The question whether the United States could const.i.tutionally maintain an army and navy, in time of peace, was, under the Articles of Confederation, not free from difficulty; but it became of imminent practical importance, under the treaty of peace. That treaty provided for an immediate withdrawal of the British forces from all posts and fortifications within the United States; and it became at once an important question, whether these posts and fortifications--especially those within certain districts, the jurisdiction and property of which had not been const.i.tutionally ascertained--should be garrisoned by troops of the United States, or of the States within which they were situated. There was also territory appertaining to the United States, not within the original claim of the United States. The whole of the Western frontier required defence. The navigation of the Mississippi and the lakes, and the rights of the fisheries and of foreign commerce, all belonging to the United States, and depending on the laws of nations and treaty stipulations, demanded the joint protection of the Union, and could not with propriety be left to the separate establishments of the States.

But the Articles of Confederation contained no express provision for the establishment and maintenance of any military and naval forces during peace. They empowered the United States, generally, (and without mention of peace or war,) to build and equip a navy, and to agree upon the number of land forces to be raised, and to call upon the States to furnish their quotas. But they also declared that no vessels of war should be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only as should be deemed necessary by Congress for the defence of such State or its trade; and that no body of forces should be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only as Congress should deem requisite to garrison the posts necessary for the defence of such State.

This provision might be construed to imply, that, in time of peace, the general defence was to be provided for by the forces of each State, and, in time of war, by those of the Union. But it was the opinion of Hamilton, that the restrictions on the powers of the States, with regard to maintaining forces during peace, could not with propriety be said to contain any directions to the United States, or to contravene the positive power vested in the latter to raise both sea and land forces, without mention of peace or war. He strengthened this view by the capital inconvenience of the contrary construction, and by the manifest necessities of the country, which could only be provided for by the power of the Union. If the United States could have neither army nor navy, until war had been declared, they would be obliged to begin to create both at the very moment when both were needed in actual hostilities; and, if the States were to be intrusted with the defence of the country in time of peace, that defence would be left to thirteen different armies and navies, under the direction of as many different governments.[198]

He contemplated, therefore, the formation of a peace establishment, to consist of certain corps of infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, and dragoons;[199] a general survey, preparatory to the adoption of a general system of land fortifications; the establishment of a.r.s.enals and magazines, and the erection of founderies and manufactories of arms. He advised the establishment of ports and maritime fortifications, and the formation and construction of a navy; and his report embraced also a plan for cla.s.sing and disciplining the militia.[200]

In all this design, Hamilton pursued the purpose, which he had long entertained, of strengthening and consolidating the Union, and guarding against its dissolution, by providing the means necessary for its defence. Federal, rather than State provision for the defence of every part of the Confederacy, in peace as well as in war, seemed to him essential. He thought, that the general government should have exclusively the power of the sword, and that each State should have no forces but its militia.[201] But his great plans were arrested, partly in consequence of the doubts entertained on the point of const.i.tutional power, and partly by reason of the great falling off of the attendance of members in Congress. At the very time when this important subject was under consideration, Congress were driven from Philadelphia, by the mutiny of a handful of men, whom they could not curb at the moment without the aid of the local authorities, and that aid was not promptly and efficiently given.[202]

Convinced, at length, that no temporary expedients would meet the wants of the country, and that a radical reform of its const.i.tution could alone preserve the Union from dissolution, Hamilton surveyed the Confederation in all its parts, and determined to lay before the country its deep defects, with a view to the establishment of a government with proper departments and adequate powers. In this examination, he applied to the Confederation the approved maxims of free government, which had been made familiar in the formation of the State const.i.tutions, and which point to the distinct separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions. The Confederation vested all these powers in a single body, and thus violated the principles on which the government of nearly every State in the Union was founded. It had no federal judicature, to take cognizance of matters of general concern, and especially of those in which foreign nations and their subjects were concerned; and thus national treaties, the national faith, and the public tranquillity were exposed to the conflict of local regulations against the powers vested in the Union. It gave to Congress the power of ascertaining and appropriating the sums necessary for the public expenses, but withheld all control over either the imposition or collection of the taxes by which they were to be raised, and thus made the inclinations, not the abilities, of the respective States, the criterion of their contributions to the common expenses of the Union. It authorized Congress to borrow money, or emit bills, on the credit of the United States, without the power of providing funds to secure the repayment of the money, or the redemption of the bills emitted.

