The Confederates had in Western Louisiana, near the mouth of the Teche, a small division of Taylor's troops, about 4,500 strong, with one gunboat. At first Banks thought to leave a brigade, with two or three light-draught gunboats, on Berwick Bay to observe Taylor's force, and then to disregard it as a factor in the subsequent movements. This, while the Atchafalaya was high and the eastern lowlands of the Attakapas widely overflowed, might have been safely done, but all these plans were destined to be essentially modified by a series of unexpected events in widely different quarters.

In the second week of January, Weitzel heard that Taylor meditated an attack on the outlying force at Berwick Bay, and that with this view the armament of the gunboat Cotton was being largely augmented. Weitzel resolved to strike the first blow. For this purpose he concentrated his whole force of seven regiments, including four of his own brigade, besides the 21st Indiana, 6th Michigan, and 23d Connecticut, with Carruth's and Thompson's batteries, four pieces of Bainbridge's battery, Barrett's Troop B of the Louisiana cavalry, and Company B of the 8th New Hampshire, commanded by Lieutenant Charles H. Camp. The 1st Louisiana held Donaldsonville and the 114th New York guarded the railway. To open the way, as well as to meet the fire of the Cotton, there were four gunboats of the light-draught flotilla under Buchanan-the flagship Calhoun, Estrella, Kinsman, and Diana.

At three o'clock on the morning of the 13th of January the crossing of Berwick Bay began; by half-past ten the gunboats had completed the ferriage of the cavalry and artillery; the infantry following landed at Pattersonville; then the whole force formed in line and, moving forward in the afternoon to the junction of the Teche with the Atchafalaya, went into bivouac. The next morning began the ascent of the Teche. The 8th Vermont was thrown over to the east or left bank of the bayou, while the main line moved forward on the west bank to attack the Cotton, now in plain sight. The gunboats led the movement, necessarily in line ahead, owing to the narrowness of the bayou. On either bank Weitzel's line of battle, with skirmishers thrown well forward, was preceded by sixty volunteers from the 8th Vermont and the same number from the 75th New York, whose orders were to move directly up to the Cotton and pick off her gunners. The line of battle moved forward steadily with the column of gunboats. Between the Union gunboats and the Cotton the bayou had been obstructed so as to prevent any hostile vessel from ascending the stream beyond that point. A brisk fight followed. Under cover of the guns of the navy and of the raking and broadside fire of the batteries, the 8th Vermont and 75th New York first drove off the land supports and then moving swiftly on the Cotton silenced her. In this advance the Vermonters captured one lieutenant and forty-one men. The Cotton retreated out of range. That night her crew applied the match and let her swing across the bayou to serve as an additional obstruction. In a few moments she was completely destroyed.

Then, having thus easily gained his object, Weitzel returned to La Fourche. His losses in the movement were 1 officer and 5 men killed, and 2 officers and 25 men wounded. Lieutenant James E. Whiteside, of the 75th New York, who had volunteered to lead the sharpshooters on the right bank, was killed close to the Cotton, in the act of ordering the crew to haul down her flag. Among the killed, also, was the gallant Buchanan-a serious loss, not less to the army than to the navy.

During a lull in the naval operations above Vicksburg, occasioned by the want of coal, eleven steamboats that had been in use by the Confederates on the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, took advantage of Porter's absence to slip up the Yazoo for supplies. There Porter's return caught them as in a trap.

Toward the end of January Grant landed on the long neck opposite Vicksburg, and once more set to work on the ca.n.a.l. Porter now determined to let a detachment of his fleet run the gauntlet of the batteries of Vicksburg for the purpose of destroying every thing the Confederates had afloat below the town. The ran Queen of the West, Colonel Charles R. Ellet, protected by two tiers of cotton bales, was told off to lead the adventure. On the 2d of February she performed the feat; then pa.s.sing on down the river, on the 3d, ran fifteen miles below the mouth of the Red River, and the same distance up that stream, took and burned three Confederate supply steamboats, and got safely back to Vicksburg on the 5th. Porter was naturally jubilant, for, as it seemed, the mastery of the great river had been the swift reward of his enterprise.

