Five of the six boats sailed independently into stormy, cold North Sea weather in the first week of October, going northabout the British Isles. Wrongly believing the Allies had not yet mined the English Channel, Donitz ordered the last boat, U-40 U-40, a Type IX making its second patrol, with a new skipper, Wolfgang Barten, age thirty, to go by way of the channel to save time and catch up with the others.

While these boats were en route to the Atlantic, Hitler, poised to attack France (or so he thought), removed another important restriction on the U-boats. Commencing October 4, U-boats were permitted to sink on sight and without warning any blacked-out ship (including a neutral ship) sailing close to the British Isles in the Atlantic or North Sea and the French Atlantic coast. Donitz and his skippers cheered this news, but to minimize charges of barbarism and inhumanity, Hitler had added a caveat: U-boats were still required to "save the crew" of any ship they sank if that could be done "without endangering" the U-boat.

Rushing to catch up with the other boats, U-40 U-40 ran at full speed through the English Channel on the surface. In the early hours of October 13, she hit a mine in the Dover-Cape Gris-Nez field. The boat blew up and sank immediately in 115 feet of water. Presumably, all hands on the bridge and in the forward compartments were killed instantly. But the watertight door in the stern room had been closed and as a result, nine enlisted men in that compartment survived the explosion and sinking. When they recovered from shock and ascertained what had occurred, the senior man, Otto Winkler, age twenty-one, organized an escape through the after deck hatch, which had a skirt for that purpose. After eating some biscuits, the men strapped on oxygen apparatus and flooded the compartment. When the water pressure in the compartment equalized with outside sea pressure, the hatch opened freely and the nine men-the first to escape a sunken U-boat-ascended. ran at full speed through the English Channel on the surface. In the early hours of October 13, she hit a mine in the Dover-Cape Gris-Nez field. The boat blew up and sank immediately in 115 feet of water. Presumably, all hands on the bridge and in the forward compartments were killed instantly. But the watertight door in the stern room had been closed and as a result, nine enlisted men in that compartment survived the explosion and sinking. When they recovered from shock and ascertained what had occurred, the senior man, Otto Winkler, age twenty-one, organized an escape through the after deck hatch, which had a skirt for that purpose. After eating some biscuits, the men strapped on oxygen apparatus and flooded the compartment. When the water pressure in the compartment equalized with outside sea pressure, the hatch opened freely and the nine men-the first to escape a sunken U-boat-ascended.

Winkler was the last to leave the compartment. When he reached the surface he saw the eight other men swimming around in a cluster. It was dark-a new moon-and the channel water was frigid. Winkler thought he saw a lighthouse and began swimming toward it. Along the way he became nauseous and then he passed out. The next morning, two British destroyers (Brazen and and Boreas Boreas) fished Winkler and two other survivors and five bodies from the water. All were wearing escape apparatus, labeled "U-40." No trace was ever found of the remaining forty-six crew. Rushed to a hospital, Winkler and the other two lived to become prisoners. The next day, October 14, Boreas Boreas found an emergency telephone-equipped buoy, which had torn loose from found an emergency telephone-equipped buoy, which had torn loose from U-40 U-40 in the explosion. Inscribed on a brass plate were these instructions: "U-boat 40 is sunk here. Do not raise buoy. Telegraph the situation to the nearest German naval command." in the explosion. Inscribed on a brass plate were these instructions: "U-boat 40 is sunk here. Do not raise buoy. Telegraph the situation to the nearest German naval command."*

Unaware of this loss, the other five boats of the "pack" headed for the Western Approaches one by one. First to arrive was the new, undertrained Type IX, U-42 U-42, commanded by Rolf Dau, age thirty-three. On the same day U-40 U-40 was lost, Dau found a 5,000-ton British freighter, was lost, Dau found a 5,000-ton British freighter, Stonepool Stonepool, which had separated from a convoy. Husbanding his torpedoes for pack operations, Dau attacked Stonepool Stonepool with his 4.1" deck gun, but the freighter was armed, shot back, and radioed the with his 4.1" deck gun, but the freighter was armed, shot back, and radioed the SSS SSS alarm. Two British destroyers, Imogen and Ilex, responding to the alarm, rushed up and attacked alarm. Two British destroyers, Imogen and Ilex, responding to the alarm, rushed up and attacked U-42 U-42 with guns, driving the boat under. with guns, driving the boat under.

Attempting to evade, Dau took U-42 U-42 to 361 feet. But the destroyers fixed the boat on sonar and delivered an accurate and brutal depth-charge attack. One charge that exploded close over to 361 feet. But the destroyers fixed the boat on sonar and delivered an accurate and brutal depth-charge attack. One charge that exploded close over U-42 U-42's stern ruptured the after-ballast tanks and lifted the bow to a 45-degree angle. In a desperate attempt to avoid sliding to crush depth stern first, Dau blew all ballast tanks. The U-42 U-42 shot to the surface like a giant cork, into the waiting arms of the destroyers, which instantly opened fire, scoring hits in the bow room. Holed fore and aft, shot to the surface like a giant cork, into the waiting arms of the destroyers, which instantly opened fire, scoring hits in the bow room. Holed fore and aft, U-42 U-42 began to sink. began to sink. Ilex Ilex ran in at full speed to ram, but seeing that ran in at full speed to ram, but seeing that U-42 U-42 was doomed and sinking, she backed full astern to avoid damage to herself, and merely grazed the boat abaft the conning tower. Dau and sixteen men got out of the sinking boat through the conning tower hatch; the other thirty-two men were lost. was doomed and sinking, she backed full astern to avoid damage to herself, and merely grazed the boat abaft the conning tower. Dau and sixteen men got out of the sinking boat through the conning tower hatch; the other thirty-two men were lost. Imogen Imogen fished the dazed German survivors from the sea. fished the dazed German survivors from the sea.

By that time Donitz had good information from the codebreakers of B-dienst B-dienst on a special French-British convoy, KJF 3, inbound directly from on a special French-British convoy, KJF 3, inbound directly from Kingston Kingston, Jamaica, escorted by the monster French submarine Surcouf Surcouf (two 8" deck guns). Assuming all six boats had reached positions in the Western Approaches, Donitz ordered Hartmann to lead the pack in the attack. But two of the six boats had been lost and Hartmann, having sunk two neutral ships (a Swede and a Greek) en route, was behind schedule and too far away to take tactical command of the other boats. (two 8" deck guns). Assuming all six boats had reached positions in the Western Approaches, Donitz ordered Hartmann to lead the pack in the attack. But two of the six boats had been lost and Hartmann, having sunk two neutral ships (a Swede and a Greek) en route, was behind schedule and too far away to take tactical command of the other boats.

Two VIIBs of the pack, operating independently, found the convoy and attacked. Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48 sank two French ships from the convoy: the 14,000-ton tanker sank two French ships from the convoy: the 14,000-ton tanker Emile-Miguet Emile-Miguet and the 7,000-ton freighter and the 7,000-ton freighter Louisiane Louisiane, plus two British freighters, apparently stragglers from other convoys. Alexander Gelhaar in U-45 U-45 also sank two ships from the convoy: the 9,200-ton British freighter also sank two ships from the convoy: the 9,200-ton British freighter Lochavon Lochavon and a prohibited vessel, the 10,000-ton French passenger liner and a prohibited vessel, the 10,000-ton French passenger liner Bretagne Bretagne, which was running blacked out and therefore inviting trouble. While she slowly sank, British ships rescued 300 passengers.

Gelhaar in U-45 U-45 did not have to answer for this mistake. While he was pursuing another ship of the now-dispersing convoy, four British destroyers, did not have to answer for this mistake. While he was pursuing another ship of the now-dispersing convoy, four British destroyers, Icarus Icarus, Inglefield Inglefield, Intrepid Intrepid, and Ivanhoe Ivanhoe, which had responded to the SSS SSS alarms, found alarms, found U-45 U-45 and attacked. Nothing more was ever heard from and attacked. Nothing more was ever heard from U-45 U-45. She was the first VIIB and the first Atlantic boat to disappear without survivors.*

The other two boats of the pack, U-37 U-37 and and U-46 U-46, arrived too late to engage in a coordinated attack. However, on the morning of October 15, Hartmann in U-37 U-37 lucked into a straggler of the convoy, the 5,200-ton French freighter lucked into a straggler of the convoy, the 5,200-ton French freighter Vermont Vermont, and sank her with demolitions. But Herbert Sohler in U-46 U-46 never found the convoy at all. His sole contribution to the action was the interception of never found the convoy at all. His sole contribution to the action was the interception of U-45 U-45's last radio transmission (not received in Germany), which helped sort out Gelhaar's first-and last-sinkings.

