Having now described the formation and the special powers of the two branches of the legislature, I proceed to inquire into the origin and history of the disqualifications to which the members were subjected.

The Const.i.tution of the United States was framed and established by a generation of men, who had observed the operation upon the English legislature of that species of influence, by the crown or its servants, which, from the mode of its exercise, not seldom amounting to actual bribery, has received the appropriate name of parliamentary corruption. That generation of the American people knew but little--they cared less--about the origin of a method of governing the legislative body, which implies an open or a secret venality on the part of its members, and a willingness on the part of the administration to purchase their consent to its measures. What they did know and what they did regard was, that for a long succession of years the votes of members of Parliament had been bought, with money or office, by nearly every minister who had been at the head of affairs; that, if this practice had not been introduced under the prince who was placed upon the throne by the revolution of 1688, it had certainly grown to a kind of system in the hands of the statesmen by whom that revolution was effected, and had attained its greatest height under the first two princes of the house of Hanover; that it was freely and sometimes shamefully applied throughout the American war; and that, down to that day, no British statesman had had the sagacity to discover, and the virtue to adopt, a purer system of administration.[167] Whether this was a necessary vice of the English const.i.tution; whether it was inherent or temporary; or whether it was only a stage in the development of parliamentary government, destined to pa.s.s away when the relations of the representative body to the people had become better settled,--could not then be seen even in England. But to our ancestors, when framing their Const.i.tution, it presented itself as a momentous fact; whose warning was not the less powerful, because it came from the centre of inst.i.tutions with which they had been most familiar, and from the country to which they traced their origin,--a country in which parliamentary government had had the fairest chances for success that the world had witnessed.

Yet it would not have been easy at that time, as it is not at the present, and as it may never be, to define with absolute precision the true limits which executive influence with the legislative body should not be suffered to pa.s.s. Still less is it easy to say that such influence ought not to exist at all;[168] although it is not difficult to say that there are methods in which it should not be suffered to be exercised. The more elevated and more clear-sighted public morality of the present age, in England and in America, condemns with equal severity and equal justice both the giver and the receiver in every transaction that can be regarded as a purchase of votes upon particular measures or occasions, whatever may have been the consideration or motive of the bargain. But whether that morality goes, or ought to go, farther,--whether it includes, or ought to include, in the same condemnation, every form of influence by which an administration can add extrinsic weight to the merits of its measures,--is a question that admits of discussion.

It may be said, a.s.suming the good intentions of an administration, and the correctness of its policy and measures, that its policy and its measures should address themselves solely to the patriotism and sense of right of the members of the legislative department. But an ever active patriotism and a never failing sense of right are not always, if often, to be found; the members of a legislative body are men, with the imperfections, the failings, and the pa.s.sions of men; and if pure patriotism and right perceptions of duty are alone relied upon, they may, and sometimes inevitably will be, found wanting. On the other hand, it is just as true, that the persons composing every administration are mere men, and that it will not do to a.s.sume their wisdom and good intentions as the sole foundations on which to rest the public security, leaving them at liberty to use all the appliances that may be found effectual for gaining right ends, and overlooking the character of the means. One of the princ.i.p.al reasons for the establishment of different departments, in the cla.s.s of governments to which ours belongs, is, that perfect virtue and unerring wisdom are not to be predicated of any man in any station. If they were, a simple despotism would be the best and the only necessary form of government.

All correct reasoning on this subject, and all true construction of governments like ours, must commence with two propositions, one of which embraces a truth of political science, and the other a truth of general morals. The first is, that, while the different functions of government are to be distributed among different persons, and to be kept distinctly separated, in order that there may be both division of labor and checks against the abuse of power, it is occasionally necessary that some room should be allowed for supplying the want of wisdom or virtue in one department by the wisdom or virtue of another.

In matters of government depending on mere discretion, unlimited confidence cannot with safety be placed anywhere.[169] The other proposition is the very plain axiom in morals, that, while in all human transactions there may be bad means employed to effect a worthy object, the character of those means can never be altered, nor their use justified, by the character of the end. With these two propositions admitted, what is to be done is to discover that arrangement of the powers and relations of the different departments whose acts involve, more or less, the exercise of pure discretion, which will give the best effect to both of these truths; and as all government and all details of government, to be useful, must be practically adapted to the nature of man, it will be found that an approximation in practice to a perfect theory is all that can be attained.