It made no proper or competent provision for interior or exterior defence; for interior defence, because it allowed the individual States to appoint all regimental officers of the land forces, and to raise the men in their own way, while at the same time an ambiguity rendered it uncertain whether the defence of the country in time of peace was not left to the particular States, both by sea and land;--for exterior defence, because it authorized Congress to build and equip a navy, without providing any compulsory means of manning it.

It failed to vest in the United States a general superintendence of trade, equally necessary both with a view to revenue and regulation.

It required the a.s.sent of nine States in Congress to matters of princ.i.p.al importance, and of seven to all others except adjournments from day to day, and thus subjected the sense of a majority of the people of the United States to that of a minority, by putting it in the power of a small combination to defeat the most necessary measures.

Finally, it vested in the federal government the sole direction of the interests of the United States in their intercourse with foreign nations, without empowering it to pa.s.s _all general laws_ in aid and support of the laws of nations; thus exposing the faith, reputation, and peace of the country to the irregular action of the particular States.[203]

Having thus fully a.n.a.lyzed for himself the nature of the existing const.i.tution, Hamilton proposed to himself the undertaking of inducing Congress freely and frankly to inform the country of its imperfections, which made it impossible to conduct the public affairs with honor to themselves and advantage to the Union; and to recommend to the several States to appoint a convention, with full powers to revise the Confederation, and to adopt and propose such alterations as might appear to be necessary, which should be finally approved or rejected by the States.[204]

But he was surrounded by men, who were not equal to the great enterprise of guiding and enlightening public sentiment. He was in advance of the time, and far in advance of the men of the time. He experienced the fate of all statesmen, in the like position, whose ideas have had to wait the slow development of events, to bring them to the popular comprehension and a.s.sent. He saw that his plans could not be adopted; and he pa.s.sed out of Congress to the pursuits of private life, recording upon them his conviction, that their public proposal would have failed for want of support.[205]

There was in fact a manifest indisposition in Congress to propose any considerable change in the principle of the government. Hence, nothing but the revenue system, with a change in the rule by which a part.i.tion of the common burdens was to be made, was publicly proposed. Although this system was a great improvement upon that of the Confederation, it related simply to revenue, in regard to which it proposed a reform, not of the principle of the government, but of the mode of operation of the old system; for it embraced only a specific pledge by the States of certain duties for a limited term, and not a grant of the unlimited power of levying duties at pleasure. There was confessedly a departure from the strict maxims of national credit, by not making the revenue coextensive with its object, and by not placing its collection in every respect under the authority charged with the management and payment of the debt which it was designed to meet.[206]

These relaxations were a sacrifice to the jealousies of the States; and they show that the time had not come for a change from a mere federative union to a const.i.tutional government, founded on the popular will, and therefore acting by an energy and volition of its own.

The temper of the time was wholly unfavorable to such a change. The early enthusiasm with which the nation had rushed into the conflict with England, guided by a common impulse and animated by a national spirit, had given place to calculations of local interest and advantage; and the principle of the Confederation was tenaciously adhered to, while the events which accompanied and followed the peace were rapidly displaying its radical incapacity. The formation of the State governments, and the consequent growth and importance of State interests, which came into existence with the Confederation, and the fact that the Confederation was itself an actual diminution of the previous powers of the Union, may be considered the chief causes of the decline of a national spirit. That spirit was destined to a still further decay, until the conflict of State against State, and of section against section, by shaking the government to its foundation, should reveal both the necessity for a national sovereignty and the means by which it could be called into life.

