By August 28, two other oceangoing U-boats had completed refits. The first was the big, unsteady Type I, U-26 U-26. The OKM directed Donitz to load her with mines and six torpedoes. In event of war, U-26 U-26 was to lay mines off Portland, a British naval base facing the English Channel. Although the boat was not really suitable for combat, after laying the mines she was to attack Allied shipping with her six torpedoes. The second boat was a new Type VIIB, was to lay mines off Portland, a British naval base facing the English Channel. Although the boat was not really suitable for combat, after laying the mines she was to attack Allied shipping with her six torpedoes. The second boat was a new Type VIIB, U-53 U-53, flagship of the Wegener Flotilla. She sailed last (with flotilla commander Ernst Sobe on board), raising the number of boats for the Atlantic, including the minelayer U-26 U-26, to eighteen.*

The deployment of the Atlantic boats was dictated by their fuel capacity-or range. Six medium-range Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla were to patrol individually in a semicircle off the Atlantic side of the British Isles. Six new VIIBs of the Wegener Flotilla, with twice the fuel capacity, were to patrol individually on a similar arc, but farther out-or westward-and southward to the Bay of Biscay. Five big long-range IXs of the Hundius Flotilla, with flotilla commander Werner Hartmann embarked in U-37 U-37, were to patrol a southern area off the Iberian Peninsula and the Strait of Gibraltar. The minelayer, U-26 U-26, was to wait for final orders off the west end of the English Channel.

To minimize the possibility of detection, the eighteen Atlantic-bound U-boats did not use the convenient English Channel. They went the much longer way, around the north end of the British Isles, remaining submerged in daytime, avoiding all contact with shipping. It was a slow, tedious, fuel-consuming journey during which all boats maintained absolute radio silence. None was detected. Nor were the two "pocket" battleships. Upon reaching the Atlantic, the U-boats took up preassigned waiting stations. None was detected. Nor were the two "pocket" battleships. Upon reaching the Atlantic, the U-boats took up preassigned waiting stations.

The North Sea U-boat force was composed, finally, of seventeen ducks and the oceangoing Type VII, U-36 U-36. In event of war, five ducks were to lay mines in English and French ports. Two ducks were to patrol offensively off the northeast coast of Scotland, in hopes of mounting surprise torpedo attacks on British men-of-war. The other ten ducks and the U-36 U-36 were deployed in defensive patrol lines in the North Sea to warn of and thwart attempts by the Royal Navy to counterattack toward Germany. were deployed in defensive patrol lines in the North Sea to warn of and thwart attempts by the Royal Navy to counterattack toward Germany.

While the U-boats were taking up positions, Raeder met with fleet commander Hermann Boehm and Donitz in Kiel. Believing that a naval war with the west was inevitable, Boehm and Donitz urged Raeder to scrap the big ships of the grandiose Z Plan and approve an "emergency" plan to build with all possible speed 300 U-boats, to include at least 200 improved Type VII mediums. Donitz remembered later that Raeder verbally "approved" the proposal and directed Donitz to submit his ideas in writing to the OKM through channels. A few days later, the OKM scrapped the Z Plan and adopted the Donitz plan to build hundreds of U-boats. But this drastic-and historic-change in direction required Hitler's approval and he was too busy with Poland to deal with naval matters.

The Germans invaded Poland on September 1. Per plan, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine supported the supported the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht and and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe by attacking the Polish Navy and bombarding shore installations. Three Type II ducks, basing from Memel, joined the attacks. Two ducks claimed to have sunk Polish submarines, but in fact, all five Polish submarines (big French-built minelayers) got away. Three ran to internment in neutral Sweden. Two, by attacking the Polish Navy and bombarding shore installations. Three Type II ducks, basing from Memel, joined the attacks. Two ducks claimed to have sunk Polish submarines, but in fact, all five Polish submarines (big French-built minelayers) got away. Three ran to internment in neutral Sweden. Two, Wilke Wilke and and Orzel Orzel, eventually escaped from the Baltic Sea and joined the Royal Navy, as did three of the four Polish destroyers.

On September 3, the British and French declared war on Germany. But the Allies were powerless to help Poland. The Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east on September 17. Caught between the Germans and Russians, Polish forces fought heroically, but were overwhelmed and surrendered on September 27. On that day Poland ceased to exist.

THE B BOAT.

The medium, 500-ton Type VII oceangoing boat U-30 U-30 patrolled a waiting station, designated U, about 150 miles west of Scotland. To the south of her, five identical sister ships of the Salzwedel Flotilla occupied waiting areas west of the British Isles. These six Type VIIs represented one-third of the German submarine force deployed in the Atlantic. patrolled a waiting station, designated U, about 150 miles west of Scotland. To the south of her, five identical sister ships of the Salzwedel Flotilla occupied waiting areas west of the British Isles. These six Type VIIs represented one-third of the German submarine force deployed in the Atlantic.

The U-30 U-30 was one of ten Type VIIs that had been commissioned in the prewar years. A forerunner for the improved mediums in being or under construction (Types VIIB and VIIC), she was three years old and was commanded by a twenty-six-year-old lieutenant, Fritz-Julius Lemp. Born in China on the eve of World War I, the son of a German Army officer, in 1931, at age eighteen, Lemp had joined the was one of ten Type VIIs that had been commissioned in the prewar years. A forerunner for the improved mediums in being or under construction (Types VIIB and VIIC), she was three years old and was commanded by a twenty-six-year-old lieutenant, Fritz-Julius Lemp. Born in China on the eve of World War I, the son of a German Army officer, in 1931, at age eighteen, Lemp had joined the Reichsmarine Reichsmarine and had served on continuous active duty for eight years. In his fifth year, 1936, he had joined the embryonic U-boat arm. After submarine school and a tour as a watch officer on the Type VII and had served on continuous active duty for eight years. In his fifth year, 1936, he had joined the embryonic U-boat arm. After submarine school and a tour as a watch officer on the Type VII U-28 U-28 and further schooling to qualify for a captaincy, in November 1938 Lemp had been promoted to command and further schooling to qualify for a captaincy, in November 1938 Lemp had been promoted to command U-30 U-30. In a recent peacetime drill U-30 U-30 had survived a near-fatal collision with her sister ship, had survived a near-fatal collision with her sister ship, U-35 U-35. Lemp had demonstrated remarkable coolness and control in that crisis, earning the praise not only of Donitz and Salzwedel Flotilla commander Hans Ibbeken, but also his crew-three other officers and forty enlisted men.

With the improvements incorporated in the later models, U-30 U-30 was the submarine type Donitz favored most. Overall she measured 211 feet and had a beam of 19 feet. Inside her cigar-shaped pressure hull, which was divided into six fore-to-aft compartments of nearly equal size, she was much smaller: about 142 feet long and about 10 feet wide in most areas. She was exceedingly cramped-a claustrophobe's worst nightmare. was the submarine type Donitz favored most. Overall she measured 211 feet and had a beam of 19 feet. Inside her cigar-shaped pressure hull, which was divided into six fore-to-aft compartments of nearly equal size, she was much smaller: about 142 feet long and about 10 feet wide in most areas. She was exceedingly cramped-a claustrophobe's worst nightmare.

The bow compartment contained U-30 U-30's main firing battery: four torpedo tubes, the standard armament of all oceangoing U-boats in commission or under construction. The U-30 U-30 carried ten torpedoes in this space, four in the tubes and six reloads-two stored above the deck plates and four in the bilges. The compartment also served as living quarters for the chief torpedoman and for about twenty-four of the lowest-ranking seamen and mechanics (stokers or firemen). They shared twelve collapsible bunks, built in along the bulkheads, and four hammocks slung in the overhead. They ate meals on small, collapsible wooden tables, while sitting on the lower bunks. The space was so densely packed with torpedoes, gear, and men that it was impossible to stand erect and there was scarcely room to move. Some submariners half jokingly called it "the cave." A more fitting description might be "snake pit." As in all ships, the bow compartment took the worst pounding in a heavy sea. The one advantage to living all the way forward was that there was no "through" traffic. carried ten torpedoes in this space, four in the tubes and six reloads-two stored above the deck plates and four in the bilges. The compartment also served as living quarters for the chief torpedoman and for about twenty-four of the lowest-ranking seamen and mechanics (stokers or firemen). They shared twelve collapsible bunks, built in along the bulkheads, and four hammocks slung in the overhead. They ate meals on small, collapsible wooden tables, while sitting on the lower bunks. The space was so densely packed with torpedoes, gear, and men that it was impossible to stand erect and there was scarcely room to move. Some submariners half jokingly called it "the cave." A more fitting description might be "snake pit." As in all ships, the bow compartment took the worst pounding in a heavy sea. The one advantage to living all the way forward was that there was no "through" traffic.