Thus the general duties and powers of the legislative and the executive departments are capable of distinct separation. The one is to make, the other is to execute the laws. But execution of the laws of necessity involves administration, and administration makes it necessary that there should be an executive policy. To carry out that policy requires new laws; authority must be obtained to do acts not before authorized; and supplies must be perpetually renewed. The executive stands therefore in a close relation to the legislative department;--a relation which makes it necessary for the one to appeal frequently, and indeed constantly, to the discretion of the other. If the executive is left at liberty to purchase what it believes or alleges to be the right exercise of that discretion, by the inducements of money or office applied to a particular case, the rule of common morals is violated; conscience becomes false to duty, and corruption, having once entered the body politic, may be employed to effect bad ends as well as good. Nay, as bad ends will stand most in need of its influence, it will be applied the most grossly where the object to be attained is the most culpable. On the other hand, if the members of the legislative body, by being made incapable of accepting the higher or more lucrative offices of state, are cut off from those inducements to right conduct and a true ambition which the imperfections of our nature have made not only powerful, but sometimes necessary, aids to virtue, the public service may have no other security than their uncertain impulses or imperfect judgments. In the midst of such tendencies to opposite mischiefs, all that human wisdom and foresight can do is, to antic.i.p.ate and prevent the evils of both extremes, by provisions which will guard both the interests of morality and the interests of political expediency as completely as circ.u.mstances will allow.

I am persuaded it was upon such principles as I have thus endeavored to state, that the framers of our national Const.i.tution intended to regulate this very difficult part of the relations between the executive and the legislature. During a considerable period, however, of their deliberations on the disabilities to which it would be proper to subject the members of the latter department, they had another example before them besides that afforded by the history of parliamentary corruption in England. The Congress of the Confederation had of course the sole power of appointment to offices under the authority of the United States; and although there is no reason to suppose that body at any time to have been justly chargeable with corrupt motives, there were complaints of the frequency with which it had filled the offices which it had created with its own members. In these complaints, the people overlooked the justification. They forgot that the nature of the government, and the circ.u.mstances of the country, rendered it difficult for an a.s.sembly which both made and filled the offices, and which exercised its functions at a time when the State governments absorbed by far the greater part of the interests and attention of their citizens, to find suitable men out of its own ranks. In that condition of things, it might have been expected,--and it implies no improper purpose,--that offices would be sometimes framed or regulated with a view to their being filled by particular persons. But the complaints existed;[170] the evil was one that tended constantly to become worse; and, in framing the new government, this was the first aspect in which the influence of office and its emoluments presented itself to the Convention.

For when the Virginia members, through Edmund Randolph, brought forward their scheme of government, they not only gave the executive no power of appointment to any office, but they proposed to vest the appointment of both the executive and the judiciary in the legislature. Hence they felt the necessity of guarding against the abuse that might follow, if the members of the legislature were to be left at liberty to appoint each other to office,--an abuse which they knew had been imputed to the Congress, and which they declared had been grossly practised by their own legislature.[171] They proposed, therefore, to go beyond the Confederation, and to make the members of both branches ineligible to any office established under the authority of the United States, (excepting those peculiarly belonging to their own functions,) during their term of service and for one year after its expiration. This provision pa.s.sed the committee of the whole; but in the Convention, on a motion made by Mr. Gorham to strike it out, the votes of the States were divided. An effort was then made by Mr.

Madison to find a middle ground, between an eligibility in all cases and an absolute disqualification. If the unnecessary creation of offices and the increase of salaries was the princ.i.p.al evil to be antic.i.p.ated, he believed that the door might be shut against that abuse, and might properly be left open for the appointment of members to places not affected by their own votes, as an encouragement to the legislative service. But there were several of the stern patriots of the Convention who insisted on a total exclusion, and who denied that there was any such necessity for holding out inducements to enter the legislature.[172] This was a question on which different minds, of equal sagacity and equal purity, would naturally arrive at different conclusions. Still, it is apparent that the mischiefs most apprehended at the time of Mr. Madison's proposition would be in a great degree prevented, by taking from the legislature the power of appointing to office; and that this modification of the system was what was needed, to make his plan a true remedy for the abuses that had been displayed in our own experience. The stigma of venality cannot properly be applied to the laudable ambition of rising into the honorable offices of a free government; and if the opportunity to create places, or to increase their emoluments, and then to secure those places, is taken away, by vesting the appointment in the executive, the question turns mainly on the relations that ought to exist between that department and the legislature. But Mr. Madison's suggestion was made before it was ascertained that the executive would have any power of appointment, and it was accordingly rejected;--a majority of the delegations considering it best to retain the ineligibility in all cases, as proposed by the Virginia plan.[173] In this way, the disqualification became incorporated into the first draft of the Const.i.tution, prepared by the committee of detail.[174]

