The second of the two questions proposed at the beginning is: How do the Marxians understand historical materialism? To me it seems undeniable that in the Marxian literature, _i.e._ the writings of the followers and interpreters of Marx, there exists in truth a _metaphysical danger_ of which it is necessary to beware. Even in the writings of Professor Labriola some statements are met with which have recently led a careful and accurate critic to conclude that Labriola understands historical materialism in the genuine and original sense of a metaphysic, and that of the worst kind, a metaphysic of the contingent.[47] But although I have myself, on another occasion, pointed out those statements and formulae which seem to me doubtful in Labriola's writings, I still think, as I thought then, that they are superficial outgrowths on a system of thought essentially sound; or to speak in a manner agreeing with the considerations developed above, that Labriola, having educated himself in Marxism, may have borrowed from it also some of its over-absolute style, and at times a certain carelessness about the working out of concepts, which are somewhat surprising in an old Herbartian like himself,[48] but which he then corrects by observations and limitations always useful, even if slightly contradictory, because they bring us back to the ground of reality.

Labriola, moreover, has a special merit, which marks him off from the ordinary exponents and adapters of historical materialism. Although his theoretical formulae may here and there expose him to criticism, when he turns to history, _i.e._ to concrete facts, he changes his att.i.tude, throws off as it were, the burden of theory and becomes cautious and circ.u.mspect: _he possesses, in a high degree, respect for history_. He shows unceasingly his dislike for formulae of every kind, when concerned to establish and scrutinise definite processes, nor does he forget to give the warning that there exists 'no theory, however good and excellent in itself, which will help us to a summary knowledge of every historical detail.'[49]

In his last book we may note especially a full inquiry into what could possibly be the nature of a _history of Christianity_. Labriola criticises those who set up as an historical subject the _essence_ of Christianity, of which it is unknown where or when it has existed; since the history of the last centuries of the Roman Empire shows us merely the origin and growth of what const.i.tuted the Christian society, or the church, a varying group of facts amidst varied historical conditions. This critical opinion held by Labriola seems to me perfectly correct; since it is not meant to deny, (what I myself, do not deny) the justification of that method of historical exposition, which for lack of another phrase, I once called _histories by concepts_,[50] thus distinguishing it from the historical exposition of the life of a given social group in a given place and during a given period of time. He who writes the _history of Christianity_, claims in truth, to accomplish a task somewhat similar to the tasks of the historians of _literature_, of _philosophy_, of _art_: _i.e._ to isolate a body of facts which enter into a fixed concept, and to arrange them in a chronological series, without however denying or ignoring the source which these facts have in the other facts of life, but keeping them apart for the convenience of more detailed consideration. The worst of it is that whereas literature, philosophy, art and so on are determined or determinable concepts, Christianity is almost solely a bond, which unites beliefs often intrinsically very diverse; and, in writing the history of Christianity, there is often a danger of writing in reality the history of a _name, void without substance_.[51]

But what would Labriola say if his cautious criticism were turned against that _history of the origin of the family, of private property and of cla.s.s distinctions_, which is one of the most extensive historical applications made by the followers of Marx: desired by Marx, sketched out by Engels on the lines of Morgan's investigations, carried on by others. Alas, in this matter, the aim was not merely to write, as could, perhaps, have been done, a useful manual of the historical facts which enter into these three concepts, but actually an _additional history_ was produced: A history, to use Labriola's own phrase, of the _essence_ family, of the _essence_ cla.s.s and of the _essence_ private property, with a predetermined cadence. A 'history of the family,' to confine ourselves to one of the three groups of facts,--can only be an enumeration and description of the particular forms taken by the _family_ amongst different races and in the course of time: a series of particular histories, which unite themselves into a general concept. It is this which is offered by Morgan's theories, expounded by Engels, which theories modern criticism have cut away on all sides.[52] Have they not allowed themselves to presuppose, as an historical stage, through which all races are fated to pa.s.s, that chimerical matriarchate, in which the mere reckoning of descent through the mother is confused with the predominance of woman in the family and that of woman in society? Have we not seen the reproofs and even the jeers directed by some Marxians against those cautious historians who deny that it is possible to a.s.sert, in the present condition of the criticism of sources, the existence of a primitive communism, or a matriarchate, amongst the h.e.l.lenic races? Indeed, I do not think that throughout this investigation proof has been given of much critical foresight.