Like all the U-boats deployed in the Atlantic, the U-30 U-30 carried two types of torpedoes, both with 616-pound warheads: the older "air"-propelled torpedoes (G7a) and the new, top secret, battery-propelled, wakeless or "electric" torpedoes (G7e). Both types were 23 feet long and 21 inches in diameter and weighed about 4,000 pounds, or two tons. The air torpedoes were fitted with pistols that could be set for either impact or magnetic detonations; the electrics only with magnetic pistols. Both types had to be thoroughly checked every three or four days to make certain the complicated propulsion, steering, and depth-setting mechanisms were in proper working order, especially that the batteries of the electrics were warm and fully charged. The torpedo maintenance disrupted sleeping and eating routines. The bunks had to be trussed up and the eating tables stored away to make room to pull the torpedoes partway from the tubes for servicing and to take up the deck plates to get at the reloads in the bilges. Those who lived in the compartment prayed for action; with the firing of each torpedo, they gained slightly more living space. carried two types of torpedoes, both with 616-pound warheads: the older "air"-propelled torpedoes (G7a) and the new, top secret, battery-propelled, wakeless or "electric" torpedoes (G7e). Both types were 23 feet long and 21 inches in diameter and weighed about 4,000 pounds, or two tons. The air torpedoes were fitted with pistols that could be set for either impact or magnetic detonations; the electrics only with magnetic pistols. Both types had to be thoroughly checked every three or four days to make certain the complicated propulsion, steering, and depth-setting mechanisms were in proper working order, especially that the batteries of the electrics were warm and fully charged. The torpedo maintenance disrupted sleeping and eating routines. The bunks had to be trussed up and the eating tables stored away to make room to pull the torpedoes partway from the tubes for servicing and to take up the deck plates to get at the reloads in the bilges. Those who lived in the compartment prayed for action; with the firing of each torpedo, they gained slightly more living space.

The next compartment aft was less forbidding. Below the deck it contained one-half (sixty-two large cells) of the boat's batteries. Above the deck were sleeping and eating accommodations for nine men: the captain, the three officers, and five other senior petty officers, midshipmen, or apprentice engineering officers. The captain's bunk, which could be sealed off by a sliding curtain, was on the port side aft. Directly across the passageway from his bunk were the sonar and radio rooms. The other eight men slept in built-in bunks along the port and starboard bulkheads. The captain and the officers ate on a small folding table in the aisle, sitting on facing lower bunks, making way for traffic to and from the bow compartment. To soften the atmosphere of the compartment-and perhaps to add a touch of elegance-the lockers and closets were faced with a veneer of varnished wood.

Toilet facilities on U-30 U-30 were primitive. There were two heads, or toilet bowls, placed in closets about the size of a telephone booth. One was located on the starboard side, forward in the officers' compartment; the other aft, adjacent to the galley. However, inasmuch as the boat had limited food-storage space, the aft toilet closet had been taken over for that purpose. The toilet in the officers' compartment thus served all forty-four men. Since the fresh-water supply was also limited, no one was permitted to bathe with fresh-water and beards were encouraged. Body odors were masked with sweet-smelling lotions. were primitive. There were two heads, or toilet bowls, placed in closets about the size of a telephone booth. One was located on the starboard side, forward in the officers' compartment; the other aft, adjacent to the galley. However, inasmuch as the boat had limited food-storage space, the aft toilet closet had been taken over for that purpose. The toilet in the officers' compartment thus served all forty-four men. Since the fresh-water supply was also limited, no one was permitted to bathe with fresh-water and beards were encouraged. Body odors were masked with sweet-smelling lotions.

The next compartment aft-the control room-was located almost exactly amidships. This was the working headquarters of the boat, somewhat comparable to the bridge of a surface ship. Merely twenty feet in length, it was crammed with machinery for operating the boat, surfaced or submerged: controls for the rudder and diving planes, engine-order telegraph, gyro compass, blow and vent valves for the ballast and other tanks, navigational plotting desk, the business end of one of the two periscopes. A six-foot man could stand erect, but just barely. Dials and gauges of every description occupied every square inch of the curved bulkheads and the low overhead. To the nonsubmariner, the control room was an unbelievably cramped space with an incomprehensible array of gear, but to the submariner, every dial, gauge, and valve was well understood-and vital to his well-being and safety.

The center of the control room was dominated by the lower skirt of a large cylindrical tube, with a ladder inside, leading to the conning tower. That small, misnamed* place was a miniature combat center. It contained a duplicate helm station, gyro-compass repeater, engine-order telegraph, the business end of the slim attack periscope (which generated less wake), and the torpedo angle and depth-setting solver. During submerged attacks, the captain manned this periscope. He orally passed data (target size, estimated speed and range, angle on the bow, etc.) to the officer manning the torpedo data solver and gave steering orders to the helmsman and depth-control instructions to those in the control room below. place was a miniature combat center. It contained a duplicate helm station, gyro-compass repeater, engine-order telegraph, the business end of the slim attack periscope (which generated less wake), and the torpedo angle and depth-setting solver. During submerged attacks, the captain manned this periscope. He orally passed data (target size, estimated speed and range, angle on the bow, etc.) to the officer manning the torpedo data solver and gave steering orders to the helmsman and depth-control instructions to those in the control room below.

The conning tower was also part of the emergency escape system. The main challenge of escaping from a disabled sunken submarine was to get a hatch open against the massive outside sea pressure. To escape from a Type VII boat, the men followed this procedure. First, all hands gathered in the control room, sealed its fore and aft watertight doors, and strapped on oxygen-breathing apparatus. Next they flooded the control room with seawater to a level above the skirt on the tube leading to the conning tower. Then they bled high-pressure air into the compartment from overhead outlets. The pressurized air pushed downward on the seawater, forcing it up through the skirt into the conning tower. The men then gradually increased air pressure on the water, compressing it until the inside water pressure equalized with the outside water pressure. When that equilibrium was established, the hatch in the conning tower, leading to the bridge, would open freely. The men escaped by ducking under the skirt, going up through the flooded tube to the flooded conning tower, thence to the bridge and onward to the surface.

The compartment aft of the control room was less austere. Below, it contained the other half (sixty-two large cells) of the boat's batteries. Above the deck plates, there were eight built-in bunks for the petty officers and thirty-six small wood-faced lockers, each measuring about one cubic foot, where the enlisted men stored personal valuables, such as money, official papers, pictures, and cigarettes. The men who lived in this compartment also ate on wooden tables in the aisle, sitting on lower bunks and giving way to traffic, which was usually heavier in this area. The ship's galley, where food for all forty-four men on the boat was prepared, was located in the after port side of this compartment. The galley consisted of a miniature three-burner electric range with hood, two small ovens, and a platter-size sink. The cooks had to carry the food from the galley to the bow compartment and to the officers' compartment, then collect the dirty pots and plates.

Principal German Attack Submarines of World War II The food on U-30 U-30, like the other VIIs, was considered to be excellent, but the diet was limited by the lack of storage space and refrigeration. Every nook and cranny of the boat had been utilized for storing potatoes, cheese (in several varieties), and countless cans of coffee, tea, milk, fruits, and sweets. Hard-crusted black bread was stored in mesh-net hammocks in the overheads. In addition, U-30 U-30 carried a stock of canned bread, which, it was believed, would not mold. Scores of large sausages and smoked meats of every kind hung from the overhead all through the boat, giving the effect of a German butcher's shop. carried a stock of canned bread, which, it was believed, would not mold. Scores of large sausages and smoked meats of every kind hung from the overhead all through the boat, giving the effect of a German butcher's shop.

The next compartment aft-the fifth from the bow-was the diesel-engine room. It contained two large, noisy 1,160-horsepower engines, one to port, one to starboard. Air for the engines was supplied by a large pipe-the main induction-running outside the pressure hull up into the bridge structure, with the intake at maximum possible elevation above sea level. The engine exhaust was piped overboard mixed with seawater to minimize smoke. The engine room also contained the main air compressor for charging the compressed-air storage bottles, and a small distiller for making fresh water from seawater. The output of the distiller was used mainly to refill the 124 battery cells, which ran hot and therefore evaporated water at a fairly high rate.

The last, or stern, compartment was known as the electrical room. It contained two 375-horsepower electric motors, or more precisely, motor-generators. The main driveshafts of the diesel engines ran through the core of the motor-generators. When the diesels were operating, either or both motor-generators could be clutched onto the turning driveshafts to serve as generators to charge the batteries. Or, as a fuel-saving (and range-extending) measure, the power produced by one motor-generator, operated by one diesel engine, could be routed to the other motor-generator to turn the other shaft.* Upon diving, when both diesels were shut down, the motor-generators were clutched to the driveshafts, drawing power from the batteries. Upon diving, when both diesels were shut down, the motor-generators were clutched to the driveshafts, drawing power from the batteries.

The U-30 U-30 and her nine Type VII sister ships were equipped with a stern torpedo tube, but it was located inconveniently outside the pressure hull and had to be fired by remote controls in the stern room. The tube was loaded in port with an air torpedo, which required less care and warmth than an electric. The tube could not be reloaded at sea. This inconvenience had been corrected in the next generation of mediums (VIIB, VIIC) by locating the tube inside the stern compartment and providing space for one reload under the deck plates. and her nine Type VII sister ships were equipped with a stern torpedo tube, but it was located inconveniently outside the pressure hull and had to be fired by remote controls in the stern room. The tube was loaded in port with an air torpedo, which required less care and warmth than an electric. The tube could not be reloaded at sea. This inconvenience had been corrected in the next generation of mediums (VIIB, VIIC) by locating the tube inside the stern compartment and providing space for one reload under the deck plates.