But by this time it was known that a large part of the patronage of the government must be placed in the hands of the President; for it had been settled that he was to appoint to all offices not otherwise provided for, and the cases thus excepted were those of judges and amba.s.sadors, which stood, in this draft of the Const.i.tution, vested in the Senate. A strong opposition to this arrangement, however, had already manifested itself, and the result was very likely to be,--as it in fact turned out,--that nearly the whole of the appointments would be made on the nomination of the President, even if the Senate were to be empowered to confirm or reject them. Accordingly, when this clause came under consideration, the principle of an absolute disqualification for office was vigorously attacked, and as vigorously defended. The inconvenience and impolicy of excluding officers of the army and navy from the legislature; of rendering it impossible for the executive to select a commander-in-chief from among the members, in cases of pre-eminent fitness; of refusing seats to the heads of executive departments; and of closing the legislature as an avenue to other branches of the public service,--were all strenuously urged and denied.[175] At length, a middle course became necessary, to reconcile all opinions. By a very close vote, the ineligibility was restrained to cases in which the office had been created, or the emolument of it increased, during the term of membership;[176] and a seat in the legislature was made incompatible with any other office under the United States.[177]

Some at least of the probable sources of corruption were cut off by these provisions. The executive can make no bargain for a vote, by the promise of an office which has been acted upon by the member whose vote is sought for; and there can be no body of placemen, ready at all times to sell their votes as the price for which they are permitted to retain their places. At the same time, the executive is not deprived of the influence which attends the power of appointing to offices not created, or the emoluments of which have not been increased, by any Congress of which the person appointed has been a member. This influence is capable of abuse; it is also capable of being honorably and beneficially exerted. Whether it shall be employed corruptly or honestly, for good or for bad purposes, is left by the Const.i.tution to the restraints of personal virtue and the chastis.e.m.e.nts of public opinion.

A serious question, however, has been made, whether the interests of the public service, involved in the relations of the two departments, would not have been placed upon a better footing, if some of the higher officers of state had been admitted to hold seats in the legislature. Under the English const.i.tution, there is no practical difficulty, at least in modern times, in determining the general principle that is to distinguish between the cla.s.s of officers who can, and those who cannot, be usefully allowed to have seats in the House of Commons. The principle which, after much inconsistent legislation and many abortive attempts to legislate, has generally been acted on since the reign of George II., is, that it is both necessary and useful to have in that House some of the higher functionaries of the administration; but that it is not at all necessary, and not useful, to allow the privilege of sitting in Parliament to subordinate officers.[178] The necessity of the case arises altogether from the peculiar relations of the ministry to the crown, and of the latter to the Commons. If the executive government were not admitted, through any of its members, to explain and vindicate its measures, to advocate new grants of authority, or to defend the prerogatives of the crown, the popular branch of the legislature would either become the predominant power in the state, or sink into insignificance. This is conceded by the severest writers on the English government.

But when we pa.s.s from a civil polity which it has taken centuries to produce, and which has had its departments adjusted much less by reference to exact principles than by the results of their successive struggles for supremacy over each other, and when we come to an original distribution of powers, in the arrangements of a const.i.tution made entire and at once by a single act of the national will, we must not give too much effect to a.n.a.logies which after all are far from being complete. In preparing the Const.i.tution of the United States, its framers had no prerogative, in any way resembling that of the crown of England, to consider and provide for. The separate powers to be conferred on the chief magistracy--aside from its concurrence in legislation--were simply executive and administrative; the office was to be elective, and not hereditary; and its functions, like those of the legislature, were to be prescribed with all the exactness of which a written instrument is capable. There was, therefore, little of such danger that the one department would silently or openly encroach on the rights or usurp the powers of the other, as there is where there exists hereditary right on the one side and customary right on the other, and where the boundaries between the two departments are to be traced by the aid of ancient traditions, or collected from numerous and perhaps conflicting precedents. There was no such necessity, therefore, as there is in England, for placing members of the administration in the legislature, in order to preserve the balance of the Const.i.tution. The sole question with us was, whether the public convenience required that the administration should be able to act directly upon the course of legislation. The prevailing opinion was that this was not required. This opinion was undoubtedly formed under the fear of corruption and the jealousy of executive power, chiefly produced--and justly produced--by the example of what had long existed in England. That the error, if any was committed, lay on the safer side, none can doubt. It is possible that the chances of a corrupt influence would not have been increased, and that the opportunities for a salutary influence might have been enlarged,--as it is highly probable that the convenience of communication would have been promoted,--if some of the higher officers of state could have been allowed to hold seats in either house of Congress. But it is difficult to see how this could have been successfully practised, under the system of representation and election which the framers of the Const.i.tution were obliged to establish: and perhaps this is a decisive answer to the objection.[179]