After the convoy dispersed, Donitz, who was following the action by radio and by reports of distress calls and British movements provided by B-dienst B-dienst, ordered the six boats (or so he thought) to move south to attack another convoy, HG 3, inbound from Gibraltar to the British Isles and to report results to date. Schultze in U-48 U-48 radioed four ships sunk for 29,000 tons; Hartmann in radioed four ships sunk for 29,000 tons; Hartmann in U-37 U-37, three ships sunk for 11,000 tons; Sohler in U-46 U-46, none. Wrongly believing Schultze and Hartmann had sunk a total of seven ships from the Caribbean convoy, Donitz added all those to Gelhaar's two and concluded that the first pack to attack an Allied convoy had sunk nine ships, an outstanding "success" that absolutely validated his pack doctrine. In reality, the first pack was so far a disaster: three of its six U-boats sunk; only four ships of the Caribbean convoy positively sunk, one of them a prohibited passenger liner!

While the boats were southbound on October 17, Hitler, still poised to attack France (as he thought), authorized a further relaxation in the rules. Henceforth U-boats could attack any "enemy" merchant ship (i.e., British or French) except big passenger liners, anywhere, without observance of the Submarine Protocol. In other words, U-boats were excused or exempted from the requirement to insure the safety of merchant-ship crews. This important relaxation allowed U-boats to wage unrestricted submarine warfare on all British and French shipping, except big passenger liners.*

The luckless Sohler in U-46 U-46 was first to find convoy Homebound Gibraltar 3, which was heavily escorted by British destroyers transferring from the Mediterranean to home waters. He tracked the ships through the night, radioed a contact report, then submerged for a daylight attack. One of his first electric torpedoes pre-matured. In all, Sohler experienced seven torpedo malfunctions, but even so, he sank the 7,200-ton British freighter was first to find convoy Homebound Gibraltar 3, which was heavily escorted by British destroyers transferring from the Mediterranean to home waters. He tracked the ships through the night, radioed a contact report, then submerged for a daylight attack. One of his first electric torpedoes pre-matured. In all, Sohler experienced seven torpedo malfunctions, but even so, he sank the 7,200-ton British freighter City of Mandalay City of Mandalay. Brought into contact by Sohler's report, Hartmann in U-37 U-37 sank the 10,000-ton British freighter sank the 10,000-ton British freighter Yorkshire Yorkshire and Schultze in and Schultze in U-48 U-48 got his fifth ship in as many days, the 7,250-ton British freighter got his fifth ship in as many days, the 7,250-ton British freighter Clan Chisholm Clan Chisholm.

Following this attack, Sohler broke radio silence to report the premature torpedo detonation and other torpedo problems. Shocked-and angry-Donitz declared that the magnetic pistol was "not safe" under any circumstances and without consulting the OKM or the Torpedo Directorate, he ordered all boats to use only contact (or impact) pistols. Hence the more powerful effect of the magnetic pistol-exploding the torpedo beneath beneath the ship-was lost. "We're back to where we were in 1914-1918," Donitz noted bitterly in his war diary. the ship-was lost. "We're back to where we were in 1914-1918," Donitz noted bitterly in his war diary.

Upon learning that Donitz had prohibited any and all use of the magnetic pistol, two days later, October 20, the Torpedo Directorate confessed to another defect. The torpedoes were indeed running deeper than set-6 feet deeper. The Directorate technicians had known this all along, but did not report it to Donitz because they did not believe it made that much difference when using magnetic pistols. But it did make a difference when using contact pistols. Donitz hastened to relay this new discovery to his skippers, advising them to deduct 6 feet from the usual depth settings for impact firing. The order introduced yet another complication. Since a depth setting of less than 13 feet was impractical when shooting in heavy seas, skippers were not to fire at any targets drawing less than 13 feet, such as destroyers.

Operations of the first wolf pack were terminated after the attack on the Gibraltar convoy. The two surviving VIIBs, U-46 U-46 and and U-48 U-48, low on fuel and low on, or out of, torpedoes, returned to Germany, Herbert Schultze to rave reviews. In two patrols Schultze had sunk eight ships for 52,000 tons, elevating him to first place in total tonnage sunk. Extending his patrol to the approaches of Gibraltar, Hartmann in U-37 U-37 sank three more ships by gun and torpedo, establishing a new sinking record for a single patrol: eight ships sunk for 35,300 tons. sank three more ships by gun and torpedo, establishing a new sinking record for a single patrol: eight ships sunk for 35,300 tons.

A careful after-action analysis of the first wolf pack deflated the earlier euphoria. In reality the attack on die Caribbean convoy was an uncoordinated free-for-all. Thanks to Sohler's contact report, the attack on the Gibraltar convoy was slightly better coordinated. However, the boats had sunk only four ships from the Caribbean convoy and three from the Gibraltar convoy. Half the pack (three of six boats) had been lost to the enemy, two boats to convoy escorts. In a significant and far-reaching report, Hartmann, who had sunk only one ship from each convoy and who had found it impossible to "tactically coordinate" the other boats of the pack, recommended that the concept of flotillas and "local pack control" (at sea) be abandoned, and that all boats should be controlled individually from Donitz's headquarters.

Donitz had three reasons for the failure to destroy the Caribbean convoy. First, the attack had been mounted too late-after the convoy was well into the Western Approaches and had been reinforced by local ASW vessels and had only a relatively short run to reach the safety of land. Second, in the confusion of combat, the boats making contact, U-45 U-45 and and U-48 U-48, had not been able to transmit accurate data on the position, course, and speed of the convoy; hence help from U-46 U-46 had been lost. Third, there were too few boats in the initial attack-only two, actually-hence the escorts were able to concentrate on those two, sinking one, had been lost. Third, there were too few boats in the initial attack-only two, actually-hence the escorts were able to concentrate on those two, sinking one, U-45 U-45.

The analysis led to three conclusions. First, convoys inbound to the British Isles from any direction had to be attacked as far out as possible in order to give the boats sufficient sea room for repeated attacks over several days and before the enemy added local ASW measures. Second, the boat first making contact with a convoy should not immediately attack, but instead should "shadow" it, transmitting "beacon" signals to "home" in other boats of the pack. Third, after the other boats arrived, all were to attack simultaneously in a single massive blow, which would scatter the convoy and overwhelm the escorts, maximizing opportunities for repeated attacks and minimizing counterattacks.

These tactics could be tested in Baltic training exercises, but not in Atlantic combat. There were not to be enough oceangoing boats to mount another full-scale wolf pack for months to come.

ATLANTIC U U-BOAT O OPERATIONS: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1939 1939.

Apart from the first wolf pack, only four boats sailed to the Atlantic in October. One was a Type VII of the Salzwedel Flotilla, U-34 U-34, which despite the design flaws and other problems of the VIIs, was believed to be capable of an Atlantic patrol. The other three formed a special (but loosely organized) task force that, in response to Raeder's demand, was to lay a minefield at the British naval base at Gibraltar, then attack Allied shipping in the Mediterranean.

Commanded by Wilhelm Rollmann, age thirty-two, the U-34 U-34 was the only boat to make a completely independent patrol in October. While going northabout the British Isles to the Western Approaches, Rollmann bagged two small freighters (one Swedish, one British). Hunting in the Western Approaches, he found an inbound convoy, Halifax 5, and despite repeated torpedo failures, he sank an 8,000-ton British freighter, was the only boat to make a completely independent patrol in October. While going northabout the British Isles to the Western Approaches, Rollmann bagged two small freighters (one Swedish, one British). Hunting in the Western Approaches, he found an inbound convoy, Halifax 5, and despite repeated torpedo failures, he sank an 8,000-ton British freighter, Malabar Malabar, and so damaged another, Bronte Bronte, that it had to be sunk by British destroyers. But U-34 U-34 was not combat-ready. An internal tank cracked and Rollmann was forced to abort. En route home, he captured the 3,200-ton Norwegian freighter was not combat-ready. An internal tank cracked and Rollmann was forced to abort. En route home, he captured the 3,200-ton Norwegian freighter Snar Snar-his second prize in as many patrols-raising his score for two patrols to an impressive eight ships for 33,600 tons. But the U-34 U-34's mechanical failure reinforced the view that until the VIIs were extensively modified, they were not safe for torpedo patrolling. Pending the modifications, no more VIIs were to be sent on torpedo patrol.