As a consequence and proof of the decline of national power, it is worthy of observation, that, at the close of the year 1783, Congress had practically dwindled to a feeble junto of about twenty persons, exercising the various powers of the government, but without the dignity and safety of a local habitation. Migrating from city to city and from State to State, unable to agree upon a seat of government, from jealousy and sectional policy; now a.s.sembling in the capitol of a State, and now in the halls of a college; at all times dependent upon the protection and even the countenance of local authorities, and without the presence of any of the great and powerful minds who led the earlier counsels of the country, this body presented a not inadequate type of the decaying powers of the Union.[207] At no time in the history of the Confederation, had all the States been represented at once; and the return of peace seemed likely to reduce the entire machinery of the government to a state of complete inaction.[208]

The Confederation, at the close of the war, is found to have accomplished much, and also to have failed to accomplish much more. It had effected the cession of the public lands to the United States; for although that cession was not completed until after the peace, still the arch on which the Union was ultimately to rest for whatever of safety and perpetuity remained for it through the four following years, was deposited in its place, when the Confederation was established. It had also placed the United States, as a nation, in a position to contract some alliances with foreign powers. It had finished the war; it had achieved the independence of the nation; and had given peace to the country. It had thus demonstrated the value of the Union, although its defective construction aided the development of tendencies which weakened and undermined its strength.

But its imperfect performance of the great tasks to which it had been called, displayed its inherent defects. It had often been unequal to the purpose of effectually drawing forth the resources of its members for the common welfare and defence. It had often wanted an army adequate to the protection and proportioned to the abilities of the country. It had, therefore, seen important posts reduced, others imminently endangered, and whole States and large parts of others overrun by small bodies of the enemy;--had been dest.i.tute of sufficient means of feeding, clothing, paying, and appointing its troops, and had thus exposed them to sufferings for which history scarcely affords a parallel. It had been compelled to make the administration of its affairs a succession of temporary expedients, inconsistent with order, economy, energy, or a scrupulous adherence to public engagements. It found itself, at the close of the war, without any certain means of doing justice to those who had been the princ.i.p.al supporters of the Union;--to an army which had bravely fought, and patiently suffered,--to citizens and to foreigners, who had cheerfully lent their money,--and to others who had contributed property and personal service to the common cause. It was obliged to rely, for the last hope of doing that justice, on the precarious concurrence of thirteen distinct legislatures, the dissent of either of which might defeat the plan, and leave the States, at an early period of their existence, involved in all the disgrace and mischiefs of violated faith and national bankruptcy.[209]

While, therefore, the United States emerged from the war, which for seven long years had wasted the energies and drained the resources of the people, with national independence, dark and portentous clouds gathered about the dawn of peace, as the future opened before them. The past had been crowned with victory;--dearly bought, but not at too dear a price, for it brought with it the vast boon of civil liberty. But the dangers and embarra.s.sments through which that victory had been achieved made it apparent that the government of the country was unequal to its protection and prosperity. That government was now called to a.s.sume the great duties of peace, without the acknowledged power of maintaining either an army or a navy, and without the means of combining and directing the forces and wills of the several parts to a general end; without the least control over commerce; without the power to fulfil a treaty; without laws acting upon individuals; and with no mode of enforcing its own will, but by coercing a delinquent State to its federal obligations by force of arms. How it met the great demands upon its energy and durability which its new duties involved, we are now to inquire.

FOOTNOTES:

[189] Letter to Hamilton, March 31, 1783. Writings, VIII. 409. Letter to Lafayette, April 5, 1783. Ibid. 411. Address to the States, June 8, 1783. Ibid. 439.

[190] These suggestions were made by Hamilton, in a letter of great ability, written in 1780, while he was still in the army, to James Duane, a member of Congress from New York. It was not published until it appeared in his Life, I. 284. At its close, he says: "I am persuaded a solid confederation, a permanent army, a reasonable prospect of subsisting it, would give us treble consideration in Europe, and produce a peace this winter. _If a convention is called, the minds of all the States and the people ought to be prepared to receive its determinations by sensible and popular writings_, which should conform to the views of Congress. There are epochs in human affairs when _novelty_ is useful. If a general opinion prevails that the old way is bad, whether true or false, and this obstructs or relaxes the operations of the public service, a change is necessary, if it be but for the sake of change.