Finally, there was the bridge, located atop the conning tower. During travel on the surface, when the boat was most vulnerable to detection by aircraft, four men were stationed on the bridge: the watch officer and three lookouts. Each man was supplied a pair of superb 7 50 Zeiss binoculars for searching the air and the horizon, which were divided into four 90-degree segments. Not an iota of slackness was tolerated; the safety of the boat depended upon the bridge watch's ability to spot a plane or enemy warship in time to dive and evade. Failure to spot a threat to the boat could result in a formal investigation and harsh disciplinary measures.

In pleasant weather a bridge watch was a welcome diversion from the crowded, smelly life belowdecks. It was also the only place where smokers were allowed to light up. But in heavy seas and cold weather, the bridge was miserable and dangerous and a poor place to smoke. Huge seas regularly smashed over the bridge, tearing at the men, who were tethered with safety harnesses, and soaking them to the skin. They came off watch wet and freezing, and often bruised and battered.

During a night surface attack, the bridge was a battle station. While the captain remained below at a plotting board to size up the big picture, the first watch officer manned the firing binoculars, called the UZO, mounted over a gyro-compass repeater. He chose and lined up the targets in the UZO and, upon receiving authorization from the captain, gave the orders to shoot torpedoes at his targets. The three-or four-lookouts on the bridge during attacks were the most able on the ship, those with exceptional night vision. During the attacks they were not permitted to watch the action. They kept their binoculars glued on their 90-degree segment of the sky and horizon, to report whatever might appear.

All oceangoing submarines of the world's navies were equipped with a big topside gun. As in World War I, these were to be used to sink unarmed or lightly armed merchant ships and for special tasks and emergency defense. Like all Type VIIs, the U-30 U-30 mounted an 88mm (3.4") fast-firing, good-quality, but unshielded naval gun. The ammunition for it was stored belowdecks and passed up hand-to-hand during a gun action. A specially trained supervising officer and a team of gunners conducted gun actions, seldom an easy task on the narrow, open, rolling and pitching deck, which was often awash with seawater. mounted an 88mm (3.4") fast-firing, good-quality, but unshielded naval gun. The ammunition for it was stored belowdecks and passed up hand-to-hand during a gun action. A specially trained supervising officer and a team of gunners conducted gun actions, seldom an easy task on the narrow, open, rolling and pitching deck, which was often awash with seawater.

To an outsider, life on board U-30 U-30 was simply appalling. The crew had no extra clothing. What they wore was soon filthy. Their hair and beards were soon matted with diesel oil and brine. The boat stank of diesel oil and sweat and cooked food and sickening sweet lotions. Except when submerged, the boat plunged, rolled, and shook wildly. Seldom could one stand or walk without a handhold. Unless properly secured, crockery and other gear flew in all directions. Cold seawater washed down the conning-tower hatch into the control room. There was always a line-sometimes a very long line-at the single toilet, which gave off its own repugnant odors. The heating and ventilation systems were not adequate. The boat was either too cold or too hot-and always damp and clammy. The food, including the canned bread, rotted and molded. Much of the vital machinery, especially the high-performance diesels, constantly broke down, it seemed. was simply appalling. The crew had no extra clothing. What they wore was soon filthy. Their hair and beards were soon matted with diesel oil and brine. The boat stank of diesel oil and sweat and cooked food and sickening sweet lotions. Except when submerged, the boat plunged, rolled, and shook wildly. Seldom could one stand or walk without a handhold. Unless properly secured, crockery and other gear flew in all directions. Cold seawater washed down the conning-tower hatch into the control room. There was always a line-sometimes a very long line-at the single toilet, which gave off its own repugnant odors. The heating and ventilation systems were not adequate. The boat was either too cold or too hot-and always damp and clammy. The food, including the canned bread, rotted and molded. Much of the vital machinery, especially the high-performance diesels, constantly broke down, it seemed.

But the young crew of U-30 U-30 took this discomfort and the danger in stride. The boat was a fighting machine, not a permanent home. A voyage was not forever, merely several weeks. When took this discomfort and the danger in stride. The boat was a fighting machine, not a permanent home. A voyage was not forever, merely several weeks. When U-30 U-30 returned to port, the crew-like submariners everywhere-would be granted an extended rest period. The men could find comfort and cleanliness and room to stretch and unwind and, if desired, solitude and privacy on board the submarine tender or in barracks ashore or at home on leave. The men of the crew considered themselves a special breed-elite volunteers within the elite returned to port, the crew-like submariners everywhere-would be granted an extended rest period. The men could find comfort and cleanliness and room to stretch and unwind and, if desired, solitude and privacy on board the submarine tender or in barracks ashore or at home on leave. The men of the crew considered themselves a special breed-elite volunteers within the elite Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine-and were proud of that distinction. And proud of U-30 U-30 and her nervy Captain Lemp, distinguished from the other men by his clean white cap. Not many men on and her nervy Captain Lemp, distinguished from the other men by his clean white cap. Not many men on U-30 U-30 would trade this arduous billet for any other duty. would trade this arduous billet for any other duty.

COMPLICATED R RULES.

Believing that he might yet talk Great Britain and France out of going to war, before the invasion of Poland, Hitler imposed severe limitations on the two "pocket" battleships and the U-boats deployed for combat in the Atlantic and North Sea. The "pocket" battleships were not to commence any operations against Allied shipping or naval forces without Hitler's specific approval. And, as Raeder remembered it, the U-boats "were likewise hedged with severe restrictions."

One of the first and most important rules Hitler laid down was that the U-boats were not to be concentrated, offensively, against enemy naval formations. The reasons were both political and practical. First, as Raeder put it, Hitler did not want to further antagonize the Allies by sinking a prestigious man-of-war. Second, as Donitz put it, "U-boat operations against naval forces promised little hope of success."

On the eve of war, Britain's Navy was dispersed and holed up in numerous heavily fortified bases, including Scapa Flow, Firth of Forth, Firth of Clyde, Portland, and Portsmouth. Even if the big ships put to sea, it would be very difficult for a U-boat to sink a major man-of-war, such as a battleship. There were not enough U-boats to cover the British bases in depth. The major ships were certain to be heavily escorted by aircraft and sonar-equipped destroyers and cruising at high speed (25 knots)-too fast for a U-boat to overhaul them and get into position to shoot torpedoes. A hit would be a matter of luck: the off chance that a U-boat lay almost directly on the path of an oncoming enemy man-of-war.

For these reasons, Hitler had ruled that in the initial offensive U-boats were to concentrate primarily against merchant shipping. But, again for political reasons, that pressure was to be applied with utmost finesse. All U-boats were to adhere strictly to the 1930 Submarine Protocol, which Germany had signed in 1936. That protocol (Article 22) specified that with certain exceptions, ships were not to be sunk without warning. They were to be stopped and inspected, or "visited and searched." If found to be an enemy ship or a neutral ship with contraband, inbound to an Allied port, they could be sunk, but only after the safety of the crew had been absolutely assured.

The exceptions-ships that could be sunk without warning, in the German view-were: * Troopships, i.e., vessels known from intelligence sources or actually observed to be carrying troops and war materiel.

* Vessels in convoy, or any vessel escorted by warships or aircraft.

* Vessels taking part in enemy actions or acting in direct support of enemy operations, including intelligence gathering.

There were not enough U-boats to make any appreciable dent in the enormous Allied merchant fleet in the first offensive. Furthermore, most of the Atlantic boats had sailed on August 19 and were already low on fuel and provisions and would have to be recalled soon. Since there was no reserve to replace them, a "lull" or "gap" of several weeks would occur in U-boat operations. Therefore the initial U-boat offensive was shaped to achieve maximum psychological impact. The goal was to sink as many enemy ships in as many different locations as possible, giving the impression that U-boats were "everywhere," thereby sowing confusion and panic and reviving memories of the costly World War I U-boat siege of England. So pressured, Hitler believed, the Allies might be less willing to continue combat in behalf of Poland.

The decision to adhere strictly to the Submarine Protocol added great risk to the submarines' tasks and reduced the odds of inflicting a dramatic first blow. The biggest risk was that during the visit and search procedure, when the U-boat was exposed on the surface, it might be surprised by an enemy warship or aircraft. To minimize the possibility of surprise by aircraft, the Atlantic boats were positioned well offshore-a hundred miles or more. This put them well to sea of the "choke points" in the British Isles, where shipping converged and congregated and thus made the job of locating ships much more difficult, especially in inclement weather.

The restriction also virtually ruled out any chance that the ducks in the North Sea could contribute to the intended psychological impact by torpedo attack. The ducks were too small and underarmed (one dismountable machine gun on deck, which could be manned only in calm water) to stop, visit, and search a merchant ship. Moreover, it was believed, British aircraft patrolled all areas of the North Sea almost continuously in daylight, posing extreme dangers to those pint-sized boats. The best that could be expected of the ducks was a lucky torpedo hit on a British convoy, warship, or submarine and/or kills from the minefields some were to lay.