I should also like to call Labriola's attention to another confusion, very common in Marxian writings, between _economic forms of organisation_ and _economic epochs_. Under the influence of evolutionist positivism, those divisions which Marx expressed in general: the _Asiatic_, the _antique_, the _feudal_ and the _bourgeois_ economic organisation, have become four historical _epochs_: _communism_, _slave organisation_, _serf organisation_, and _wage-earning organisation_. But the modern historian, who is indeed not such a superficial person as the ordinary Marxians are accustomed to say, thus sparing themselves the trouble of taking a share in his laborious procedure, is well aware that there are four _forms_ of economic organisation, which succeed and intersect one another in actual history, often forming the oddest mixtures and sequences. He recognises an Egyptian mediaevalism or feudalism, as he recognises an h.e.l.lenic mediaevalism or feudalism; he knows too of a German _neo-mediaevalism_ which followed the flourishing bourgeois organisation of the German cities before the Reformation and the discovery of the New World; and he willingly compares the general economic conditions of the Greco-Roman world at its zenith with those of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Connected with this arbitrary conception of historical epochs, is the other of the inquiry into _the cause_ (note carefully; into the cause) of the transition from one form to another. Inquiry is made, for instance, into the _cause_ of the abolition of slavery, which must be the _same_, whether we are considering the decline of the Greco-Roman world or modern America; and so for serfdom, and for primitive communism and the capitalist system: amongst ourselves the famous Loria has occupied himself with these absurd investigations, the perpetual revelation of a single cause, of which he himself does not know exactly whether it be the earth, or population or something else--yet it should not take much to convince us, (it would suffice for the purpose to read, with a little care, some books of narrative history), that the transition from one form of economic, or more generally, social, organisation, to another, is not the result of a _single cause_, nor even of _a group of causes which are always the same_; but is due to causes and circ.u.mstances which need examination for each case since they usually vary for each case. Death is death; but people die of many diseases.

But enough of this; and I may be allowed to conclude this paragraph by reference to a question which Labriola also brings forward in his recent work, and which he connects with the criticism of historical materialism.

Labriola distinguishes between historical materialism as an interpretation of history, and as a general conception of life and of the universe (_Lebens-und-Weltanschauung_), and he inquires what is the nature of the _philosophy immanent_ in historical materialism; and after some remarks, he concludes that this philosophy is the _tendency to monism_, and is a _formal_ tendency.

Here I take leave to point out that if into the term _historical materialism two different things_ are intruded, _i.e._: (1) a method of interpretation; (2) a definite conception of life and of the universe; it is natural to find a philosophy in it, and moreover with a tendency to monism, because it was included therein at the outset.

What close connection is there between these two orders of thought?

Perhaps a logical connection of _mental coherence_? For my part, I confess that I am unable to see it. I believe, on the contrary, that Labriola, this time, is simply stating _a propos_ of historical materialism what he thinks to be the necessary att.i.tude of modern thought with regard to the problems of ontology; or what, according to him, should be the standpoint of the socialist opinion in regard to the conceptions of optimism and pessimism; and so on. I believe, in short, that he is not making an _investigation_ which will reveal the philosophical conceptions underlying historical materialism; but merely a _digression_, even if a digression of interest and importance. And how many other most noteworthy opinions and impressions and sentiments are welcomed by socialist opinion! But why christen this a.s.semblage of new facts by the name of historical materialism, which has. .h.i.therto expressed the well-defined meaning of a way of interpreting history? Is it not the task of the scientist to distinguish and a.n.a.lyse what in empirical reality and to ordinary knowledge appears mingled into one?