The three-boat Mediterranean task force was composed of the clumsy Type I sister ships U-25 U-25 (finally out of overhaul) and (finally out of overhaul) and U-26 U-26, and the VIIB, U-53 U-53. The plan was for Klaus Ewerth in U-26 U-26, who had laid the fruitful minefield at Portland, to precede the other boats by several days and lay delayed-action TMB mines at Gibraltar. On his signal that the field was laid, the other two boats, waiting outside in the Atlantic, were to slip through the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean, where all three boats were to attack shipping with torpedoes.

Everything that could go wrong did. Ewerth in U-26 U-26 ran into intense ASW patrols and bad weather and was forced to abort the mine mission and did not make a second try. When he returned to Germany, he was assigned to other duty. While awaiting the go-ahead signal, the clumsy sister ship, ran into intense ASW patrols and bad weather and was forced to abort the mine mission and did not make a second try. When he returned to Germany, he was assigned to other duty. While awaiting the go-ahead signal, the clumsy sister ship, U-25 U-25, commanded by Viktor Schutze, age thirty-three, attacked two ships which came his way. In the first attack Schutze experienced four contact-pistol failures under perfect conditions (stationary target, calm sea, short ranges, careful aiming) and finally sank the ship. In his second attack, by gun, the recoil cracked the torpedo-loading hatch and Schutze was forced to abort and return to Germany. Ernst-Gunther Heinicke in U-53 U-53 refused to penetrate the heavily patrolled Strait of Gibraltar and flailed around for days out of touch. refused to penetrate the heavily patrolled Strait of Gibraltar and flailed around for days out of touch.

The Mediterranean task force was thus a failure.

Schutze in U-25 U-25 broke radio silence to report the malfunction of the four contact pistols. His report ignited an absolute furor at the OKM and Donitz's headquarters. Raeder demanded yet another exhaustive investigation. Meanwhile, on November 10, Donitz ordered all boats to revert to magnetic pistols, which the Torpedo Directorate assured him had been improved. It was a calculated risk, but he reasoned that a half-baked, improved magnetic pistol was better than an impact pistol that apparently did not work at all. broke radio silence to report the malfunction of the four contact pistols. His report ignited an absolute furor at the OKM and Donitz's headquarters. Raeder demanded yet another exhaustive investigation. Meanwhile, on November 10, Donitz ordered all boats to revert to magnetic pistols, which the Torpedo Directorate assured him had been improved. It was a calculated risk, but he reasoned that a half-baked, improved magnetic pistol was better than an impact pistol that apparently did not work at all.

Donitz was Furious Furious. The torpedo technicians, he wrote in his war diary, did "not understand the matter." At least "30% of all torpedoes are duds." They "either do not detonate at all or they detonate in the wrong place." The skippers were "losing confidence" in their torpedoes, he went on. "In the end their fighting spirit will suffer. The torpedo failure problem is at present the most urgent of all the problems of U-boat warfare." But the Directorate seemed unable to correct the flaws.

In the month of November, the Atlantic U-boat campaign was disrupted by yet another special operation. The "pocket" battleship Deutschland Deutschland, operating in the North Atlantic (with meager results), had incurred engine trouble and was aborting to Germany. At about the same time, the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst were to make a sortie into the Atlantic. Believing these movements might provoke capital ships of the Royal Navy into action, which could be tracked by were to make a sortie into the Atlantic. Believing these movements might provoke capital ships of the Royal Navy into action, which could be tracked by B-dienst B-dienst, the OKM directed that several U-boat traps be laid in the North Sea, utilizing both oceangoing boats and ducks.

Donitz chose four oceangoing boats for the main trap: the VIIBs U-47 U-47 (Prien) and (Prien) and U-48 U-48 (Schultze) and, reluctantly, two patched-up Type VIIs, (Schultze) and, reluctantly, two patched-up Type VIIs, U-31 U-31 (Habekost) and (Habekost) and U-35 U-35 (Lott). He laid the trap on a line east of the Shetlands. As expected, the Royal Navy picked up the movements of (Lott). He laid the trap on a line east of the Shetlands. As expected, the Royal Navy picked up the movements of Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and deployed to search and attack, and and deployed to search and attack, and B-dienst B-dienst provided the OKM with current data on the British movements. But the operations of all ships, both German and British, were hampered by hideous weather. provided the OKM with current data on the British movements. But the operations of all ships, both German and British, were hampered by hideous weather.

Patrolling on the surface in huge seas on November 28, Lott in U-35 U-35, sixty miles east of Shetland Island, saw a heavy cruiser (Norfolk) and broke radio silence to report her. Twelve miles northeast of U-35 U-35, Prien in U-47 U-47 picked up Lott's message and plotted a course to intercept. picked up Lott's message and plotted a course to intercept.

Despite the mountainous seas, the interception was perfect. Sighting Norfolk Norfolk's top hamper, Prien submerged and closed to about 1,000 yards. He fired a single torpedo with the improved magnetic pistol. He then made ready a second tube, but the heavy seas slewed the boat around and Prien lost sight of Norfolk Norfolk in the periscope. Eighty-six seconds after firing, the men on in the periscope. Eighty-six seconds after firing, the men on U-47 U-47 clearly heard a detonation and cheered. clearly heard a detonation and cheered.

Prien surfaced in the turbulent seas to assess the damage. Closing the cruiser, unseen, he observed that "the upper deck [was] slightly buckled and piping [was] hanging over the starboard side." The ship's reconnaissance aircraft was "tilted on its tail." He saw black smoke at the point of torpedo impact-beneath Norfolk Norfolk's starboard torpedo rack.

The cruiser hauled away and disappeared in rain squalls. Prien attempted to pursue for a second attack, but the heavy seas defeated him. He broke radio silence to report: "Have torpedoed one London London-class cruiser. One hit. Wind strength 10." He did not claim a sinking then or later, merely that one hit was "highly probable." Leaping to the conclusion that Norfolk Norfolk was sunk, the OKM was ecstatic, gloatingly logging the attack as "a magnificent success." Over Donitz's objections, Berlin propagandists claimed that a U-boat had sunk a " was sunk, the OKM was ecstatic, gloatingly logging the attack as "a magnificent success." Over Donitz's objections, Berlin propagandists claimed that a U-boat had sunk a "London-class" heavy cruiser and named Prien-the "Bull of Scapa Flow"-as the U-boat skipper who had done the job.

Churchill and First Sea Lord Pound first got the news from Berlin radio. In response to an Admiralty query, Norfolk Norfolk reported herself undamaged. She had seen an explosion in her wake but had assumed it to be an aircraft bomb. She had not sighted reported herself undamaged. She had seen an explosion in her wake but had assumed it to be an aircraft bomb. She had not sighted U-47 U-47. The improved magnetic pistol on the torpedo Prien fired had apparently malfunctioned. The BBC denied the sinking, but Berlin radio persisted in the claim, elevating Prien to ever greater celebrity.

At dawn on the day following Prien's unsuccessful attack on Norfolk Norfolk, Lott in U-35 U-35 was cruising on the surface near the Shetland Islands. Lott's radio report of his sighting of was cruising on the surface near the Shetland Islands. Lott's radio report of his sighting of Norfolk Norfolk, which had enabled Prien to find her, and Prien's radio report of the attack may have been DFed by the British. In any event, the British destroyer Icarus Icarus saw saw U-35 U-35 and turned to attack, with the rising sun behind her. and turned to attack, with the rising sun behind her.

Blinded by the sun, Lott's bridge watch failed to see Icarus Icarus approaching. Caught by surprise, Lott crash-dived and went deep-to 229 feet-and steered evasive courses. But approaching. Caught by surprise, Lott crash-dived and went deep-to 229 feet-and steered evasive courses. But Icarus Icarus got her on sonar and dropped depth charges set for 250 feet. Two other destroyers, got her on sonar and dropped depth charges set for 250 feet. Two other destroyers, Kingston Kingston and and Kashmir Kashmir, responded to Icarus Icarus's alert. Directed by Icarus Icarus to the likely spot, to the likely spot, Kingston Kingston made two depth-charge attacks, which jammed the made two depth-charge attacks, which jammed the U-35 U-35's diving planes and put her at a sharp up angle. In an attempt to bring the bow down and regain control of the boat, Lott rushed all available men to the forward torpedo room and put on full speed. All in vain. The depth charges had also ruptured fuel and ballast tanks aft and no amount of weight forward could level the boat.