A week later Ellet again ran down the Mississippi and up the Red, burning and destroying until, pushing his success too far, he found himself under the guns of Fort De Russy. A few shots sufficed to disable the Queen of the West, which fell into the hands of the Confederates, while Ellet and his men escaped in one of their captures.

Below Natchez they met the Indianola coming down the river, after safely pa.s.sing Vicksburg. On the 24th the Confederate gunboat Webb, and the ram Queen of the West, now also flying the Confederate colors, came after the Indianola, attacked her off Palmyra Island, and sank her. Thus, as suddenly as it had gone from them, the control of the long reach of the Mississippi once more pa.s.sed over to the Confederates.

At this news Farragut took fire. Between him and the impudent little Confederate flotilla, whose easy triumph had suddenly laid low the hopes and plans of his brother admiral, there stood nothing save the guns of Port Hudson. These batteries he would pa.s.s, and for the fourth time, yet not the last, would look the miles of Confederate cannon in the mouth. Banks, whose movements were r.e.t.a.r.ded and to some extent held in abeyance, from the causes already mentioned, promptly fell in with the Admiral's plans, and both commanders conferring freely, the details were soon arranged.

CHAPTER VIII. FARRAGUT Pa.s.sES PORT HUDSON.

While Farragut was putting his fleet in thorough order for this adventure, looking after all needful arrangements with minute personal care, Banks concentrated all his disposable force at Baton Rouge. By the 7th of March, leaving T. W. Sherman to cover New Orleans and Weitzel to hold strongly La Fourche, Banks had a marching column, composed of Augur's, Emory's, and Grover's divisions, 15,000 strong. On the 9th of March tents were struck, to be pitched no more for five hard months, and the next morning the troops were ready, but repairs delayed the fleet, the last vessels of which did not reach Baton Rouge until about the 12th. On that day, for the first time, Banks reviewed his army, on the old battle-ground, in the presence of the admiral, his staff, and many officers of the fleet. The new regiments, with some exceptions, showed plainly the progress already attained under the energetic training and constant work of their officers. The degree of instruction and care then apparent forecast the value of their actual service. The 38th Ma.s.sachusetts and 116th New York were specially commended in orders.

To hold Baton Rouge about 3,000 men were detached, under Chickering, including the 41st Ma.s.sachusetts, 173d New York, 175th New York, 1st Indiana heavy artillery, 3d Louisiana native guards, Mack's battery, and Troop F of the Rhode Island cavalry.

All arrangements being concerted for the pa.s.sage of the batteries on the evening of the 14th of March, Grover set out on the afternoon of the 13th, followed, at daybreak the next morning, by Emory, with Augur bringing up the rear. In the afternoon Grover went into camp, covering the intersection of the Bayou Sara road and the road that leads from it toward the river. Emory formed on his left, covering the branches of this road that lead to Springfield Landing and to Ross Landing, his main body supporting the centre at Alexander's plantation. Augur, on the right, held the cross-road that leads from the Bayou Sara road by Alexander's to the Clinton road at Vallandigham's. At two o'clock in the afternoon the signal officers opened communication from Springfield Landing with the fleet at anchor near the head of Prophet Island, and a strong detachment was posted near the landing to maintain the connection.

As the Confederates were known to have a force of about 1,200 cavalry somewhere between Clinton and Baton Rouge, strong detachments became necessary to observe all the approaches and to hold the roads and bridges in the rear in order to secure the withdrawal of the army when the demonstration should be completed, as well as to guard the operation from being inopportunely interrupted. These dispositions reduced the force for battle to about 12,000.

It had been intended to concentrate nearly all the artillery near the river in the vicinity of Ross Landing in such a manner as to engage, or at least divide, the attention of the lower batteries of Port Hudson; but the maps were even more imperfect than usual, and when a reconnoissance, naturally r.e.t.a.r.ded by the enemy's advance guard, showed that the road by which the guns were to have gone into position did not exist, the daylight was already waning. A broken bridge also caused some delay.

At five o'clock in the afternoon Banks received a despatch from Farragut announcing an important change in the hour fixed for the movement of the fleet. Instead of making the attempt "in the gray of the morning," as had been the admiral's first plan, he now meant to get under way at eight o'clock in the evening. When darkness fell, therefore, it found the troops substantially in the positions already described, yet with their outposts well thrown forward.