IV

OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN FACE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

_Socialism and free trade not scientific deductions: Obsolete metaphysics of old theory of free trade: Basis of modern free trade theories not strictly scientific though only possible one: The desirable is not science nor the practicable: Scientific law only applicable under certain conditions: Element of daring in all action._

It has become a commonplace that, owing to Marx's work, socialism has pa.s.sed _from utopia to science_, as the t.i.tle of a popular booklet by Engels expresses it; and _scientific socialism_ is a current term.

Professor Labriola does not conceal his doubts of such a term; and he is right.

On the other hand, we hear the followers of other leaders, for instance the extreme free traders (to whom I refer by preference _honoris causa_, because they, too, are amongst the _idealists_ of our times), in the name of science itself, condemn socialism as _anti-scientific_ and declare that free trade is the only scientific opinion.

Would it not be convenient if both sides retraced their steps and mortified their pride a little, and acknowledged that _socialism and free trade_ may certainly be called _scientific_ in metaphor or hyperbole; but that neither of them are, or ever can be, scientific deductions? And that thus the problem of socialism, of free trade and of any other practical social programme, may be transferred to another region; which is not that of pure science, but which nevertheless is the only one suited to them?

Let us pause for an instant at free trade. It presents itself to us from two points of view, _i.e._ with a two-fold justification. In the older aspect it undeniably has a metaphysical basis, consisting in that conviction of the goodness of natural laws and that concept of _nature_ (natural law, state of nature, etc.) which, proceeding from the philosophy of the 17th century, was predominant in the 18th century.[53] 'Do not hinder Nature in her work and all will be for the best.' A similar note is struck, only indirectly, by a criticism like that of Marx; who, when a.n.a.lysing the concept of _nature_, showed that it was the ideological complement of the historical development of the middle cla.s.s, a powerful weapon of which this cla.s.s availed itself against the privileges and oppressions which it intended to overthrow.[54] Now this concept may indeed have originated as a weapon made occasional use of historically, and nevertheless be intrinsically true. _Natural law_ in this case, is equivalent to _rational law_; it is necessary to deny both the rationality and the excellence of this law. Now, just because of its metaphysical origin, this concept can be rejected altogether, but cannot be refuted in detail--it disappears with the metaphysic of which it was a part, and it seems at length to have really disappeared. Peace to the _sublime goodness_ of natural laws.

But free trade presents itself to us, among its more recent supporters, in a very different aspect--the free traders, abandoning metaphysical postulates, a.s.sert two theses of practical importance: (_a_) that of an _economic hedonistic maximum_, which they suppose identical with the maximum of social desirability;[55] and (_b_) the other, that this hedonistic maximum can only be completely secured by means of the fullest economic liberty. These two theses certainly take us outside metaphysics and into the region of reality; but not actually into the region of science. Indeed the first of them contains a statement of the ends of social life, which may perhaps be welcome, but is not a deduction from any scientific proposition. The second thesis cannot be proved except by reference to experience, _i.e._ to what we know of human psychology, and to what, by approximate calculation, we may suppose that psychology will still probably be in the future. A calculation which can be made, and has been made with great ac.u.men, with great erudition and with great caution and which hence may even be called scientific, but only in a metaphorical and hyperbolical sense, as we have already remarked: hence the knowledge which it affords us, can never have the value of strictly scientific knowledge.[56] Pareto, who is both one of the most intelligent and also one of the most trustworthy and sincere, of the recent exponents and supporters of free trade,[57] does not deny the limited and approximate nature of its conclusions; which appears to him so much the more clearly in that he uses mathematical formulae, which show at once the degree of certainty to which statements of this kind may lay claim.

