Julian Assange - Wikileaks: Warrior For True - Part 15
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Part 15

Back to Monday, June 21 2010, back in the United Kingdom.

Nick Davies works in the UK. He knew that Julian was in Brussels for this seminar. The next day he was taking the Eurostar high-speed train from London to Brussels and within two hours he would be meeting up with his colleague, Ian Traynor.

Nick Davies was a well-known investigative journalist in the United Kingdom. He has been in the business since 1976, as a freelancer, working regularly as a correspondent for The Guardian. He was their star journalist. He was also an author and doc.u.mentary maker for television. He has been named Journalist of the Year, Reporter of the Year and Feature Writer of the Year for his investigations on crime, drugs, poverty and other social ills. Hundreds of journalists attend his master cla.s.ses on investigative techniques. He has also won a European Journalism Award for his work on the politics of drugs. He has published four books, including White Lies about a legal error based on racism in Texas and Dark Heart on poverty in Great Britain. His latest book, Flat Earth News is controversial. It exposes lies, distortion and propaganda in news that is related by and through the media. In November 2009, the University of Westminster made him an honorary fellow for service to journalism.

At the beginning of June 2010, Davies heard of the Pentagon leaks that WikiLeaks had in their possession. At the same time, he had also read an article in The Guardian on Bradley Manning's arrest. The star journalist was determined to find Julian. He then contacted the Number One of the a.s.sociation to see what could be published, but to no avail. The rumor was that Julian had been arrested or attacked. He couldn't be found. Finally, one of Julian's friends tipped Davies about his intervention in Brussels at the European Parliament.

Nick called his colleague Ian Traynor, a political journalist and correspondent of The Guardian in Brussels for four years. Ian Traynor remained very humble and discreet about his intervention that day. Following his colleague's call, he went to the conference of the European Parliament to listen to Julian and speak to him. He found out that the founder of WikiLeaks had two million doc.u.ments.

On Tuesday, June 22 2010, Nick Davies arrived at Brussels-South train station. He took a taxi that drove him directly to the Hotel Leopold, a four-star hotel just down the street from the European Parliament where the conference hosts were staying.

Davies arrived with a strange proposal in his suitcase. On the train taking him to Brussels, he had already talked to Julian on the phone. He claimed that the material WikiLeaks had possession of would have more of an impact if it were well-researched and made into stories by major players of the mainstream press.

It was around 2 p.m. Julian a.s.sange, Nick Davies and Ian Traynor were at the Leopold. The hotel was practically empty and everything was calm at the beginning of the afternoon. They set up in the Italian garden. The place was empty. Their conversation lasted for six hours.

Ian Traynor: I drank coffee. I think he had a soda. He was very quiet; speaks very quietly. He's quite difficult to understand. He's got an Australian accent and he speaks... It's difficult. He seems very... disorganized, but he is, in fact, very organized. Very determined, focused on his goal. Very intelligent. Very quick. Very well informed and always careful. Very cautious. Davies suggested to Julian that The Guardian and The New York Times collaborate on the material. He mentioned that even though British law could make it easy for authorities to get a court order to stop The Guardian from revealing secret doc.u.ments, American law would make it next to impossible for any authority to shut down The New York Times.

Ian Traynor: At that stage, it was only the Afghan and then the Iraqi stuff. It was not way before all the rest. We knew that he had more material, but we didn't know what, so we started with the Afghan material and he wanted other newspapers involved. I suggested Der Spiegel because I speak German and used to work there. It's the biggest country, and it's the Afghan material the Germans have a big problem in Afghanistan with their public opinion. And Der Spiegel is a good newspaper. It has lots of money and lots of resources. In fact, it's the only paper in Germany that does investigative reporting.

At the end of the afternoon, the men were still at the table at the Leopold, on the brightly lit half-open terrace under a blue sky. The gla.s.s roof above their heads was entirely open and let in lots of sunlight. Davies and a.s.sange launched the premises of their collaboration. Traynor observed and listened. The two men prepared a secret pa.s.sword and wrote it down on a paper napkin.

Nick Davies explained: "Julian hooked together various words in the commercial logo on the napkin to create one long pa.s.sword. He also wrote the letters GPG in the top left-hand corner that's some kind of encryption program. The technical people at The Guardian needed to know that in order to decrypt the material. I won't tell you the exact pa.s.sword, because Julian asked me not to, in case it a.s.sisted any police inquiry."

elise: Did Julian talk about anything else during this discussion?