Believing the boat to be doomed, Lott blew all ballast tanks and surfaced. He manned his deck gun to shoot it out, but when he saw three destroyers close by and when one of them, Kashmir, fired at U-35 U-35, Lott gave up and ordered the boat scuttled. As U-35 U-35 slowly flooded and settled, the gun crew raised their arms in surrender. Kashmir fished four officers and twenty-seven men from the icy water; slowly flooded and settled, the gun crew raised their arms in surrender. Kashmir fished four officers and twenty-seven men from the icy water; Kingston Kingston picked up Lott and eleven others, who were last to leave the boat. All forty-three men of picked up Lott and eleven others, who were last to leave the boat. All forty-three men of U-35 U-35 were rescued. were rescued.

Owing to the diversion of U-47 U-47 and and U-48 U-48 to the North Sea submarine trap, only three oceangoing boats were available to mount the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic in November. These were the brand-new VIIB, to the North Sea submarine trap, only three oceangoing boats were available to mount the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic in November. These were the brand-new VIIB, U-49 U-49, and two IXs, U-41 U-41 and and U-43 U-43, the latter also brand-new. Carrying improved magnetic pistols, they sailed into the cold, mountainous, and forbidding seas.

These boats, and others, were the beneficiaries of yet another relaxation in the U-boat rules. On November 12 Hitler authorized the on-sight sinkings of any and all enemy passenger vessels of whatever size, known (or seen) to be armed, and any and all tankers, including those of neutral nations (but not American or friends or allies of Germany), which were "beyond all doubt" going to or from the British Isles or France. This relaxation meant that any tanker in British waters could be sunk without warning or without assuring the safety of the crew.

Rounding the British Isles in terrible weather, Gustav-Adolf Mugler in U-41 U-41 sank a British trawler with his 4.1" deck gun on November 12. Taking pity on the survivors, he fished about half the surviving crew from the icy seas, intending to put them on board another trawler. Before he could do so, Mugler ran across the 11,000-ton Norwegian tanker sank a British trawler with his 4.1" deck gun on November 12. Taking pity on the survivors, he fished about half the surviving crew from the icy seas, intending to put them on board another trawler. Before he could do so, Mugler ran across the 11,000-ton Norwegian tanker Arne Kjode Arne Kjode, which, under the relaxed rules, appeared to be fair game for attack. While the British trawler survivors looked on in horrified fascination, Mugler sank the tanker with a single electric torpedo fitted with an improved magnetic pistol. He made no effort to rescue the tanker crew (five died). Later in the day he found another trawler and off-loaded the British.*

The weather off the British Isles turned from terrible to hideous. Accordingly, Donitz directed the three Atlantic boats to patrol farther to the south off the Iberian Peninsula. While passing southbound through the Western Approaches, all three boats found targets. Mugler in U-41 U-41 attacked a British freighter, attacked a British freighter, Hope Star Hope Star, but three torpedoes missed or malfunctioned. Wilhelm Ambrosius, age thirty-six, in the new IX U-43 U-43, sank a 5,000-ton British freighter, Arlington Court Arlington Court. Curt von Gossler, age thirty-four, commanding the new VIIB U-49 U-49, fired four torpedoes at the 7,000-ton British freighter Rothesay Castle Rothesay Castle, but without success. Two destroyers, Echo Echo and and Wanderer Wanderer, pounced on U-49 U-49 and delivered a punishing depth-charge attack, during which von Gossler was driven to the unprecedented depth of 557 feet. and delivered a punishing depth-charge attack, during which von Gossler was driven to the unprecedented depth of 557 feet.

Finally escaping, that night von Gossler hauled to the west to get off an important report to Donitz. He had nothing but bad news: three G7a (air) torpedoes with improved magnetic pistols had prematured, two of them after a run of only 656 feet. One G7e (electric) with a magnetic pistol had failed to fire. This report, Donitz wrote, was "a bitter disappointment." All "our best hopes" for the "improved" magnetic pistol "were dashed in one blow." Donitz fumed on: "The torpedo can in no way be regarded as a front line weapon of any use."

This latest torpedo disaster-and the near loss of von Gossler's U-49 U-49-so infuriated Raeder that he resorted to a drastic measure. He reached outside the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine and brought in a civilian scientist, Dr. E. A. Cornelius, and named him "Torpedo Dictator." Cornelius was to have "wide powers" not only to correct the faults of the torpedoes (pistols, depth keeping, etc.) but also to take measures to increase torpedo production, which was badly lagging. The appointment was "of major importance to the U-boat arm," Donitz noted. "It is hoped he will be completely successful." and brought in a civilian scientist, Dr. E. A. Cornelius, and named him "Torpedo Dictator." Cornelius was to have "wide powers" not only to correct the faults of the torpedoes (pistols, depth keeping, etc.) but also to take measures to increase torpedo production, which was badly lagging. The appointment was "of major importance to the U-boat arm," Donitz noted. "It is hoped he will be completely successful."

With all four bow torpedo tubes and a periscope out with unrepairable damage, von Gossler in U-49 U-49 was compelled to abort. He limped into Wilhelmshaven after only twenty days at sea, feeling very lucky to have survived. His descent to the astounding depth of 557 feet proved to be a valuable experience. Until then it was believed that the Type VIIB would implode or "crush" at such depths. The discovery meant that the Type VIIBs could safely descend to at least fifty-seven feet below the maximum depth setting (500 feet) of British depth charges. Hence an important new avenue of escape from depth charges had opened up. was compelled to abort. He limped into Wilhelmshaven after only twenty days at sea, feeling very lucky to have survived. His descent to the astounding depth of 557 feet proved to be a valuable experience. Until then it was believed that the Type VIIB would implode or "crush" at such depths. The discovery meant that the Type VIIBs could safely descend to at least fifty-seven feet below the maximum depth setting (500 feet) of British depth charges. Hence an important new avenue of escape from depth charges had opened up.

Heinicke in U-53 U-53, a legacy of the abortive Mediterranean task force, was still patrolling cautiously off the Iberian Peninsula. Finding a convoy, he reported it and shadowed. On instruction from Donitz, Heinicke transmitted a "beacon" signal to home in the southbound IXs, U-41 U-41 and and U-43 U-43. By this means an impromptu three-boat pack developed, loosely directed by Donitz. Mugler in U-41 U-41, who paused to sink a small British tramp en route, made contact with the convoy, Sierra Leone 7, taking over as the shadower from U-53 U-53, which had been driven off by the escorts. All three boats, operating independently, shot at ships of the convoy, but only Am-brosius in U-43 U-43 sank one. British and French destroyers pounced on sank one. British and French destroyers pounced on U-41 U-41 and and U-43 U-43. They held U-41 U-41 down for an unprecedented twenty hours down for an unprecedented twenty hours* and severely damaged and severely damaged U-43 U-43, which finally shook loose and escaped west, where Ambrosius sank a lone 2,500-ton British freighter before aborting the patrol due to battle damage, and heading for Germany.

The results of the November operations in the Atlantic were meager. Mugler in U-41 U-41, who reported nine torpedo failures in eleven shots, was credited with four ships for 12,914 tons, including two trawlers, but only one of the sinkings, the Norwegian tanker Arne Kjode Arne Kjode, was worth the trip. Ambrosius in U-43 U-43, severely damaged, was credited with four ships for 16,000 tons. Von Gossler in U-49 U-49, also severely damaged, sank none. Heinicke in U-53 U-53, who had balked at entering the Mediterranean, sank no ships, returned to Germany with eleven of his fourteen torpedoes, and went to other duty. The repairs to U-43 U-43 and and U-49 U-49 were to keep both boats out of service until March 1940. were to keep both boats out of service until March 1940.

The operations plan for December was more encouraging. Donitz believed he might get six boats to the Atlantic: U-47 U-47 (Prien) and (Prien) and U-48 U-48 (Schultze), released from the submarine trap in the North Sea, and four other boats, including the VIIBs (Schultze), released from the submarine trap in the North Sea, and four other boats, including the VIIBs U-51 U-51 and and U-52 U-52, returning to service after months of repairs and modifications. But the plan was not realized, owing to what Donitz characterized as an act of "sabotage." The crews found sand in the lubricating oil of U-25 U-25, U-51 U-51, and U-52 U-52. The U-25 U-25 was repaired and sailed, only to abort in the North Sea with an unrelated oil leak, but was repaired and sailed, only to abort in the North Sea with an unrelated oil leak, but U-51 U-51 and and U-52 U-52 could not sail in December. The could not sail in December. The U-52 U-52 was so badly damaged, Donitz noted in his diary, that she was to be out of action "until further notice." The sailing of the other boat, was so badly damaged, Donitz noted in his diary, that she was to be out of action "until further notice." The sailing of the other boat, U-46 U-46, was delayed for other reasons.