And, in effect, communism (which has also had its metaphysical period, and earlier still a theological period) may, with entire justice, set against the two theses of free trade, two others of its own which consist: (_a_) in a different and not purely economic estimate of the maximum of social desirability; (_b_) in the a.s.sertion that this maximum can be attained, not through extreme free trade, but rather through the organisation of economic forces; which is the meaning of the famous saying concerning the _leap from the reign of necessity_ (=free compet.i.tion or anarchy) _into that of liberty_ (=the command of man over the forces of nature even in the sphere of the social natural life). But neither can these two theses be proved; and for the same reasons. Ideals cannot be proved; and empirical calculations and practical convictions are not science. Pareto clearly recognises this quality in modern socialism; and agrees that the communistic system, as a system, is perfectly conceivable, _i.e._ theoretically it offers no internal contradictions (-- 446). According to him it clashes, not with scientific laws, but with _immense practical difficulties_ (_l.c._) such as the difficulty of adopting technical improvements without the trial and selection secured by free compet.i.tion; the lack of stimuli to work; the choice of officials, which in a communistic society would be guided, still according to him, not by wholly technical reasons, as in modern industry, but on political and social grounds (837). He admits the socialist criticism of the waste due to free compet.i.tion; but thinks this inevitable as a practical way of securing equilibrium of production. The real problem--he says--is: whether without the experiments of free compet.i.tion it is possible to arrive at a knowledge of the line (the line which he calls _mn_) of the complete adaptation of production to demand, and whether the expense of making a unified (communistic) organisation of work, would not be greater than that needed to solve the equations of production by experiments (718, 867). He also acknowledged that there is something parasitical in the capitalist (Marx's _sad-faced knight_); but, at the same time, he maintains that the capitalist renders social services, for which we do not know how otherwise to provide.[58] If it be desired to state briefly the contrasts in the two different points of view, it may be said that human psychology is regarded by the free traders as for the most part, determined, and by the socialists, as for the most part changeable and adaptable. Now it is certain that human psychology does change and adapt itself; but the extent and rapidity of these changes are incapable of exact determination and are left to conjecture and opinion. Can they ever become the subject of exact calculation?

If now we pa.s.s to considerations of another kind, not of what is desirable, that is of the ends and means admired and thought good by us; but of what under present circ.u.mstances, history promises us; _i.e._ of the objective tendencies of modern society, I really do not know with what meaning many free traders cast on socialism the reproach of being Utopian. For quite another reason socialists might cast back the same reproach upon free trade, if it were considered as it is at present, and not as it was fifty years ago when Marx composed his criticism upon it. Free Trade and its recommendations turn upon an ent.i.ty which _now at least_, does not exist: _i.e._ the national or general interest of society; since existing society is divided into antagonistic groups and recognises the interest of each of these groups, but not, or only very feebly, a general interest. Upon which does free trade reckon? On the landed proprietors or on the industrial cla.s.ses, on the workmen or on the holders of public dignities?

Socialism, on the contrary, from Marx onwards, has placed little reliance on the good sense and good intentions of men, and has declared that the social revolution must be accomplished chiefly by the effort of a cla.s.s directly interested, _i.e._ the proletariat. And socialism has made such advances that history must inquire whether the experience that we have of the past justifies the supposition that a social movement, so widespread and intense, can be reabsorbed or dispersed without fully testing itself in the sphere of facts. On this matter too I gladly refer to Pareto, who acknowledges that even in that country of free traders' dreams, in England, the system is supported not owing to people's conviction of its intrinsic excellence, but because it is in the interests of certain _entrepreneurs_.[59] And he recognises, with political ac.u.men, that since social movement takes place in the same manner as all other movements, along the line of least resistance, it is very likely that it may be necessary to pa.s.s through a socialistic state,--in order to reach a state of free compet.i.tion (-- 791).

I have said that the extreme free traders, much more than the socialists, are _idealists_, or if one prefers it, _ideologists_.