This is exactly the case now. 'T is an universal sentiment, that our present system is a bad one, and that things do not go right on this account. The measure of a convention would revive the hopes of the people, and give a new direction to their pa.s.sions, which may be improved in carrying points of substantial utility. The Eastern States have already pointed out this mode to Congress: they ought to take the hint, and antic.i.p.ate the others." What is here said of the action of the Eastern States probably refers, not to any suggestion of a convention to revise the powers of the general government, but to a convention of committees of the Eastern States, which first a.s.sembled at Hartford, and afterwards at Boston, in November, 1779, and in August, 1780, _for regulating the prices of commodities_. Journals of Congress, V. 406; VI.

271, 331, 392. But the writer may have had in his mind the convention which had just a.s.sembled in Ma.s.sachusetts to form the const.i.tution of that State. I am aware of no public proposal, as early as 1780, of a general convention to remodel the Confederacy.

[191] "It is not to be presumed," he said, "that the const.i.tution of any State means to define and fix the precise numbers and descriptions of all officers to be permitted in the State, excluding the creation of any new ones, whatever might be the necessity derived from that variety of circ.u.mstances incident to all political inst.i.tutions. The legislature must always have a discretionary power of appointing officers, not expressly known to the const.i.tution, and this power will include that of authorizing the federal government to make the appointments in cases where the general welfare may require it. The denial of this would prove too much; to wit, that the power given by the Confederation to Congress, to appoint all officers in the post-office, was illegal and unconst.i.tutional. The doctrine advanced by Rhode Island would perhaps prove also that the federal government ought to have the appointment of no internal officers whatever; a position that would defeat all the provisions of the Confederation, and all the purposes of the union. The truth is, that no federal const.i.tution can exist without powers that in their exercise effect the internal police of the component members. It is equally true, that no government can exist without a right to appoint officers for those purposes which proceed from, and concentre in, itself; and therefore the Confederation has expressly declared, that Congress shall have authority to appoint all such 'civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction.' All that can be required is, that the federal government confine its appointments to such as it is empowered to make by the original act of union, or by the subsequent consent of the parties; unless there should be express words of exclusion in the const.i.tution of a State, there can be no reason to doubt that it is within the compa.s.s of legislative discretion to communicate that authority. The propriety of doing it upon the present occasion, is founded on substantial reasons. The measure proposed is a measure of necessity. Repeated experiments have shown, that the revenue to be raised within these States is altogether inadequate to the public wants.

The deficiency can only be supplied by loans. Our applications to the foreign powers on whose friendship we depend, have had a success far short of our necessities. The next resource is to borrow from individuals. These will neither be actuated by generosity nor reasons of state. 'Tis to their interest alone we must appeal. To conciliate this, we must not only stipulate a proper compensation for what they lend, but we must give security for the performance. We must pledge an ascertained fund, simple and productive in its nature, general in its principle, and at the disposal of a single will. There can be little confidence in a security under the constant revisal of thirteen different deliberatives.

It must, once for all, be defined and established on the faith of the States, solemnly pledged to each other, and not revocable by any without a breach of the general compact. 'Tis by such expedients that nations whose resources are understood, whose reputations and governments are erected on the foundation of ages, are enabled to obtain a solid and extensive credit. Would it be reasonable in us to hope for more easy terms, who have so recently a.s.sumed our rank among the nations? Is it not to be expected, that individuals will be cautious in lending their money to a people in our circ.u.mstances, and that they will at least require the best security we can give? We have an enemy vigilant, intriguing, well acquainted with our defects and embarra.s.sments. We may expect that he will make every effort to instil diffidences into individuals, and in the present posture of our internal affairs he will have too plausible ground on which to tread. Our necessities have obliged us to embrace measures, with respect to our public credit, calculated to inspire distrust. The prepossessions on this article must naturally be against us, and it is therefore indispensable we should endeavor to remove them, by such means as will be the most obvious and striking. It was with these views Congress determined on a general fund; and the one they have recommended must, upon a thorough examination, appear to have fewer inconveniences than any other. It has been remarked as an essential part of the plan, that the fund should depend on a single will. This will not be the case, unless the collection, as well as the appropriation, is under the control of the United States; for it is evident, that, after the duty is agreed upon, it may, in a great measure, be defeated by an ineffectual mode of levying it. The United States have a common interest in a uniform and equally energetic collection; and not only policy, but justice to all the parts of the Union, designates the utility of lodging the power of making it where the interest is common. Without this, it might in reality operate as a very unequal tax." Journals of Congress, VIII. 153.

