BEATS ON THE D DRUM.

By sunset on January 13, the three Type IXs of the first wave had reached their assigned positions off the East Coast of the United States. Hardegen in U-123 U-123 was near the eastern tip of Long Island; the new skipper Folkers in was near the eastern tip of Long Island; the new skipper Folkers in U-125 U-125 was off New Jersey; and Zapp in was off New Jersey; and Zapp in U-66 U-66 was east of Cape Hatteras. In the early, dark hours of January 14, Hardegen came upon the armed and loaded 9,600-ton Panamanian tanker was east of Cape Hatteras. In the early, dark hours of January 14, Hardegen came upon the armed and loaded 9,600-ton Panamanian tanker Norness Norness. In two surface attacks, he fired five electric torpedoes from close range. Three of the five hit and Norness Norness sank in shallow water, with about 100 feet of her bow sticking out. A new American destroyer in workup, sank in shallow water, with about 100 feet of her bow sticking out. A new American destroyer in workup, Ellyson Ellyson, rescued twenty-four survivors the following day.

After lying on the bottom during the day to give his crew some rest and to save fuel, on the night of January 14 Hardegen approached the outer reaches of New York Harbor in very shallow water, close enough to see the glow of lights in lower Manhattan. Somewhat awestruck by this sight-and the realization that the men of U-123 U-123 were the first German warriors to see it-Hardegen invited others to the bridge, including a propagandist-photographer, Alwin Tolle. But it was too dark and the boat was too far away for photographs. were the first German warriors to see it-Hardegen invited others to the bridge, including a propagandist-photographer, Alwin Tolle. But it was too dark and the boat was too far away for photographs.*

When the sight-seeing was done, Hardegen reversed course and cruised easterly toward deeper water, keeping Long Island on his port hand. In the early hours of January 15, the watch spotted a lighted vessel coming up astern. She was the loaded 6,800-ton British tanker Coimbra Coimbra, bound for Halifax. Hardegen closed to about 900 yards and fired two electrics. One or both hit and Coimbra Coimbra exploded in a giant fireball. She, too, sank, bow up in shallow water. Thirty-six men died; six men, all injured, were rescued. exploded in a giant fireball. She, too, sank, bow up in shallow water. Thirty-six men died; six men, all injured, were rescued.

Had Admiral Raeder sent Tirpitz Tirpitz to attack the United States, Admiral King, from his headquarters in Washington, would have directed the Atlantic Fleet commander, Royal Ingersoll, to engage and sink her. But repelling a U-boat attack against merchant shipping close off the coast called into play entirely different naval commands, which were based ashore and charged with "local defense." to attack the United States, Admiral King, from his headquarters in Washington, would have directed the Atlantic Fleet commander, Royal Ingersoll, to engage and sink her. But repelling a U-boat attack against merchant shipping close off the coast called into play entirely different naval commands, which were based ashore and charged with "local defense."

Established before the war, these commands, called "Coastal Frontiers," superseded the old Naval Districts administratively and otherwise. The Coastal Frontier commanders kept close track of naval and commercial ships sailing within their frontier. In event of hostilities the commanders were to defend the frontier, protect coastal shipping, and support the Atlantic Fleet and Army and other forces operating within the frontier.

The first, busiest, and most important of these commands was the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, soon renamed the Eastern Sea Frontier. Its area of responsibility extended north-south along the coast from the Canadian border to North Carolina and 200 miles out to sea. It was commanded by King's Naval Academy classmate (1901) sixty-three-year-old Adolphus Andrews, an able, energetic admiral and friend of the President. He had established his headquarters in the Federal Building, 90 Church Street, in downtown Manhattan, complete with an operations center, where his staff plotted all shipping on huge wall maps.

Owing to the shortage of warships, Andrews had none permanently under his command. The plan was that should the Eastern Sea Frontier come under attack by surface raider or U-boat, Andrews would call upon the Atlantic Fleet for warships. In view of that fleet's commitments to escort troop convoys and to other tasks, the prospects of help to combat U-boats were thin to nonexistent, at least until the new King convoy plan was approved. Accordingly, Andrews had mobilized and brought to war readiness what one official naval historian aptly labeled a "tatterdemalion fleet," consisting of twenty small craft: seven Coast Guard cutters (the 165-foot Dione Dione and six 125-footers), four prewar 110-foot SCs, three 200-foot, World War I and six 125-footers), four prewar 110-foot SCs, three 200-foot, World War I Eagle Eagle-class subchasers, two ancient (1905) gunboats, and four large (170- to 245-foot) converted yachts. Of these vessels, only the Norfolk-based, 16-knot, Coast Guard cutter Dione Dione, which had a single 3/50 caliber bow gun and stern depth-charge tracks, was anywhere near capable of engaging a U-boat. Moreover, only Dione Dione and two other vessels were consistently reliable mechanically. and two other vessels were consistently reliable mechanically.

Nor did Andrews command any land-based combatant aircraft with which to fight U-boats. This situation was akin to that of the Royal Navy in 1939 when the Admiralty did not yet exercise operational control of Coastal Command. This has not been understood, apparently, by many historians of the U-boat war and thus demands explanation and clarification. From the perspective of the 1990s, the story seems quaint, even a bit preposterous.

Between the World Wars, when it became obvious that aircraft had become an important instrument of warfare, American Army and Navy leaders fell into hot disputes over strategic control of military aviation. In this bureaucratic struggle, the Army won an important victory: All land-based aircraft-notably bombers of all types-were to be assigned to the Army Air Corps (from June 20, 1941, Army Air Forces), a semiautonomous branch of the Army. Under the agreement, which had the force of law, the U.S. Navy, like the Royal Navy, was restricted to capitalship- and carrier-based aircraft, big flying boats or seaplanes (such as Sunderlands, Catalinas, and Mariners), and rigid dirigibles and nonrigid blimps, plus a few non-combatant wheeled, executive, utility, and trainer aircraft based ashore.

On January 12, 1942, Admiral Ingersoll's Atlantic Fleet had under its control 150 aircraft other than those based on ships: about 100 Catalinas and about 50 scout and utility planes. The Catalinas-known as patrol bombers-were based in Iceland (8), Argentia (8), Newport, Rhode Island (6), Norfolk (38), San Juan, Puerto Rico (12), Coco Solo, Panama (24), and Natal, Brazil (6). Like the Sunderland force of the Royal Navy in 1939, the primary mission of the Catalina force was to seek out and warn of enemy capital ships (such as Tirpitz Tirpitz) that posed a threat to the Atlantic Fleet or to the Panama Canal or other important coastal installations. In addition, the sixteen Catalinas at Argentia and Iceland provided limited convoy escort between those places.

Owing to the deliveries of Catalinas to the British* under Lend-Lease and to the loss of Catalinas in the attack on Pearl Harbor, in early 1942 the Navy was desperately short of Catalinas and the newer seaplane patrol-bomber, the Mariner. In order to help overcome this shortage, King had to suspend the deliveries of Catalinas to the Royal Navy from January through March 1942. Although the deliveries were to resume in April (climbing to fifty aircraft per month), the temporary suspension annoyed the Admiralty and provided yet another reason to berate King, who sent most of the Catalina production in those months to the Pacific to replace the Catalina losses at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere. under Lend-Lease and to the loss of Catalinas in the attack on Pearl Harbor, in early 1942 the Navy was desperately short of Catalinas and the newer seaplane patrol-bomber, the Mariner. In order to help overcome this shortage, King had to suspend the deliveries of Catalinas to the Royal Navy from January through March 1942. Although the deliveries were to resume in April (climbing to fifty aircraft per month), the temporary suspension annoyed the Admiralty and provided yet another reason to berate King, who sent most of the Catalina production in those months to the Pacific to replace the Catalina losses at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere.

In view of the acute scarcity of American Catalinas in the Atlantic Ocean area, Admiral Ingersoll was unable to provide Admiral Andrews of the Eastern Sea Frontier with these aircraft for offshore hunter-killer ASW patrols, especially since no appreciable U-boat threat had yet developed in American waters. The few Catalinas that Ingersoll did bring into play in January 1942 were used principally to provide limited escort for troopship convoys. The upshot was that for inshore air patrols Andrews could mobilize only about 100 unarmed or lightly armed naval and Coast Guard aircraft and four Navy blimps, based at Lakehurst, New Jersey.

Of these craft, only the blimps were capable of sustained overwater ASW patrols and could carry enough bombs or depth charges to mount an attack on a U-boat. In June, 1940, President Roosevelt had authorized a force of forty-eight blimps for local convoy escort and ASW patrols, but only these four were combat-ready at Lakehurst on January 1, 1942, when the Navy commissioned the first combat Squadron 12.* These blimps flew forty-five ASW patrols and six convoy escort missions in January 1942. These blimps flew forty-five ASW patrols and six convoy escort missions in January 1942.