Even so, there was a great deal riding on this first U-boat offensive. If Hitler's political intuition was right, a smashing U-boat success might discourage the Allies from continuing the war, and Poland would have been gained at small cost to Germany. For those who did not believe the Allies would back away from war-and those included Raeder and Donitz-it presented an opportunity to wrest Hitler's attention away from the land war and focus it on naval warfare and to impress upon him the grave peril posed by the Allied naval powers. A successful U-boat opening blow could persuade Hitler to give the tiny U-boat arm the full backing it desperately needed to wage a credible naval war.

On the day Great Britain and France declared a state of war with Germany, September 3 at 1256 hours Berlin time, the OKM sent an urgent, encoded message to all Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine ships, U-boats, and shore stations: "Hostilities with England effective immediately." A little over an hour later, at 1400, the OKM sent another urgent message: "U-boats to make war on merchant shipping in accordance with operations order," meaning they were to observe strictly the Submarine Protocol or prize rules. Because theretofore the U-boats had been instructed not to attack any ships except in self-defense, Donitz felt a clarification was required. From his shore headquarters in Wilhelmshaven, at 1550 German time, he radioed all U-boats: "Open hostilities against England immediately. Do not wait to be attacked first." ships, U-boats, and shore stations: "Hostilities with England effective immediately." A little over an hour later, at 1400, the OKM sent another urgent message: "U-boats to make war on merchant shipping in accordance with operations order," meaning they were to observe strictly the Submarine Protocol or prize rules. Because theretofore the U-boats had been instructed not to attack any ships except in self-defense, Donitz felt a clarification was required. From his shore headquarters in Wilhelmshaven, at 1550 German time, he radioed all U-boats: "Open hostilities against England immediately. Do not wait to be attacked first."

England, yes, but what about France? Believing that France might be even more easily dissuaded from war than Great Britain, Hitler had reached the drastic decision that U-boats should not attack any French ships of any kind. At 1752 that same afternoon, the Berlin naval staff addressed that matter with yet another message: "Boats are to take no hostile action against [French] merchant ships for the present, except in self-defense."

Another complication-and added danger! U-boats could not assume a ship was French merely because it flew a French flag or insignia. British ships or neutral ships with contraband might hoist French flags. Therefore all ships flying French flags would have to be stopped, visited, and searched to be certain they were French. If positively identified as French, they were to be allowed to sail on unmolested. This procedure could result in a great waste of time, during which the U-boat would be exposed to attack by enemy ships and aircraft.

The limitations virtually ruled out all U-boat attacks at night. In darkness it would be difficult, if not impossible, to positively distinguish a blacked-out French merchant ship from a British merchant ship. Hence no U-boat commander could confidently attack any convoy at night, lest a French ship be sunk by mistake.

At 1630 local time that day, Fritz-Julius Lemp in U-30 U-30 was cruising northwest of Ireland on the surface in the extreme northern sector of his patrol area. This put him about sixty miles south of Rockall, a barren sixty-three-foot rock projecting upwards from the sea. Until then, for purposes of concealment, Lemp had been keeping well off the normal sea-lanes. About that time, the bridge watch sighted a ship on the horizon, coming from the direction of the British Isles on a northwesterly course that was taking her unusually close to Rockall. Lemp hauled around on the surface to get on her track and dived for a closer periscope inspection. was cruising northwest of Ireland on the surface in the extreme northern sector of his patrol area. This put him about sixty miles south of Rockall, a barren sixty-three-foot rock projecting upwards from the sea. Until then, for purposes of concealment, Lemp had been keeping well off the normal sea-lanes. About that time, the bridge watch sighted a ship on the horizon, coming from the direction of the British Isles on a northwesterly course that was taking her unusually close to Rockall. Lemp hauled around on the surface to get on her track and dived for a closer periscope inspection.

The two vessels closed at about 1900 (7 P.M. P.M.), by which time the daylight was fading. Through the periscope Lemp could see that she was a very large ship. She was blacked out and zigzagging and appeared to be armed with deck guns. On the basis of this hurried, overeager look, and her unusual track near Rockall, Lemp concluded the vessel must be a British armed merchant or auxiliary cruiser* on patrol and therefore fair game for an attack without warning. He sent his crew to battle stations and ordered two torpedoes made ready. on patrol and therefore fair game for an attack without warning. He sent his crew to battle stations and ordered two torpedoes made ready.

At 1940 (7:40 P.M. P.M.) Lemp initiated the Atlantic U-boat war, firing the two torpedoes. The first ran true and struck the target squarely. The second malfunctioned and ran wild. Believing it might circle back and blow up U-30 U-30, Lemp dived deep to evade. When the danger had passed, he surfaced in the evening twilight and examined the listing target from the bridge through binoculars, edging ever closer, taking care to keep U-30 U-30 down-moon in the shadows. Since the ship did not appear to be sinking, Lemp fired a third torpedo, but it, too, malfunctioned or missed. down-moon in the shadows. Since the ship did not appear to be sinking, Lemp fired a third torpedo, but it, too, malfunctioned or missed.

Moving up quietly and close to the target, soon Lemp could clearly see its silhouette. He went below and checked the boat's copy of Lloyd's Register Lloyd's Register of merchant ships. He saw then that he had made an inexcusable and horrendous error. She was not an auxiliary cruiser, but rather S.S. of merchant ships. He saw then that he had made an inexcusable and horrendous error. She was not an auxiliary cruiser, but rather S.S. Athenia Athenia, a well-known, sixteen-year-old, 13,580-ton British ocean liner of the Donaldson line. She was bound for Canada, jammed with 1,103 men, women, and children, including 311 Americans who were fleeing the war. If there was any doubt in Lemp's mind about the identity of the ship it was shortly removed. Athenian Athenian's, radio operator repeatedly telegraphed a plain language distress signal, giving her position and the three-letter code, SSS SSS, meaning she had been attacked by a submarine. All this was clearly audible on U-30 U-30's radio receiver.

Lemp then compounded the error. He had been ordered to maintain radio silence to conceal his presence, but the distress signal-and SSS SSS-from Athenia Athenia had already given him away. He would not have unduly jeopardized the safety of his boat by breaking radio silence to inform Berlin or Donitz of this egregious error, thereby giving the German government timely notice of a public storm certain to arise. Possibly fearing that he might be recalled and relieved-or perhaps harshly punished by the Nazi government-Lemp sent no message, thereby leaving Berlin and Donitz completely in the dark. had already given him away. He would not have unduly jeopardized the safety of his boat by breaking radio silence to inform Berlin or Donitz of this egregious error, thereby giving the German government timely notice of a public storm certain to arise. Possibly fearing that he might be recalled and relieved-or perhaps harshly punished by the Nazi government-Lemp sent no message, thereby leaving Berlin and Donitz completely in the dark.

Nor did Lemp make any effort to render assistance to Athenia Athenia's passengers and crew. Fortunately the seas were calm and the weather was good, and Athenia Athenia remained afloat until the following morning, enabling passengers and crew to abandon ship in an orderly manner. Three merchant ships and three British destroyers raced to the rescue and, as a result, the loss of life on remained afloat until the following morning, enabling passengers and crew to abandon ship in an orderly manner. Three merchant ships and three British destroyers raced to the rescue and, as a result, the loss of life on Athenia Athenia was not calamitous: 118, including twenty-eight Americans, some deaths being caused when one of the rescue ships, the Norwegian freighter was not calamitous: 118, including twenty-eight Americans, some deaths being caused when one of the rescue ships, the Norwegian freighter Knut Nelson Knut Nelson, clumsily churned up a lifeboat with her propellers.*

The hue and cry arising from this first U-boat sinking of the war was thunderous. Although the casualties had not been heavy, the incident evoked the horror of the 1915 Lusitania Lusitania sinking in which 1,198 people, including 128 Americans, had perished. The Admiralty hurried to inform the media that sinking in which 1,198 people, including 128 Americans, had perished. The Admiralty hurried to inform the media that Athenia Athenia had been sunk by a torpedo from a U-boat, which had been seen by some passengers. The obvious implication was that Germany had abrogated the Submarine Protocol and had launched World War II with a barbarous and inhumane campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. had been sunk by a torpedo from a U-boat, which had been seen by some passengers. The obvious implication was that Germany had abrogated the Submarine Protocol and had launched World War II with a barbarous and inhumane campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare.

Berlin and Donitz first learned of the Athenia Athenia sinking from radio news broadcasts. It came as a rude shock. Such was the care that had been exercised, both in oral and written orders, to avoid a violation of the Submarine Protocol, that it seemed inconceivable that the very first British ship-a passenger liner at that-had been sunk illegally. It was a terrible blot on the honor of the sinking from radio news broadcasts. It came as a rude shock. Such was the care that had been exercised, both in oral and written orders, to avoid a violation of the Submarine Protocol, that it seemed inconceivable that the very first British ship-a passenger liner at that-had been sunk illegally. It was a terrible blot on the honor of the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine. It was certain to undermine-and perhaps even collapse-Hitler's attempts to negotiate Great Britain out of the war, and it would also seriously antagonize the United States.