About ten o'clock the fleet weighed anchor and moved up the river. The flagship Hartford took the lead, with the Albatross lashed to her port side, next the Richmond with the Genesee, the Monongahela with the Kineo, and last the side-wheeler Mississippi alone. The Ess.e.x and Sachem remained at anchor below, with the mortar boats, to cover the advance. An hour later a rocket shot up from the bluff and instantly the Confederate batteries opened fire. They were soon joined by long lines of sharpshooters. To avoid the shoal that makes out widely from the western bank, as well as to escape the worst of the enemy's fire, both of musketry and artillery, the ships hugged closely the eastern bluff; so closely, indeed, that the yards brushed the leaves from the overhanging trees and the voices of men on sh.o.r.e could be distinctly heard by those on board. Watch-fires were lighted by the Confederates to show as well the ships as the range; yet this did more harm than good, since the smoke united with that of the guns ash.o.r.e and afloat to render the fleet invisible. On the other hand, the pilots were soon unable to see.

The Hartford, meeting the swift eddy at the bend, where the current describes nearly a right angle, narrowly escaped being driven ash.o.r.e. The Richmond, following, was disabled by a shot through her engine-room when abreast of the upper battery at the turn. The Monongahela's consort, the Kineo, lost the use of her rudder, and the Monongahela herself ran aground on the spit; presently the Kineo, drifting clear, also grounded, but was soon afloat again, and, with her a.s.sistance, the Monongahela too swung free, after nearly a half hour of imminent peril. Then the Kineo, cast loose by her consort, drifted helplessly down the stream, while the Monongahela pa.s.sed up until a heated bearing brought her engines to a stop and she too drifted with the current.

Last of the fleet, the Mississippi, unseen in the smoke, and therefore safe enough from the Confederate guns, yet equally unable to see either friend, foe, or landmark, was carried by the current hard on the spit; then, after a half hour of ineffectual exertion, lying alone and helpless under the concentrated aim of the Confederate batteries, she was abandoned and set on fire by her captain. About three in the morning, becoming lighter, as the fire did its work, she floated free and drifted down the stream one ma.s.s of flames, in plain view, not merely of the fleet, but also of the army, condemned to stand to arms in sight and sound of the distant battle and now to look on idly as, with a mighty flash and roar, the Mississippi cast to the heavens her blazing timbers, amid a myriad of bursting sh.e.l.ls, in one mountain of flame: then black silence.

Thus, when at last the gray of the morning came, the Hartford and Albatross rode in safety above Port Hudson, while the Richmond, Monongahela, Genesee, and Kineo, all battered and more or less injured, lay at anchor once more near Prophet Island, and the Mississippi had perished in a blaze of glory.

Narrowly escaping the total failure of his plans and the destruction of his fleet, Farragut had so far succeeded in his objects that henceforth the Confederates practically lost the control of the Mississippi above Port Hudson, as well as the use of the Red River as their base of supplies. Save in skiff-loads, beef, corn, and salt could no longer be safely carried across the Mississippi, and the high road from Galveston and Matamoras was closed against the valuable and sorely needed cargoes brought from Europe by the blockade runners.

As for the army, it had gained some facility of movement, some knowledge of its deficiencies, and some information of great future value as to the topography of the unknown country about Port Hudson; more than this could hardly have been expected. Indeed, the sole object of the presence of the army was defeated by the movement of the fleet so many hours before the time agreed upon. This object was to make a diversion that might attract the enemy's attention and thus tend to reduce the fire of musketry on the exposed decks of the fleet, and to draw off or hold off the fire of the field-pieces that might otherwise be ma.s.sed on the river front. The disparity between the relative strength of Banks's army and that of the garrison was too well known to justify the thought of an actual attack upon the works.

Such, however, was not the opinion of the government, which to the last seems to have taken for granted that all that was needed to insure the surrender of Port Hudson was a desire to attack it. Even after the surrender, Halleck, in his annual report for 1863, speaking of the position of affairs in March, said: "Had our land forces invested Port Hudson at this time, it could have been easily reduced, as its garrison was weak ... but the strength of the place was not then known." In truth, the place was never so strong, before or after, as at this time; nor is it often in war that the information tallies so nearly with the fact. The effective strength of the garrison was more than 16,000. Gardner's monthly report accounts for 1,366 officers and 14,921 men present for duty, together 16,287 out of a total present of 20,388. Besides the twenty-two heavy guns in position, he had thirteen light batteries.

