When Congress met in December, 1844, a remarkable change had come over the political would in the United States. The extraordinary popularity of Mr. Clay induced reflective men to believe, at the close of the last session, that he would be elected president, and that the prospects of immediate annexation would probably be blighted by that event. The great body of his partizans opposed the project of President Tyler; but the Democratic convention, a.s.sembled in Baltimore, in May, inscribed the fortunes of Texas on its banner together with the name of that party's candidate. The south immediately rallied around it, whilst the north a.s.sumed strange grounds of objection to the course of Mr. Clay. The Native American and Abolition parties in New York professed to vote with the friends of that gentleman in consequence of his opposition to annexation, and yet a sufficient number to defeat his election cast their ballots in direct contradiction of their principles. This was but another lesson of the danger of confiding in men or parties who have but a single idea. The folly of fanaticism commonly leads to violent inconsistencies, but perhaps a more palpable one was never exhibited than in the result of the presidential election of 1844.

When the project of annexation was first discussed in 1843 in the gazettes of the day, and before any decided action by the president or secretary of state, General Almonte, who was then Mexican envoy at Washington, protested earnestly against the act, and even threatened, by express order of his government, that on sanction being given to the incorporation of Texas into the United States, he would consider his mission as ended, seeing that the Mexican government was resolved to declare war as soon as it received information of such a deed.[55]

But Mr. Tyler, disregarding the irascible temper of the minister and his government, despatched pacific and soothing instructions to our charge at Mexico, intimating a desire to act justly towards that republic, and to settle all questions growing out of the treaty as well as of boundary on the most liberal terms.[56]

The Mexican government, however, would listen to no proposals of accommodation. The Texan question, as we have seen, was always one of great annoyance to the Mexican authorities; for although they acknowledged, in effect, that their dominion was really lost over Texas, yet their national pride and public feeling forced them to project, if they did not attempt, its reconquest.[57] Besides this, darkness was gathering around the fate of Santa Anna, who dared not undertake negotiations upon a subject so unpopular.

When a new congress a.s.sembled in Mexico in January, 1844, it was disposed to aid the executive in his scheme of reconquest. Four millions of dollars were therefore granted him; but when he claimed ten millions for the same purpose, whilst it was notorious that the first grant had not yet been collected, the members of congress absolutely refused to sustain Santa Anna's measures for the recovery of the lost territory.

This refusal was not grounded upon any aversion of the Mexicans from reconquest, but solely because they believed the money would be extorted from the people only to be plundered by the president and his myrmidons.

The politicians and country had alike, lost confidence in him; and Santa Anna, observing the rising storm, obtained permission from congress to retire to his estate of Manga de Clavo near the sea coast at Vera Cruz, whilst his friend Don Valentin Ca.n.a.lizo took his place in the capital as president _ad interim_.

Santa Anna hardly reached his estate when a fatal blow was struck against his administration from the departmental junta of Jalisco. This revolt was lead by General Paredes, and after a mult.i.tude of military and diplomatic manoeuvres, resulted in Santa Anna's downfall on the 4th of January, 1845. The ex-president fled towards the sea-coast; but was captured by a detachment of volunteers at the village of Jico, whence he was transferred under a strong escort to the castle of Perote.

It is difficult even to imagine the bitter wrath with which the Mexican people a.s.sailed the captured chief. He, who but a few months before exercised despotic sway over the land, was now a prisoner and at the mercy of the mob. His friends interposed in this emergency to save his life both from popular fury and judicial action which might make it the penalty of his misrule. The strife was long and anxious, but, at length, an amnesty was declared, under which Santa Anna departed for Cuba on the 29th of May, 1845, accompanied by his wife and daughter.[58] The fury of the people against the exile may be imagined from the fact that they exhausted every means by which they could manifest their hatred of his deeds and memory. They thronged the streets singing ribald songs, and hawking ridiculous caricatures;--they tore his pictures from the walls, and hurled his statues from their pedestals; and, with the fiendishness of hyenas, they even s.n.a.t.c.hed from the grave the leg he had lost in battle with the French at Vera Cruz, and tossed it about the streets of Mexico![59]

The result of Santa Anna's downfall was the establishment of a provisional government under General Herrera, president of the council.

This person is represented to have been a discreet officer, whose judgment naturally led him to see the wisdom of a pacific course towards the United States, but whose destiny was finally controlled by the rash and unprincipled conduct of insurrectionary demagogues.