Such was the gravity of this matter that early on September 4, Raeder flew to Wilhelmshaven to confer with Donitz. Together they reviewed the operational orders and patrol areas of the U-boats. Although both later stated otherwise, there is little doubt that they knew that morning that Lemp in U-30 U-30 had sunk had sunk Athenia Athenia. Owing to radio silence and his freedom to move about his assigned area, Lemp's position was not precisely known. But Athenia Athenia definitely had been sunk within the boundaries of Lemp's patrol zone, Area U. definitely had been sunk within the boundaries of Lemp's patrol zone, Area U.

Hitler's greatest concern was that the British would balloon the Athenia Athenia sinking into another sinking into another Lusitania Lusitania and generate sufficient outrage to pull the United States into the war. Before Raeder returned to Berlin, Hitler issued orders that Germany should categorically deny that a U-boat sank and generate sufficient outrage to pull the United States into the war. Before Raeder returned to Berlin, Hitler issued orders that Germany should categorically deny that a U-boat sank Athenia Athenia and characterize any charge that one did so as a false "British atrocity report." The German Foreign Ministry issued the official denial at noon on September 4. The spokesman asserted that no U-boat could have sunk and characterize any charge that one did so as a false "British atrocity report." The German Foreign Ministry issued the official denial at noon on September 4. The spokesman asserted that no U-boat could have sunk Athenia Athenia inasmuch as the northern boundary of the patrol zone of the nearest U-boat lay "seventy miles to the south." The Germans claimed inasmuch as the northern boundary of the patrol zone of the nearest U-boat lay "seventy miles to the south." The Germans claimed Athenia Athenia must have been sunk by a British mine or submarine. must have been sunk by a British mine or submarine.

Hitler's decision to lie about Athenia Athenia set in motion a complicated cover-up in which Raeder and Donitz participated. Four days later, Raeder sent a telegram to a newspaper reporter (which was leaked to foreign naval attaches in Berlin) in which he stated that the British claim that set in motion a complicated cover-up in which Raeder and Donitz participated. Four days later, Raeder sent a telegram to a newspaper reporter (which was leaked to foreign naval attaches in Berlin) in which he stated that the British claim that Athenia Athenia had been torpedoed by a U-boat was an "abominable lie" because the nearest U-boat was "170 sea miles away" and, furthermore, the had been torpedoed by a U-boat was an "abominable lie" because the nearest U-boat was "170 sea miles away" and, furthermore, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine strictly adhered to international law, the prize rules in particular. Still later, with the full knowledge that strictly adhered to international law, the prize rules in particular. Still later, with the full knowledge that U-30 U-30 had sunk Athenia, Hitler's Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels, published a preposterous article in Germany charging that the Admiralty had deliberately ordered the destruction of had sunk Athenia, Hitler's Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels, published a preposterous article in Germany charging that the Admiralty had deliberately ordered the destruction of Athenia Athenia to curry favor with neutral nations and bring America into the war. to curry favor with neutral nations and bring America into the war.

The Athenia Athenia sinking led directly to further complications-and risks-for U-boat skippers. Insisting that there be no repetition of this politically disastrous sinking, Hitler imposed yet another restriction. On September 4, the OKM radioed Atlantic forces, including the "pocket" battleships and all U-boats: "By order of the Fuhrer: No hostile action is to be taken for the present against passenger ships, even in convoy." sinking led directly to further complications-and risks-for U-boat skippers. Insisting that there be no repetition of this politically disastrous sinking, Hitler imposed yet another restriction. On September 4, the OKM radioed Atlantic forces, including the "pocket" battleships and all U-boats: "By order of the Fuhrer: No hostile action is to be taken for the present against passenger ships, even in convoy."

Although the order was no doubt meant to apply mainly to large ocean liners, it did not define "passenger ships." Many ships, including tramp steamers, carried passengers. Were U-boat skippers to allow a tramp steamer with ten or twenty passengers to pass unmolested? If not, what was to be the cutoff point? Were "passenger ships" obviously transporting troops (and therefore "troopships" by the Submarine Protocol) likewise to be spared? Were convoys that included "passenger ships" to be unmolested out of fear that a stray torpedo might hit one? Unable to answer these questions or to clarify the order in any way, Donitz was powerless to help his skippers.

"WINSTON I IS B BACK"

On the evening of September 3, while Lemp was torpedoing Athenia Athenia, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain invited the sixty-five-year-old hawk and political exile Winston Churchill back into the government. The job: First Lord of the Admiralty, a post Churchill had held from 1911 to 1915. The Admiralty signaled his arrival with a message to all forces: "Winston is back."

Churchill's appointment came as a tonic to the British. The Admiralty was in need of vigorous leadership. The senior admiral, First Sea Lord A. Dudley P. R. Pound, appointed the previous June, was not physically fit and not viewed as an inspiring leader. He suffered painfully from arthritis of the left hip. The official naval historian Stephen Roskill wrote, he had "no intellectual interest or social graces," was "too addicted to extreme centralization," and "loved schedules and Courts of Inquiry." A senior Army general noted in his diary that during meetings of the chiefs of staff, Pound was "asleep 90 percent of the time" and "the remaining 10 percent" was "none too sure of what he is arguing about." However, Churchill liked Pound and had confidence in him. Pound was a good balance wheel.

Back in government harness and confronting Hitler, Churchill was a phenomenon: a tireless, pugnacious, mesmerizing genius with immense knowledge of military affairs. Working man-killing hours, he shook the staid Admiralty from top to bottom. From his office gushed a torrent of ideas (some of them harebrained) and memos demanding prominently "Action This Day." He demanded prompt, incisive reports on every conceivable aspect of the Royal Navy. Nothing, it seemed, escaped his notice. His memos, which usually began, "Pray tell me ...," were facetiously called "The Lord's Prayers."

Restricted for fifteen years by naval treaties, pinch-penny budgets, and the antiwar mood in England, the Royal Navy Churchill inherited was far superior to the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine but a pale reflection of its former self. Its main striking power consisted of twelve battleships, three battle cruisers, and six aircraft carriers. Ten of the battleships and two of the battle cruisers were of World War I vintage; two battleships ( but a pale reflection of its former self. Its main striking power consisted of twelve battleships, three battle cruisers, and six aircraft carriers. Ten of the battleships and two of the battle cruisers were of World War I vintage; two battleships (Rodney, Nelson) dated from 1927. The other battle cruiser (Hood, a huge 42,000 tons) dated from 1920. Three battleships (Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Valiant) and two battle cruisers (Renown, Repulse) had been extensively modernized in 1936-1939. But Queen Elizabeth, Valiant Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, and Renown Renown were back in the yards for major refits. Only one of the six carriers, were back in the yards for major refits. Only one of the six carriers, Ark Royal Ark Royal, commissioned in 1938, had been built as such from the keel up; the other five were conversions dating from the 1920s.*

The capital ships of the Royal Navy were divided between two fleets: Home and Mediterranean. The Home Fleet, commanded by Charles M. Forbes, consisted of seven battleships, two battle cruisers, and four aircraft carriers. The Mediterranean Fleet, commanded by Andrew B. Cunningham, based in Gibraltar and Alexandria, Egypt, consisted of three battleships and one aircraft carrier. The Home Fleet was supported by about twenty heavy and light cruisers; the Mediterranean Fleet by about six. Other heavy and light cruiser squadrons were scattered all over the globe. All forces were further reinforced by scores of fleet destroyers.

The Home Fleet had three principal missions. The first and overriding task was to contain, neutralize, and destroy the surface forces of the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine and thereby deny it an opportunity to raid British shipping or attack England by shore bombardment. That task was to be accomplished in a replication of World War I naval strategy, by bottling up the and thereby deny it an opportunity to raid British shipping or attack England by shore bombardment. That task was to be accomplished in a replication of World War I naval strategy, by bottling up the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine in the North Sea-blocking a sortie into the Atlantic-and by whittling it down if it dared leave its home bases and offer battle. The main obstacle to carrying out this mission was the in the North Sea-blocking a sortie into the Atlantic-and by whittling it down if it dared leave its home bases and offer battle. The main obstacle to carrying out this mission was the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe. Its perceived threat to the Home Fleet precluded an offensive naval strike at the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine in the lower North Sea and compelled the main British naval strength to base in Scapa Flow, believed to be beyond German bomber range, but also ideally located to blockade the North Sea. in the lower North Sea and compelled the main British naval strength to base in Scapa Flow, believed to be beyond German bomber range, but also ideally located to blockade the North Sea.