Morning found the army alone and in a bad position, either for attack or defence. Nothing was to be gained by staying there, and much was to be risked. As soon, therefore, as word came through the ever-active and adventurous signal-officers that all was well with what remained of the fleet, Banks once more took up the line of march for Baton Rouge, and went into bivouac in great discomfort on the soggy borders of the Bayou Montesanto, about eight miles north of the town.

Meanwhile, what had become of Farragut? The last seen of the Hartford and Albatross was on the morning of the 15th by the signal officers at Springfield Landing. The two vessels then lay at anchor beyond the bend above Port Hudson. Several attempts were made to communicate with the Admiral across the intervening neck of lowland. The first was on the 16th, by Parmele, with the 174th New York and a squadron of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry. Next, on the 18th, Banks, eager to advance the effort, took Dudley's brigade, two sections of Rails's battery, and Magen's troop, and joined Parmele. But for a time these efforts accomplished nothing, since it was impossible to see far over the flat and wooded country; and the Confederates having cut the great levee at Morganza, the whole neighborhood was under water and the bridges gone. Finally, on the 19th, Colonel Charles J. Paine went out with the 2d Louisiana, the 174th New York, and a small squad of cavalry, and leaving first the infantry and then most of the troopers behind, and riding on almost alone, succeeded in crossing the bend and gained the levee at the head of the old channel known as Fausse River, about three miles above Port Hudson. There he had a good view of the river, yet nothing was to be seen of the Hartford and Albatross. Again, on the 24th, Dudley sent Magen with his troop to Hermitage Landing. Pushing on with a few men, Magen got a full view of the reach above Waterloo for five miles, but he too learned nothing of the fleet. Farragut had in fact gone up the river on the 15th, after vainly attempting to exchange signals with his ships below and with the army, and was now near Vicksburg in communication with Admiral Porter, engaged in concerting plans for the future. Before getting under way he had caused three guns to be fired from the Hartford. This was the signal agreed upon with Banks, but for some reason it was either not heard or not reported.

Just before separating at Baton Rouge, Banks had handed to Farragut a letter addressed to Grant, to be delivered by the Admiral in the event of success. This letter, the first direct communication between the two generals, Grant received on the 20th of March, and from it derived his first information of the actual state of affairs in the Department of the Gulf. After stating his position and force Banks wound up by saying: "Should the Admiral succeed in his attempt, I shall try to open communication with him on the other side of the river, and, in that event, trust I shall hear from you as to your position and movements, and especially as to your views as to the most efficient mode of co-operation upon the part of the forces we respectively command."

With the Hartford and Albatross controlling the reach between Port Hudson and Vicksburg, as well as the mouth of the Red River and the head of the Atchafalaya, Banks might now safely disregard the movements of the Confederate gunboats. Accordingly, while waiting for Grant's answer, he turned to the execution of his former plan.

CHAPTER IX. THE TECHE.

In effect, this plan was to turn Port Hudson by way of the Atchafalaya. For the original conception, the credit must be given to Weitzel, who seems indeed to have formed a very similar scheme when he first occupied La Fourche. However, his force was, at that time, barely sufficient for the defence of the territory confided to his care. Not only was there then no particular object in moving beyond the Atchafalaya, but any advance in that direction would have exposed his little corps to disaster on account of the great facilities afforded by the numberless streams for a movement by detachments of the enemy into his rear. It was largely to prepare for an advance into Western Louisiana, as well as to defend his occupancy of La Fourche, that Butler, upon Weitzel's suggestion, had created the gunboat flotilla.

Soon after Banks took the command, Weitzel, who had opinions and the courage to enforce them, laid his ideas before his new chief. On the 18th of January, disturbed by hearing that Admiral Farragut meant to take one of the army gunboats, recently transferred to the navy, away from Berwick Bay, instead of sending more, Weitzel expressed himself strongly in a despatch to headquarters.