Among the powers conceded by the Const.i.tution to the legislature of each State is that of prescribing the time, place, and manner of holding the elections of its senators and representatives in Congress.

This provision[180] originated with the committee of detail; but, as it was reported by them, there was no other authority reserved to Congress itself than that of altering the regulations of the States; and this authority extended as well to the place of choosing the senators, as to all the other circ.u.mstances of the election.[181] In the Convention, however, the authority of Congress was extended beyond the alteration of State regulations, so as to embrace a power to make rules, as well as to alter those made by the States. But the place of choosing the senators was excepted altogether from this restraining authority, and left to the States.[182] Mr. Madison, in his minutes, adds the explanation, that the power of Congress to _make_ regulations was supplied, in order to enable them to regulate the elections, if the States should fail or refuse to do so.[183] But the text of the Const.i.tution, as finally settled, gives authority to Congress at "any time" to "make or alter such regulations"; and this would seem to confer a power, which, when exercised, must be paramount, whether a State regulation exists at the time or not.

There is one other peculiarity of the American legislature, of which it is proper in this connection to give a brief account; namely, the compensation of its members for their public services. In the plan presented by the Virginia delegation, it was proposed that the members of both branches should receive "liberal stipends"; but it was not suggested whether they were to be paid by the States, or from the national treasury. The committee of the whole determined to adopt the latter mode of payment; and as the representation in both branches, according to the first decision, was to be of the same character, no reason was then suggested for making a difference in the source of their compensation. But when the construction of the Senate was considered in the Convention, the idea was suggested that this body ought in some way to represent wealth; and it was apparently under the influence of this suggestion, that, after a refusal to provide for a payment of the senators by their States, payment out of the national treasury was stricken from the resolution under debate.[184] There was thus introduced into the resolutions sent to the committee of detail, a discrepancy between the modes of compensating the members of the two branches; for while the members of the House were to be paid "an adequate compensation" out of "the public treasury," the Senate were to receive "a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public service," but the source of payment was not designated. But when the whole body of those resolutions had been acted on, the character of the representation in the Senate had been settled, and the idea of its being made a representation of wealth, in any sense, had been rejected. The committee of detail had, therefore, in giving effect to the decisions of the Convention, to consider merely whether the members of the two branches should be paid by their States, or from the national treasury; and for the purpose of making the same provision as to both, and in order to avoid the question whether the Const.i.tution should establish the amount, or should leave it to be regulated by the Congress itself, they provided that the members of each house should receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State in which they should be chosen.[185]

This, however, was to encounter far greater evils than it avoided. If paid by their States, the members of the national legislature would not only receive different compensations, but they would be directly subjected to the prejudices, caprices, and political purposes of the State legislatures. Whatever theory might be maintained with respect to the relations between the representatives, in either branch, and the State in which they were chosen, or the people of the States, to subject one cla.s.s of public servants to the power of another cla.s.s could not fail to produce the most mischievous consequences. A large majority of the States, therefore, decided upon payment out of the national treasury,[186] and it was finally determined that the rate of compensation should not be fixed by the Const.i.tution, but should be left to be ascertained by law.[187]

Among the separate functions a.s.signed by the Const.i.tution to the houses of Congress are those of presenting and trying impeachments. An impeachment, in the report of the committee of detail, was treated as an ordinary judicial proceeding, and was placed within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That this was not in all respects a suitable provision, will appear from the following considerations.

Although an impeachment may involve an inquiry whether a crime against any positive law has been committed, yet it is not necessarily a trial for crime; nor is there any necessity, in the case of crimes committed by public officers, for the inst.i.tution of any special proceeding for the infliction of the punishment prescribed by the laws, since they, like all other persons, are amenable to the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts of justice, in respect of offences against positive law.