Although it seems grossly illogical-even preposterous-from this distance, in the immediate prewar years the Army Air Forces, like the RAF, was assigned the principal aircraft ASW role in American waters. This was owing to a hazy strategic doctrine under which the Army had responsibility for defending the coastlines as well as the continental United States. Although the British had shown that the RAF Coastal Command became a superior ASW arm after the Admiralty was granted operational control, President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Stimson had firmly resisted all efforts by the U.S. Navy to duplicate that arrangement in the American military establishment. One big reason was that if it were done, the U.S. Navy would inevitably push for the acquisition of the superior four-engine land-based aircraft (B-17s, B-24s) that were controlled solely by the U.S. Army Air Forces. If the Navy were allowed to acquire such aircraft, it would undermine the Army's absolute hold on strategic air power and aircraft.

On January 14, 1942, the U.S. Navy remounted its efforts to acquire and control land-based aircraft for the ASW role and for other purposes. This came in the form of a request from the chief of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics, John H. Towers, to the chief of the Army Air Forces, Henry "Hap" Arnold, for 400 long-range four-engine B-24 Liberators and 900 medium-range twin-engine B-25 Mitchells from the Army allotment. Arnold denied the request because, he wrote, he was "critically short by 1,190 planes of the barest needs to meet United States Army Air Forces requirements" and because the request raised "questions of far greater import than the possibility of diverting planes" to the Navy.

After assuming the post of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, King resubmitted this request with utmost vigor and persistence. His relentless campaign for land-based aircraft vastly irritated Secretary of War Stimson, a onetime National Guard officer, who much earlier (1911-1913) had served as Secretary of War in the Taft Administration and who fancied himself a skilled military strategist. He had developed an intense antipathy to the Navy, in particular to King, who could be a brusque and undiplomatic advocate, and to Frank Knox. Stimson's testy views about the Navy and King colored the views of the entire Army establishment.* His acid criticisms in his lengthy personal diaries have provided critics of King-British critics in particular-with much ammunition for decades. These critics seldom if ever suggest that Stimson was anything but objective and simon-pure in motive. His acid criticisms in his lengthy personal diaries have provided critics of King-British critics in particular-with much ammunition for decades. These critics seldom if ever suggest that Stimson was anything but objective and simon-pure in motive.

In rejecting King's campaign for land-based aircraft for ASW, Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold argued that the Army Air Forces were perfectly capable of carrying out the air ASW role. In fact, they held, the Army could do the job better than the Navy, which lacked the necessary infrastructure for and familiarity with land-based aircraft. President Roosevelt either believed this to be true or else chose to remain removed from this increasingly bitter inter-service debate. Whatever the reason, where a presidential ruling or guidance was obviously required, none was forthcoming. This was yet another failure by the President to appreciate the potential peril of the U-boat threat and provide firm leadership to meet it. On this issue as well, he has escaped all blame.

Hap Arnold delegated the air ASW mission on the American East Coast to Arnold N. Krogstad, chief of the 1st Bomber Command of the First Air Force. Like most air units of those frantic days, 1st Bomber Command was in a transitory stage, neither fully formed nor trained. Many of its most skilled pilots had been siphoned off to cadre the hugely expanding Army Air Forces or to more pressing combat assignments. What remained was a thin veneer of experienced men and a very large number of keen but green air crews that still required extensive training in air tactics, bombing, and navigation, manning about 100 multi-engine medium and large bombers at four airfields along the Eastern Seaboard. None of the planes was equipped with radar or depth charges. None of the airmen knew how to find and attack a U-boat or how difficult it was to sink one. As a result, there was not the slightest possibility that 1st Bomber Command could effectively carry out the air ASW role.

In compliance with his assigned mission to repel and destroy U-boats, the chief of 1st Bomber Command, Arnold Krogstad, established a headquarters in the Federal Building in Manhattan, down the corridor from Admiral Andrews's operations center. Carefully observing the separation of military forces, Krogstad set up an independent operations center, unlinked electronically or otherwise to the Eastern Sea Frontier operations center. Working in loose "cooperation" with Andrews, Krogstad had commenced ASW patrols.

The sinking of two tankers in the waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier by Reinhard Hardegen in U-123 U-123 triggered a rapid and energetic response in the Federal Building. Andrews and Krogstad deployed all available aircraft, blimps, and small craft to hunt down and kill Hardegen and his cohorts. The Navy planes and blimps patrolled near the shore; the Army planes patrolled farther out to sea. Inasmuch as nobody knew how to find and kill a U-boat, this response was futile. Communications between the various shore-based commands and airfields and the forces at sea or in the air were primitive or ineffective. triggered a rapid and energetic response in the Federal Building. Andrews and Krogstad deployed all available aircraft, blimps, and small craft to hunt down and kill Hardegen and his cohorts. The Navy planes and blimps patrolled near the shore; the Army planes patrolled farther out to sea. Inasmuch as nobody knew how to find and kill a U-boat, this response was futile. Communications between the various shore-based commands and airfields and the forces at sea or in the air were primitive or ineffective.

King's critics have excoriated him for failing to respond more promptly and aggressively to the Drumbeat U-boat threat. The most recent and vociferous critics have been Americans: Michael Gannon and Montgomery C. Meigs.* Gannon wrote that since there were twenty-five American destroyers in East Coast ports from Maine to Virginia on January 12, the Navy was derelict-or cowardly or worse-in not deploying destroyer hunter-killer groups to confront the Gannon wrote that since there were twenty-five American destroyers in East Coast ports from Maine to Virginia on January 12, the Navy was derelict-or cowardly or worse-in not deploying destroyer hunter-killer groups to confront the U-123 U-123 and the other Drumbeat U-boats. When he later discovered that four of the twenty-five destroyers ( and the other Drumbeat U-boats. When he later discovered that four of the twenty-five destroyers (Dallas, Kearny, Lea, MacLeish) were in drydock or to be used "only in an emergency," Gannon reduced the available destroyers to twenty-one in the paperback edition of his book but did not tone down his criticism of King and the Navy.

The harsh criticism Gannon leveled at the Navy on this issue is not justified. The British and American navies had long since declared the type of hunter-killer operations he proposed to be futile, wasteful, and dangerous. Most all of the twenty-one destroyers he lists were already committed to other vital tasks: * Thirteen of the twenty-one destroyers on the Gannon list were to join the battleship Texas Texas, carrier Wasp Wasp, and heavy cruiser Quincy Quincy to escort (as Task Force 15) America's first big troop convoy, AT 10, sailing from New York to Iceland and Northern Ireland on January 15. At the very last minute, that convoy was scaled back to three big troopships ( to escort (as Task Force 15) America's first big troop convoy, AT 10, sailing from New York to Iceland and Northern Ireland on January 15. At the very last minute, that convoy was scaled back to three big troopships (Chateau Thierry, Munargo, Strathaird), and four of these thirteen destroyers (Charles F. Hughes, Hilary P. Jones, Ingraham, Lansdale) were reassigned to join the cruisers Vincennes Vincennes and and Nashville Nashville to escort (as Task Force 16) another troop convoy, to escort (as Task Force 16) another troop convoy, BT BT 200, composed of seven troopships carrying 22,000 men, sailing from New York to the Pacific on January 22. 200, composed of seven troopships carrying 22,000 men, sailing from New York to the Pacific on January 22.

* Two other destroyers on the Gannon list (Mustin, O'Brien) were under orders to join three other destroyers (Anderson, Morris, Hammann) to escort the battleships Idaho, Mississippi Idaho, Mississippi, and New Mexico New Mexico, which, as related, shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific in January.

* Another destroyer on the list (Gleaves) sailed from Boston on January 15 to escort the valuable 7,000-ton destroyer tender Melville Melville to Argentia for further transfer to Londonderry, where she was to establish an American destroyer base for the new "straight through" convoys. (The to Argentia for further transfer to Londonderry, where she was to establish an American destroyer base for the new "straight through" convoys. (The Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutter Ingham Ingham also served in the escort.) also served in the escort.) * Still another destroyer (Bristol), commissioned on October 22, 1941, was en route from New York to Casco Bay, Maine, for additional workup.

* Yet another destroyer (Ellyson), commissioned on November 28, 1941, and still in workup, sailed from Newport, Rhode Island, for more sea trials and, as related, on January 14, rescued survivors of the torpedoed tanker Norness. Norness.

Gannon wrote that there was "no pressing urgency" for the sailing of the big troop convoy AT 10 on January 15 and that it "could easily have been delayed," so the original thirteen destroyers of its escort could hunt U-boats. This is not the way Washington saw it. Although they had been reduced in numbers at the last minute, the political and symbolic value of the troops bound for Iceland (Indigo) and Northern Ireland (Magnet) in AT 10 were very great. Those troops were to release other troops for combat, to deter a possible German invasion of the British Isles in the spring of 1942, and to prepare for Gymnast, partially satisfying Moscow's demands for a "second front." To have delayed the sailing of that troop convoy and the equally vital troop convoy BT 200 in order to hunt an unknown number of U-boats, which to then had sunk only two ships in waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier, would have not only vastly upset all convoy and warship schedules but also incurred the wrath of the American Army, which almost hourly pressed King to hurry troopship sailings. Besides that, the majority of the warships with convoy AT 10 were, in fact, sailing directly to Canadian waters, where there were by far the greatest number of Drumbeat U-boats.