"With such a naval force in that bay, in co-operation with a suitable land force, the only true campaign in this section could be made. Look at the map. Berwick Bay leads into Grand Lake, Grand Lake into the Atchafalaya, the Atchafalaya into Red River. Boats drawing not more than four or five feet and in the force I mention [10 or 12], with a proper land force, could clear out the Atchafalaya, Red River, and Black River. All communications from Vicksburg and Port Hudson cross this line indicated by me. By taking it in the manner I propose, Vicksburg and Port Hudson would be a cipher to the rebels. It would be a campaign that 100,000 men could not so easily fight, and so successfully. It is an operation to which the taking of Galveston Island is a cipher and the capture of the Mobile Bay forts a nonent.i.ty."

With these views Banks was himself in accord, yet not in their entirety. The pressure of time led him to desire to avoid divergences into the Teche country. If it were possible, he wished to gain the Atchafalaya by some route at once speedier and more direct. While the explorations were in progress to discover such a route, Weitzel once more took occasion to urge his original plan. On the 15th of February, he wrote to Augur, his division commander:

"I feel it a duty which I owe you and my country to address you at this late hour in the night on the present proposed movement on b.u.t.te a la Rose and the Teche country... . In all honesty and candor, I do not believe the present plan to be a proper one... . Sibley's Texas brigade is somewhere in the Opelousas country... . Mouton's main body is in rear of intrenchments on Madame Meade's plantation, six miles below Centreville. If we defeat these two commands we form a junction with our forces near Vicksburg. By pursuing our success to Alexandria, we may capture General Mouton's force, and with little loss, unless it form a junction with Sibley. If it forms a junction, we will meet them near Iberia and engage them in open field, and with a proper force can defeat them. General Emory's whole division (moved to Brashear City) and my brigade can do this work. Let the light transportation, now with General Emory, and all destined for and collected by me be collected at Brashear City. Let two of the brigades be moved to and landed at Indian Bend, while the other two are crossed and attack in front. If Mouton escapes (which I think, if properly conducted, will be doubtful) we form a junction at Indian Bend. We proceed to attack and with much superior force, because I do not believe Mouton and Sibley united will exceed 6,000 men. We can defeat them, pursue our success to Alexandria and of course get b.u.t.te a la Rose; our gunboats to facilitate its fall, attacking it as they cannot accompany us farther up than Saint Martinville. I believe this to be the true and only correct plan of the campaign."

These views were unquestionably sound; they were such as might have been expected of an officer of Weitzel's skill and experience and special knowledge of the theatre of operations. Supported by the strong current of events, they were now to be carried into effect.

At the date of this despatch, Emory's division had been for several weeks near the head of the Bayou Plaquemine, with headquarters at Indian Village, endeavoring to find or force a waterway to the Atchafalaya, while Weitzel was holding his brigade in readiness to co-operate by a simultaneous movement against Taylor on the Teche. Many attempts were made by Emory to carry out the object confided to him, yet all proved failures. Bayou Sorrel, Lake Chicot, Grand River, and the Plaquemine itself, from both ends of the stream, were thoroughly explored, but only to find the bayous choked with driftwood impossible to remove, and until removed rendering the streams impa.s.sable. Two of these drifts in Bayou Sorrel were carefully examined by Captain Henry Cochen, of the 173d New York. The first he reported to be about a mile in length, "composed of one ma.s.s of logs, roots, big and small trees, etc., jammed tightly for thirty feet, the whole length of my pole." The second drift, just beyond, was found nearly as bad, and farther on lay another even worse. Moreover, a thorough reconnoissance showed the whole country, between the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya above the Plaquemine, to be impracticable at that season for all arms. After more than a month of this sort of work, Emory was called across the river to Baton Rouge to take part in the events narrated in the last chapter.