The purposes of an impeachment lie wholly beyond the penalties of the statute or the customary law. The object of the proceeding is to ascertain whether cause exists for removing a public officer from office. Such a cause may be found in the fact, that, either in the discharge of his office, or aside from its functions, he has violated a law, or committed what is technically denominated a crime. But a cause for removal from office may exist, where no offence against positive law has been committed, as where the individual has, from immorality or imbecility or maleadministration, become unfit to exercise the office. The rules by which an impeachment is to be determined are therefore peculiar, and are not fully embraced by those principles or provisions of law which courts of ordinary jurisdiction are required to administer.

From considerations of this kind, especially when applied to the impeachment of a President of the United States, the Convention found it expedient to place the trial in the Senate. In fact, the whole subject of impeachments, as finally settled in the Const.i.tution, received its impress in a great degree from the attention that was paid to the bearing of this power upon the executive. Few members of the Convention were willing to const.i.tute a single executive, with such powers as were proposed to be given to the President, without subjecting him to removal from office on impeachment; and when it was perceived to be necessary to confer upon him the appointment of the judges, it became equally necessary to provide some other tribunal than the Supreme Court for the trial of his impeachment. There was no other body already provided for in the government, with whom this jurisdiction could be lodged, excepting the Senate; and the only alternative to this plan was to create a special tribunal for the sole purpose of trying impeachments of the President and other officers. This was justly deemed a manifest inconvenience; and although there were various theoretical objections suggested against placing the trial in the Senate, on the question being stated there were found to be but two dissentient States.[188] This point having been settled, in relation to impeachments of the President, the trial of impeachments of all other civil officers of the United States was, for the sake of uniformity, also confided to the Senate.[189] The power of impeachment was confined, as originally proposed, to the House of Representatives.[190]

The number of members of each house that should be made a _quorum_ for the transaction of business gave rise to a good deal of difference of opinion. The controlling reason why a smaller number than a majority of the members of each house should not be permitted to make laws, was to be found in the extent of the country and the diversity of its interests. The central States, it was said, could always have their members present with more convenience than the distant States; and after some discussion, it was determined to establish a majority of each house as its quorum for the transaction of business, giving to a smaller number power to adjourn from day to day, and to compel the attendance of absent members.[191]

Provisions making each house the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; that for any speech, or debate in either house no member shall be questioned in any other place; and that in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, the members shall be privileged from arrest during their attendance at, and in going to and returning from, the sessions of their respective houses,--were agreed to without any dissent.[192]

The power of each house to determine the rules of its proceedings, to punish its members for disorderly behavior, and to expel with the concurrence of two thirds, was agreed to with general a.s.sent.[193]

Each house was also directed to keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time to publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and one fifth of the members present in either house were empowered to require the yeas and nays to be entered on its journal.[194]

The report of the committee of detail had made no provision for such an officer as the Vice-President of the United States, and had therefore declared that the Senate, as well as the House, should choose its own presiding officer. This feature of their report received the sanction of the Convention; but subsequently, when it became necessary to create an officer to succeed the President of the United States, in case of death, resignation, or removal from office, the plan was adopted of making the former _ex officio_ the presiding officer of the Senate, giving him a vote only in cases where the votes of the members are equally divided.[195] To this was added the further provision, that the Senate shall choose, besides all its other officers, a President _pro tempore_, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.[196] The House of Representatives were empowered to choose their own Speaker, and other officers, as originally proposed.[197]

The mode in which laws were to be enacted was the last topic concerning the action of the legislature which required to be dealt with in the Const.i.tution. The principle had been already settled, that the negative of the President should arrest the pa.s.sage of a law, unless, after he had refused his concurrence, it should be pa.s.sed by two thirds of the members of each house. In order to give effect to this principle, the committee of detail made the following regulations, which were adopted into the Const.i.tution;--that every bill, which shall have pa.s.sed the two houses, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; that, if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the house in which it originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it; that if, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house agree to pa.s.s the bill, it is to be sent with the objections to the other house, by which it is likewise to be reconsidered, and, if approved by two thirds of that house, it is to become a law; but in all such cases, the votes of both houses are to be determined by yeas and nays entered upon the journal. If any bill be not returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it has been presented to him, it is to become a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by adjourning prevent its return, in which case it is not to become a law. All orders, resolutions, and votes to which the concurrence of both houses is necessary, (except on a question of adjournment,) are subject to these provisions.[198]