FIRST A ACTIONS OFF C CAPE H HATTERAS.

Having achieved the psychological impact desired by sinking the tankers Norness Norness and and Coimbra Coimbra, Hardegen in U-123 U-123 cleared out of the shallow waters of New York. Southbound off New Jersey in the dark early hours of January 17, Hardegen claimed, he found and sank an unidentified 4,000-ton freighter with a single torpedo. Postwar German records credited him with the 2,000-ton American ship cleared out of the shallow waters of New York. Southbound off New Jersey in the dark early hours of January 17, Hardegen claimed, he found and sank an unidentified 4,000-ton freighter with a single torpedo. Postwar German records credited him with the 2,000-ton American ship San Jose. San Jose. But Gannon has established from official survivor reports that But Gannon has established from official survivor reports that San Jose San Jose was not torpedoed. She collided with another ship, was not torpedoed. She collided with another ship, Santa Elisa Santa Elisa, and sank. Gannon could not identify Hardegen's claimed victim. No other vessel in his area went down that night. Perhaps Hardegen happened upon the collision scene and believed that his torpedo had fatally hit San Jose San Jose or or Santa Elisa Santa Elisa, which caught fire in the collision, burned for six hours, and finally limped into New York.

Hardegen in U-123 U-123 and Richard Zapp in and Richard Zapp in U-66 U-66 reached the Cape Hatteras area almost simultaneously on January 18-19. Wading into a throng of lighted, unescorted ships, Zapp sank the loaded 6,600-ton American tanker reached the Cape Hatteras area almost simultaneously on January 18-19. Wading into a throng of lighted, unescorted ships, Zapp sank the loaded 6,600-ton American tanker Allan Jackson Allan Jackson and the 8,000-ton Canadian passenger-cargo vessel and the 8,000-ton Canadian passenger-cargo vessel Lady Hawkins. Lady Hawkins. Of the forty-eight men on the Of the forty-eight men on the Allan Jackson Allan Jackson, thirty-five died in the flaming inferno. Of the 312 crew and passengers on Lady Hawkins Lady Hawkins, about 250 were killed or died after horrible ordeals in lifeboats.

Hardegen, who had only five torpedoes left, was astounded at the dense ship traffic off Cape Hatteras. He logged that at one point he had in sight "no fewer than twenty steamers, some with their lights on." During the night of January 18-19, in a period of seven hours he claimed he sank four ships by torpedo and gun: another unidentified 4,000-ton freighter, the 5,300-ton American freighter City of Atlanta City of Atlanta, the 3,800-ton Latvian freighter Ciltvaira Ciltvaira, and the 8,200-ton American tanker Malay Malay, southbound in ballast. Postwar records listed the unidentified freighter as the 4,500-ton Brazos Brazos, but again, Gannon's research reveals that it was not so. Like San Jose, Brazos San Jose, Brazos was sunk in a collision six days earlier. was sunk in a collision six days earlier.* The sinkings of the The sinkings of the City of Atlanta City of Atlanta and and Ciltvaira Ciltvaira were confirmed, but the tanker were confirmed, but the tanker Malay Malay was only damaged and limped into Norfolk. was only damaged and limped into Norfolk.

To this point, Hardegen and Zapp had sunk three tankers and damaged another in U.S. waters. These four ships were a tiny segment of the huge and vital Allied tanker traffic on the United States East Coast. This traffic was composed of ships en route to and from the Caribbean (Aruba, Curacao, Trinidad) and the Gulf of Mexico (Texas, Louisiana) to United States East Coast ports and to Halifax to join convoys to the British Isles. Inasmuch as attacks on this traffic were to become a prominent feature of the German U-boat campaign in American waters, further details about this traffic are appropriate.

In the early days of the American oil boom, the industry shipped oil from the rich fields in Texas and Louisiana to the East Coast refineries and consumers in railroad tank cars and to closer places by barges on the Mississippi, Ohio, and other rivers, by trucks, and by short pipelines. Experience with oil tankers in the Caribbean and elsewhere demonstrated that oil or petroleum "product" (such as gasoline) could be shipped much more economically by water than by railroad. By June 1941, 95 percent of all oil brought to the East Coast from Texas and Louisiana came by ship, 3 percent by truck, barge, or pipeline, and only 2 percent by railroad cars.

By that same time, June 1941, it had become obvious to the Roosevelt administration that the movement of oil and petroleum products was to be among the most vital of wartime enterprises. Roosevelt therefore named an "oil czar," Harold I. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, to head what became the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW). Cutting its teeth on the British oil "shuttle" of 1941, when fifty American tankers were diverted to that task, PAW, working closely with the oil industry, developed a complete picture of oil problems to be expected in wartime and an array of plans and programs to overcome them.

The plans included ways to greatly increase the efficiency of existing oil transport by seagoing tankers to the East Coast ports and also new or fallback plans should that tanker fleet prove to be insufficient. The most important programs were: * The construction of about 14,000 miles of pipeline, the most economical and efficient system for moving oil. The most prominent of these was the Big Inch, a stupendous network of 24" seamless steel pipe for moving crude oil, which ran from Longview, Texas, to an existing pipeline hub, Norris City, Illinois, thence to the East Coast; in all, a distance of 1,475 miles. The pipe itself held 3.8 million barrels of oil, "a perpetual reservoir of oil moving constantly eastward," as an oil historian put it, delivering about 300,000 barrels daily. Second was the only slightly less stupendous Little Big Inch, a network of 20" pipe to move finished product (100 octane aviation gasoline, etc.), which ran from Texas to the East Coast via Seymour, Indiana. The pipe itself held 2.9 million barrels of product and delivered about 235,000 barrels daily. Third was the Plantation pipeline, which ran from Baton Rouge via Bremen, Georgia, to Greensboro, North Carolina, and was later extended to Richmond and Norfolk. This pipeline (12" to Bremen, 10" to Greensboro) delivered about 50,000 barrels a day.*

* The rehabilitation of the railroad tank-car system. On the eve of war, there were about 145,000 oil-carrying railroad tank cars scattered around the United States, with an average capacity of 215 barrels each. About 105,000 of these were involved in transporting oil or petroleum products. When war came, most of these cars were assigned to haul crude oil or product from Texas to the East Coast in special mile-long express trains composed of up to 100 cars each, transporting an aggregate of about 22,000 barrels of oil or product. The shipment of oil by railroad cars climbed spectacularly from 141,000 barrels a day in October 1941 to 585,000 barrels a day in April 1942, to 828,000 barrels a day in September 1942, to one million barrels a day (about fifty one-hundred-car trains) in March 1943.

* Dramatic improvement of oil-barge operations on rivers, lakes, and inter-coastal waterways and tanker-truck operations on highways and byways. In January 1942, United States companies had in operation 1,400 oil barges and 106,000 tanker trucks. As a result of more efficient routings and other measures, these vehicles delivered twice or more oil than theretofore. Moreover, by directing tanker trucks to take over almost all oil hauling under 200 miles on a twenty-four-hour-a-day basis in all weather, PAW freed up thousands of railroad tank cars for use in the special Texas-East Coast oil trains.

At the time of Drumbeat, when 95 percent of the oil arriving at East Coast ports came by ship, the American-registered fleet consisted of about 350 big, modern, seagoing tankers of about 3 million gross tons. About 260 of these were engaged in moving crude from Texas to the Eastern Seaboard. The sea-lanes were also crowded with British and British-controlled tankers en route from the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico to Halifax to join convoys. About 260 of these were engaged in moving crude from Texas to the Eastern Seaboard. The sea-lanes were also crowded with British and British-controlled tankers en route from the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico to Halifax to join convoys.

Upon learning of the possible arrival of U-boats in United States East Coast waters in early January, Admiral Andrews had directed that these tankers and all other coastwise shipping should travel well offshore to avoid "bunching" targets for the Germans in the usual and well-known lanes. Western Approaches at first directed British-controlled shipping to put into or remain in American ports until the U-boat picture clarified, but quickly released these vessels and routed them "evasively" to Halifax or to Bermuda for onward voyages in Halifax convoys to the British Isles. As a result, U-boats sank only one more British-owned tanker in waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier in January and February.