Meanwhile the congress of the United States reconsidered the Texan question, and after a long and ardent debate, finally pa.s.sed a joint resolution for annexation, with an alternative permission to the executive to negotiate; provided he thought proper to adopt that course.

This was a solemn decision of the question by the representatives of the people, and it was sustained by the president who did not permit himself to be influenced by the threats of Mexico or the hostile preparations made by that country. In fact, Mr. Tyler had been careful to guard against military surprises, for, in consequence of the early menaces of Mexico, he deemed it his duty, as a precautionary measure, to concentrate in the gulf and its vicinity a large portion of the Home squadron under the command of Commodore Conner, and, at the same time to a.s.semble at fort Jesup on the Texan border, as large a military force as the demands of the service at other encampments would allow.

Thus, the joint resolution for annexing Texas to the United States, with its alternative power to negotiate, came to President Tyler and was approved by him on the 1st of March, 1845. On the fourth of the same month, James K. Polk, who had been chosen president of the United States, at the last election, was to a.s.sume the reins of government.

President Tyler believed that the necessity for annexation was immediate and urgent in consequence of the reasons he had already presented to congress in his several messages. The only doubt therefore, that he experienced in making his selection, arose from a point of delicacy to his successor. The first section of the joint resolution authorized the erection of a new State of our Union out of the republic of Texas under certain conditions contained in the second section; whilst the third authorized the president to negotiate with that republic for admission either by treaty to be submitted to the senate, or by articles of agreement to be presented to our houses of congress, as the president might direct.

Under these circ.u.mstances a cabinet council was summoned for the 2nd of March, and the point was resolved by informing the president's successor, Mr. Polk, of the proposed action, and, if he desired it, submitting to his perusal the despatch to Texas. Mr. Calhoun, our secretary of state, at the president's request, accordingly waited upon Mr. Polk, explained to him Mr. Tyler's selection of the first and second sections of the joint resolution, and expressed a readiness to exhibit the despatch to Mr. A. J. Donelson, who had been appointed charge to Texas.[60] Mr. Polk courteously declined expressing an opinion concerning the executive action, accompanying his remark with some complimentary declaration; and, on that evening, a bearer of despatches with the requisite doc.u.ments, was on his way to Mr. Donelson.[61]

This is a brief and accurate summary of the history of annexation so far as the action of our government is involved, and as is necessary for this narrative. The terms of annexation which were offered by the United States were accepted by Texas, and the public faith of both nations was solemnly pledged to a compact of union, which was finally consummated at the following session of congress, when Texas became a member of our confederacy.

There were other circ.u.mstances, however, which properly induced the prompt course of President Tyler in sending the joint resolution for the action of Texas; but, in order to understand these perfectly, it is necessary for us to direct our attention to the French and English negotiations between that republic and Mexico. In 1840, as we have seen, England preferred separate action on behalf of Texas, but she was now willing to unite with France against the aggrandizement of the United States. Monsieur de Saligny and the Hon. Mr. Elliott were the representatives of these European courts in Texas, and to the former of them was entrusted the active part of the diplomacy. Whilst the discussions were going on in the United States Mr. Elliott was never at rest. He was heard of in Charleston, in New Orleans, in Havana, in Mexico, and, again, in Texas. The restlessness of the agent denoted the anxiety of his government and of France.

The rejection of the annexation treaty by congress, in 1844, had almost deprived Texas of hope. She believed it impossible to expect a union with the United States, and was prepared to receive the mediation of France and England which would secure her independence. This was surely gratifying to the emissaries of these powers and they eagerly undertook the task of obtaining the coveted boon from Mexico. The Mexican ministry, ever anxious to thwart the union with our confederacy, was equally pleased to avert it by any diplomatic _ruse_ that would save the point of honor, and place her erect before the world. Besides this, the Mexicans relied on a hope that increasing difficulties between the United States and England upon the Oregon boundary question, would make us loath to undertake a war with a southern neighbor whilst our north and our sea board were menaced by Great Britain. This hope of a counter-menace from England inspirited the Mexican cabinet and made it solicitous to resist us successfully. Herrera's ministry was composed of discreet and patriotic men; but, in the first moments of their power, they dared not oppose popular prejudices. The revolution which overthrew Santa Anna was one of the few that sprang from the popular branches of the nation, and originated neither in factions, the army, or the church, but derived its success from the universal feeling that existed against the oppressive misrule of the executive.[62]

Nevertheless popular feeling was against our country, and the cabinet took its tone from its patrons.