Ian Traynor: Just this matter and politics in general, and the United States.

elise: What did he say about America?

Ian Traynor: He speaks generally about politics, but he's discussing material and it was all related to America that we were dealing with. It was Afghanistan. It was Iraq. It was American diplomacy. It was all to do with America. He wanted The New York Times involved because he felt that would give him protection in America, like an insurance policy. If he just did it with foreign media then it might be easier for the Americans to prosecute him for foreign espionage, but if you give it to The New York Times, they can't.

At the beginning of the evening, a gentlemen's agreement was concluded: Davies convinced the Number One of WikiLeaks that sharing raw data with a news organization would increase the leaks' visibility more than just publishing them on the WikiLeaks site.

In London, Alan Rusbridger, Editor-in-Chief of The Guardian phoned Bill Keller of The New York Times and asked him mysteriously if he knew how to arrange a secure communication. "Not really," he admitted. He explained that his paper didn't have encrypted phone lines. Keller then tried to speak to Rusbridger in an indirect, awkward way: "In a roundabout way, he laid out an unusual proposition: an organization called WikiLeaks, a secretive cadre of anti-secrecy vigilantes, had come into possession of a substantial amount of cla.s.sified United States government communications. WikiLeaks's leader, Julian a.s.sange, an eccentric former computer hacker of Australian birth and no fixed residence, offered The Guardian half a million military dispatches from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. There might be more after that, including an immense bundle of confidential diplomatic cables. The Guardian suggested-to increase the impact as well as to share the labor of handling such a trove-that The New York Times be invited to share this exclusive bounty. The source agreed. Was I interested? I was interested."

Two days later, in London, the team of The Guardian downloaded the first installment of U.S. government secrets, which consisted of more than 90,000 field reports produced by U.S. military units fighting in Afghanistan from the WikiLeaks site. This site would only exist for a few hours, enough time to download doc.u.ments before disappearing into cybers.p.a.ce.

American journalist Eric Schmitt of The New York Times in Washington hopped on a plane and flew to London to see the material for himself. Keller admitted: "His main a.s.signment is to get a sense of the material. Was it genuine? Was it of public interest? [...] Schmitt would also meet the WikiLeaks leader, who was known to a few Guardian journalists but not to us. Schmitt's first call back to The Times was encouraging. There was no question in his mind that the Afghanistan dispatches were genuine. They were fascinating a diary of a troubled war from the ground up. And there were intimations of more to come, especially cla.s.sified cables from the entire constellation of American diplomatic outposts. WikiLeaks was holding those back for now, presumably to see how this venture with the establishment media worked out."

The material was in fact authentic. It was decided then, The New York Times was on board. Julian, flexing his proprietary rights, contacted Marcel Rosenbach, Editor-in-chief of German publication Der Spiegel. Like Davies predicted, the leaks would have an enormous impact. Here is what he said in the Huffington Post, an American news site published exclusively online, on December 30 2010: "I was the journalist who took it on himself back in June to track down Julian a.s.sange and to persuade him not to post his latest collection of secrets on the WikiLeaks website but to hand them over to The Guardian and other news organizations. The publication of the Afghan and Iraqi war logs and then the diplomatic cables all flowed from that initiative. I did that because I think journalists should tell the truth about important things without being frightened, for example, by the government of the most powerful state on the planet."

29.

REVOLUTION.

The world of media is in the middle of a ma.s.sive revolution! WikiLeaks allied itself with three major names in journalism: Britain's Guardian, America's New York Times and Germany's Der Spiegel, and they made an agreement vis-a-vis the biggest doc.u.ment leak in history. Julian a.s.sange brought together these three heavy weights of the international press to give them the exclusive on his confidential doc.u.ments.

Julian compared this leak the most important in recent military history to "opening the Stasi archives." The Stasi was the official state security service of the German Democratic Republic, regarded as one of the most repressive secret police in the world.

In July 2010, with the 92,000 reports received on the War in Afghanistan, the three newspapers were faced with a dilemma: publish without checking the origin of these reports (as they would have done had they found them on their own) or let WikiLeaks release the doc.u.ments on their site. In the end, they decided to play along. WikiLeaks' interest was clear: Julian surrounded himself with these three big players in order to create a buzz.

WikiLeaks' new partners have the human means to verify all the data and even give them some added value. Nick Davies explained to the French Telerama: "Our competencies in data journalism have been essential in properly handling the subject. I think the reputation of honesty and independence of The Guardian is what helped. We chose the information we felt was the most interesting after verification. Moreover, it can't cause injury to anyone posted in Afghanistan."