Thus, not six but only two boats, Prien's U-47 U-47 and Schultze's and Schultze's U-48 U-48, were available to mount the Atlantic U-boat campaign in early December, and both of these were low on fuel. Taking advantage of the relaxed rules, on the way to the Shetlands Schultze sank the 6,300-ton Swedish tanker Gustaf E. Reuter Gustaf E. Reuter. Both boats confronted brutally cold weather and mountainous seas, which flung ice water at the bridge watches, and pitched, rolled, and yawed the boats to alarming angles.

Prien arrived in the Western Approaches so low on fuel he had to limit his Atlantic patrol to about five days. During that brief period he sank three big and important ships: the 8,800-ton British freighter Navasota Navasota, the 6,200-ton Norwegian tanker Britta Britta, and the 8,150-ton Dutch freighter Tajandoen Tajandoen. In the attack on Navasota Navasota, British destroyers counterattacked U-47 U-47, and for the first time in the war Prien and his men felt the impact of depth charges. But the counterattack was desultory and Prien evaded and headed home. En route he shot his last torpedoes at two ships, but the torpedoes missed or malfunctioned.

When Prien arrived in Wilhelmshaven, he was again accorded a hero's welcome. In spite of indignant denials from London, Berlin persisted in crediting him with sinking the cruiser Norfolk Norfolk, inflating his total sinkings in three patrols to 72,000 tons. In reality he had sunk three ships for 23,168 tons on this patrol, elevating his total confirmed sinkings to 61,500 tons, which, however, put him in first place. He reported that eight of twelve electric torpedoes (with improved magnetic pistols) had missed or malfunctioned. Having completed the necessary three war patrols to qualify, all hands were awarded a new and coveted decoration: the Kriegsabzeichen Kriegsabzeichen, or U-boat badge.

Left alone in the Western Approaches in appalling weather, Schultze in U-48 U-48 patrolled for only seven days. In that time he, too, accounted for three important ships: a 5,000-ton Greek freighter, the 6,700-ton British freighter patrolled for only seven days. In that time he, too, accounted for three important ships: a 5,000-ton Greek freighter, the 6,700-ton British freighter Brandon Brandon, and the 7,400-ton British tanker San Alberto San Alberto, which was so badly damaged she had to be sunk by a British destroyer. After Schultze left the Atlantic on December 19, for a period of five days there were no U-boats in those waters.

On arrival in Wilhelmshaven from this third patrol, Schultze found himself on the way to becoming a national hero, like Prien and Schuhart. He had sunk four more ships for 25,618 tons, bringing his total to twelve ships for 77,500 tons. That was almost twice the number of confirmed ships Prien had sunk and substantially greater tonnage. Inflating Schultze's kills to an even "80,000 tons," Berlin propagandists gave Schultze and his crew the full publicity treatment. The crew was awarded medals and the U-boat badge, but Schultze did not get a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Donitz had decreed that to earn that high award a skipper had to sink 100,000 tons of enemy shipping or perform a feat of exceptional daring, such as Prien's penetration of Scapa Flow.

Owing to the sabotage of U-51 U-51 and and U-52 U-52, and the abort of U-25 U-25, only one boat sailed from Germany in December to make a torpedo patrol. This was the VIIB U-46 U-46, commanded by Herbert Sohler. Outbound in the North Sea, Sohler sank a 1,000-ton Norwegian freighter and earned the dubious distinction of being the only U-boat in the Atlantic on Christmas Day. Sohler found plenty of shipping in the Western Approaches and attacked aggressively, but he achieved no other sinkings. Two weeks into the patrol, one diesel engine broke down, forcing Sohler to abort. Reviewing the boat's shooting record for three patrols during which merely two ships for 8,000 tons had been sunk, Donitz concluded that the fire-control party needed further training and sent the boat back to "school," a humiliation for this Veteran Veteran but unlucky crew, and yet another unforeseen deduction from the dwindling Atlantic force. but unlucky crew, and yet another unforeseen deduction from the dwindling Atlantic force.

Counting the first (abortive) wolf pack and the Mediterranean task force, Donitz mounted only sixteen torpedo patrols to the Atlantic during the three-month period October-December 1939, five less than the initial deployment in September. Three of these sixteen (U-40, U-42 U-42, U-45 U-45) had been lost, plus U-35 U-35 of the North Sea submarine trap. of the North Sea submarine trap.* Two, Two, U-43 U-43 and and U-49 U-49, had incurred severe battle damage. U-51 U-51 and and U-52 U-52 had been sabotaged and had been sabotaged and U-46 U-46 had been sent to retraining. The sixteen Atlantic patrols had resulted in thirty-five ship sinkings or prizes, an average of 2.2 ships sunk or captured per boat per patrol, about the same as the September averages and thus a disappointment. The five leading skippers in tonnage sunk were Schultze, Prien, Schuhart, Hartmann, and Rollmann. had been sent to retraining. The sixteen Atlantic patrols had resulted in thirty-five ship sinkings or prizes, an average of 2.2 ships sunk or captured per boat per patrol, about the same as the September averages and thus a disappointment. The five leading skippers in tonnage sunk were Schultze, Prien, Schuhart, Hartmann, and Rollmann.

Admiralty statisticians calculated that as of December 31, 1939, a total of 5,756 ships had sailed in British convoys, most of them in home waters or the North Sea. Of these, the Admiralty boasted, only four had been sunk by U-boats. That was an understatement, but the general thrust was true. According to the meticulous work of the German U-boat historian Jurgen Rohwer, in that four months of the so-called Phony War in 1939, all U-boats, including the North Sea ducks, sank 123 merchant ships of 500 gross tons or more. Excluding the French convoy KJF 3, only fourteen of the 123 ships sunk by U-boats were sailing in convoy, three inbound from Halifax, two inbound from Sierra Leone, three inbound from Gibraltar, and the rest outbound in ballast, MINELAYING.

In support of Hitler's planned attack on France in November 1939, Admiral Raeder and the OKM had ordered German surface ships, aircraft, and submarines to mine British seaports. The primary aim of the mining campaign was to shut off the flow of British troops and supplies to the continent. A secondary aim was to disrupt or shut down British merchant shipping, sowing terror and panic.

Restricted by a shortage of magnetic mines, which had not been mass-produced in peacetime, the campaign got off to a halting start. In October four ducks laid, or attempted to lay, minefields, each consisting of nine delayed-action TMB magnetic mines. Two fields were flops. That of Horst Wellner in U-16 U-16, off Dover, sank one small tugboat. Moreover, after laying the field, Wellner hit an Allied mine in the Dover-Cape Gris-Nez field on October 24, and U-16 U-16 was lost with all hands. That of Harald Jeppener-Haltenhoff in was lost with all hands. That of Harald Jeppener-Haltenhoff in U-24 U-24, at Hartlepool, sank only one 1,000-ton coaster.* Two fields produced handsomely. That of Hans Meckel in Two fields produced handsomely. That of Hans Meckel in U-19 U-19, off Hartlepool, sank three freighters for 12,344 tons. That of Fritz Frauenheim in U-21 U-21, courageously planted off the British naval base in the Firth of Forth, wrecked the new British heavy cruiser Belfast Belfast, a spectacular victory for the ducks.

The oceangoing boats were to foul British west coast ports, which were beyond reach of the ducks or German aircraft. Donitz assigned these missions to the available Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla, which, pending modification, had been declared unsafe for torpedo patrols. The first, most important, and dangerous mission went to Paul Buchel in U-32 U-32, who had planted a (nonproductive) minefield in the Bristol Channel in September. Buchel's destination was Loch Ewe, in northwest Scotland, where the Home Fleet based after Prien's raid in Scapa Flow. But U-32 U-32 was not seaworthy and the was not seaworthy and the U-31 U-31, commanded by Johannes Habekost, substituted.