There can be little doubt of the fact, that the notion of probable difficulties between the United States and England on the boundary question, was studiously fostered by emissaries who were hostile to us.

Herrera's cabinet therefore hailed with delight the propositions which were brought to Mexico by Mr. Elliott, and were presented by the Hon.

Charles Bankhead and Baron Alleye de Cyprey, the British and French ministers. These propositions, Senor Cuevas laid before the Mexican congress on the 21st of April, 1845. The preliminary conditions offered by Texas, under French and English mediation, and transmitted from that republic by President Jones, on the 29th of March, were the following:

1st. That Mexico shall consent to acknowledge the independence of Texas.

2nd. That Texas shall engage and stipulate in the treaty _not to annex herself to or become subject to any country whatever_.

3rd. The limits and other conditions shall be matter of arrangement by final treaty.

4th. That Texas should be willing to remit disputed points _concerning territory and other matters to the arbitration of umpires_.

These spiteful stipulations, evidently aimed against the United States, and bearing the marks of their European parentage, suited the taste of Mexico precisely. Her congress, therefore, at once deemed it advisable to entertain the Texan proposals, and to proceed to the celebration of a treaty. But when the Baron de Cyprey announced this a.s.sent to the president of Texas, on the 20th of May, it was already too late for the success of European diplomacy. Our congress had pa.s.sed the joint-resolution, our president had approved it, and our minister, Mr.

Donelson, was in Texas preparing the cabinet to act favorably upon our propositions. Accordingly when Mr. Elliott returned in June to Texas in a French corvette, the public mind was already manifesting its anxiety to accede to our liberal offers, which were finally sanctioned by the Texan convention on the 4th of July, 1845.

Had the resolution for annexation not been adopted at the preceding session of congress, the pretensions of Mexico, instead of being lowered, would have been raised still higher than they were on the receipt of the propositions from President Jones. The mediatorial powers of Mr. Elliott would, in all probability, have been employed in negotiating truces and treaties until the foundation was laid for the operation of those peaceful means by which Lord Aberdeen declared it his intention to promote his philanthropic views. "Abandoned by the United States, oppressed by debt, and wearied by the increasing burthens and privations of war, Texas would have been at the mercy of Britain, and her statesmen would have accepted almost any terms to secure independence and peace."[63]

FOOTNOTES:

[55] Senate doc. No. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 95.

[56] Senate doc. No. 1, 28th cong. 2d sess. p. 53.

[57] General Almonte, the Mexican envoy, in a conversation in New York, confessed to the writer, in the spring of 1843, that Texas was lost to Mexico, but that all then desired by his countrymen was to save the point of honor before they acknowledged its independence.

[58] Mexico as it was and as it is, 4th Ed. Letter XXV. p. 367.

[59] Id. page 382.

[60] House of Rep., doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 125.

[61] The election of the 1st and 2nd sections of the joint resolution made by President Tyler was subsequently approved by President Polk, as he declares both in his negotiations and in his message to congress of the 2nd December, 1845. H. of R., Doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st session, p.

3.

[62] Mexico as it was and as it is--p. 390, 4th ed.

[63] Letter from Mr. Donelson to Mr. Buchanan, 2nd June, 1845, H. of R., doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 52. I do not discuss the question of the _mode_ of annexation, whether by treaty, joint resolution, or negotiation, as that would require almost a volume by itself to present a true sketch of the debate that occurred upon it. It is my purpose rather to narrate events than to discuss all the various subordinate questions arising from them. "Annexation," is made one of the great motives or causes for war by Mexico, no matter in what way it is effected or attempted. "_Mexico would never agree to annexation_;"--said Senor Cuevas, the Mexican secretary of foreign affairs, in April, 1845.--Mexico as it was and as it is. p. 391, 4th ed.

CHAPTER VI.