But according to Julian, this big media group created a magnetic effect for the site, which received significantly more submissions after the broadcast of Collateral Murder.

From the onset, this a.s.sociation of digital media experts and traditional journalists turned out to be more efficient than a normal editorial board. Nick Davies agrees: "There are good points for both methods. Without WikiLeaks, we wouldn't have any material. Without traditional news outlets, WikiLeaks could not make sense of its information and offer it a platform that would attract enough attention. Every one of us needs the other and everyone sees the benefits of working together."

The alliance started in July 2010 and continued over the next few months. From July to November, an impressive number of secret doc.u.ments were revealed. On July 25, the first phase kicked off with strategically leaking 92,000 confidential reports from the U.S. army on the war in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan War Logs.

The three media players presented the results of their respective investigations of the doc.u.ments supplied by WikiLeaks, but they didn't work the same way: The Guardian chose cartography to highlight the most important facts, The New York Times opted to write a very long article, stating the entirety of the main points, while Der Spiegel went with a slideshow.

London Tuesday, January 18 2011. Kings Place, 90 York Way: Meeting with Ian Katz.

Ian Katz is the Deputy Editor of the Guardian, which he joined in 1990. He also worked as a reporter for said newspaper.

Ian Katz: There were lots of small train crashes, one could say. On the day before publication, Der Spiegel accidentally distributed about forty or fifty copies to Basel, and they went on sale at the Basel train station. A local radio station bought one and started reading it on air, and then a freelance journalist got one and started Tweeting it. So we were all sitting here watching Twitter as he was tweeting through Der Spiegel magazine thinking, 'Do we need to publish early? Do we need to bring it forward?'

We were having conference calls every hour saying, 'He's got a hundred followers on Twitter now. Is anyone else following him?' All of us were obsessively reading the German Twitter-sphere, and in the end, we had to publish slightly early because of that. We had a number of quite tricky things around doc.u.ments that would pop up somewhere else because some of the cables found their way into the public domain through different routes.

WikiLeaks published one or two themselves. A cable we wanted to publish the next day has just popped up and we would have to suddenly publish now. Then we'd have a frantic ringing round. We'd have The New York Times saying: 'No, you can't do that now because we're doing it tomorrow,' and Le Monde would say: 'We have to do it now because it's out there.'

So we had a few of those incidents, but nothing huge. One of the trickiest aspects of the collaboration was that, as you know, we wrote all the cables to protect sources very carefully, so we had a very complex process where each reporter who was working on a story wrote their own cables. Then it went through a person who was just looking at cables, a senior production editor here, and he did it again.

Then he spoke with his opposite members at the other papers such as Der Spiegel and The New York Times to say: 'How are you writing this doc.u.ment? We're taking this, this and this out.' Then they would compare notes and settle on a final version, which we would give to WikiLeaks, which they would publish. That was an unbelievably labor-intensive process.

You can imagine. We did seven hundred seventy doc.u.ments. The New York Times did a hundred and something. Each paper did several hundred, and each one of those, they had a discussion about. It was very labor intensive, but broadly, I think that was quite successful in that it meant we couldn't slip anything out that was dangerous.

I just had that sort of story up till publication, really, and then you would have seen kind of what happened next in terms of what we all printed. We had a grid for two weeks when we started and I think we produced a grid for another-I'm trying to remember now. No, we didn't produce a grid for another week, but what we agreed after the two weeks was that we would notify each other forty-eight hours before publication.

So if we found a story that we wanted to run, we would say that we were planning on running it on Thursday. Then if any of the others were interested we would share the cable information. In the third week, we all went in slightly different directions, but the agreement was still in place.

elise: Was this kind of agreement set up with lawyers?

Ian: No.

elise: No?

Ian: I mean- the agreement with a.s.sange was handled by his lawyer.

elise: Who had the contact with a.s.sange at The Guardian?

Ian: Initially Nick [Davies], then David [Leigh, investigations executive editor of The Guardian] and then me.

elise: So you still talk to him sometimes?

Ian: In an encrypted chatroom.

elise: No phone contact?

Ian: As you know, he doesn't take phone calls, but you can call some people that have some sort of contact with WikiLeaks people.

elise: In Sweden, in Iceland or here?

Ian: Well, Kristinn, you can get on the phone.

elise: Kristinn Hrafnsson? So he's involved?