Low on fuel and out of torpedoes, Hardegen set a course for France. When he was well clear of the American coast, he radioed Donitz the results of his one-week foray in American waters, January 12 to January 19. It was a heavy beat on the drum: eight ships sunk for 53,060 tons, including three tankers. Counting past overclaims, Hardegen believed he had sunk "over 100,000" tons and therefore qualified for a Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz. Well pleased with this drumbeat, Admiral Raeder and Donitz replied with congratulations and the award. Well pleased with this drumbeat, Admiral Raeder and Donitz replied with congratulations and the award.*

But Hardegen was not yet done. Homebound in mid-Atlantic, he found and aggressively attacked and sank two ships with his deck gun: the 3,000-ton British freighter Culebra Culebra on January 25, and the 9,200-ton Norwegian tanker on January 25, and the 9,200-ton Norwegian tanker Pan Norway Pan Norway in ballast on January 26. in ballast on January 26. Fortunately for the fifty-one survivors of the Fortunately for the fifty-one survivors of the Pan Norway Pan Norway, an Italian freighter under Swiss charter (hence a "neutral") was close at hand and upon orders from Hardegen, she put about and rescued the Norwegians. Unfortunately for Hardegen, a bridge gun blew up during the attack on Culebra Culebra, severely wounding the propagandist Alwin Tolle. Unable to provide proper medical care, Hardegen resourcefully set up a plan with Kerneval to transfer Tolle to the inbound blockade runner Spreewald Spreewald, which had a doctor on board.

After Hardegen had cleared out of the Cape Hatteras area, Richard Zapp in U-66 U-66 returned. On January 22 and 23, he sank two loaded American freighters, the 2,300-ton returned. On January 22 and 23, he sank two loaded American freighters, the 2,300-ton Norvana Norvana (sugar) and the 8,000-ton (sugar) and the 8,000-ton Venore Venore (iron ore), and the loaded 8,100-ton British tanker (iron ore), and the loaded 8,100-ton British tanker Empire Gem. Empire Gem. Low on fuel and torpedoes, Zapp also called it a day and headed for France. In his radio report, he also claimed a heavy beat on the drum: five ships for 50,000 tons sunk, all off Cape Hatteras. His confirmed score was five ships for 33,456 tons. Counting overclaims on prior patrols, Zapp's total sinkings were about 75,000 tons, not enough for a Low on fuel and torpedoes, Zapp also called it a day and headed for France. In his radio report, he also claimed a heavy beat on the drum: five ships for 50,000 tons sunk, all off Cape Hatteras. His confirmed score was five ships for 33,456 tons. Counting overclaims on prior patrols, Zapp's total sinkings were about 75,000 tons, not enough for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, but his successes in American waters earned a "well done" from Donitz and a propaganda broadcast from Berlin.

The last of the three boats to arrive in the Cape Hatteras area was the green skipper Erich Folkers in U-125. U-125. Having been assigned initially a patrol zone east of the New Jersey coast, he had seen no traffic and was hungry for kills. He found two victims on the afternoon and evening of January 25. The first was the American tanker Having been assigned initially a patrol zone east of the New Jersey coast, he had seen no traffic and was hungry for kills. He found two victims on the afternoon and evening of January 25. The first was the American tanker Olney Olney, which had grounded on a shoal. Folkers fired a total of seven torpedoes at this sitting duck, but inexplicably, he claimed, only one hit for damage. In fact, Olney Olney reported (with relief) all seven torpedoes missed. Later that night, Folkers shot two torpedoes at the 5,700-ton American freighter reported (with relief) all seven torpedoes missed. Later that night, Folkers shot two torpedoes at the 5,700-ton American freighter West Ivis. West Ivis. This time the torpedoes worked and This time the torpedoes worked and West Ivis West Ivis sank in fourteen minutes. sank in fourteen minutes.

Low on fuel-and frustrated-Folkers set a course for France. He stated in his report to Donitz that he still had six torpedoes in his bow compartment, but that three of his four bow tubes were "out of order." Kerneval instructed Folkers to down-load torpedoes to his stern room in case he should find a worthwhile ship on the way home. Folkers complied with this unusual order, but he did not find another target. His beat on the drum was faint.

The first three Type IXs of Drumbeat to enter waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier thus hit eleven ships and sank ten in that area, from January 14 through January 24. Hardegen in U-123 U-123 sank four positively confirmed ships (two tankers); Zapp in sank four positively confirmed ships (two tankers); Zapp in U-66 U-66 sank five positively confirmed ships (two tankers); Folkers in sank five positively confirmed ships (two tankers); Folkers in U-125 U-125 sank one positively confirmed freighter. Other claimed sinkings remain conjectural. This damage was only slightly greater than that inflicted by the Japanese submarine skippers off California in December: nine merchant ships (seven tankers) hit; two tankers sunk. The damage inflicted by Axis submarines on both coasts was cause for serious concern, but not for panic. sank one positively confirmed freighter. Other claimed sinkings remain conjectural. This damage was only slightly greater than that inflicted by the Japanese submarine skippers off California in December: nine merchant ships (seven tankers) hit; two tankers sunk. The damage inflicted by Axis submarines on both coasts was cause for serious concern, but not for panic.

THE A ATTACK ON C CANADA.

In most accounts of the opening U-boat campaign in the Americas, the patrols of the twelve U-boats (two IXs, ten VIIs) committed to Canadian waters in January are seldom fully described. In fact, they inflicted almost twice the damage as did the first three Type IXs in United States waters during the same period.

Those twelve boats confronted appalling weather. Blinding blizzards raked the bleak land and seascapes. Thick ice encrusted the exposed superstructures, adding tons of destabilizing weight to the boats. Before diving, the bridge watch had to chip ice from the flanges of the main air-induction inlet so the valve would seat properly. There was small comfort below; most of the VIIs had no cold-weather heating systems. One boat recorded inside temperatures of 33 degrees Fahrenheit day after day. Unheated periscopes fogged up to the point of uselessness.

Warned by the Admiralty of the oncoming U-boat assault, the Canadian Navy and American air and naval forces in the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia area were on full alert. They added an escort group of nine vessels to convoy Halifax 169 and diverted it to the northeast. In spite of the unfavorable flying conditions, they mounted maximum air patrols.

Ernst Kals in the new Type IXC U-130 U-130, embarked on his first full-length war patrol, took position in Cabot Strait, separating Newfoundland and Cape Breton Island. On January 12, a Canadian plane found Kals on the surface and attacked with 250-pound depth charges. Fortunately for Kals and his men, the air crew botched the attack and U-130 U-130 escaped undamaged. Remaining in the strait, in the early hours of January 13, Kals opened the U-boat campaign in Canada. In two separate attacks he fired five torpedoes, got four hits, and sank two ships: the 1,600-ton Norwegian freighter escaped undamaged. Remaining in the strait, in the early hours of January 13, Kals opened the U-boat campaign in Canada. In two separate attacks he fired five torpedoes, got four hits, and sank two ships: the 1,600-ton Norwegian freighter Frisco Frisco, and the 5,400-ton Panamanian freighter Friar Rock. Friar Rock. Reporting these first successes to Donitz, Kals complained of "heavy" air cover and "tremendous" cold. Reporting these first successes to Donitz, Kals complained of "heavy" air cover and "tremendous" cold.

Hounded by the stepped-up air patrols, Kals nonetheless closed on the seaport of Sydney, Cape Breton Island, where it was believed slow convoys assembled. He surfaced on the evening of January 16 twelve miles off the coast. He observed Sydney as Hardegen had observed New York City. Like New York, Sydney was brightly lighted. But no convoys emerged. Earlier, on January 9, after the departure of Slow Convoy 64, Sydney had "closed" for the winter and the assembly of all convoys had been shifted to Halifax.

Kals nearly came to grief the next day. Two "destroyers" found U-130 U-130 on the surface. When one turned to ram, Kals crash-dived just in time. However, the ice-caked main induction did not seat properly and eight tons of ice water flooded the engine room, dragging on the surface. When one turned to ram, Kals crash-dived just in time. However, the ice-caked main induction did not seat properly and eight tons of ice water flooded the engine room, dragging U-130 U-130 to the bottom at 157 feet. Perhaps because the "destroyer's" depth-charge racks were iced up, no attack ensued. After pumping out the excess water, Kals surfaced and ran out to sea. In response to a message from Donitz giving to the bottom at 157 feet. Perhaps because the "destroyer's" depth-charge racks were iced up, no attack ensued. After pumping out the excess water, Kals surfaced and ran out to sea. In response to a message from Donitz giving U-130 U-130 "freedom of action," Kals, who had a good supply of fuel, immediately departed Canadian waters for the warmer and safer waters off Cape Hatteras. On the way there he sank the 8,200-ton Norwegian tanker "freedom of action," Kals, who had a good supply of fuel, immediately departed Canadian waters for the warmer and safer waters off Cape Hatteras. On the way there he sank the 8,200-ton Norwegian tanker Alexandra Alexandra Hoegh, which was sailing alone well offshore. Hoegh, which was sailing alone well offshore.