The two important differences between the negative thus vested in the President of the United States and that which belongs to the King of England are, that the former is a qualified, while the latter is an absolute, power to arrest the pa.s.sage of a law; and that the one is required to render to the legislature the reasons for his refusal to approve a bill, while the latter renders no reasons, but simply answers that he will advise of the matter, which is the parliamentary form of signifying a refusal to approve. The provision in our Const.i.tution which requires the President to communicate to the legislature his objections to a bill, was rendered necessary by the power conferred upon two thirds of both houses to make it a law, notwithstanding his refusal to sign it. By this power, which makes the negative of the President a qualified one only, the framers of the Const.i.tution intended that the two houses should take into consideration the objections which may have led the President to withhold his a.s.sent, and that his a.s.sent should be dispensed with, if, notwithstanding those objections, two thirds of both houses should still approve of the measure. These provisions, therefore, on the one hand, give to the President a real partic.i.p.ation in acts of legislation, and impose upon him a real responsibility for the measures to which he gives his official approval, while they give him an important influence over the final action of the legislature upon those which he refuses to sanction; and, on the other hand, they establish a wide distinction between his negative and that of the King in England. The latter has none but an absolute "veto"; if he refuse to sign a bill, it cannot become a law; and it is well understood, that it is on account of this absolute effect of the refusal, that this prerogative has been wholly disused since the reign of William III., and that the practice has grown up of signifying, through the ministry, the previous opposition of the executive, if any exists, while the measure is under discussion in Parliament. It is not needful to consider here which mode of legislation is theoretically or practically the best. It is sufficient to notice the fact, that the absence from our system of official and responsible advisers of the President, having seats in the legislature, renders it impracticable to signify his views of a measure, while it is under the consideration of either house. For this reason, and because the President himself is responsible to the people for his official acts, and in order to accompany that responsibility with the requisite power both to act upon reasons and to render them, our Const.i.tution has vested in him this peculiar and qualified negative.[199]

The remaining topic that demands our inquiries, respecting the legislature, relates to the place of its meeting. The Confederation was a government without a capitol, or a seat; a want which seriously impaired its dignity and its efficiency, and subjected it to great inconveniences; at the same time, it was unable to supply the defect.

Its Congress, following the example of their predecessors, had continued to a.s.semble at Philadelphia, until June, 1783; when, as we have already seen, in consequence of a mutiny by some of the federal troops stationed in that neighborhood, against which the local authorities failed to protect them, they left that city, and rea.s.sembled at Princeton, in the State of New Jersey, in the halls of a college.[200] There, in the following October, a resolution was pa.s.sed, directing that buildings for the use of Congress should be erected at some suitable place near the falls of the Delaware; for which the right of soil and an exclusive jurisdiction should be obtained.[201] But this was entirely unsatisfactory to the Southern States. They complained that the place selected was not central, was unfavorable to the Union, and unjust to them. They endeavored to procure a reconsideration of the vote, but without success.[202]

Several days were then consumed in fruitless efforts to agree on a temporary residence; and at length it became apparent that there was no prospect of a general a.s.sent to any one place, either for a temporary or for a permanent seat. The plan of a single residence was then changed, and a resolution was pa.s.sed, providing for an alternate residence at two places, by directing that buildings for the use of Congress, and a federal town, should also be erected at or near the lower falls of the Potomac, or Georgetown; and that until both places, that on the Delaware and that on the Potomac, were ready for their reception, Congress should sit alternately, for equal periods of not more than one year and not less than six months, at Trenton, the capital of the State of New Jersey, and at Annapolis, the capital of the State of Maryland. The President was thereupon directed to adjourn the Congress, on the 12th of the following November, to meet at Annapolis on the 26th, for the despatch of business. Thither they accordingly repaired, and there they continued to sit until June 3, 1784. A recess followed, during which a committee of the States sat, until Congress rea.s.sembled at Trenton, on the 30th of the following October.