The second task was to impose a maritime or economic blockade of Germany, another replication of World War I strategy. Because of the presence of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe the blockade could not be mounted in the lower North Sea as in World War I, but had to be much farther north. The blockade line ran west from the Orkney Islands to Iceland and east from the Orkneys to Norway. To enforce the blockade between the Orkneys and Iceland, the Admiralty had established a Northern Patrol, composed initially of eight aging light cruisers. Ships of the blockade were to observe "cruiser rales," a stop-and-search procedure similar to the Submarine Protocol, allowing neutrals not carrying contraband to pass. the blockade could not be mounted in the lower North Sea as in World War I, but had to be much farther north. The blockade line ran west from the Orkney Islands to Iceland and east from the Orkneys to Norway. To enforce the blockade between the Orkneys and Iceland, the Admiralty had established a Northern Patrol, composed initially of eight aging light cruisers. Ships of the blockade were to observe "cruiser rales," a stop-and-search procedure similar to the Submarine Protocol, allowing neutrals not carrying contraband to pass.

Few believed the maritime blockade would have any appreciable impact on Germany. The blockade of World War I had been deadly effective in part because Czarist Russia had been Germany's enemy. Now the Soviet Union was Germany's military ally and trading partner. Whatever food, oil, and other imports Germany required could be brought by rail and truck overland from Russia. Germany's high-grade iron ore for weaponry came from neutral Sweden. In mild weather it was sent by ships in the Baltic Sea directly to Germany. In cold weather, when the Baltic was frozen, it was sent by rail to Narvik, Norway, then by ship in Norwegian waters through the Skagerrak and Kattegat to Germany. The Royal Navy was not able to force its way into the Baltic Sea; it could not legally impose a blockade in neutral Norwegian waters. Hence the maritime "blockade" of Germany was to amount to little more than psychological harassment.

The third task of the Home Fleet was to protect British maritime assets from German submarines. Inasmuch as Germany had no submarine force until 1935, the Admiralty had not pursued ASW vigorously. Not until December 1938, when the Germans advised Great Britain that they would build to submarine parity, did the Admiralty begin serious planning for the possibility of U-boat war. All ASW plans were influenced by the belief that British sonar, developed in the last days of World War I and improved in the 1920s and 1930s, had virtually rendered submarines obsolete. Sonar, Churchill (for one) judged, was a "remarkable" device. With sonar, Churchill wrote, two destroyers were as effective as ten destroyers in World War I.

The Admiralty plans for confronting the U-boat threat derived from the experience of World War I. The Admiralty assumed that unlike the case in World War I, Germany would wage unrestricted submarine war from the first day. The Royal Navy was to combat U-boats by the following measures: * M MINES. It was not forgotten that mines were the greatest killer of U-boats in World War I. Defensive minefields were to be planted along the east coast of the British Isles and in the English Channel, to close off that passage. Offensive minefields were to be planted in the lower North Sea, west of Helgoland. A plan to recreate the North Sea Barrage between the Orkneys and Norway was in hand, but more serious consideration was given to planting fields between the Orkney and Faeroe islands, between the Faeroes and Iceland, and between Iceland and Greenland. It was not forgotten that mines were the greatest killer of U-boats in World War I. Defensive minefields were to be planted along the east coast of the British Isles and in the English Channel, to close off that passage. Offensive minefields were to be planted in the lower North Sea, west of Helgoland. A plan to recreate the North Sea Barrage between the Orkneys and Norway was in hand, but more serious consideration was given to planting fields between the Orkney and Faeroe islands, between the Faeroes and Iceland, and between Iceland and Greenland.

* H HUNTER-KILLER G GROUPS. Offensive patrolling by surface ships had produced small returns in World War I. However, since that time the aircraft carrier had come into service. It was believed that a carrier, escorted by a flotilla of six or eight modern, sonar-equipped destroyers, would be a formidable ASW weapons system. The carrier aircraft could patrol an enormous area in a day's time. Upon spotting a U-boat, aircraft were to attack and, if possible, sink the U-boat or at least drive it under and hold it down until the destroyers could be brought up to attack. Offensive patrolling by surface ships had produced small returns in World War I. However, since that time the aircraft carrier had come into service. It was believed that a carrier, escorted by a flotilla of six or eight modern, sonar-equipped destroyers, would be a formidable ASW weapons system. The carrier aircraft could patrol an enormous area in a day's time. Upon spotting a U-boat, aircraft were to attack and, if possible, sink the U-boat or at least drive it under and hold it down until the destroyers could be brought up to attack.

There were several weaknesses in this concept. The Royal Navy had only four carriers in the Home Fleet and just one of these (Ark Royal) was first-rate. Navy carrier pilots, trained to attack big enemy capital ships, had not drilled in searching for small U-boats. Moreover, Britain had slighted development of carrier aircraft and weaponry, giving priority to the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber and Fighter commands. In September 1939, the Royal Navy had only 175 carrier aircraft: 150 old wire-and-fabric biplanes (Swordfish) and 25 new monoplanes (Skuas); the former for torpedo launching, the latter for dive bombing. The aviators believed that the few planes available should be husbanded for attacks on German capital ships, not be worn out on ASW patrols.

Alternate ideas for sea-basing ASW aircraft at less cost had been proposed. One scheme was to build a number of what the Americans were to call "jeep carriers," capable of handling about a dozen aircraft. These miniature aircraft carriers could be created quickly, it was believed, by mounting a flight deck and a catapult on existing tankers or other suitable merchant-ship hulls of about 12,000 tons. The Admiralty had approved an experimental conversion of the seaplane tender Pegasus Pegasus to explore this concept. Another scheme was to equip ordinary merchant ships with catapults (like those on cruisers and battleships) that could launch a recoverable seaplane or wheeled aircraft, which could land ashore. to explore this concept. Another scheme was to equip ordinary merchant ships with catapults (like those on cruisers and battleships) that could launch a recoverable seaplane or wheeled aircraft, which could land ashore.

* L LAND-BASED A AIR P PATROL. The RAF had established a Coastal Command to support the Royal Navy. Its primary mission was to provide the Navy reconnaissance on German capital ship movements in the North Sea and elsewhere. Although land-based aircraft had positively sunk only one U-boat in all of World War I, it was believed that Coastal Command could serve effectively in an ASW role. But Coastal Command pilots had not drilled in submarine spotting, and the hardware had also been neglected. In September 1939, Coastal Command had 300 aircraft in its inventory, most of them obsolete, and only about half the pilots were fully trained. Only three squadrons were equipped with modern aircraft: two with long-range four-engine flying boats (Sunderlands); one with medium-range twin-engine American-designed, British-built wheeled aircraft (Hudsons). The Hudsons (replacing obsolete Ansons) were not yet fully operational. The RAF had established a Coastal Command to support the Royal Navy. Its primary mission was to provide the Navy reconnaissance on German capital ship movements in the North Sea and elsewhere. Although land-based aircraft had positively sunk only one U-boat in all of World War I, it was believed that Coastal Command could serve effectively in an ASW role. But Coastal Command pilots had not drilled in submarine spotting, and the hardware had also been neglected. In September 1939, Coastal Command had 300 aircraft in its inventory, most of them obsolete, and only about half the pilots were fully trained. Only three squadrons were equipped with modern aircraft: two with long-range four-engine flying boats (Sunderlands); one with medium-range twin-engine American-designed, British-built wheeled aircraft (Hudsons). The Hudsons (replacing obsolete Ansons) were not yet fully operational.

* C CONVOYS. This time around there was to be no agonizing debate over convoying. With the onset of war, all British merchant ships were to be placed under operational control of the British government. All Commonwealth This time around there was to be no agonizing debate over convoying. With the onset of war, all British merchant ships were to be placed under operational control of the British government. All Commonwealth* vessels except those which could exceed 15 knots or were slower than 9 knots were to travel by escorted convoy. In preparation for this massive undertaking, the government had created on paper a convoy control organization and had indoctrinated thousands of merchant marine officers in convoy tactics and procedure, such as station keeping, zigzagging, and communications. A list of retired Royal Navy officers who were to be recalled to serve in the convoy control organization, and at sea as convoy commanders, was on file. vessels except those which could exceed 15 knots or were slower than 9 knots were to travel by escorted convoy. In preparation for this massive undertaking, the government had created on paper a convoy control organization and had indoctrinated thousands of merchant marine officers in convoy tactics and procedure, such as station keeping, zigzagging, and communications. A list of retired Royal Navy officers who were to be recalled to serve in the convoy control organization, and at sea as convoy commanders, was on file.

The weakness-a big weakness-in the convoy plan was the acute shortage of escort vessels. Great Britain had about 175 fleet destroyers worldwide, of which about 100 were modern (1926-1939), the rest World War I vintage. Fifteen of the latter ( Fifteen of the latter (V and and W W class) had been designated convoy "escort destroyers." In addition, there were about thirty so-called sloops-smaller, slower warships, yet in some ways (range, habitability) superior vessels to destroyers for convoy escort. Most of the modern destroyers were required as screens for capital ships, for scouting, port protection, and other tasks. That left only a very few for ocean-convoy escort: the old destroyers and sloops. The old destroyers earmarked for that task required constant maintenance, and only a few were equipped with sonar. class) had been designated convoy "escort destroyers." In addition, there were about thirty so-called sloops-smaller, slower warships, yet in some ways (range, habitability) superior vessels to destroyers for convoy escort. Most of the modern destroyers were required as screens for capital ships, for scouting, port protection, and other tasks. That left only a very few for ocean-convoy escort: the old destroyers and sloops. The old destroyers earmarked for that task required constant maintenance, and only a few were equipped with sonar. For inshore, or coastal, escort in the British Isles, the Navy had some 170-foot coal-burning trawlers, fitted with 3" guns and depth charges. Some had older sonar sets, but the trawlers were too slow (11 knots) to chase a U-boat. For inshore, or coastal, escort in the British Isles, the Navy had some 170-foot coal-burning trawlers, fitted with 3" guns and depth charges. Some had older sonar sets, but the trawlers were too slow (11 knots) to chase a U-boat.