Hence in Italy we are witnesses of this strange phenomenon, a sort of fraternising and spiritual sympathy between socialists and free traders, in so far as both are bitter and searching critics of the same thing, which the former call the _bourgeois tyranny_ and the latter _bourgeois socialism_. But in the field of practical activity the socialists (and here I no longer refer especially to Italy) undoubtedly make progress whilst the free traders have to limit themselves to the barrenness of evil-speaking and of aspirations, forming a little group of well-meaning people of select intelligence, who make audience for one another.[60] By this I mean no reproach to these sincere and thoroughly consistent free-traders: rather I sincerely admire them; their lack of success is not their own fault.

I wish merely to remark that if ideals, as the philosopher says, have short legs, those of the free traders' ideals are indeed of the shortest.

I could continue this exemplification, bringing forward various other social programmes, such as that of state socialism, which consists in accepting the socialist ideal, but as an ultimate end perhaps never fully attainable, and extending its partial attainment over a long course of centuries; and in relying for the effective force, not in a revolutionary cla.s.s, nor simply in the views of right thinkers, but in the state, conceived as a creative power, independent of and superior to individual wills. It is certainly undeniable that the function of the state, like all social functions, owing to a complication of circ.u.mstances, amongst which are tradition, reverence, the consciousness of something which surpa.s.ses individuals, and other impressions and sentiments which are a.n.a.lysed by collective psychology, acquires a certain independence and develops a certain peculiar force; but in the estimation of this force great mistakes are made, as socialist criticism has clearly shown: and, in any case, whether it be great or small, we are always faced by a calculation; and one moreover, in the region of opinion, which region science may, in part, yet bring under its power, but which in a great degree will always be rebellious to it.

Oh the misuses which are made of this word _science_! Once these misuses were the monopoly of metaphysics, to whose despotic nature they appeared suitable. And the strangest instances could be quoted, even from great philosophers, from Hegel, from Schopenhauer, from Rosmini, which would show how the humblest practical conclusions, made by the pa.s.sions and interests of men, have often been metaphysically transformed into inferences from the Spirit, from the Divine Being, from the Nature of things, from the finality of the universe.

Metaphysics hypostatised what it then triumphantly inferred. The youthful Marx wittily discovered in the Hegelianism of Bruno Bauer, the _pre-established harmony of critical a.n.a.lysis_ (Kritische Kritik) under German _censorship_. Those who most frequently have the word in their mouths make a sort of Sibyl or Pythia of a limited intellectual function. But the _desirable_ is not science, nor is the practicable.[61]

Is scientific knowledge then in fact superfluous in practical questions? Are we to a.s.sent to this absurdity? The attentive reader will be well aware that we are not here discussing the _utility_ of science, but the possibility of _inferring_, as some claim to do, _practical programmes from scientific prepositions_; and it is this possibility only which is denied.

Science, in so far as it consists in knowledge of the laws governing actual facts, may be a legitimate means of simplifying problems, making it possible to distinguish in them what can be scientifically ascertained from what can only be partially known. A great number of things which are commonly disputed, may be cleared up and accurately decided by this method. To give an example, when Marx in opposition to Proudhon and his English predecessors (Bray, Gray, etc.) showed the absurdity of creating _labour bonds_, _i.e._ labour-money; and when Engels directed similar criticisms against Duhring, and then again, perhaps with less justification, against Rodbertus[62] or when both established the close connection between the method of production and the method of distribution, they were working in the field proper to scientific demonstration, trying to prove an inconsistency between the conclusions and the premisses, _i.e._ an internal contradiction in the concepts criticised. The same may be said of the proof, carefully worked out by the free traders, of the proposition: that protection of every kind is equivalent to a destruction of wealth. And if it were possible to establish accurately that law of the tendency of the rate of profits to decline, with which Marx meant to correct and widen the Ricardian law deduced from the continuous encroachments of the rent of land, it could be said, _under certain conditions_, that the end of the bourgeois capitalist organisation was a scientific certainty, though it would remain doubtful what could take its place.