The other big boat in Newfoundland waters, the Type IXB U-109 U-109, commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt, experienced similar difficulties from the brutal weather and maddening torpedo problems as well. Patrolling off the south coast of Nova Scotia, Bleichrodt found a 5,000-ton freighter hove to, apparently waiting for a pilot to guide her into Yarmouth. In five separate approaches on this sitting duck, Bleichrodt fired five torpedoes from about 600 yards. All torpedoes inexplicably failed or missed, a demoralizing experience for Bleichrodt, who had not sunk a ship on holder Heinrich Bleichrodt, experienced similar difficulties from the brutal weather and maddening torpedo problems as well. Patrolling off the south coast of Nova Scotia, Bleichrodt found a 5,000-ton freighter hove to, apparently waiting for a pilot to guide her into Yarmouth. In five separate approaches on this sitting duck, Bleichrodt fired five torpedoes from about 600 yards. All torpedoes inexplicably failed or missed, a demoralizing experience for Bleichrodt, who had not sunk a ship on U-109 U-109 since taking command of her the previous May. In view of the "heavy" ASW measures and miserable weather in Canadian waters, and the size and clumsiness of since taking command of her the previous May. In view of the "heavy" ASW measures and miserable weather in Canadian waters, and the size and clumsiness of U-109 U-109, doubtless Bleichrodt would have also welcomed a shift to Cape Hatteras, but the IXB U-109 U-109 lacked the fuel capacity of the IXC lacked the fuel capacity of the IXC U-130 U-130 (165 tons versus 208 tons) and he had to stay put and endure the hardships. Before setting off for home, Bleichrodt sank one confirmed ship in Canadian waters, the 4,900-ton British freighter (165 tons versus 208 tons) and he had to stay put and endure the hardships. Before setting off for home, Bleichrodt sank one confirmed ship in Canadian waters, the 4,900-ton British freighter Thirlby. Thirlby.*

The ten Type VIIs assigned to Canadian waters patrolled a wide section of the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia coastlines, conserving fuel to the greatest extent possible. The Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Erich Topp in holder Erich Topp in U-552 U-552, who also carried a propagandist-photographer, bagged the first ship on January 15, the 4,100-ton British freighter Dayrose Dayrose, sailing alone off Cape Race on the Avalon Peninsula, Newfoundland. But it took five torpedoes to sink her: three failed or missed, only two hit.

Cruising directly off St. John's over the next several days-his periscopes damaged by ice-Topp had more torpedo difficulties. On January 17, he attacked a freighter escorted by two "destroyers." Three more torpedoes failed or missed; a "destroyer" counterattacked and drove him off. The next day, off St. John's, he intercepted the 2,600-ton American freighter Frances Salman. Frances Salman. Again it took Topp five torpedoes to sink his victim; three missed or failed, only two hit. On the night following, Topp conducted a gun attack on what he described as a "10,000-ton Greek freighter," firing 126 rounds. He claimed she went down, but the sinking could not be confirmed in Allied records. Having shot thirteen torpedoes to sink two (confirmed) ships for 6,722 tons, Topp set a course for home, furious at the nine torpedo failures or misses and the meager return for the time and risk invested and extreme discomfort endured. Again it took Topp five torpedoes to sink his victim; three missed or failed, only two hit. On the night following, Topp conducted a gun attack on what he described as a "10,000-ton Greek freighter," firing 126 rounds. He claimed she went down, but the sinking could not be confirmed in Allied records. Having shot thirteen torpedoes to sink two (confirmed) ships for 6,722 tons, Topp set a course for home, furious at the nine torpedo failures or misses and the meager return for the time and risk invested and extreme discomfort endured.

Two other Type VII boats, both on maiden patrols, departed Canadian waters at about the same time. The first was Joachim Berger in U-87 U-87, who had sunk a tanker en route to Canada. On January 17 Berger attacked another tanker, the 8,100-ton Norwegian Nyholt Nyholt, with torpedoes and gun. The ship went down, but during the action U-87 U-87 was herself, in Berger's words, badly "shot up," forcing him to abort to France. The other boat was Friedrich-Hermann Praetorius's was herself, in Berger's words, badly "shot up," forcing him to abort to France. The other boat was Friedrich-Hermann Praetorius's U-135. U-135. He sank no ships in Canadian waters, but on his way home he got the impressive 9,600-ton Belgian freighter He sank no ships in Canadian waters, but on his way home he got the impressive 9,600-ton Belgian freighter Gandia Gandia, a straggler from convoy Outbound North 54, which had been scattered by winter storms.

Of the remaining seven Type VIIs in Canadian waters, Karl Thurmann in U-553 U-553 was the most successful. In spite of seven torpedo "misses" (he reported), he sank two big tankers for 17,366 tons: the 9,106-ton British was the most successful. In spite of seven torpedo "misses" (he reported), he sank two big tankers for 17,366 tons: the 9,106-ton British Diala Diala and the 8,260-ton Norwegian and the 8,260-ton Norwegian Inneroy. Inneroy. Peter Cremer in the new Peter Cremer in the new U-333 U-333 ranked second in tonnage, sinking three freighters (with four torpedoes) for 14,045 tons. Third was another new skipper, Hans Oestermann in ranked second in tonnage, sinking three freighters (with four torpedoes) for 14,045 tons. Third was another new skipper, Hans Oestermann in U-754 U-754, who sank four freighters (two British, two Greek) for 11,386 tons. Walter Schug in the new U-86 U-86, who also had a close call from a Canadian aircraft, sank a crippled 4,300-ton Greek freighter and severely damaged the 8,600-ton British tanker Toorak. Toorak. On the way home he attacked another tanker, but the torpedoes failed or missed. The On the way home he attacked another tanker, but the torpedoes failed or missed. The Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Rolf Mutzelburg in holder Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 sank two ships, including, awkwardly, a Portuguese neutral, but in aggregate, the two came to a mere 2,000 tons. Two other skippers, Horst Uphoff in sank two ships, including, awkwardly, a Portuguese neutral, but in aggregate, the two came to a mere 2,000 tons. Two other skippers, Horst Uphoff in U-84 U-84 and Horst Degen in and Horst Degen in U-701 U-701, who had sunk a ship en route to Canada, sank no ships in Canadian waters. When he got home, Donitz harshly criticized Degen for his "awkward temerity," for wasting torpedoes, and for not conducting a more thorough search for his first watch officer after he was washed overboard early in the patrol.

In addition to these sinkings in Canadian waters, some of these VIIs caused American naval authorities gray hairs. The battleship Arkansas Arkansas, the "jeep" carrier Long Island Long Island, the light cruiser Philadelphia Philadelphia, and the new, small seaplane tender Barnegat Barnegat, with appropriate destroyer escort, were at Argentia, Newfoundland, preparing to sail to the States January 18. Upon learning of the sinking of the freighter Dayrose Dayrose and trawler and trawler Catalina Catalina on January 15 off Cape Race, merely sixty miles from Argentia, American naval authorities sent an eight-ship hunter-killer group, consisting of four American destroyers ( on January 15 off Cape Race, merely sixty miles from Argentia, American naval authorities sent an eight-ship hunter-killer group, consisting of four American destroyers (Badger, Ellis, Ericsson, Greer) and four Canadian corvettes to Cape Race to attack and drive off U-boats and assure a safe passage for the big ships. Owing to further sinkings by U-boats off Cape Race and to the inability of the Allied warships to find and to kill U-boats, the sailing of Arkansas, Long Island Arkansas, Long Island, et al., had to be postponed to January 22.

Because of fuel limitations, by January 22 all ten Type VIIs of the first wave in Canadian waters had commenced the long, slow, arduous voyage home, as had Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109, who was ordered to follow a southerly course and scout the island of Bermuda. The VIIs had caused shock and not a little chaos in Canadian waters, but the prolonged travel time, miserable weather, strong ASW measures, and exceptionally large number of torpedo failures had resulted in disappointing returns. Even so, counting sinkings en route to and from Canada, the ten VIIs had bagged a total of eighteen confirmed ships for 85,400 tons. The two confirmed victories by Kals in U-130 U-130 and one each by Bleichrodt in and one each by Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109 and Hardegen in and Hardegen in U-123 U-123 brought the total sinkings in Canadian waters by all U-boats of the first wave to twenty-two. brought the total sinkings in Canadian waters by all U-boats of the first wave to twenty-two.