Habekost crammed eighteen TMB mines into U-31 U-31. Off Loch Ewe he tangled the boat in a torpedo net-a harrowing episode-but he finally broke free, laid the mines in the outer channel, and returned home after ten days, the shortest patrol on record. The field produced no immediate results and was therefore believed to be a failure. But thirty-seven days later, on December 4, the Home Fleet flagship, the battleship Nelson Nelson, triggered one of the mines, incurring such heavy damage she had to be dry-docked for four months. The British concealed this disaster from the Germans.

The U-33 U-33, commanded by Hans-Wilhelm von Dresky, drew the next mission: Bristol Channel, where Buchel in U-32 U-32 had apparently mislaid his field in September. Since it had to be assumed that the British were aware of the submarine minelaying and therefore the boats could not sail utterly defenseless, von Dresky carried twelve TMB mines and six torpedoes. Outbound in the North Sea, a crewman remembered, both diesels broke down and had apparently mislaid his field in September. Since it had to be assumed that the British were aware of the submarine minelaying and therefore the boats could not sail utterly defenseless, von Dresky carried twelve TMB mines and six torpedoes. Outbound in the North Sea, a crewman remembered, both diesels broke down and U-33 U-33 had to lie on the bottom for three days while the engineers made repairs. "The boat was not really seaworthy," the crewman explained. "The crew was very nervous. Many [men] were reluctant to go back to sea in this boat." However, the field was highly productive: three big ships, for 25,600 tons sunk, including the British tanker had to lie on the bottom for three days while the engineers made repairs. "The boat was not really seaworthy," the crewman explained. "The crew was very nervous. Many [men] were reluctant to go back to sea in this boat." However, the field was highly productive: three big ships, for 25,600 tons sunk, including the British tanker Inverdargle Inverdargle, forcing the British to close Bristol for the second time.

After laying the field, von Dresky sought gun and torpedo targets. Off North Ireland he stopped five British trawlers and, after permitting the crews to abandon ship, he sank them all by gun. Homebound in the Orkneys, in miserable weather, he destroyed by gun and torpedo the 3,700-ton German freighter Borkum Borkum, which British warships had seized as a prize. Unwittingly, von Dresky's gunfire killed four German crewmen. When the boat limped into Germany, Donitz commended von Dresky for a "well-conducted" patrol, but U-33 U-33 had to be sent back to the shipyards for extensive repairs. had to be sent back to the shipyards for extensive repairs.

The mining campaign built up a full head of steam in November. Finally getting into action, German surface ships and aircraft, operating under cover of the long nights, assailed British east coast and channel ports. Dashing across the North Sea and back, the surface ships laid over 500 mines. In separate missions over three nights the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe parachuted forty-one mines in the mouth of the Thames River, off the Humber, and at Harwich. One of the parachuted forty-one mines in the mouth of the Thames River, off the Humber, and at Harwich. One of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe mines was mis-dropped onto mudflats at Shoeburyness. The British recovered it intact, quickly learned the secrets of the magnetic mine, and initiated a crash R&D program to produce countermeasures. mines was mis-dropped onto mudflats at Shoeburyness. The British recovered it intact, quickly learned the secrets of the magnetic mine, and initiated a crash R&D program to produce countermeasures.

The surface-ship mine offensive was highly effective. It forced the British to close down numerous east coast and channel ports and brought shipping to a standstill. The psychological impact was as great as-or greater than-the sinkings caused by the U-boats. Seeking to calm the shocked British population and to chastise Hitler for employing a sinister and barbaric weapon, the Chamberlain government immediately revealed the secrets of the magnetic mine ("An amazing new invention," said one British official) but promised that "science and intelligence" would deal with it as effectively as it had dealt with the U-boat menace.

In the stepped-up offensive, seven ducks sailed to lay minefields in November. Two were flops: that of Otto Kretschmer's U-23 U-23 off the British naval base in Cromarty Forth (Invergordon) and that of Herbert Kuppisch's off the British naval base in Cromarty Forth (Invergordon) and that of Herbert Kuppisch's U-58 U-58 off Lowestoft. The other five, at Lowestoft, Ordfordness, Yarmouth, and Newcastle, produced six sinkings for 15,000 tons and damage to one freighter for 4,434 tons. off Lowestoft. The other five, at Lowestoft, Ordfordness, Yarmouth, and Newcastle, produced six sinkings for 15,000 tons and damage to one freighter for 4,434 tons.

Three of these seven sinkings by the ducks were small ships of 209, 258, and 496 tons, which became known to the Germans. This revelation led Donitz to question the reliability of the TMB magnetic mine with the same intensity he had questioned the reliability of the torpedoes. In response, the Mine Directorate conducted "live" tests of the TMB in the Baltic Sea. The results confirmed Donitz's suspicions. The mines, the Directorate conceded, were not "positively lethal" when laid on the bottom at ninety-eight feet (thirty meters) per instructions, but rather only at eighty-two feet (twenty-five meters). Moreover, the tests revealed, the pistols were overly sensitive. As a consequence, Donitz directed the submarine crews to lay TMB mines sixteen feet shallower than designed and to "coarsen" (or desensitize) the magnetic pistols.

Donitz had another complaint. He did not believe the 1,200-pound warhead of the TMB was sufficiently powerful for use against big, heavily armored capital ships. He requested a mine with twice the power of the TMB. In striking contrast to the torpedo technicians, the mine technicians responded willingly and enthusiastically. They quickly converted a big submarine floating mine, the TMA, then going into production, to a ground mine. Redesignated the TMC, it had a huge warhead of 2,200 pounds and was believed to be lethal up to a depth of 118 feet (36 meters).

Two Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla, which had been in the shipyards for weeks, drew Atlantic minelaying assignments in November. These were Gunter Kuhnke's U-28 U-28 and Otto Schuhart's and Otto Schuhart's U-29 U-29. Both loaded twelve TMB mines and six torpedoes to continue the campaign in the Bristol Channel.

En route to Bristol, Kuhnke sank two ships with torpedoes. The first was the 5,000-ton Dutch tanker Sliedrecht Sliedrecht, fair game under the newly relaxed rules regarding neutral tankers. After the crew abandoned ship, Kuhnke fired a single torpedo, which demolished the ship in a "terrific flash." He left the survivors to fend for themselves and only five lived. The second kill was the 5,100-ton British freighter Royston Grange Royston Grange, sunk in the Western Approaches after the crew had abandoned ship.

Kuhnke laid his field at Swansea and returned to Germany. Since it produced no immediate results, it too was believed to be a failure. The U-28 U-28 went back into the shipyards for more weeks of repairs and modifications. About sixty days later one of the mines triggered and sank an important ship: the 9,600-ton British freighter went back into the shipyards for more weeks of repairs and modifications. About sixty days later one of the mines triggered and sank an important ship: the 9,600-ton British freighter Protesilaus Protesilaus.

The hero Otto Schuhart in U-29 U-29, who had sunk the carrier Courageous Courageous, was directed to lay his field at Milford Haven. But he broke radio silence to say that foul weather and a bright moon had forced him to abort the mission. Donitz directed Schuhart to attempt an alternate location, but apparently Schuhart's heart was not in the task and he returned to Germany with a full load of twelve mines and six torpedoes. Furious Furious at the failure, Donitz criticized Schuhart for being "too cautious," but in view of Schuhart's outstanding first patrol, Donitz decided he would give Schuhart a second chance. The opportunity for redemption did not come soon; at the failure, Donitz criticized Schuhart for being "too cautious," but in view of Schuhart's outstanding first patrol, Donitz decided he would give Schuhart a second chance. The opportunity for redemption did not come soon; U-29 U-29 also went back to the shipyard for more weeks of modifications. also went back to the shipyard for more weeks of modifications.

Five ducks laid or attempted to lay minefields in December. All five fields bore fruit, sinking a total of eight small ships for 13,200 tons. The field of Karl-Heinrich Jenisch in U-22 U-22, laid at Newcastle, was the most productive: four small freighters for 4,978 tons. Jurgen Oesten attempted to lay a second field in the dangerous waters of the Firth of Forth, but ASW forces drove him off before he could finish. The mines he planted bagged one small coaster. The largest ship, a 4,373-ton freighter, was sunk by the mines of Georg Schewe's U-60 U-60, at Lowestoft.

Two Type VIIs mounted the Atlantic minelaying campaign in December: Lemp's U-30 U-30 and Buchel's and Buchel's U-32 U-32. Lemp was to plant a dozen TMBs in Liverpool, closing that important port. Buchel was to lay eight of the new, powerful TMC mines off the British naval base in the dangerous waters of the Firth of Clyde, where it was hoped the TMCs would bag a capital ship.