At Trenton, the accommodations appear to have been altogether insufficient, and the States of South Carolina and Pennsylvania proposed to adjourn from that place.[203] The plan of two capitols in different places was then rescinded,[204] and an ordinance was pa.s.sed, for the appointment of commissioners to establish a seat of government on the banks of the Delaware, at some point within eight miles above or below the lower falls of that river. Until the necessary buildings should be ready for their reception, the ordinance provided that Congress should sit at the city of New York.[205] When a.s.sembled there in January, 1785, they received and accepted from the corporation an offer of the use of the City Hall; and in that building they continued to hold their sessions until after the adoption of the Const.i.tution.[206]

It does not appear that any steps were taken under the ordinance of 1784, or under any of the previous resolutions, for the establishment of a federal town and a seat of government at any of the places designated. Whether the Congress felt the want of const.i.tutional power to carry out their project, or whether the want of means, or a difficulty in obtaining a suitable grant of the soil and jurisdiction, was the real impediment, there are now no means of determining. It seems quite probable, however, that, after their removal to the city of New York, they found themselves much better placed than they or their predecessors had ever been elsewhere; and as the discussions respecting a total revision of the federal system soon afterwards began to agitate the public mind, the plan of establishing a seat for the accommodation of the old government was naturally postponed.

The plan itself, on paper, was a bold and magnificent one. It contemplated a district not less than two and not more than three miles square, with a "federal house" for the use of Congress; suitable buildings for the executive departments; official residences for the president and secretary of Congress, and the secretaries of foreign affairs, of war, of the marine, and the officers of the treasury; besides hotels to be erected and owned by the States as residences for their delegates. But, for this fine scheme of a federal metropolis, an appropriation was made, which, even in those days, one might suppose, would scarcely have paid for the land required. The commissioners who were to purchase the site, lay out the town, and contract for the erection and completion of all the public edifices,--excepting those which were to belong to the States,--"in an elegant manner," were authorized to draw on the federal treasury for a sum not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars, for the whole of these purposes. If we are to understand it to have been really expected and intended that this sum should defray the cost of this undertaking, we must either be amused by the modest requirements of the Union at that day, or stand amazed at the strides it has since taken in its onward career of prosperity and power. From the porticos of that magnificent Capitol whose domes overhang the Potomac, the eye now looks down upon a city, in which, at a cost of many millions, provision has been made for the central functions of a government, whose daily expenditure exceeds the entire sum appropriated for the establishment of the necessary public buildings and official residences seventy years ago.

In truth, however, there is not much reason to suppose that the Congress of the Confederation seriously contemplated the establishment of a federal city. They were too feeble for such an undertaking. They could pa.s.s resolutions and ordinances for the purpose, and send them to the authorities of the States;--and if a more decent attention to the wants and dignity of the federal body was excited, it was well, and was probably the effect princ.i.p.ally intended. If they had actually proceeded to do what their resolution of 1783 proposed,--to acquire the jurisdiction, as well as the right of soil, over a tract of land,--they must have encountered a serious obstacle in the want of const.i.tutional power. This difficulty seems to have been felt at a later period; for the ordinance of 1784 only directs a purchase of the land, and is silent upon the subject of munic.i.p.al jurisdiction. It is fortunate, too, on all accounts, that the design was never executed, if it was seriously entertained. The presence of Congress in the city of New York, where the legislature of the State was also sitting, in the winter of 1787, enabled Hamilton to carry those measures in both bodies, which led immediately to the summoning of the national Convention.[207] And it was especially fortunate that this whole subject came before the Convention unembarra.s.sed with a previous choice of place by the old Congress, or with any steps concerning munic.i.p.al jurisdiction which they might have taken, or omitted.

For it was no easy matter, in the temper of the public mind existing from 1783 to 1788, to determine where the seat of the federal, or that of the national government, ought to be placed. The Convention found this an unsettled question, and they wisely determined to leave it so.

The cities of New York and Philadelphia had wishes and expectations, and it was quite expedient that the Const.i.tution should neither decide between them, nor decide against both of them. It was equally important that it should not direct whether the seat of the national government should be placed at any of the other commercial cities, or at the capital or within the jurisdiction of any State, or in a district to be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the United States. These were grave questions, which involved the general interests of the Union; but however settled, they would cost the Const.i.tution, in some quarter or other, a great deal of the support that it required, if determined before it went into operation.[208]

Temporarily, however, the new government must be placed somewhere within the limits of a State, and at one of the princ.i.p.al cities; and as the Congress then sitting at New York would probably invite their successors to a.s.semble there, it became necessary to provide for a future removal, when the time should arrive for a general agreement on the various and delicate questions involved. The difference of structure, however, between the two branches of the proposed Congress, and the difference of interests that might predominate in each, made a disagreement on these questions probable, if not inevitable; and a disagreement on the place of their future sessions, if accompanied by power to sit in separate places, would be fatal to the peace of the Union and the operation of the government.