Ian: Yes, he was, particularly when Julian was in jail. We were dealing with three or four different people.

elise: Who else?

Ian: I'm reluctant to identify them because I think they may not wish to be identified, but there were two younger volunteers at WikiLeaks who were looking after the production process. So there was a system that they built where we uploaded our redacted doc.u.ments and then automatically published them onto WikiLeaks, and that's how we ensured that the versions they used were the versions that we had pa.s.sed.

Obviously, the people who ran that process we had to talk to the whole time to say, 'Ignore that version. We're sending a new version,' and there's another young journalist there who we talked to, plus Stephens [Mark Stephens, a.s.sange's British lawyer]. There were four or five people that we were talking to. Obviously, a.s.sange himself was out of the picture for quite a while.

elise: Did a.s.sange come here? How many times?

Ian: Well, he came to two big meetings with the partners and he was in and out of the office quite a bit over the last year, four or five times.

elise: Just by himself or with someone else?

Ian: It depends. For these big meetings-the one meeting that Sarah Ellison wrote about, he came with his lawyers and his sort of lieutenant, Kristinn. Other times he came by himself. It was a very relaxed collaboration really.

elise: Could you talk to me about him, the man?

Ian: He's a very charismatic figure. He does have a way of sort of very quietly becoming the center of attention in the room. He's a very quiet, magnetic presence. He is clearly highly intelligent but quite emotionally unintelligent. I think he doesn't always read situations brilliantly. His a.n.a.lytical mind is extraordinary. He's very sharp.

You feel like you're sitting with a chess player. He's three moves ahead and very good at gaming a situation and trying to work out where he's trying to end up. He's quite thin-skinned. He doesn't deal with criticism well. He tends to be sort of slightly paranoid about what lies behind things, which may be completely innocent, but he's a very admirable figure in many ways.

He is not remotely materialistic. He has no possessions that I know of at all beyond a few laptops. He barely owns any clothes. He is really motivated by getting his material out there and through most of our conversations that was the primary drive for him, how best to get this material into the public domain and make the most impact with it. Not just dumping it, but getting it noticed.

elise: Did you talk about other things?

Ian: I don't think he's ever asked me anything. He's not a great question asker. He is very focused. You feel he's absolutely sort of laser-like.

He is a monomaniac in that sense. I think he sees an organization like The Guardian and asks very much in terms of what use we are to him and how we can suit his grander purpose.

The partnership continued in October 2010, with a second wave. This time WikiLeaks and its British, American and German partners revealed secret doc.u.ments on the war in Iraq: the Iraq War Logs, which began to leak on October 22 of the same year.

The big media buzz started in November. After having experimented with their alliance and after the first two deliveries, Julian dealt a big blow: 250,000 American diplomatic cables. Operation 'Cablegate' was launched on November 28 2010 and it made a lot of noise.

At that moment WikiLeaks' leader wanted to expand their impact. "He wanted something bigger with more options," Ian Traynor said. French daily Le Monde and Spanish magazine El Pais joined in.

The alliance, now with five partners, exposed 250,000 secret doc.u.ments from American emba.s.sies, revealing the underside of American diplomacy.

While the first leaks on Afghanistan contained few significant revelations and those from Iraq mostly focused on exactions committed between different Iraqi factions, the third and final hit would leave permanent traces.

Since May of 2010 Washington has been worried. Strengthened by the actions of five partners, WikiLeaks dropped a bomb by revealing information concerning Iran, terrorism, Israel and Guantanamo, among others. The viewpoint of the United States was partially revealed, and chaos ensued on the international scene. Diplomats had probably realized that they could no longer do their jobs the same way anymore. The White House responded immediately by condemning the release as a 'reckless and dangerous act,' risking lives of thousands of diplomats and officials and endangering its relationship with friends and allies.

Bryan Whitman, spokesperson for the Pentagon, said that the Department of Defense had taken a series of measures to stop these kinds of incidents from happening in the future. The Pentagon condemned these reckless releases and announced a strengthening of network security of secret communications of the U.S. army.

The five newspapers "exchanged a lot of information, a.n.a.lyses and expertise," said Sylvie Kauffmann, Executive Editor of Le Monde.

One hundred twenty-five people of the five editorial boards worked inconspicuously day and night for several weeks. The publication of the memos started on Sunday night, November 28 2010 but due to the sheer amount of information, it was spread out over several days. The partners had agreed on a publishing schedule and how to post the memos online. They were very careful in crossing out names or indications to protect people's ident.i.ty.