Lemp's U-30 U-30 had been in the shipyards for seventy days undergoing battle-damage repair and modification. He believed the boat to be seaworthy, but while outbound near the Shetlands an engine failed and he had to return to Germany. He resailed, finally, on December 23, four days behind Sohler's had been in the shipyards for seventy days undergoing battle-damage repair and modification. He believed the boat to be seaworthy, but while outbound near the Shetlands an engine failed and he had to return to Germany. He resailed, finally, on December 23, four days behind Sohler's U-46 U-46, which was outbound to the Atlantic for torpedo patrol. Reapproaching the Shetlands on Christmas Eve, Lemp received a message from Raeder addressed to "all U-boats" at sea: "A Merry Christmas. Good wishes for successful operations." Since all the ducks and the other oceangoing boats were in port, the greeting applied only to Lemp and Sohler.

Rounding the British Isles, Lemp reached the Butt of Lewis on the north end of the Hebrides in the early morning of December 28. There he came upon a British trawler. Believing his crew needed sharpening, Lemp battle-surfaced. After the British abandoned the trawler, he sank her with his deck gun. As it happened, that very day the 2,500-ton British freighter Stanholme Stanholme hit one of the mines von Dresky had planted earlier in the Bristol Channel. London indignantly claimed hit one of the mines von Dresky had planted earlier in the Bristol Channel. London indignantly claimed Stanholme Stanholme had been torpedoed without warning by a U-boat. Hearing the news in Berlin, the OKM wrongly attributed the sinking to Lemp. Perhaps mindful of the furor Lemp had caused by sinking had been torpedoed without warning by a U-boat. Hearing the news in Berlin, the OKM wrongly attributed the sinking to Lemp. Perhaps mindful of the furor Lemp had caused by sinking Athenia Athenia, the OKM virtuously chastised Lemp for providing the British with an opportunity to condemn Germans for waging submarine warfare "during Christmas."

To reinforce the depleted Home Fleet, the Admiralty had brought home two old (1915-1916) battleships: Warspite Warspite (which had been modernized in the late 1930s) and (which had been modernized in the late 1930s) and Barham Barham. In addition, the old battle cruiser Repulse Repulse and the carrier and the carrier Furious Furious had arrived from Canada on convoy duty. Late in the afternoon of this same day-December 28-the had arrived from Canada on convoy duty. Late in the afternoon of this same day-December 28-the Barham Barham and and Repulse Repulse, escorted by five destroyers, cruised off the Butt of Lewis, to backstop the cruisers of the Northern Patrol in case Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst came out again. came out again.

Resuming his voyage south, Lemp sighted the top hampers of Repulse Repulse and and Barham Barham late that afternoon. He submerged on a closing course and coolly made ready the four electric torpedoes (with magnetic pistols) in his bow tubes. Boldly maneuvering under the destroyer screen, Lemp fired two torpedoes each at late that afternoon. He submerged on a closing course and coolly made ready the four electric torpedoes (with magnetic pistols) in his bow tubes. Boldly maneuvering under the destroyer screen, Lemp fired two torpedoes each at Barham Barham and and Repulse Repulse. Lemp and his men heard one of the four torpedoes hit Barham Barham, and cheered. It struck forward, causing considerable damage and flooding in the ammunition lockers. The other three torpedoes malfunctioned or missed.

In the excitement and confusion that ensued, the British botched the submarine hunt and Lemp withdrew without undergoing counterattack. That night he galvanized Donitz and Berlin with this message: "Attacked two Repulse Repulse class, escorted by destroyers ... one hit probable." class, escorted by destroyers ... one hit probable." B-dienst B-dienst intercepted and decoded intercepted and decoded Barham Barham's damage report and the instructions to her from the Admiralty to put into Liverpool for repairs because the Firth of Clyde was too crowded. Repaired in a Liverpool shipyard, Barham Barham was out of action for, three months. was out of action for, three months.

Liverpool was also Lemp's destination. Approaching with utmost caution, he arrived there and laid his twelve TMB mines. This well-planted field paid off handsomely. Within the next thirty days one tanker and three big British freighters for 22,472 tons blew up and sank, and a 5,600-ton freighter, Gracia Gracia, was severely damaged. As a result, the British were compelled to close Liverpool.

Donitz had high praise for Lemp. The minelaying, Donitz commented in his diary, was well carried out and required "a lot of dash, thought, ability and determination." If Lemp had been under a cloud for sinking Athenia Athenia, his hit on Barham Barham and the Liverpool minefield removed it. Including and the Liverpool minefield removed it. Including Athenia Athenia and the victims of his mines, Lemp's confirmed sinkings totaled eight ships for 45,678 tons, ranking him first in the Salzwedel Flotilla and third in the entire U-boat arm in tonnage sunk after Herbert Schultze and Gunther Prien. and the victims of his mines, Lemp's confirmed sinkings totaled eight ships for 45,678 tons, ranking him first in the Salzwedel Flotilla and third in the entire U-boat arm in tonnage sunk after Herbert Schultze and Gunther Prien.

Buchel in U-32 U-32 finally sailed in late December after eighty-nine days in and out of the shipyards. Rounding the British Isles, like Lemp he paused to sink a ship (a 1,000-ton Norwegian) to sharpen the crew. Continuing southward, he entered North Channel and proceeded with due caution to the Firth of Clyde, which was heavily patrolled and protected by antitorpedo nets. Daunted by the intense ASW measures, Buchel balked at planting the mines in midchannel where Donitz had specified, and dropped them in a less promising location in deeper water. When Buchel returned to Germany, Donitz sacked him, angrily noting in his diary that the job had been "too difficult for this commanding officer." None of the TMCs exploded. Thus the first use of this extremely powerful weapon failed. finally sailed in late December after eighty-nine days in and out of the shipyards. Rounding the British Isles, like Lemp he paused to sink a ship (a 1,000-ton Norwegian) to sharpen the crew. Continuing southward, he entered North Channel and proceeded with due caution to the Firth of Clyde, which was heavily patrolled and protected by antitorpedo nets. Daunted by the intense ASW measures, Buchel balked at planting the mines in midchannel where Donitz had specified, and dropped them in a less promising location in deeper water. When Buchel returned to Germany, Donitz sacked him, angrily noting in his diary that the job had been "too difficult for this commanding officer." None of the TMCs exploded. Thus the first use of this extremely powerful weapon failed.

The ducks and oceangoing boats mounted a total of twenty-two minelaying missions in British home waters between October and December, 1939, planting 218 mines. One oceangoing boat (U-29) with twelve mines aborted at Bristol; one duck (U-61) was driven off before it finished laying its field in the Firth of Forth. Several fields were mislaid, most notably U-32 U-32's TMCs in the Firth of Clyde. Two duck fields, probably mislaid, produced no sinkings; two others sank but two very small ships. The five minefields (sixty-two mines) sown by oceangoing boats sank ten ships for about 58,000 tons; the sixteen minefields (about 140 mines) sown by the ducks sank twenty ships for 46,400 tons. The combined campaigns produced thirty ships sunk* for 104,400 tons, a statistical average of 1.4 ships per boat per patrol and one ship of 3,500 tons sunk for every seven mines planted. One duck, for 104,400 tons, a statistical average of 1.4 ships per boat per patrol and one ship of 3,500 tons sunk for every seven mines planted. One duck, U-16 U-16, had been lost on a mine mission.

The Admiralty estimated that during the period October-December, 1939, seventy-one merchant ships were lost to enemy mines in British waters. The mines planted by U-boat accounted for almost one-half (42 percent) of these losses, plus the severe damage to the cruiser Belfast Belfast and moderate damage to the battleship and moderate damage to the battleship Nelson Nelson. Even so, Donitz did not share the enthusiasm of Raeder and the OKM for submarine minelaying. It was tedious, time-consuming, and very dangerous. The observed or known returns per minefield appeared to be quite meager. He distrusted the TMB mines. Minelaying diverted a great many duck skippers from torpedo shooting which, in view of the greatly relaxed U-boat rules, offered many more opportunities for success as well as valuable combat training. German aircraft and surface ships could mine almost all the ports the ducks could reach.

Donitz urged Raeder and the OKM to release submarines from minelaying, but he won only a partial victory. All further duck minelaying was suspended, except for two missions to Cromarty Forth. However, the Atlantic boats were to continue the campaign against ports on the west coast of Britain.

U-BOAT C COUNTER-MEASURES.