Having come down to Cape Hatteras from Canada-and sunk a big tanker en route-Ernst Kals in the Type IXC U-130 U-130, was the fourth and last U-boat of the first wave to directly invade United States waters. He found good hunting. According to Allied records, on January 22 he sank the 5,300-ton Panamanian-registered tanker Olympic. Olympic. Swinging north to the coast of New Jersey, on the night of January 25 he sank the loaded 9,300-ton Norwegian tanker Swinging north to the coast of New Jersey, on the night of January 25 he sank the loaded 9,300-ton Norwegian tanker Varanger. Varanger. The explosion rattled windows ashore, thirty-five miles away. Returning to the Cape Hatteras area on January 27, he hit and blew up the 7,100-ton American tanker The explosion rattled windows ashore, thirty-five miles away. Returning to the Cape Hatteras area on January 27, he hit and blew up the 7,100-ton American tanker Francis E. Powell. Francis E. Powell. Having exhausted all torpedoes, Kals attacked yet another 7,000-ton American tanker, Having exhausted all torpedoes, Kals attacked yet another 7,000-ton American tanker, Halo Halo, with his deck gun, but she got away.

Homebound to France, Kals reported his claims to Donitz: six ships for about 48,000 tons, including four tankers plus damage to a fifth tanker. Postwar accounting credited him with six confirmed sinkings (four tankers) for 37,000 tons. Disallowing Hardegen's two unidentified freighters, for which no official confirmation has yet been found, Kals-making his first full war patrol-sank more ships in North American waters than any other skipper. Counting the three ships for 15,000 tons he had sunk on his seventeen-day voyage from Kiel to Lorient in early December, his total score-nine confirmed ships for 52,000 tons-was one of the best starts by any skipper in the war. As with Hardegen and Zapp, Berlin propagandists gave Kals prominent play.

Per orders, Ritterkreuz holder Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in Heinrich Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109 scouted Bermuda on his way home, but found no targets. The diversion used more fuel than anyone anticipated, so much, Bleichrodt reported, that scouted Bermuda on his way home, but found no targets. The diversion used more fuel than anyone anticipated, so much, Bleichrodt reported, that U-109 U-109 could not make it back to France. In response, Kerneval directed Kals in could not make it back to France. In response, Kerneval directed Kals in U-130 U-130 to rendezvous with to rendezvous with U-109 U-109 and transfer fuel. While waiting at the rendezvous point, Kals spotted the 8,000-ton British freighter and transfer fuel. While waiting at the rendezvous point, Kals spotted the 8,000-ton British freighter Tacoma Star Tacoma Star, but he had no torpedoes. He obligingly tracked the ship, homing in Bleichrodt in U-109. U-109. When Bleichrodt arrived on February 1, he sank the ship, then took on fuel from When Bleichrodt arrived on February 1, he sank the ship, then took on fuel from U-130. U-130. Thanks to Kals for tracking and for fuel, Bleichrodt was able to sink two more ships by torpedo and gun on his way back to France: the 11,300-ton Canadian tanker Thanks to Kals for tracking and for fuel, Bleichrodt was able to sink two more ships by torpedo and gun on his way back to France: the 11,300-ton Canadian tanker Montrolite Montrolite and a 3,500-ton Panamanian freighter. With these victories, Bleichrodt claimed five ships for 33,700 tons. Postwar accounting gave him four confirmed ships for 27,700 tons on this patrol-his first sinkings in fifteen months. and a 3,500-ton Panamanian freighter. With these victories, Bleichrodt claimed five ships for 33,700 tons. Postwar accounting gave him four confirmed ships for 27,700 tons on this patrol-his first sinkings in fifteen months.

Homebound to France from Canadian waters, Peter Cremer in the new Type VII U-333 U-333, who had sunk three ships for 14,000 tons, came upon a lone, zigzagging freighter on January 31. He submerged and closed to 400 yards to look her over. Concluding she was British, Cremer hit her with his last two torpedoes. After the first torpedo struck, the ship radioed an SOS SOS in plain language, identifying herself as the British in plain language, identifying herself as the British Brittany. Brittany. She was actually the 5,100-ton German blockade runner She was actually the 5,100-ton German blockade runner Spreewald Spreewald, homebound from the Far East with a cargo of 3,365 tons of rubber, 250 tons of tin, and eighty-six British prisoners of war she had received from the German merchant-ship raider Kormoran. Kormoran.*

From the open radio broadcasts, Donitz and the OKM divined the error immediately. The OKM was furious. Given the "dire raw materials situation," the OKM's diarist fumed, the loss of Spreewald Spreewald's cargo "by an unforgivable error" was "extremely painful." Donitz, too, was angry; the incident had tarnished the glorious success of Drumbeat. When he learned from Cremer that U-333 U-333 was the shooter, Donitz directed that upon his arrival, Cremer was to be court-martialed for "disobedience in action, manslaughter, and damage to military property." was the shooter, Donitz directed that upon his arrival, Cremer was to be court-martialed for "disobedience in action, manslaughter, and damage to military property."

Meanwhile Donitz set in motion a massive sea and air rescue. Cremer in U-333 U-333, Hardegen in U-123 U-123 (who was looking for (who was looking for Spreewald Spreewald to transfer the wounded propagandist), and Gunther Heydemann in to transfer the wounded propagandist), and Gunther Heydemann in U-575 U-575 (who was to escort (who was to escort Spreewald Spreewald into France) were first on the scene. Three other Type VIIs, inbound from Canada, arrived next. Then came two boats outbound to North America, including the Type IXB into France) were first on the scene. Three other Type VIIs, inbound from Canada, arrived next. Then came two boats outbound to North America, including the Type IXB U-105 U-105, commanded by a new skipper, Heinrich Schuch. Lastly, five Condors from France searched a large area around the reported position. Owing to fuel shortages, the inbound boats were unable to search extensively and Hardegen in U-123 U-123 soon proceeded onward to Lorient; the propagandist survived his injuries. soon proceeded onward to Lorient; the propagandist survived his injuries.

Forty-eight hours after the sinking, on the afternoon of February 2, Schuch in U-105 U-105 found survivors in three lifeboats and three rafts: twenty-five of sixty Germans and fifty-five of the eighty-six British POWs. Another lifeboat, containing found survivors in three lifeboats and three rafts: twenty-five of sixty Germans and fifty-five of the eighty-six British POWs. Another lifeboat, containing Spreewald Spreewald's captain and twenty other German sailors, had separated and could not be found. Schuch put the eighty survivors below and headed for France at full speed. When he reported that one German survivor was gravely injured, Donitz sent out a Dornier seaplane to pick him up. However, while landing in the rough sea, the seaplane broke off a wing and Schuch had to rescue the airmen as well. Other outbound boats searched for the missing Germans from Spreewald Spreewald, but they were never found.

When Cremer in U-333 U-333 arrived in Lorient on February 9, he faced an instant court-martial. However, after all the technicalities had been entered and analyzed, Donitz's first staff officer, Gunter Hessler, rose to Cremer's defense. The sinking was indeed regrettable, but the simple fact was that the disguised arrived in Lorient on February 9, he faced an instant court-martial. However, after all the technicalities had been entered and analyzed, Donitz's first staff officer, Gunter Hessler, rose to Cremer's defense. The sinking was indeed regrettable, but the simple fact was that the disguised Spreewald Spreewald was not where she was supposed to be. Therefore Cremer was not at fault. That Cremer had conducted an outstanding maiden patrol and showed great promise weighed heavily in his favor. The court acquitted him; everyone involved was sworn to secrecy. The was not where she was supposed to be. Therefore Cremer was not at fault. That Cremer had conducted an outstanding maiden patrol and showed great promise weighed heavily in his favor. The court acquitted him; everyone involved was sworn to secrecy. The Spreewald Spreewald affair remained hushed up for years. affair remained hushed up for years.*

Notwithstanding the disappointing returns of the VIIs and IXs in Canadian waters and the Spreewald Spreewald incident, Donitz-and Berlin propagandists-pronounced the first foray of U-boats into North American waters a great success, as indeed it was. Counting ships sunk en route to and from North America, the five Type IXs had sunk twenty-three for about 150,000 tons. Combined with the eighteen sinkings for about 85,000 tons by the VIIs, the total was forty-one ships for about 236,000 tons, plus damage to several others. The sinkings included thirteen tankers, eight of them British or British-controlled. incident, Donitz-and Berlin propagandists-pronounced the first foray of U-boats into North American waters a great success, as indeed it was. Counting ships sunk en route to and from North America, the five Type IXs had sunk twenty-three for about 150,000 tons. Combined with the eighteen sinkings for about 85,000 tons by the VIIs, the total was forty-one ships for about 236,000 tons, plus damage to several others. The sinkings included thirteen tankers, eight of them British or British-controlled.

In return, not a single U-boat had been lost; only one, Berger's U-87 U-87, had incurred serious damage from Allied forces.

EXPLOITING B BRITISH A ANTISUBMARINE T TECHNOLOGY.

The British continued to badger the Americans to organize convoys on the United States East Coast. Toward that end, Churchill and Pound offered Roosevelt and King, in addition to the ten corvettes, twenty-four British ASW trawlers, as well as ten motor torpedo boats under construction in Canada. King eagerly accepted the twenty-four trawlers but declined the Canadian vessels because the "Sixty Ships in Sixty Days" were to be completed long before the Canadian vessels, or so it was thought. but declined the Canadian vessels because the "Sixty Ships in Sixty Days" were to be completed long before the Canadian vessels, or so it was thought.