As for the veracity of the doc.u.ments, Ms. Kauffmann said: "We have no specific reason to doubt their authenticity or believe that some of them are false. The U.S. State Department hasn't denied anything and hasn't claimed anything was false, so we have used our judgment as well: the memos we couldn't guarantee the validity of their content we put aside."

All the memos supplied were reviewed by the partners and then put online by WikiLeaks. The organization accepted to work this way. And for the third time, it supplied the material for free.

What could we actually learn from these leaked doc.u.ments? Randomly going through them we could learn that, for example, Saudi donors are still the main backers of radical organizations like Al-Qaeda. In fact, several countries in the region like Qatar have only made minimal efforts to combat terrorism. We could also learn that since 2007 the United States has being trying to verify the illegal production of nuclear fuel in Pakistan. Efforts to check the activity of several reactors didn't produce any results. Pakistani officials rejected the visits of American experts, fearing a negative reaction of the public opinion; a public that is afraid of Washington controlling the national nuclear capacities. As for Guantanamo, emptying the prison is not an easy job. Washington wanted to put pressure on smaller countries so that they would welcome some liberated prisoners. It can still be read that U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates thought attacking Iran would only delay their nuclear capabilities for one to three years.

WikiLeaks continued to gradually drop its 'bombs,' a "real 9/11 of world diplomacy," according to the Iranian government.

American authorities have tried to suppress the devastating effects of world diplomacy by contacting its strategic allies, especially Great Britain, Canada, Australia, Israel, Turkey and France.

Javier Moreno at El Pais said, "[N]ewspapers are not liable."

The U.S. State Department and government acted like the main victims of these leaks. The Spanish Editor-in-chief believes that "the main victims are the hundreds of people who went to the American emba.s.sies in the many countries over the past years and who have had breakfast and dinner with diplomats and American amba.s.sadors. These people gave their opinions freely, and more importantly, they fed important information to the American diplomacy machine."

Moreno believes that the press has a great responsibility to citizens and society of transmitting truthful and important information so that they are able to make educated judgments on their government's policies. He feels that newspapers aren't around to hamper or avoid governments or authorities in general to be exposed to embarra.s.sing situations like those caused by 'Cablegate.'

"The fruitful alliance of new media with traditional media in operation War Logs shows that we're not witnessing a 'revolution of journalism,' which should replace a regime crushed by another, as gurus of the 'Internet revolution' are claiming. It's a hybridization of a young growth of new journalism, a mutant variation on the old tree trunk of traditional journalism. As Julian a.s.sange said himself, the War Logs are a partnership."

In November 2010, militant libertarian news site WikiLeaks made its way into the flow of mainstream press: Julian's revelation of the world's greatest secrets is the only thing they talked about, quoted by all major international media and picked up by every television station in the world.

30.

A 180-DEGREE TURN.

In an alliance, people still fight over rational problems and compatibility issues because collaboration comes with its fair share of trouble. During the last six months of 2010, the relations between Julian a.s.sange, and the five mainstream media, experienced some stigmatized turbulence mostly between the WikiLeaks' Julian a.s.sange and The Guardian, and between Julian and The New York Times.

Journalist Sarah Ellison echoed this story in the February 2011 edition of Vanity Fair. After having met many parties involved in the matter, the American journalist revealed the story behind the headlines. In her article, The Man Who Spilled the Secrets1, she presented the confrontation between the traditional media that follows established principles and journalistic ethics, and a bunch of libertarians of a new type of information. A conflict between two cultures, Ellison provided an outsider's look at the rocky relationship between Julian a.s.sange and the partners of the alliance. A detailed report revealed a few new elements of an already strained partnership.

The first problem encountered in the alliance happened at the start of summer 2010, when a.s.sange went solo to approach German magazine Der Spiegel to include it in the partnership. During the collaboration it also appeared that the ethical approaches of the two groups were very different. Traditional media wanted to provide a context to what they published, while WikiLeaks wanted a more raw approach. David Leigh witnessed this style difference: "We were starting from: 'Here's a doc.u.ment. How much of it shall we print? Whereas Julian's ideology was, 'I shall dump everything out and then you have to try and persuade me to cross a few things out.' We were coming at it from opposite poles."

WikiLeaks colleagues had noticed that Julian became "increasingly autocratic and dismissive." The Guardian had noticed it as well.