To help fill the gap, the Royal Navy had developed two new vessels: a Hunt Hunt-class, small (280 feet; 900 tons), fast (26 knots), heavily armed (four 4" guns) destroyer for ocean escort, and a Flower Flower-class corvette to augment the trawlers for inshore escort. The 205-foot, oil-fired steam engine, single-screw corvette, based on a whale-catcher design built for Norway, was slow (16 knots) and miserably wet, but it was a hardy sea boat that could be built cheaply and quickly. The February 1939 ship-building program of the Royal Navy included twenty Hunt Hunt-class destroyers, and fifty-six Flower Flower-class corvettes (as well as twenty Tree-class trawlers), but in September 1939, these vessels were a long way from completion.*

PLATE 5 5.

* S SHIP D DEFENSE. Since it was assumed the Germans would not observe the Submarine Protocol-that any and all British merchant ships were to be sunk without warning-the Admiralty had drawn plans to arm British merchant ships for self-defense as rapidly as possible after the commencement of hostilities. For this purpose, the Admiralty had stockpiled hundreds of guns and thousands of shells. It also had plans to equip some merchant ships with depth charges. These were to be rolled over the side to deter (rather than to kill) U-boats. The Admiralty had indoctrinated thousands of merchant-ship captains and officers in gunnery and depth-charge use, and had encouraged the captains to ram U-boats whenever the opportunity presented itself. Without exception, all British merchant ships were to report immediately all contacts of any kind with a U-boat ( Since it was assumed the Germans would not observe the Submarine Protocol-that any and all British merchant ships were to be sunk without warning-the Admiralty had drawn plans to arm British merchant ships for self-defense as rapidly as possible after the commencement of hostilities. For this purpose, the Admiralty had stockpiled hundreds of guns and thousands of shells. It also had plans to equip some merchant ships with depth charges. These were to be rolled over the side to deter (rather than to kill) U-boats. The Admiralty had indoctrinated thousands of merchant-ship captains and officers in gunnery and depth-charge use, and had encouraged the captains to ram U-boats whenever the opportunity presented itself. Without exception, all British merchant ships were to report immediately all contacts of any kind with a U-boat (SSS), another means of gathering intelligence on U-boat positions.

* S SUBMARINES. In World War I, British submarines had proved to be efficient U-boat killers. Since it was assumed that the British blockade would empty the seas of German merchant ships and that the In World War I, British submarines had proved to be efficient U-boat killers. Since it was assumed that the British blockade would empty the seas of German merchant ships and that the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine would not often venture from its home bases, the Admiralty planned to commit most of the British submarine force to ASW. would not often venture from its home bases, the Admiralty planned to commit most of the British submarine force to ASW.

Commanded by Bertram C. Watson (Rear Admiral, Submarines) from headquarters on the Firth of Forth, the Royal Navy submarine force was a deplorable hodgepodge. Long the victim of an indifferent and frequently hostile Admiralty, it consisted of fifty-eight boats of ten different types. More than half (thirty-three) were old and dangerous duds: eighteen big O O-, P P-, and R R-class ocean boats; twelve small World War I H H- and L L-class boats; three huge River-class fleet boats. Only twenty-four of the fifty-eight boats could be ranked as first-rate: twelve relatively new medium (700-ton) Swordfish Swordfish- or S S-class attack boats; six large (1,800-ton) minelayers; three new large (1,300-ton) Triton Triton- or T T-class attack boats; and three new small (600-ton) Unity Unity- or U U-class attack boats, ideal for North Sea or Mediterranean operations.*

In late August 1939, there were forty-five British submarines ready for war: eighteen were based at North Sea ports, nine at Malta, two in the South Atlantic, and sixteen in the Far East. In the tense last week of August, Watson had sent eleven of the eighteen home-based boats on patrol in the North Sea to scout Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine capital ships. These boats got off to a wobbly start. British aircraft mistakenly bombed capital ships. These boats got off to a wobbly start. British aircraft mistakenly bombed Sturgeon Sturgeon and and Seahorse Seahorse. Sturgeon Sturgeon fired torpedoes at fired torpedoes at Swordfish Swordfish in error, but fortunately, they all missed. The new in error, but fortunately, they all missed. The new Triton Triton fired torpedoes at the old fired torpedoes at the old Oxley Oxley in error, but unfortunately, in error, but unfortunately, Triton Triton's missiles hit. There were two survivors. Oxley Oxley was the first submarine to be sunk by any of the belligerents in the war. Her loss to a sister ship cast a pall in the British submarine force and raised questions in the Admiralty about competence. was the first submarine to be sunk by any of the belligerents in the war. Her loss to a sister ship cast a pall in the British submarine force and raised questions in the Admiralty about competence.

The French had invested heavily in submarines. When the war commenced, the French Navy had seventy-seven submarines: thirty-eight large (1,300- to 1,500-ton) ocean boats; thirty-two medium (600-ton) boats; six minelayers (750-ton); and the monstrous (3,000-ton) white elephant Surcouf Surcouf. About twenty of the large and medium boats, dating from the 1920s, had been modernized in the late 1930s. Nonetheless, only forty-one of the seventy-seven boats could be ranked as first-rate: twenty-nine 1,500-ton ocean boats, all built in the 1930s; six Saphir Saphir-class minelayers; and six new mediums of the Minerve Minerve class. class.

French submariners took great pride in their heritage as European submarine pioneers. Morale in the force was high and much was expected. But there existed serious organizational and technical weaknesses. There was no centralized, single submarine commander; moat of the submarines were scattered between Atlantic and Mediterranean bases, assigned to operate with subordinate fleet commands. Some of the technical weaknesses were daunting. Owing to unreliable gyros, French torpedoes could not be fired at sharp angles. To compensate for this deficiency, many boats were fitted with complicated, ungainly torpedo-tube arrangements, such as multiple traversing external mounts of the type found on destroyers. Some boats carried torpedoes of two different sizes (21" and 15"), which led to logistical headaches.

Since Italy had not entered the war and Germany offered few targets for French submarines, it would have been advantageous had French submarines merged with British submarines in a joint ASW mission. A combined force of about 120 British and French submarines, directed by a single commander-a la Donitz-from a centralized submarine headquarters, doubtless would have posed a formidable counterforce to the fifty-six combat-capable German U-boats. But no merger was attempted and the French submarine force was to be wasted in a variety of nonproductive missions, such as escorting convoys.

* R RADIO I INTELLIGENCE. In World War I, Great Britain had thoroughly penetrated German naval communications by establishing a network of direction-finding (DF) stations and by breaking codes. Between the wars, the Germans had learned about these electronic intelligence coups and had taken vigorous steps to prevent a repetition. The In World War I, Great Britain had thoroughly penetrated German naval communications by establishing a network of direction-finding (DF) stations and by breaking codes. Between the wars, the Germans had learned about these electronic intelligence coups and had taken vigorous steps to prevent a repetition. The Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine had prescribed certain radio procedures to minimize the effectiveness of enemy DFing (silence or encoded "short signals") and utilized an interior code in messages for position reporting to eliminate frequently used, possibly recognizable latitudes and longitudes. had prescribed certain radio procedures to minimize the effectiveness of enemy DFing (silence or encoded "short signals") and utilized an interior code in messages for position reporting to eliminate frequently used, possibly recognizable latitudes and longitudes.* Like the Like the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht and and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine had also adopted an ingenious encoding machine, Enigma, which was believed to be unbreakable. had also adopted an ingenious encoding machine, Enigma, which was believed to be unbreakable.

German naval Enigma was more complicated than Wehrmacht Wehrmacht or or Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Enigma. Moreover, Enigma. Moreover, Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine signals security was tighter and the traffic less dense. For these reasons many British codebreakers-including some senior holdovers from the famous Room 40 of World War I-were not too hopeful of penetrating naval Enigma. Nonetheless, the assistance of some brilliant Polish codebreakers (discussed in signals security was tighter and the traffic less dense. For these reasons many British codebreakers-including some senior holdovers from the famous Room 40 of World War I-were not too hopeful of penetrating naval Enigma. Nonetheless, the assistance of some brilliant Polish codebreakers (discussed in chapter 2 chapter 2), a special team of British codebreakers, located in a remote countryside mansion, Bletchley Park, had tackled the job and believed it might be done, especially if the keys and other material for naval Enigma could somehow be captured.

