All may well feel proud to inscribe on their banners the name of Santiago de Cuba.

By command of Major-General Shafter.

Official: John B. Miley, E. J. McClernand, Aide. a.s.st. Adj.-Gen.

APPENDIX II.

The Santiago Campaign.

Report of Major-General Wm. R. Shafter, Commanding.

September 13, 1898.

Sir,--I have the honor to submit the following report of the campaign which terminated in the fall of Santiago de Cuba and the adjacent territory, and the establishment of the military government therein.

The expedition was undertaken in compliance with telegraphic instructions of May 30, 1898, from Headquarters of the Army, in which it was stated:

"Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have been seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and a.s.sist in capturing harbor and fleet."

On this date there were a large number of transports in Port Tampa Bay, which had been collected for the purpose of an expedition which it had been previously contemplated I should command, and for such other emergencies as might arise. Orders were immediately given for loading aboard those transports the necessary subsistence and quartermaster supplies, and for the embarkation of the authorized number of troops and their material. General Orders No. 5, from these headquarters, indicate the organizations it was at first proposed to take.

The order is as follows:

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, "Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898.

"G. O. 5.

"The following troops will hold themselves in readiness to move immediately on board transports upon notification from these headquarters:

"1. The 5th Army Corps.

"2. The Battalion of Engineers.

"3. The detachment of the Signal Corps.

"4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the commanding general of the cavalry division, in accordance with instructions previously given.

"5. Four batteries of light artillery, to be commanded by a major, to be selected by the commanding officer of the light artillery brigade.

"6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, to be selected by the commanding officer of the siege artillery battalion, with eight (8) guns and eight (8) field mortars.

"7. The Battalion of Engineers, the infantry and cavalry will be supplied with 500 rounds of ammunition per man.

"8. All troops will carry, in addition to the fourteen (14) days'

field rations now on hand, ten (10) days' travel rations.

"9. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage as prescribed in G. O. 54, A. G. O., c. s., will be taken.

"10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 8 of this order, the chief commissary will provide sixty (60) days' field rations for the entire command.

"11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be stored, carefully piled and covered, will be left in camp in charge of a commissioned officer, to be selected by the regimental commander.

Where there are no recruits available, the necessary guard only will be left.

"12. Travel rations will be drawn at once by the several commands, as indicated in paragraph 8.

"By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter.

"E. J. McClernand, "A. A. G."

This order was afterwards changed to include twelve squadrons of cavalry, all of which were dismounted because of lack of transportation for the animals, and because it was believed, from the best sources of information obtainable, that mounted cavalry could not operate efficiently in the neighborhood of Santiago. This was found subsequently to be correct.

The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa for embarking the troops and the large amount of supplies required were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it was not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as I hoped and desired.

On the evening of June 7th I received orders to sail without delay, but not with less than 10,000 men.

The orders referred to caused one division, composed of Volunteer troops, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Snyder, and which it had been intended to include in my command, to be left behind. I was joined, however, by Brig.-Gen. Bates, who had already arrived on transports from Mobile, Ala., with the 3d and 20th Infantry and one squadron of the 2d Cavalry with their horses, the latter being the only mounted troops in my command.

After some of them had already reached the lower bay, telegraphic instructions were received from the honorable Secretary of War, directing that the sailing of the expedition be delayed, waiting further orders. This delay was occasioned by the Navy reporting that a Spanish war vessel had been sighted in the Nicholas Channel. The ships in the lower bay were immediately recalled. On the next day, in compliance with instructions from the adjutant-general of the Army, the necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the full capacity of the transports, and the expedition sailed on June 14th with 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men.

The pa.s.sage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. The health of the command remained remarkably good, notwithstanding the fact that the conveniences on many of the transports, in the nature of sleeping accommodations, s.p.a.ce for exercise, closet accommodations, etc., were not all that could have been desired. While commenting upon this subject, it is appropriate to add that the opinion was general throughout the Army that the travel ration should include tomatoes, beginning with the first day, and that a small quant.i.ty of canned fruit would prove to be a most welcome addition while traveling at sea in the tropics. If the future policy of our Government requires much transportation for the military forces by sea, definite arrangements should be determined upon to provide the necessary hammock accommodations for sleeping. Hammocks interfere immeasurably less than bunks with the proper ventilation of the ships and during the day can be easily removed, thus greatly increasing s.p.a.ce for exercise; moreover, they greatly diminish the danger of fire.

While pa.s.sing along the north coast of Cuba one of the two barges we had in tow broke away during the night, and was not recovered. This loss proved to be very serious, for it delayed and embarra.s.sed the disembarkation of the army. On the morning of June 20th we arrived off Guantanamo Bay, and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came on board my headquarters transport. It was arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban general (Garcia) at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west of the Morro. During the interview Gen. Garcia offered the services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men in the vicinity of Aserraderos and about 500, under Gen. Castillo, at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Baiquiri. I accepted his offer, impressing it upon him that I could exercise no military control over him except, such as he would concede, and as long as he served under me I would furnish him rations and ammunition.

DISEMBARKATION IN CUBA.

Ever since the receipt of my orders I had made a study of the terrain surrounding Santiago, gathering information mainly from the former residents of the city, several of whom were on the transports with me.

At this interview all the possible points of attack were for the last time carefully weighed, and then, for the information and guidance of Admiral Sampson and Gen. Garcia, I outlined the plan of campaign, which was as follows:

With the a.s.sistance of the small boats of the Navy, the disembarkation was to commence on the morning of the 22d at Baiquiri; on the 21st 500 insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This force, under Gen. Castillo, was to attack the Spanish force at Baiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. This movement was successfully made. To mislead the enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, I requested Gen. Garcia to send a small force (about 500 men), under Gen. Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabanas, situated on the coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and where it was reported the enemy had several men intrenched, and from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago.

I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several of his warships, with a number of my transports, opposite this town, for the purpose of making a show of disembarking there.

In addition, I asked the admiral to cause a bombardment to be made at Cabanas and also at the forts around the Morro and at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney, and Baiquiri. The troops under Gen. Garcia remaining at Aserraderos were to be transferred to Baiquiri or Siboney on the 24th. This was successfully accomplished at Siboney.

These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from the east over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from Baiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment.

On the morning of the 22d the Army commenced to disembark at Baiquiri.

The following general order indicates the manner in which the troops left the transports and the amount of supplies carried immediately with them:

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, "On board S. S. Seguransa, "At Sea, June 20, 1898.

"G. O. 18.

(Extract.)