The committee of detail, therefore, inserted in their draft a clause prohibiting either house, without the consent of the other, from adjourning for more than three days, or to any other place than that at which the Congress might be sitting. Mr. King expressed an apprehension that this implied an authority in both houses to adjourn to any place; and as a frequent change of place had dishonored the federal government, he thought that a law, at least, should be made necessary for a removal. Mr. Madison considered a central position would be so necessary, and that it would be so strongly demanded by the House of Representatives, that a removal from the place of their first session would be extorted, even if a law were required for it.

But there was a fear that, if the government were once established at the city of New York, it would never be removed if a law were made necessary. The provision reported by the committee was therefore retained, and it was left in the power of the two houses alone, during a session of Congress, to adjourn to any place, or to any time, on which they might agree.[209]

Still it was needful that the Const.i.tution should empower the legislature to establish a seat of government out of the jurisdiction of any of the States, and away from any of their cities. The time might come when this question could be satisfactorily met. The time would certainly come, when the people of the whole Union could see that the dignity, the independence, and the purity of the government would require that it should be under no local influences; when every citizen of the United States, called to take part in the functions of that government, ought to be able to feel that he and his would owe their protection to no power, save that of the Union itself. Some disadvantage, doubtless, might be experienced, in placing the government away from the great centres of commerce. But neither of the princ.i.p.al seats of wealth and refinement was very near to the centre of the Union; and if either of them had been, the necessity for an exclusive local jurisdiction would probably be found, after the adoption of the Const.i.tution, to outweigh all other considerations.

Accordingly, when the Const.i.tution was revised for the purpose of supplying the needful provisions omitted in its preparation, it was determined that no peremptory direction on the subject of a seat of government should be given to the legislature; but that power should be conferred on Congress to exercise an exclusive legislation, in all cases, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as might, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States. This provision has made the Congress of the United States the exclusive sovereign of the District of Columbia, which it governs in its capacity of the legislature of the Union. It enabled Washington to found the city which bears his name; towards which, whatever may be the claims of local attachment, every American who can discern the connection between the honor, the renown, and the welfare of his country, and the dignity, convenience, and safety of its government, must turn with affection and pride.

With respect to a regular time of meeting, no instructions had been given to the committee of detail; but they inserted in their draft of the Const.i.tution a clause which required the legislature to a.s.semble on the first Monday of December in every year. There was, however, a great difference of opinion as to the expediency of designating any time in the Const.i.tution, and as to the particular period adopted in the report. But as it was generally agreed that Congress ought to a.s.semble annually, the provision which now stands in the Const.i.tution, which requires annual sessions, and establishes the first Monday in December as the time of their commencement, unless a different day shall be appointed by law, was adopted as a compromise of different views.[210]

FOOTNOTES:

[130] The first draft of the Const.i.tution, reported by the committee of detail, will be found in the Appendix.

[131] A general instruction had been given to report "certain qualifications of property and citizenship," for the executive, the judiciary, and the members of both houses of Congress.

[132] It is only necessary to mention the names of Hamilton, Wilson, Robert Morris, and Fitzsimmons, to show the entire impracticability of a rule that would have excluded all persons of _foreign birth_ from being electors, or from being elected to office.

[133] I have called the naturalization power a _practical_ control upon the States in the matter of suffrage. It is indirect, but it is effectual; for I believe that no State has ever gone so far as, by express statutory or const.i.tutional provision, to admit to the right of voting persons of foreign birth who are not naturalized citizens of the United States.

[134] Art. VI. Sect. 2 of the reported draft.

[135] Art. IV. Sect. 2 of the reported draft.

[136] New Hampshire, Ma.s.sachusetts, and Georgia alone voted to retain it. Elliot, V. 404.

[137] The Const.i.tution of Pennsylvania had given to foreigners, after two years' residence, all the rights of citizens. There were similar provisions in nearly all of the States.

[138] The members who advocated the exemption were G. Morris, Mercer, Gorham, Madison, and Wilson; those who opposed it were Rutledge, Sherman, General Pinckney, Mason, and Baldwin. The States voting for it were Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 5; the States voting against it were New Hampshire, Ma.s.sachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 6. The question elicited a good deal of feeling, and was debated with some warmth.

[139] _Ante_, Chap. VII.

[140] See _ante_, Chap. VIII.