The British War Cabinet sent several military missions to the United States. Their purpose was to give the Americans the benefit of the British experience with U-boats and find out if the Americans were "really short of escort craft on the East Coast," and if, as suspected, King was siphoning off the destroyers released from the North Atlantic run to reinforce the Pacific Fleet. Predictably, the reports of these missions were uniformly negative. The Americans had not yet learned how difficult it was to find and kill a U-boat. There was little to no coordination between the air and naval forces-no single operations center. In total numbers, the air and naval ASW forces were "quite inadequate." There was as yet no single guiding hand within the U.S. Navy to formulate ASW tactical doctrine and to prescribe training methods and to coordinate R&D for new weaponry. The weaponry available was inadequate to the task. For example, American depth charges had a maximum depth setting of only 300 feet.

All this was undeniable. The reports later provided rich grist for those historians who sought to make the case that the Americans had "learned nothing" from the British experience with U-boats and/or that they-and King-had failed to grasp or were oblivious to the U-boat threat. But the reports failed to take notice of the very large number of ASW measures underway in America over and above the massive ship and aircraft building and repair programs. A great many of these ASW measures were a direct outgrowth of the British experience: * T THE M MOBILIZATION OF S SCIENCE. Emulating the British example, in June 1940, America had mobilized its huge scientific and engineering community to assist the military. President Roosevelt had established the National Defense Research Committee, chaired by Dr. Vannevar Bush. Composed of a glittering array of eminent scientists, the committee had recruited thousands of willing scientists and engineers who had fanned out through the military establishments to contribute their talent to the war effort or who pursued military projects in their own institutions and laboratories. Emulating the British example, in June 1940, America had mobilized its huge scientific and engineering community to assist the military. President Roosevelt had established the National Defense Research Committee, chaired by Dr. Vannevar Bush. Composed of a glittering array of eminent scientists, the committee had recruited thousands of willing scientists and engineers who had fanned out through the military establishments to contribute their talent to the war effort or who pursued military projects in their own institutions and laboratories.

The Navy bureaus and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) did not always welcome this outside talent with open arms. Many of the civilian scientists met calculated hostility. Nonetheless, by the time America entered the war the Vannevar Bush committee or its offshoots had launched a great array of ASW projects, based upon the work of British or American scientists, engineers, and mathematicians, some of whom had adopted the new British technique of "operations research."

* R RADAR. Based on the British cavity magnetron, American R&D on radar had grown enormously. By January 1, 1942, MIT's Radiation Laboratory had fifty different radar projects in the works. However, quantity production of centimetric-wavelength radar for naval ships and aircraft proved difficult. According to one authority, Based on the British cavity magnetron, American R&D on radar had grown enormously. By January 1, 1942, MIT's Radiation Laboratory had fifty different radar projects in the works. However, quantity production of centimetric-wavelength radar for naval ships and aircraft proved difficult. According to one authority,* "not a single microwave [centimetric] set was in use" on January 1, 1942. But the groundwork was well laid and the breakthroughs came quickly. On February 17, the Navy contracted for mass production of a 300-pound airborne (air to surface) centimetric-wavelength radar, Model AS-G (known colloquially as "George"), which could detect a coastline at a range of 100 miles, convoys at eighty-five miles, and surfaced U-boats at nine miles or more. Contracts for powerful long-range shipborne (surface to surface) centimetric-wavelength radar (Model S-G, also called "George") followed almost immediately. "not a single microwave [centimetric] set was in use" on January 1, 1942. But the groundwork was well laid and the breakthroughs came quickly. On February 17, the Navy contracted for mass production of a 300-pound airborne (air to surface) centimetric-wavelength radar, Model AS-G (known colloquially as "George"), which could detect a coastline at a range of 100 miles, convoys at eighty-five miles, and surfaced U-boats at nine miles or more. Contracts for powerful long-range shipborne (surface to surface) centimetric-wavelength radar (Model S-G, also called "George") followed almost immediately.

* H HUFF D DUFF. Encouraged by the work of British and French radio engineers, as well as American specialists in that field, the NRL was pursuing with highest priority R&D on a High Frequency Direction Finder (Huff Duff) for ship-board installation. Spearheaded by the NRL's Maxwell K. Goldstein, who worked in collaboration with engineers at International Telephone and Radio Laboratories, the R&D led to a set, designated Model DAQ. It, together with the British Model FH-3, was installed in the new destroyer Encouraged by the work of British and French radio engineers, as well as American specialists in that field, the NRL was pursuing with highest priority R&D on a High Frequency Direction Finder (Huff Duff) for ship-board installation. Spearheaded by the NRL's Maxwell K. Goldstein, who worked in collaboration with engineers at International Telephone and Radio Laboratories, the R&D led to a set, designated Model DAQ. It, together with the British Model FH-3, was installed in the new destroyer Corry Corry in the early months of 1942 for comparative tests. in the early months of 1942 for comparative tests.

The upshot was the development of yet another American set, DAR, which was put into "mass" production in the late summer of 1942. In Goldstein's words, the DAR was an extensively modernized version of the British FH-3. While it utilized "most of the basic components" of the FH-3, the DAR incorporated "the complete use of U.S. tubes, stabilization of the radio frequency oscillator, a new 'on course' indicator of the cathode-ray type and a new power supply (with speaker) of compact design."

The DAR (and its variations) was to become one of the most effective ASW "tools" of World War II. Parallel to its development, engineers at the NRL and at International Telephone and Radio Laboratories produced an equally effective land-based Huff Duff, Model DAJ.

* D DEPTH C CHARGES. As the British reports noted, American depth charges had an unacceptable depth limit of 300 feet. American scientists discovered other faults. The charges sank too slowly and followed an erratic underwater trajectory. The warheads were too weak. A crash R&D program was already underway to produce depth charges with 600-foot depth limits, faster sinking rates, improved trajectories, and 50 percent more explosive power, by substituting the British-developed Torpex for TNT. Two reliable standard depth charges for surface vessels were soon to emerge: the Mark VII, with a 600-pound warhead, and the Mark IX, with a 300-pound warhead. The big Mark VII could only be rolled from the stern tracks. The smaller Mark IX could be rolled from stern tracks or fired from Y guns or the improved K guns. As the British reports noted, American depth charges had an unacceptable depth limit of 300 feet. American scientists discovered other faults. The charges sank too slowly and followed an erratic underwater trajectory. The warheads were too weak. A crash R&D program was already underway to produce depth charges with 600-foot depth limits, faster sinking rates, improved trajectories, and 50 percent more explosive power, by substituting the British-developed Torpex for TNT. Two reliable standard depth charges for surface vessels were soon to emerge: the Mark VII, with a 600-pound warhead, and the Mark IX, with a 300-pound warhead. The big Mark VII could only be rolled from the stern tracks. The smaller Mark IX could be rolled from stern tracks or fired from Y guns or the improved K guns.

* E EXPENDABLE S SONOBUOYS. British scientists had proposed an ingenious device, the sonic- or sonobuoy, which was designed to be tossed from a merchant ship or escort during a suspected or actual U-boat attack. Fitted with a miniaturized hydrophone and a radio transmitter, the sonobuoy would float free to the rear of the convoy, where it could pick up the noise of a submerged submarine and send a warning signal. British scientists had proposed an ingenious device, the sonic- or sonobuoy, which was designed to be tossed from a merchant ship or escort during a suspected or actual U-boat attack. Fitted with a miniaturized hydrophone and a radio transmitter, the sonobuoy would float free to the rear of the convoy, where it could pick up the noise of a submerged submarine and send a warning signal.

The British did not pursue the sonobuoy, but the Americans, believing the device had great potential, had launched a large R&D program to produce improved sonobuoys for aircraft. Upon reaching the suspected area of a submarine or after detecting one by sight, the aircraft was to drop a pattern of sonobuoys. Since each buoy was to have a different coded signal, the aircraft would be able to follow the submerged moves of the submarine and set up an attack based on the detected movement, and/or call in surface forces to assist in the attack.

* A AIR-DROPPED W WEAPONS. By the time the United States entered the war, the British, but not the Americans, had developed an aerial depth-charge pistol with a shallow setting of about twenty-five feet for attacking surfaced or crash diving U-boats. Profiting from British technology, the Americans hastened to fit a version of this pistol to the 250-pound Mark XVII aerial depth charge. Moreover, by substituting British-developed Torpex for TNT, the Americans increased the lethality of the aerial depth charge by 50 percent. By the time the United States entered the war, the British, but not the Americans, had developed an aerial depth-charge pistol with a shallow setting of about twenty-five feet for attacking surfaced or crash diving U-boats. Profiting from British technology, the Americans hastened to fit a version of this pistol to the 250-pound Mark XVII aerial depth charge. Moreover, by substituting British-developed Torpex for TNT, the Americans increased the lethality of the aerial depth charge by 50 percent.