[192] He said, as an additional reason for the revenue being collected by officers under the appointment of Congress, that, "as the energy of the federal government was evidently short of the degree necessary for pervading and uniting the States, it was expedient to introduce the influence of officers deriving their emoluments from, and consequently interested in supporting the power of Congress." Upon this Mr. Madison observes: "This remark was imprudent, and injurious to the cause it was intended to serve. This influence was the very source of jealousy which rendered the States averse to a revenue under collection, as well as appropriation, of Congress. All the members of Congress who concurred in any degree, with the States in this jealousy, smiled at the disclosure.

Mr. Bland, and still more Mr. Lee, who were of this number, took notice, in private conversation, that Mr. Hamilton had let out the secret."

Elliot's Debates, I. 35.

[193] March 18 and 23, 1781. Journals, VII. 56, 67.

[194] Life of Hamilton, II. 50-57.

[195] March 20, 1783. Journals, VIII. 157-159.

[196] The census was to be of "the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, s.e.x, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes, in each State; which number shall be triennially taken and transmitted to the United States in Congress a.s.sembled, in such mode as they shall direct and appoint." When the Articles of Confederation were framed and adopted in Congress, a valuation of land as the rule of proportion was adopted instead of numbers of inhabitants, in consequence of the impossibility of compromising the different ideas of the Eastern and Southern States as to the rate at which slaves should be counted; the Eastern States of course wishing to have them counted in a near ratio to the whites, and the Southern States wishing to diminish that ratio. Numbers would have been preferred by the Southern States to land, if half their slaves only could have been taken; but the Eastern States were opposed to this estimate. (Elliot's Debates, I. 79.) In 1783, when it was proposed to change the rule of proportion from land to numbers, the first compromise suggested (by Mr. Wolcott of Connecticut) was to include only such slaves as were between the ages of sixteen and sixty; this was found to be impracticable; and it was agreed on all sides, that, instead of fixing the proportion by ages, it would be best to fix it in absolute numbers, and the rate of three fifths was agreed upon. (Ibid. 81, 82.)

[197] Life of Hamilton, II. 204-212.

[198] Ibid.

[199] He proposed that the States should transfer to Congress the right to appoint the regimental officers, and that the men should be enlisted under continental direction.

[200] That the subject of a peace establishment originated with Hamilton is certain, from the fact that early in April, soon after the appointment of the committee, he wrote to General Washington, wishing to know his sentiments at large on such inst.i.tutions of every kind for the interior defence of the States as might be best adapted to their circ.u.mstances. (Writings of Washington, VIII. 417.) Washington wrote to all the princ.i.p.al officers of the army then in camp, for their views, and from the memoirs which they presented to him an important doc.u.ment was compiled, which was forwarded by him to the committee of Congress.

In one of these memoirs Colonel Pickering suggested the establishment of a military academy at West Point. "If any thing," he said, "like a military academy in America be practicable at this time, it must be grounded on the permanent military establishment of our frontier posts and a.r.s.enals, and the wants of the States, separately, of officers to command the defences of their sea-coasts. On this principle, it might be expedient to establish a military school, or academy, at West Point. And that a competent number of young gentlemen might be induced to become students, it might be made a rule, that vacancies in the standing regiments should be supplied from thence; those few instances excepted where it would be just to promote a very meritorious sergeant. For this end, the number which shall be judged requisite to supply vacancies in the standing regiment might be fixed, and that of the students, who are admitted with an exception of filling them, limited accordingly. They might be allowed subsistence at the public expense. If any other youth desired to pursue the same studies at the military academy, they might be admitted, only subsisting themselves. Those students should be instructed in what is usually called military discipline, tactics, and the theory and practice of fortification and gunnery. The commandant and one or two other officers of the standing regiment, and the engineers, making West Point their general residence, would be the masters of the academy; and the inspector-general superintend the whole." (Ibid.) The subject of a peace establishment was made one of the four princ.i.p.al topics on which Washington afterwards enlarged in his circular letter to the States, in June; but his suggestions related chiefly to a uniform organization of the militia throughout the States. He subsequently had several conferences with the committee of Congress, on the whole subject, but nothing was done. (Vide note, infra.)