This limitation '_under certain conditions_' is the point to be noticed. All scientific laws are abstract laws; and there is no bridge over which to pa.s.s from the concrete to the abstract; just because the abstract is not a reality, but a form of thought, one of our, so to speak, abbreviated ways of thinking. And, although a knowledge of the laws may _light up_ our perception of reality, it cannot become _this perception itself_.

Here we may agree with what Labriola justly felt, when, showing his dissatisfaction with the term _scientific socialism_, he suggested, though without giving any reasons, that that of _critical communism_ might be subst.i.tuted.[63]

If then from abstract laws and concepts we pa.s.s to observations of historical fact, we find, it is true, points of agreement between our ideals and real things, but at the same time we enter upon those difficult calculations and conjectures, from which it is always impossible to eliminate, as was remarked above, the diversity of opinions and propensities.

In face of the future of society, in face of the path to be pursued, we have occasion to say with Faust--Who can say I believe? Who can say I do not believe?

Not indeed that we wish to advocate or in any way justify a vulgar scepticism. But at the same time we need to be sensible of the relativity of our beliefs, and to come to a determination in practice where indetermination is an error. This is the point; and herein lie all the troubles of men of thought; and hence arises their practical impotence, which art has depicted in Hamlet. Neither shall we wish, in truth, to imitate that magistrate, famous for miles around the district where he officiated for the justice of his decisions, of whom Rabelais tells us, that he used the very simple method, when about to make up his mind, of offering a prayer to G.o.d and settling his decision by a game of odd and even.[64] But we must strive to attain personal conviction, and then bear always in mind that great characters in history have had the courage to _dare_. '_Alea jacta est_,' said Caesar; '_Gott helfe mir, amen!_' said Luther. The brave deeds of history would not be brave if they had been accompanied by a clear foresight of the consequences, as in the case of the prophets and those inspired by G.o.d.

Fortunately, logic is not life, and man is not intellect alone. And, whilst those same men whose critical faculty is warped, are the men of imagination and pa.s.sion, in the life of society the intellect plays a very small part, and with a little exaggeration it may even be said that things go their way independent of our actions. Let us leave them to their romances, let them preach, I will not say in the market places where they would not be believed, but in the university lecture rooms, or the halls of congresses and conferences--the doctrine that science (_i.e._ their science) is the ruling queen of life. And we will content ourselves by repeating with Labriola that 'History is the true mistress of all us men, and we are as it were _vitalised_ by History.'

V

OF ETHICAL JUDGMENT IN FACE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

_Meaning of Marx's phrase the 'impotence of morality' and his remark that morality condemns what has been condemned by history: Profundity of Marx's philosophy immaterial: Kant's position not surpa.s.sed._

Labriola, with his usual piquancy, lashes those who reduce history to a _case of conscience_ or to an _error in bookkeeping_.

With this he recalls us to the two-fold consideration (1) that for Marx the social question was not a moral question, and (2) that the a.n.a.lysis made by Marx of capitalism amounts to a proof of the laws which govern a given society, and not indeed to a proof of _theft_, as some have understood it, as though it would suffice to restore to the workman the amount of his wrongfully exacted surplus labour, so that the accounts may turn out in order, and the social question be satisfactorily solved.[65]

Leaving the second consideration, which yet gives us an instance of the ludicrous travesties which may be made of a scientific theory, let us pause for a moment over the first formula, which usually gives the greatest offence to non-socialists; so much so that many of them wish to put a little salt in the broth and complete socialism by morality.

In actual fact, offence and moral indignation have never been caused less appropriately.