Aware from the British experience that aircraft attacks on U-boats had not been very successful, American scientists sought a more sophisticated device for killing fast-diving U-boats. The upshot was a small, smart, acoustic airborne torpedo that, after entering the water, "homed" on the noise of the submerged U-boat.

Declared feasible in December 1941, scientists and engineers at the Harvard Underwater Sound Laboratory, the Columbia University Underwater Sound Laboratory, the Navy's David Taylor Model Basin, General Electric, and Western Electric and its subsidiary Bell Laboratories pursued this weapon with the highest priority in utmost secrecy using the cover name "Mark XXIV Mine." Informally known as "Fido," this weapon was ready for use in merely twelve months. It would prove to be one of the most effective ASW devices produced during the war, so successful that the original order for 10,000 torpedoes was cut back to 4,000.

The "Fido" was seven feet long and seventeen inches in diameter. It weighed 680 pounds and had a 92-pound Torpex warhead. It could "chase" a submerged U-boat for ten minutes at a maximum speed of 12 knots. Since a U-boat could outsmart Fido by surfacing and running away at high speed on diesels, the characteristics of Fido remained very secret throughout the war, to the point that the weapon could not be employed except on a fully submerged U-boat, and not even then if an Allied ship or another U-boat was on the surface nearby.

* L LORAN. The British experience had demonstrated that a means of all-weather navigation was essential for reporting positions of sighted U-boats, for more effective rendezvous of convoys with air and surface escorts, for evasive maneuvers of convoys, and for other military purposes. The British experience had demonstrated that a means of all-weather navigation was essential for reporting positions of sighted U-boats, for more effective rendezvous of convoys with air and surface escorts, for evasive maneuvers of convoys, and for other military purposes.

In October 1940, an American scientist, Alfred Loomis, proposed an electronic navigation system which was based on radio pulses emitted in a certain way by shore-based transmitters. In early 1941 a team at MIT's Radiation Laboratory, headed by Melville Eastham, pursued this proposal and by September of that year had demonstrated its feasibility. Known as Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN), the system proved to be capable of providing nearly precise navigational fixes up to 700 miles from the shore-based transmitters in daytime and 1,400 miles at night in any weather. Soon after America entered the war, the Army and Navy established five LORAN transmitting stations in Canada and Greenland, for the benefit of the North Atlantic convoy network. From this beginning, the LORAN system was to spread over half the globe.

* M MAGNETIC A AIRBORNE D DETECTOR (MAD). (MAD). American scientists had suggested before the war that the mass of metal of a submerged submarine could probably be detected from a low-flying aircraft equipped with a magnetometer. In October 1941, a Catalina equipped with primitive MAD gear verified the theory and by the time America entered the war, a very large MAD R&D program was underway to intensify the sensitivity of the magnetometer. An improved MAD had been installed in a blimp based on the East Coast and sets were being installed in other blimps. American scientists had suggested before the war that the mass of metal of a submerged submarine could probably be detected from a low-flying aircraft equipped with a magnetometer. In October 1941, a Catalina equipped with primitive MAD gear verified the theory and by the time America entered the war, a very large MAD R&D program was underway to intensify the sensitivity of the magnetometer. An improved MAD had been installed in a blimp based on the East Coast and sets were being installed in other blimps.

Upon getting a MAD contact, the blimp dropped floating flares or lights to mark the course of the submerged submarine so that it or other ASW forces could set up an attack. To make the flares and lights fall vertically-and accurately-they were fired backward at a speed equal to the forward motion of the blimp. R&D was underway to reduce the weight of MAD gear so that units could be mounted on each wingtip of fixed-wing aircraft, to provide improved "directionality," and for a Magnetic Airborne Bomb Sight (MABS). The latter was to compensate for the forward speed of the aircraft and automatically fire bombs or rockets rearward which, like the flares and lights, were to fall vertically to the target.

* S SONAR AND S SONAR P PRESENTATION. Apart from work underway to greatly increase the power and sophistication of sonar, American scientists had urged development of an electronic "plotter," which would simplify the difficult job of tracking and attacking submarines for the benefit of the unskilled reserves who were to man most of the Navy's ships. The answer from the laboratories was the important Antisubmarine Course Plotter. Based on electronic inputs from the sonar and from the gyro compass and the pit log of the surface vessel, it automatically displayed on a cathode-ray tube the track of the submarine and the track of the attacking surface ship. Apart from work underway to greatly increase the power and sophistication of sonar, American scientists had urged development of an electronic "plotter," which would simplify the difficult job of tracking and attacking submarines for the benefit of the unskilled reserves who were to man most of the Navy's ships. The answer from the laboratories was the important Antisubmarine Course Plotter. Based on electronic inputs from the sonar and from the gyro compass and the pit log of the surface vessel, it automatically displayed on a cathode-ray tube the track of the submarine and the track of the attacking surface ship.

These and many other new devices were in due course to immeasurably assist the Allies in the U-boat war, but, as the British reports noted, there remained the absence of a single guiding hand to direct the Navy's ASW effort. An important step to remedy this deficiency was taken on February 7, 1942-as the first wave of Drumbeat U-boats was arriving back in France. On that date Atlantic Fleet commander Royal Ingersoll established in Boston what was called the Atlantic Fleet ASW Unit, commanded by Wilder D. Baker, an experienced destroyerman and escort-group commander, detached from the North Atlantic convoy run.

The purpose of the Baker group was to develop and standardize tactics, weaponry, and training for killing U-boats. At King's direction or invitation, all Sea Frontiers and the Army Air Forces attached liaison officers to the unit. At Baker's invitation, ten men skilled in "operations research" from a division of the National Defense Research Committee, known as the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG), joined his unit. Soon after the unit was staffed, King transferred it from Boston to his headquarters in Washington, and bestowed upon it extraordinary powers.

Emulating the British example in its earliest days, the Baker group produced manuals for carrying out attacks on U-boats and also for "attack teachers." The latter were elaborate hands-on layouts to simulate battles versus U-boats. Evolved from "a few" imported British models, the American attack teachers were produced by three firms: General Electric, Sangamo, and the Submarine Signal Company. As in the Royal Navy, the U.S. Navy required that all American officers involved with ASW had to master the intricacies of the attack teacher.

At the Federal Building in downtown Manhattan, meanwhile, Admiral Andrews and General Krogstad had to improvise with the inadequate "tools" at hand. The "tatterdemalion fleet" of the Eastern Sea Frontier, augmented by a few Navy minesweepers, tugboats, and other utility craft-whatever could get to sea-patrolled close offshore, but these little ships were so busy searching for and picking up survivors of the many torpedoed ships that they had little time for hunting and fighting U-boats. The Navy and Coast Guard aircraft and blimps patrolled the inner shipping lanes. Krogstad's keen but green bomber pilots, alternating basic bomber training with ASW patrols, reconnoitered lanes further offshore. Several air crews found and attacked what they believed to be U-boats, but these contacts were doubtless products of overactive imaginations.

The British continued to pressure King to initiate convoying on the United States East Coast. However, King, Ingersoll, Andrews, and all other senior naval officers resisted this pressure because they did not believe, as the British did, that inadequately escorted cargo convoys were better than no convoys at all. The American view had been formed to a great extent by the severe British shipping losses in the thinly escorted North Atlantic convoys of the summer and fall of 1940 and on the losses in the fall of 1941 on the North Atlantic run when inadequately trained and equipped Canadian vessels served as convoy escort. The abort of the Canadian-escorted Slow Convoy 52 in Newfoundland waters in early November 1941 was still vivid in American minds and doubtless influenced King and others.

In his attack on the U.S. Navy, historian Michael Gannon argues that inasmuch as Donitz had focused his U-boats on "America's doorstep," leaving the North Atlantic convoy run "quiet," the Allies should have immediately shifted the bulk of ASW and escort forces from North Atlantic to North American waters, both to attack U-boats and to provide escorts for an East Coast convoy network.

This argument, which appears logical and prudent, is, in fact, neither.

* The North Atlantic convoy run was definitely not "quiet," meaning un-threatened. The U-boats, en route to and from the Americas, crossed the North Atlantic along routes approximately the same as the convoys. Since the U-boats traveled alone, rather than in groups, or wolf packs, and maintained radio silence, they were very difficult to locate and evade. Any one of those U-boats could happen upon a North Atlantic convoy at any hour. If the convoy was not properly escorted, the result could be catastrophic.*

* In the initial wave of U-boats Donitz sent to the Americas, twelve of the fifteen boats went to Canadian waters. They patrolled off Halifax, St. John's, and Sydney, where transatlantic convoys originated and dispersed. Deprived of proper escorts, these convoys could be massacred in Canadian waters by succeeding waves of U-boats.