General Almonte demands pa.s.sports and leaves--Shannon and Rejon and Cuevas--Views of the Mexican cabinet and people--Animosity--Revolt in Mexico--Political condition of Mexico--Her right of reconquering Texas--Mr. Buchanan despatches Mr. Slidell as envoy--Rejection of all accommodation between us--The reason why Mexico refused to negotiate, after promising to receive a commissioner from the United States--Subterfuges--Ill feeling in Mexico on the Texas question-- Herrera overthrown by Paredes--Paredes and the monarchical party-- Unpopularity of his scheme--Miserable state of Mexican affairs-- Review of the Texas question.

In March, 1845, as soon as congress pa.s.sed the joint-resolution, Gen.

Almonte demanded his pa.s.sports and departed. A correspondence which took place in Mexico between Mr. Shannon, our envoy, and Senor Rejon, the minister of foreign affairs, relative to the projected union resulted fruitlessly; and, on the 2d of April, Senor Cuevas, who had succeeded Rejon in office, announced to our legation that his government could neither continue diplomatic intercourse with ours, nor maintain friendship with a republic that violated her obligations and usurped a portion of Mexican territory. He declared, moreover, that the relations between the two countries could not be re-established before a complete reparation of that injury should be made.[64]

This violent and denunciatory language, together with the hint to our minister to depart, was of course not calculated to allay ill-feeling in either country. The Mexican congress was not less bitter in its animadversions, thereby spreading the animosity among the people. It promptly seconded the wishes of the cabinet, and offered two projects, both of which a.s.serted the unalienated rights of Mexico over Texas, and the national resolve to maintain them by force.

Meantime, however, domestic discontent was again brewing. A certain Gen.

Rangel attempted to revolutionize the government, and is said to have been favored by the partizans of the late administration. The insurgents seized the palace, capturing the president and three of his ministers of state; but they were speedily overpowered and the insurrection suppressed. In June and July of this year all the Mexican papers were loud in their clamors for vengeance. The minister of war, Garcia Conde, wrote despatch after despatch; and, with the usual spirit of national gasconade, denounced our "perfidy," and continually alluded to "the war which Mexico waged against the United States," in consequence of our "treachery." On the 16th of the latter month, he despatched to the minister of foreign relations and justice a note detailing a plan for covering the national frontiers, and a.s.serted that Mexico would maintain her rights by force, or fall in the struggle. "She will not consent,"

says he, "to give up one half of her territory from the base fear of losing the other!"

Patriotic and stirring as are these declarations, they cannot but be regarded otherwise than as the most inflated bombast when we recollect that they were made in defiance of the United States, and after a failure for seven years to reconquer even Texas, feeble as she was. What just hope could distracted Mexico reasonably entertain of ultimate victory? Several years before this period, her discreet statesmen and reflecting citizens privately acknowledged that Texas was lost forever.

Pecuniary embarra.s.sments, political misrule, and repeated revolutions had still more impaired her national strength, and yet, an obstinacy as inveterate as it was silly, forced her to make declarations of intended hostilities which only served to kindle and spread the excitement among the ma.s.ses.

It is just that we should concede to national pride and honor all they reasonably demand of respect, yet I have greatly misunderstood this spirit of our century, if it does not require nations to be as reasonable in their quarrels as individuals. Empires, kingdoms, states, republics, and men, are equally amenable to the great tribunal of the world's common sense, and all are obliged, if they consult their interests, to yield to the force of circ.u.mstances they cannot control.

What then becomes of the mere abstract and visionary "right of reconquest" which Mexico a.s.serted, even if she really possessed it after the central usurpation, and destruction of the federal system in 1824?

What hope was there in a war with the United States, after a failure in that with Texas? It is true that Mexico had the power to annoy us, and procrastinate her fate; she might oppose and resist; she might develope all the evil pa.s.sions of her people and let them loose on our armies in irregular warfare; but these, after all were nothing more than spiteful manifestations of impotent malice, disgraceful to the nation that encouraged them. The cause of genuine humanity, which, I believe, in our age, truly seeks for peace, demanded the pacification of Texas. The cruelty with which the war was waged, and the brutal treatment received by some of the prisoners of the Santa Fe expedition in 1841 and 1842, convince us that a strong power should have imposed peace on Mexico.

National propriety demanded it; for how long was the "right of reconquest" to continue? England, the proudest nation on earth, acknowledged the independence of the United States after a seven years war. The great powers of Europe interfered to protect oppressed Greece.

England has several times interposed in the affairs of Spain and Portugal; and our geographical as well as political affinity to Texas clearly indicated that it was our national interest to establish a firm and friendly government on our border.