[201] Life of Hamilton, II. 214-219. The State of New York precipitated the const.i.tutional question, by demanding that the Western posts within her limits should be garrisoned by troops of her own, and by instructing her delegates in Congress to obtain a declaration, conformably to the sixth article of the Confederation, of the number of troops necessary for that purpose. Hamilton forbore to press this application while the general subject of a peace establishment was under consideration. But the doubts that arose as to the const.i.tutional power of Congress to raise an army for the purposes of peace, and the urgency of the case, made it necessary to adopt a temporary measure with regard to the frontier posts, and to direct the commander-in-chief to garrison them with a part of the troops of the United States which had enlisted for three years. This was ordered on the 12th of May. Soon after, the mutiny of a portion of the new levies of the Pennsylvania line occurred, which drove Congress from Philadelphia to Princeton, on the 21st of June. At Princeton, they remained during the residue of the year, but with diminished numbers and often without a const.i.tutional quorum of States.

In September, General Washington wrote to Governor Clinton: "Congress have come to no determination yet respecting a peace establishment, nor am I able to say when they will. I have lately had a conference with a committee on this subject, and have reiterated my former opinions: but it appears to me, that there is not a sufficient representation to discuss great national points; nor do I believe there will be, while that honorable body continue their sessions at this place. The want of accommodation, added to a disinclination in the Southern delegates to be farther removed than they formerly were from the centre of the empire, and an aversion in the others to give up what they conceive to be a point gained by the late retreat to this place, keep matters in an awkward situation, to the very great interruption of national concerns.

Seven States, it seems, by the Articles of Confederation, must agree, before any place can be fixed upon for the seat of the federal government; and seven States, it is said, never will agree; consequently, as Congress came here, here they are to remain, to the dissatisfaction of the majority and a great let to business, having none of the public offices about them, nor any place to accommodate them, if they were brought up; and the members, from this or some other cause, are eternally absent."

[202] Mr. Madison has given the following account of this occurrence:--"On the 19th of June, Congress received information from the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, that eighty soldiers, who would probably be followed by others, were on the way from Lancaster to Philadelphia, in spite of the expostulations of their officers, declaring that they would proceed to the seat of Congress and demand justice, and intimating designs against the Bank. A committee, of which Colonel Hamilton was chairman, was appointed to confer with the executive of Pennsylvania, and to take such measures as they should find necessary. After a conference, the committee reported that it was the opinion of the executive that the militia of Philadelphia would probably not be willing to take arms before they should be provoked by some actual outrage; that it would hazard the authority of government to make the attempt; and that it would be necessary to let the soldiers come into the city, if the officers who had gone out to meet them could not stop them. The next day the soldiers arrived in the city, led by their sergeants, and professing to have no other object than to obtain a settlement of accounts, which they supposed they had a better chance for at Philadelphia than at Lancaster. On the 21st, they were drawn up in the street before the State-House, where Congress were a.s.sembled. The Executive Council of the State, sitting under the same roof, was called on for the proper interposition. The President of the State (d.i.c.kinson) came in and explained the difficulty of bringing out the militia of the place for the suppression of the mutiny. He thought that, without some outrages on persons or property, the militia could not be relied on.

General St. Clair, then in Philadelphia, was sent for, and desired to use his interposition, in order to prevail on the troops to return to the barracks. But his report gave no encouragement. In this posture of things, it was proposed by Mr. Izard that Congress should adjourn.

Colonel Hamilton proposed that General St. Clair, in concert with the Executive Council of the State, should take order for terminating the mutiny. Mr. Reed moved that the General should endeavor to withdraw the mutineers, by a.s.suring them of the disposition of Congress to do them justice. Nothing, however, was done. The soldiers remained in their position, occasionally uttering offensive words and pointing their muskets at the windows of the hall of Congress. At the usual hour of adjournment the members went out, without obstruction; and the soldiers retired to their barracks. In the evening Congress rea.s.sembled, and appointed a committee to confer anew with the executive of the State.