Banks returned to New Orleans on the 24th of March, and the next day ordered Grover to embark and move down the river to Donaldsonville, and thence march down the Bayou La Fourche to Thibodeaux. At the same time Emory was ordered, as soon as Grover's river transports should be released, to embark his command for Algiers, and thence move by the railway to Brashear. Meanwhile, on the 18th of March, Weitzel learned of the presence of the Queen of the West and Webb in the Atchafalaya, and as this seemed to indicate an intention to attack him, and the navy had no more light-draught gunboats to spare for his further security, to avoid having his hand forced and the game spoiled, he discreetly fell back on the 21st to the railway bridge over Bayou Boeuf, and took up a position where he was not exposed, as at Brashear, to the risk of being cut off by any sudden movement of the enemy.

On the 28th of March the Diana was sent to reconnoitre the Confederate position and strength on the lower Teche; but continuing on down the Atchafalaya, instead of returning by Grand Lake as intended, and thus running into the arms of the enemy, she fell an easy prey. The Calhoun went to her relief, but ran aground, and the Estrella had to go to the a.s.sistance of the Calhoun. Acting-Master James L. Peterson, commanding the Diana, was killed, and Lieutenant Pickering D. Allen, aide-de-camp to General Weitzel, was wounded. With the Diana there fell into the enemy's hands nearly one hundred and fifty prisoners. This gave the Confederates three rather formidable boats in the Atchafalaya and the Teche.

The movement of the troops was necessarily slow, as well by reason of the extremely limited facilities for transportation, as because of the state of the roads, but by the 8th of April every thing was well advanced, and on that day Banks moved his headquarters to Brashear. Weitzel, who had been reinforced by the siege-train, manned by the 1st Indiana heavy artillery, had already re-occupied his former front on Berwick Bay. Emory was in bivouac at Bayou Ramos, about five miles in the rear of Weitzel, and Grover at Bayou Boeuf, about four miles behind Emory. Thus the whole movement was almost completely masked from the Confederates, who from their side of the bay saw only Weitzel, and knew little or nothing of the gathering forces in his rear. So little, indeed, that Taylor, with his usual enterprise, seems to have thought this a favorable moment for attempting upon Weitzel the same operation that Weitzel had been so long meditating for the discomfiture of Taylor.

Emory marched early in the morning of the 9th of April and closed up on Weitzel, who, an hour later, about ten o'clock, began to cross. No enemy was seen save a small outpost, engaged in observing the movement. This detachment retired before Weitzel's advance, without coming to blows. Weitzel at once sent his a.s.sistant Adjutant-General, Captain John B. Hubbard, with Perkins's and Williamson's troops of cavalry and one section of Bainbridge's battery to discover the enemy's position. The Confederates were found to be in some force in front of Pattersonville, with their cavalry pickets advanced to within a mile of Weitzel's front.

As soon as Weitzel had completed his crossing, and released the boats, Emory followed him. The four brigades bivouacked in front of the landing-place that night. The gunboats, having done the greater share of the ferriage, went back to the east bank for Grover.

Grover, who had marched from Bayou Boeuf at nine o'clock, just as Emory was arriving at Brashear, came there, in his turn, early in the afternoon. The plan had been that Grover should embark immediately, and, having his whole force on board by an early hour in the night, the boats should set out at daylight, so as to place Grover by nine o'clock on the morning of the 11th in position for the work cut out for him. With few pilots, and the sh.o.r.es unlighted, it was out of the question to attempt the navigation of the waters of the Grand Lake during the night. However, it was not until the night of the 11th that Grover was able to complete the embarkation of his division. To understand this it is necessary to observe that Emory and Weitzel, in making the pa.s.sage of Berwick Bay, were merely crossing a short ferry, so that the boats engaged in the transfer could be loaded rapidly to almost any extent, so long as they remained afloat, and being unloaded with equal facility, were in a few minutes ready to repeat the operation. In Grover's case, however, the infantry, artillery, cavalry, and stores had all to be taken care of at once, with every provision for fighting a battle. For this the artillery was considered indispensable, and it was not without great trouble and long delay that the guns and horses were got afloat. Fate seemed to be against Grover, for after all had been accomplished by the greatest exertion on his part, as well as on the part of his officers and the corps quartermasters, a fog set in so dense that the pilots were unable to see their way. This continued until nine o'clock on the morning of the 12th; then at last the movement began.

