activity. There is a _set_ of laws. Each law, by itself, is a simple law, and is incapable of organizing a substance into a being. But when these laws are considered, as they naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each other, it is seen that this, their standing together, const.i.tutes ideals, or forms of being and activity. To ill.u.s.trate from an earthly object. The law of gravitation alone could not organize a Universe; neither could the law of cohesion, nor of centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any other one law. All these laws must be acting together,--or rather all these laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to their own nature, thus const.i.tuting an ideal form, in accordance with which G.o.d may create this Universe. For an ill.u.s.tration of our topic in its highest form, the reader is referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's "Rational Psychology," where he a.n.a.lyzes personality into its elements of Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is sufficiently evident that either of these alone cannot organize a person, but that all three must be present in order to const.i.tute such a being. There are, then, various forms of activity in the person, as Reason, Sensibility, and Will, in each of which the organized substance acts in a mode or form, and this form is determined by the set of organizing laws. Consciousness also is such a form. The "raw material of thought," then, must be this substance considered under the peculiar form of activity which we call consciousness, but _before the substance thus formulated has been awakened into activity by those circ.u.mstances which are naturally suited to it, for bringing it into action_. Now, by the very terms of the statement it is evident that the substance thus organized in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness considered apart from and prior to its activity, can never be known _by experience_, i. e., _we can never be conscious of an unconscious state_.