This conference produced nothing but a repet.i.tion of the doubts concerning the disposition of the militia to act, unless some actual outrage were offered to persons or property, the insult to Congress not being deemed a sufficient provocation. On the 24th, the efforts of the State authority being despaired of, Congress were summoned by the President to meet at Trenton." (Elliot's Debates, I. 92-94.) The mutiny was afterwards suppressed by marching troops into Pennsylvania under Major-General Howe. (Journals, VIII. 281.)

[203] Life of Hamilton, II. 230-237.

[204] Life of Hamilton, II. 230-237.

[205] Ibid.

[206] See the Address to the States, accompanying the proposed revenue system, April 26, 1783, from the pen of Mr. Madison. Journals, VIII.

194-201.

[207] The first Continental Congress was called to meet at Philadelphia, that being the nearest to the centre of the Union of any of the princ.i.p.al cities in the United States. Succeeding Congresses had been held there, with the exception of the period when the city was in the possession of the enemy, in the year 1777, until, on the 21st of June, 1783, in consequence of the mutiny of the soldiers, the President was authorized to summon the members to meet at Trenton, or Princeton, in New Jersey, "in order that further and more effectual measures may be taken for suppressing the present revolt, and maintaining the dignity and authority of the United States." On the 30th, Congress a.s.sembled at Princeton, in the halls of the college, which were tendered by its officers for their use. In August, a proposition was made to return to Philadelphia, and that, on the second Monday in October, Congress should meet at Annapolis, unless in the mean time it had been ordered otherwise. But this was not agreed to. A committee was then appointed (in September), "to consider what jurisdiction may be proper for Congress in the place of their permanent residence." This seems to have been followed by propositions from several of the States, from New York to Virginia inclusive, respecting a place for the permanent residence of Congress, although the Journal does not state what they were. A question was then taken (October 6), in which State buildings should be provided and erected for the residence of Congress, beginning with New Hampshire and proceeding with all the States in their order. Each State was negatived in its turn. The highest number of votes given (by States) were for New Jersey and Maryland, which had four votes each. A resolution was then carried, "that buildings for the use of Congress be erected on or near the banks of the Delaware, provided a suitable district can be procured on or near the banks of said river, for a federal town; and that the right of soil, and an exclusive or such jurisdiction as Congress may direct, shall be vested in the United States"; and a committee was appointed, to repair to the falls of the Delaware, to view the country, and report a proper district for this purpose. A variety of motions then followed, for the selection of a place of temporary residence, but none was adopted. On the 17th of October, a proposition was made by a delegate of Ma.s.sachusetts (Mr.

Gerry), to have buildings provided for the alternate residence of Congress in two places, with the idea of "securing the mutual confidence and affection of the States, and preserving the federal balance of power"; but the question was lost. Afterwards, the following resolution was agreed to: "Whereas, there is reason to expect that the providing buildings for the alternate residence of Congress in two places will be productive of the most salutary effects, by securing the mutual confidence and affections of the States, _Resolved_, That buildings be likewise erected, for the use of Congress, at or near the lower falls of the Potomac, or Georgetown, provided a suitable district on the banks of the river can be procured for a federal town, and the right of soil, and an exclusive jurisdiction, or such as Congress may direct, shall be vested in the United States; and that until the buildings to be erected on the banks of the Delaware and Potomac shall be prepared for the reception of Congress, their residence shall be alternately, at equal periods of not more than one year and not less than six months, in Trenton and Annapolis; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to adjourn Congress on the twelfth day of November next, to meet at Annapolis on the twenty-sixth day of the same month, for the despatch of public business." (Journals of Congress from June to November, 1783.)

[208] Report of a committee appointed to devise means for procuring a full representation in Congress, made November 1, 1783. Journals, VIII.

480-482.

[209] Hamilton's proposed Resolutions; Life, II. 230-237.

BOOK III.