About noon, on the 11th of April, Weitzel, leading the advance of the main column, moved forward. At once his skirmishers felt the skirmishers of the enemy, who retired slowly, without attempting any serious opposition. In the evening, Weitzel rested in line of battle a short distance above Pattersonville. Emory followed closely, and went into bivouac on Weitzel's left. The march had not been begun earlier, and the enemy was not pressed, because it was desired to keep him amused until Grover should have gained his rear, and Grover had not yet started.

After the early morning of Sunday, the 12th of April, had been spent in light skirmishing and in demonstrations of the cavalry, designed to observe the enemy, and at the same time to attract and hold his attention, word came that Grover was under way. Banks knew that the pa.s.sing fleet must soon be in plain sight of the Confederates. Therefore, it was now necessary to move promptly, and to feel the enemy strongly, yet not too strongly, lest he should abandon his position too soon and suddenly spoil all. From this moment it is important to remember that, save in the event of complete success, no word could come from Grover for nearly two days. The first news from him was expected to be the sound of his guns in the enemy's rear.

At eleven o'clock the bugle again sounded the advance. The whole line moved forward, continually skirmishing, until, about four o'clock in the afternoon, the infantry came under fire of the Confederate guns in position on the lines known as Camp Bisland. The line of march led up the right bank of the Atchafalaya until the mouth of the Teche was reached, thence up the Teche, partly astride the stream, yet mainly by the right bank. At first Weitzel formed on the right, Emory on the left, but as the great bend of the Teche was reached, about four miles below Bisland, and by the nature of the ground the front became narrowed at the same time that in following the change of direction of the bayou the line was brought to a wheel, Weitzel took ground to the left in two lines, while Emory advanced Paine's brigade into the front line on Weitzel's right, placed Ingraham in his second line, and made a third line with G.o.dfrey.

Then finding the enemy beyond the Teche too strong for the cavalry to manage single-handed, Banks called on Emory to reinforce the right bank. Emory sent Bryan across with the 175th New York and a section of the 1st Maine battery, commanded by Lieutenant Eben D. Haley. They were to push the enemy back, and to conform to the advance of the main line.

The day was hot, the air close, and the march over the fields of young cane, across or aslant the heavy furrows and into and over the deep ditches, was trying to the men, as yet but little accustomed to marches. Fortunately, however, there was no need of pressing the advance until Grover's guns should be heard. About half-past five in the afternoon a brisk artillery fire began, and was kept up until night fell; then Emory moved the 4th Wisconsin forward to hold a grove in front of a sugar-house, near the bayou, well in advance of his right, in order to prevent the Confederates from occupying it, to the annoyance of the whole line.

After dark all the pickets were thrown well forward in touch with those of the enemy, but the main lines were drawn back out of range, for the sake of a good night's sleep before a hard day's work.

CHAPTER X. BISLAND.

The works behind which the Confederates now stood to battle were named Camp Bisland or Fort Bisland, in honor of the planter whose fields were thus given over to war. The defences consisted of little more than a line of simple breastworks, of rather low relief, thrown completely across the neck of dry land on either bank of the Teche, the flanks resting securely on the swamps that border Grand Lake on the left and on the right extend to the Gulf. The position was well chosen, for five miles below Centreville, where the plantation of Mrs. Meade adjoins the Bethel Place, the neck is at its narrowest. The Teche, pa.s.sing a little to the left of the centre of the works, enabled the guns of the Diana, moving freely around the bends, to contribute to the defence, while the obstructions placed below the works hindered the ascent of the bayou by the Union gunboats. The Confederate right was also somewhat strengthened by the embankment of the unfinished railroad to Opelousas. On the other hand, from the nature of the ground, low and flat as it was, the works were in part rather commanded than commanding; yet the difference of level was inconsiderable, and for a force as small as Taylor's, outnumbered as his was, any slight disadvantage in this way was more than compensated by the shortness of the line.

Along the banks of the bayou were a few live oaks; on either flank the swamp was densely wooded, mainly with cypress, cottonwood, and willow, with an outlying and almost impenetrable canebrake, while between the attacking columns and the Confederate position, on either bank of the bayou, stretched a field where the young shoots of the sugar-cane stood knee-high. This was crossed at right angles with the bayou, by many of those wide and deep ditches by which the planters of Louisiana are accustomed to drain their tilled lowlands.