From some garrulous German U-boat POWs and the recovery of Prien's unexploded torpedoes in Scapa Flow, Churchill and the Admiralty learned almost all there was to know about the organization and size of the U-boat arm, the characteristics, armament, and limitations of the three main classes of boats (Types II, VII, IX), the usual patrol routes and zones, the torpedo and boat defects, and the U-boat production rates. This wealth of information, together with the sharp decline in merchant-shipping losses from October to December 1939, and an absurdly optimistic estimate of U-boat kills, convinced Churchill and Pound-indeed, the entire Admiralty-that the U-boat menace had been checked, at least for the present.

But Churchill continued to fret about the future, the several hundred U-boats certain to appear in due course to savage British shipping. He therefore continued to push for ever larger numbers of convoy escorts, including "jeep" carriers, ASW surface vessels such as the Hunt Hunt-class small destroyers, and aircraft, as well as new merchant ships to be built at home and abroad, and to encourage R&D for improved sonar and radar, ASW bombs, and depth charges.

Of the British antisubmarine R&D programs, the three most technically difficult but promising-and urgent-were minesweeping, radar, and codebreaking. By happy coincidence for the British, all three programs began to pay the first dividends in the early weeks of 1940.

* M MINESWEEPING. Immediately after the recovery of the misdropped German magnetic mine at Shoeburyness, a team of British scientists, engineers, and mine technicians commenced a crash program to develop ways to "sweep" (i.e., explode) these mines. Immediately after the recovery of the misdropped German magnetic mine at Shoeburyness, a team of British scientists, engineers, and mine technicians commenced a crash program to develop ways to "sweep" (i.e., explode) these mines.

The team pursued several approaches, but that which proved most practical and efficient was called the "Double Longitude," or "Double L," method. Two wooden minesweepers, sailing on a parallel course about 300 yards apart, each dragged two buoyant electrical cables, one long, one short. One cable constituted a negative electric pole, the other a positive pole. When the pairs of cables of both ships were energized in precise synchronization by five-second pulses of DC current from shipboard batteries, the salt water completed the electrical circuit, creating an intense magnetic field almost ten acres in size.

The first full sea-trial of the Double L system was conducted on the day after Christmas, merely thirty-six days after the recovery of the German mine. The trial was not completely satisfactory, but by the end of January the defects in the system had been corrected. During February 1940, a total of seventy-four sweeps were performed, resulting in the explosion of dozens of magnetic mines and the clearing of numerous fouled areas. Developed in about ninety days, the British Double L method thoroughly defeated the first generation of German magnetic mines.

Parallel with the "sweeping," the British initiated procedures for "degaussing" (neutralizing the magnetic fields) of ships to reduce their vulnerability to both magnetic mines and magnetic pistols in torpedoes. At first this was done by clamping a big, permanent, heavy electrical cable around the ship's hull and continuously energizing the cable with shipboard DC current. Later it was discovered that the same effect could be achieved by laying the energized cables on the ship's deck, or-better yet-placing them in steel tubes inside the ship's hull. Still later, it was discovered that a ship could be satisfactorily degaussed for about three months by passing a very powerful charged electric cable along the length of the hull while the ship was still in port. Although this degaussing technique (called "wiping") was temporary, it was preferred to all others because the permanent cables on shipboard were a nuisance.

* R RADAR. The main British radar R&D was aimed at improving the reliability and accuracy of the extensive Chain Home network to give early warning of The main British radar R&D was aimed at improving the reliability and accuracy of the extensive Chain Home network to give early warning of Luftwaffe Luftwaffe bombers. However, work continued on miniaturized radar sets, which could be fitted in aircraft and small surface ships, such as convoy escorts. By the close of 1939, an Air Ministry research team, led by Edward G. ("Taffy") Bowen, had made some progress toward miniaturized radar for aircraft (the ASV for U-boat detection and A-I for night bomber interception), but field tests of these laboratory-built sets merely served to emphasize that a scientific breakthrough of some kind was required. bombers. However, work continued on miniaturized radar sets, which could be fitted in aircraft and small surface ships, such as convoy escorts. By the close of 1939, an Air Ministry research team, led by Edward G. ("Taffy") Bowen, had made some progress toward miniaturized radar for aircraft (the ASV for U-boat detection and A-I for night bomber interception), but field tests of these laboratory-built sets merely served to emphasize that a scientific breakthrough of some kind was required.

The Air Ministry's Robert Watson-Watt, who was supervising all British radar development, concluded that because of limitations imposed by the basic laws of physics, the avenues of miniaturization being pursued by Bowen's team and others would never bear practical fruit. He therefore recommended that a separate group of scientists tackle the problem independently of Bowen, with the aim of finding a solution along theretofore untried avenues. For this purpose, Watson-Watt created a new committee, chaired by the scientist Fredrick' Brundrett. Seeking a fresh research team, Brundrett gave the task to the physics department at the University of Birmingham, headed by the Australian-and Cambridge graduate-Mark Oliphant.

Oliphant, with a senior assistant, John Randall, and a graduate student, Henry Boot, approached the assignment with a sense of urgency. Simply stated, the aim was to invent from scratch an entirely new "electronic valve" that was capable of generating high-frequency radio waves with sufficient power to find objects as small as bombers and submarines. That is, a powerful electronic "booster" of a new kind which could sharply focus radio waves.

The initial research of Randall and Boot led them to some obscure scientific papers published by an American physicist, Albert W. Hull. While working at the General Electric Research Laboratory in Schenectady, New York, to develop an alternative to the radio vacuum tube in the 1920s and 1930s, Hull had invented what he called the magnetron, in which the flow of electrons was controlled magnetically, rather than electrostatically. For various reasons, General Electric did not pursue the magnetron commercially, but Hull continued to work on the physics of it for the next ten years, publishing several papers that were of no interest to anyone outside of the tiny handful of specialists in that arcane science.

The magnetron per se was not the answer Randall and Boot sought, but a cursory study of Hull's papers led to an idea that was to make the practical miniaturization of radar possible and open the way to its installation on aircraft and ships.

The idea, called a "cavity magnetron," is quite simple to a scientist but difficult for the layman to understand. Radar historian David Fisher explained it this way: The basic concept of the magnetron is to use a magnetic field to herd the electrons along, to guide them where you want them to go. Randall and Boot combined this with a totally different concept-the concept of a penny whistle.A whistle consists of a loose, hard object in a cavity into which you blow. The force of your blowing makes the object inside rattle around in the cavity, generating sound waves which reverberate inside and then escape. The frequency with which they bounce around inside governs the frequency of the sound emitted, and that frequency is in turn decided by the dimensions of the cavity, so that a large whistle emits a long-wave, low-pitched hoot while a tiny whistle gives out a high-pitched scream. Ergo, the cavity magnetron.Randall and Boot constructed a small solid block of copper, which would conduct their variable magnetic field. In this they carefully scooped out a precisely measured cavity. When an electric current was made to flow through the copper and a magnetic field was applied, electrons were caught in the cavity-which served as an anode-and were made to bounce around in there by the magnetic field. As they bounced back and forth, resonating, they emitted electromagnetic waves just as the bouncing ball in a whistle emits sound waves. The size of the cavity was constructed so that the electrons moved only a few centimeters between bounces and therefore produced electromagnetic waves just a few centimeters long. It was brilliant and it worked.

Randall and Boot conducted the first test of the cavity magnetron on February 21, 1940. Having no idea what the power output would be, they hooked it up to a set of automobile headlights, hoping they might at least get a dim illumination. Such was the power output, it blew out the headlights and then the bigger headlights of a truck. Finally, they wired it up to a set of neon floodlights. These held, enabling Randall and Boot to measure the wavelength and power output. As expected, the wavelength was 9.8 centimeters (usually described as "ten centimeters"); the power output of this experimental little gadget was an awesome 400 watts, or nearly half a kilowatt, four times the power output of the existing airborne radar sets. Moreover, it was an easy step to increase the power a hundredfold. A prototype, generating 50 kilowatts, picked up the periscope of a submerged submarine at a range of more than seven miles!

The cavity magnetron, which made possible practical radar miniaturization, was one of the greatest scientific breakthroughs of World War II-the greatest in general utility. The British author Brian Johnson aptly wrote in 1978: "It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of Randall and Boot's work. It lifted radar from an electronic stone age to the present day." greatest in general utility. The British author Brian Johnson aptly wrote in 1978: "It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of Randall and Boot's work. It lifted radar from an electronic stone age to the present day."