In the meantime, the British focused on three other avenues of radio intelligence: * D DIRECTION F FINDING (DFing). (DFing). From the opening days of the war, the British sought to improve this method of detecting enemy radio transmissions at sea. They established a new network of sophisticated land-based listening posts in the British Isles and in Canada, Bermuda, and the British West Indies. These posts were linked by a special communication system to London and manned by technicians who soon began to master this difficult technology. When, as Donitz required, a U-boat made a "passage" report upon entering the Atlantic proper and a sinking and situation report upon leaving its patrol area, the British DFed this traffic from a growing number of widely spaced listening posts with far greater accuracy than the Germans credited. From the opening days of the war, the British sought to improve this method of detecting enemy radio transmissions at sea. They established a new network of sophisticated land-based listening posts in the British Isles and in Canada, Bermuda, and the British West Indies. These posts were linked by a special communication system to London and manned by technicians who soon began to master this difficult technology. When, as Donitz required, a U-boat made a "passage" report upon entering the Atlantic proper and a sinking and situation report upon leaving its patrol area, the British DFed this traffic from a growing number of widely spaced listening posts with far greater accuracy than the Germans credited.

* T TRAFFIC A ANALYSIS (TA). (TA). The U-boat radio traffic, like the The U-boat radio traffic, like the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht or or Luftwaffe Enigma Luftwaffe Enigma traffic, was stylized. Therefore after study, British radio intelligence technicians were able to distinguish U-boat traffic (Donitz or a flotilla commander to a U-boat or vice versa) by its often repeated, unique characteristics or by the prefatory call-ups to "short signals," such as a "passage report." traffic, was stylized. Therefore after study, British radio intelligence technicians were able to distinguish U-boat traffic (Donitz or a flotilla commander to a U-boat or vice versa) by its often repeated, unique characteristics or by the prefatory call-ups to "short signals," such as a "passage report."

* R RADIO F FINGERPRINTING (RFP) and TINA. (RFP) and TINA. Radio technicians had long known that every radio transmitter gave off a unique electronic "signature" and that individual telegraphers likewise had a unique "style" or "fist." It was soon possible to record the "electronic signature" of individual U-boats on strips of photographic paper, a process known as "radio fingerprinting" or RFR Then as now, an experienced listener could distinguish the "fist" of a particular telegrapher, but the British enhanced this identifying process, TINA, with tapes and mathematical analysis. The aim was to track the comings and goings of particular U-boats and identify them again and again by these methods, but the effort was only marginally successful. Radio technicians had long known that every radio transmitter gave off a unique electronic "signature" and that individual telegraphers likewise had a unique "style" or "fist." It was soon possible to record the "electronic signature" of individual U-boats on strips of photographic paper, a process known as "radio fingerprinting" or RFR Then as now, an experienced listener could distinguish the "fist" of a particular telegrapher, but the British enhanced this identifying process, TINA, with tapes and mathematical analysis. The aim was to track the comings and goings of particular U-boats and identify them again and again by these methods, but the effort was only marginally successful.

When the British technicians combined the results of DFing, TA, RFR and TINA, and the reported U-boat sinkings and sightings from all sources, it became possible to formulate a fair picture of U-boat activity and predict probable threatened areas without the benefit of codebreaking. Hence, as in World War I, the British were able to route convoys away from known or probable U-boat positions with considerable success, thus reducing shipping losses.

* R RADAR. The British had been last after the United States, France, and Germany, to develop radar-a technique of sending out and receiving controlled radio pulses to determine the range to an object in the air or on the sea. But fear of the growing power of the The British had been last after the United States, France, and Germany, to develop radar-a technique of sending out and receiving controlled radio pulses to determine the range to an object in the air or on the sea. But fear of the growing power of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe spurred the Air Ministry and British scientists into high gear in the mid-1930s. By September 1939 Great Britain led the world in radar technology. It had girded the east and south coasts of the British Isles (facing Germany) with an elaborate overlapping network of radar stations (called Chain Home) to give early warning of German bombers. The British had also developed a small, crude radar set that could be fitted in aircraft, and a no less crude set for warships, to provide gunners accurate ranges in inclement weather and at night. spurred the Air Ministry and British scientists into high gear in the mid-1930s. By September 1939 Great Britain led the world in radar technology. It had girded the east and south coasts of the British Isles (facing Germany) with an elaborate overlapping network of radar stations (called Chain Home) to give early warning of German bombers. The British had also developed a small, crude radar set that could be fitted in aircraft, and a no less crude set for warships, to provide gunners accurate ranges in inclement weather and at night.

The Admiralty believed that airborne radar (known as Air to Surface Vessel, or ASV) and shipborne radar had potential to be wondrous ASW weapons. When brought to a practical stage, radar in aircraft and ships would enable the British to detect U-boats on the surface at night and in foul weather. But in September 1939, airborne and shipborne radar was virtually useless because it was not powerful or reliable enough to consistently and accurately pinpoint a small target, such as a U-boat conning tower. A scientific breakthrough of some kind was required-but nobody knew what kind. Meanwhile, the highest priority was given to perfecting an airborne set for night fighters so that the RAF Fighter Command could find and shoot down the anticipated waves of Luftwaffe Luftwaffe bombers in the dark. bombers in the dark.

Winston Churchill knew full well that the naval threat to Great Britain was to be posed not by Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine surface ships but by U-boats. Shortly after taking office, he told Neville Chamberlain and the War Cabinet that within nine months-by the summer of 1940-Britain "may have to face an attack by 200 or 300 U-boats." Perhaps Churchill believed that to be so or perhaps he deliberately inflated the threat to spur the War Cabinet and Admiralty into greater ASW measures. Whatever the case, his numbers were wildly off the mark. There was not to be that number of U-boats in combat-ready status for at least three years. surface ships but by U-boats. Shortly after taking office, he told Neville Chamberlain and the War Cabinet that within nine months-by the summer of 1940-Britain "may have to face an attack by 200 or 300 U-boats." Perhaps Churchill believed that to be so or perhaps he deliberately inflated the threat to spur the War Cabinet and Admiralty into greater ASW measures. Whatever the case, his numbers were wildly off the mark. There was not to be that number of U-boats in combat-ready status for at least three years.

Meanwhile, in view of the very small number of oceangoing U-boats in the Atlantic, the inexperience of the crews, and the complicated rules of engagement imposed by Hitler, the decision of the British to initiate convoying in the Atlantic in September may well have been premature. Convoying in the Atlantic brought much vital British trade to a temporary standstill and in the months ahead, reduced imports (in Churchill's estimate) by "about one-third." Most official and unofficial British naval historians argue that it was correct to rush to convoying, but the arguments are not based on scientific analysis of U-boat weaknesses and limitations (fuel, torpedoes) or numbers, positions, weather, and so on. A case can be made that had convoying not been initiated so precipitously, British imports would not have decreased by "one-third" in these first critical months and the hard wear and tear on the convoy escorts (battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, etc.), which led to extended yard upkeep and overhauls, could have been avoided.

The First Lord did, in fact, have second thoughts about the wisdom of convoying, according to Churchill's biographer, Martin Gilbert. He reports that at the end of ten weeks of war, November 9, Churchill was "deeply disturbed" by the "immense slowing down of trade" which convoying caused. After convening a high-level meeting on this subject, Churchill drafted a memo in which he advocated that Britain "secretly loosen up the convoy system (while boasting about it publicly), especially on the outer routes" and he commissioned two of his prewar advisers, Frederick Lindemann and Desmond Morton, to make an intricate study of the shipping problem. Gilbert did not, however, record the results of the study.

On one issue Churchill was absolutely correct in his judgment. As in World War I, he believed that Great Britain would require enormous and unstinting help from the United States to defeat Germany. He therefore welcomed an invitation from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which arrived only a few days after Churchill returned to the Admiralty, to carry on a private correspondence. This secret correspondence provided Churchill with an unprecedented avenue for encouraging Roosevelt to support Great Britain and for enticing Roosevelt ever closer to war. Churchill was to use this avenue to the fullest.

His first thoughts, of course, turned to how Roosevelt might help the Royal Navy. In particular, Churchill thought Roosevelt might be persuaded to sell Britain fleet destroyers to fill the urgent need for open-ocean escorts for convoys. Owing to the decision to build five King George V King George V-class battleships and half a dozen fleet carriers as well as Hunt Hunt-class destroyers and many corvettes, British shipyards were programmed to produce only nine fleet destroyers in the first eighteen months of the war. The idea of buying destroyers from America gradually gained momentum in the Admiralty but owing to the unfavorable political climate in America and to Roosevelt's insistence that the United States get full value in return, a full year was to elapse before a mutually satisfactory destroyer deal could be struck.

HITS AND M MISSES.

The six new Type VIIBs of the Wegener Flotilla, comprising another third of the German U-boats in the Atlantic, patrolled a larger arc west of the British Isles, reaching around to the Bay of Biscay. To the untutored eye, the VIIBs looked identical to the Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla, but, in fact, they incorporated significant technical improvements: greater length (218 feet versus 211), more powerful diesel engines (2,800 horsepower versus 2,320), greater surface speed (17.2 knots versus 16 knots), much larger fuel capacity (108 tons versus 67), heavier armament (fourteen torpedoes versus eleven),* and a single stern torpedo tube located internally. and a single stern torpedo tube located internally.