Those remarks in Marx's writings which savour of moral indifference, bear a very limited and trivial meaning. Consider a moment, as indeed has been considered many times, that no social order of any kind can exist without a basis of slavery, or serfdom, or hired service; that is to say that slavery, or serfdom, or hired service are natural conditions of social order, and that without them a thing cannot exist, which is so necessary to man that, at least since he was man, he has never done without it, viz., society. Faced by such a fact, what meaning would our moral judgment have, directed against these governing human beings who call themselves slave owners, feudal lords and bourgeois capitalists, and in favour of these governed human beings who call themselves slaves, serfs, free labourers; neither of whom could be different from what they are, nor could otherwise fulfil the function a.s.signed to them by the very nature of things.[66] Our condemnation would be a condemnation of the inevitable; a Leopardian curse directed against the _brutal power which rules in secret to the general harm_. But moral praise or blame has reference always to an act of will, good or bad; and such judgments would on the contrary be directed against a fact, which has not been willed by anyone, but is endured by every one because it cannot be different. You, indeed, may lament it; but by lamenting it, you not only do not destroy it, you do not even touch it, _i.e._, you waste your time.

This is what Marx calls the impotence of morality, which is as much as to say that it is useless to propound questions which no effort can answer and which are therefore absurd.

But when, on the other hand, these conditions of subjection are not conceived as necessary for the social order in general, but only as necessary for a stage in its history; and when new conditions make their appearance which render it possible to destroy them (as was the case in the industrial advance toward serfdom, and as the socialists reckon will happen in the final phase of modern civilisation in regard to wage earners and capitalism); then moral condemnation is justified, and, up to a certain point, is also effective in quickening the process of destruction and in sweeping away the last remnants of the past.

This is the meaning of Marx's other saying: that morality condemns what has already been condemned by history.[67]

I cannot manage to see any difficulty in agreeing to remarks of this kind, even from the standpoint of the strictest ethical theories.

There is here no question of misunderstanding the nature of morality, and of wishing to make it into something fortuitous or relative; but simply of determining the conditions of human progress, turning the attention from the inevitable effects to the fundamental causes, and seeking remedies in the nature of things and not in our caprices and pious wishes. It must needs be thought that the opposition proceeds, not from intellectual error, but rather from human pride, or vanity it may be, owing to which many desire to retain for their wretched words a little of the virtue of the divine word, which created light by its decree.[68]

The same feeling must perhaps be present as the basis of the horror which usually greets the other practical maxim of the socialists; that the workman educates himself by the political struggle. But Labriola is fully justified in admiring in the advance of German socialism 'the truly new and imposing instance of social pedagogy; viz. that, amongst such an enormous number of men, particularly of workmen of the lower middle cla.s.s, a new consciousness is developing, within which compete in equal degree, a direct sense of the economic situation, which incites to the struggle, and the socialist propaganda understood as the goal or point of arrival.' What means have the preachers of moral maxims at their disposal, to secure a result equal to this? Who are these workmen who combine in a.s.sociations, who read their newspapers, discuss the acts of their delegates and accept the decisions of their congresses, if not _men who are educating themselves morally_?

But there is not only a question of vanity and pride in that feeling of aversion, which animates many with regard to the practical maxims of the socialists, and in the desire, which people also show, of undertaking in the name of morality or religion, the spiritual direction of the education of the working man; nor shall we wish to be so ingenuous and complacent as to confine ourselves to such a partial explanation. There is more, there is, I might almost say, an _apprehension_ and a _fear_. An apprehension, little justified, lest the political organisation of the proletariat may lead to a brutal and unrestrained outbreak of the ma.s.ses and to I know not what kind of social ruin; as if such outbreaks were not recorded by history in precisely those periods in which it is usual to suppose that the dominion of religion over conscience was greatest,--as in the _jacqueries_ of the fourteenth century in France, and again in the _peasants' wars_ in Germany,--and in which there was no organisation and political culture amongst the common people.[69] A _fear_, which is on the contrary thoroughly justified and arises from the knowledge that instinctive and blind proletariat movements are conquered by force; whereas organisation combined with an enlightened consciousness, is not conquered or only suffers temporary reverses.

Does not Mommsen remark, in reference to the slave revolts in ancient Rome; that _states_ would be very fortunate if they were in no other dangers besides those which might come to them from the revolts of the proletariat, _which are no greater than the dangers arising from the claws of hungry bears or wolves_?