85.

Were not divines in perpetual contradiction with themselves, they would see, that, according to their hypothesis, man cannot be reputed free an instant. Do they not suppose man continually dependent on his G.o.d? Are we free, when we cannot exist and be preserved without G.o.d, and when we cease to exist at the pleasure of his supreme will? If G.o.d has made man out of nothing; if his preservation is a continued creation; if G.o.d cannot, an instant, lose sight of his creature; if whatever happens to him, is an effect of the divine will; if man can do nothing of himself; if all the events, which he experiences, are effects of the divine decrees; if he does no good without grace from on high, how can they maintain, that a man enjoys a moment's liberty? If G.o.d did not preserve him in the moment of sin, how could man sin? If G.o.d then preserves him, G.o.d forces him to exist, that he may sin.

86.

The Divinity is frequently compared to a king, whose revolted subjects are the greater part of mankind; and it is said, he has a right to reward the subjects who remain faithful to him, and to punish the rebellious. This comparison is not just in any of its parts. G.o.d presides over a machine, every spring of which he has created. These springs act agreeable to the manner, in which G.o.d has formed them; he ought to impute it to his own unskilfulness, if these springs do not contribute to the harmony of the machine, into which it was his will to insert them. G.o.d is a created king, who has created to himself subjects of every description; who has formed them according to his own pleasure whose will can never find resistance.

If G.o.d has rebellious subjects in his empire, it is because G.o.d has resolved to have rebellious subjects. If the sins of men disturb the order of the world, it is because it is the will of G.o.d that this order should be disturbed.

n.o.body dares to call in question the divine justice; yet, under the government of a just G.o.d, we see nothing but acts of injustice and violence. Force decides the fate of nations, equity seems banished from the earth; a few men sport, unpunished, with the peace, property, liberty, and life of others. All is disorder in a world governed by a G.o.d who is said to be infinitely displeased with disorder.

87.

Although men are for ever admiring the wisdom, goodness, justice, and beautiful order of Providence, they are, in reality, never satisfied with it. Do not the prayers, continually addressed to heaven, shew, that men are by no means satisfied with the divine dispensations? To pray to G.o.d for a favour, shews diffidence of his watchful care; to pray to him to avert or put an end to an evil, is to endeavour to obstruct the course of his justice; to implore the a.s.sistance of G.o.d in our calamities, is to address the author himself of these calamities, to represent to him, that he ought, for our sake, to rectify his plan, which does not accord with our interest.

The Optimist, or he who maintains that _all is well_, and who incessantly cries that we live in _the best world possible_, to be consistent, should never pray; neither ought he to expect another world, where man will be happier. Can there be a better world than _the best world possible_? Some theologians have treated the Optimists as impious, for having intimated that G.o.d could not produce a better world, than that in which we live.

According to these doctors, it is to limit the power of G.o.d, and to offer him insult. But do not these divines see, that it shews much less indignity to G.o.d, to a.s.sert that he has done his best in producing this world, than to say, that, being able to produce a better, he has had malice enough to produce a very bad one? If the Optimist, by his system, detracts from the divine power, the theologian, who treats him as a blasphemer, is himself a blasphemer, who offends the goodness of G.o.d in espousing the cause of his omnipotence.

88.

When we complain of the evils, of which our world is the theatre, we are referred to the other world, where it is said, G.o.d will make reparation for all the iniquity and misery, which, for a time, he permits here below.

But if G.o.d, suffering his eternal justice to remain at rest for a long time, could consent to evil during the whole continuance of our present world, what a.s.surance have we, that, during the continuance of another world, divine justice will not, in like manner, sleep over the misery of its inhabitants?

The divines console us for our sufferings by saying, that G.o.d is patient, and that his justice, though often slow, is not the less sure. But do they not see, that patience is incompatible with a just, immutable, and omnipotent being? Can G.o.d then permit injustice, even for an instant? To temporize with a known evil, announces either weakness, uncertainty, or collusion. To tolerate evil, when one has power to prevent it, is to consent to the commission of evil.

89.

Divines every where exclaim, that G.o.d is infinitely just; but that _his justice is not the justice of man_. Of what kind or nature then is this divine justice? What idea can I form of a justice, which so often resembles injustice? Is it not to confound all ideas of just and unjust, to say, that what is equitable in G.o.d is iniquitous in his creatures?

How can we receive for our model a being, whose divine perfections are precisely the reverse of human?

"G.o.d," it is said, "is sovereign arbiter of our destinies. His supreme power, which nothing can limit, justly permits him to do with the works of his own hands according to his good pleasure. A worm, like man, has no right even to complain." This arrogant style is evidently borrowed from the language, used by the ministers of tyrants, when they stop the mouths of those who suffer from their violences. It cannot then be the language of the ministers of a G.o.d, whose equity is highly extolled; it is not made to be imposed upon a being, who reasons. Ministers of a just G.o.d! I will inform you then, that the greatest power cannot confer upon your G.o.d himself the right of being unjust even to the vilest of his creatures. A despot is not a G.o.d. A G.o.d, who arrogates to himself the right of doing evil, is a tyrant; a tyrant is not a model for men; he must be an object execrable to their eyes.

Is it not indeed strange, that in order to justify the Divinity, they make him every moment the most unjust of beings! As soon as we complain of his conduct, they think to silence us by alleging, that _G.o.d is master_; which signifies, that G.o.d, being the strongest, is not bound by ordinary rules.

But the right of the strongest is the violation of all rights. It seems right only to the eyes of a savage conqueror, who in the heat of his fury imagines, that he may do whatever he pleases with the unfortunate victims, whom he has conquered. This barbarous right can appear legitimate only to slaves blind enough to believe that everything is lawful to tyrants whom they feel too weak to resist.

In the greatest calamities, do not devout persons, through a ridiculous simplicity, or rather a sensible contradiction in terms, exclaim, that _the Almighty is master_. Thus, inconsistent reasoners, believe, that the _Almighty_ (a Being, one of whose first attributes is goodness,) sends you pestilence, war, and famine! You believe that the _Almighty_, this good being, has the will and right to inflict the greatest evils, you can bear!

Cease, at least, to call your G.o.d _good_, when he does you evil; say not, that he is just, say that he is the strongest, and that it is impossible for you to ward off the blows of his caprice.

_G.o.d_, say you, _chastises only for our good_. But what real good can result to a people from being exterminated by the plague, ravaged by wars, corrupted by the examples of perverse rulers, continually crushed under the iron sceptre of a succession of merciless tyrants, annihilated by the scourges of a bad government, whose destructive effects are often felt for ages? If chastis.e.m.e.nts are good, then they cannot have too much of a good thing! _The eyes of faith_ must be strange eyes, if with them they see advantages in the most dreadful calamities, in the vices and follies with which our species are afflicted.

90.

What strange ideas of divine justice must Christians have, who are taught to believe, that their G.o.d, in view of reconciling to himself the human race, guilty, though unconscious, of the sin of their fathers, has put to death his own son, who was innocent and incapable of sinning? What should we say of a king, whose subjects should revolt, and who, to appease himself, should find no other expedient than to put to death the heir of his crown, who had not partic.i.p.ated in the general rebellion? "It is,"

the Christian will say, "through goodness to his subjects, unable of themselves to satisfy divine justice, that G.o.d has consented to the cruel death of his son." But the goodness of a father to strangers does not give him the right of being unjust and barbarous to his own son. All the qualities, which theology ascribes to G.o.d, reciprocally destroy one another. The exercise of one of his perfections is always at the expense of the exercise of another.

Has the Jew more rational ideas of divine justice than the Christian?

The pride of a king kindles the anger of heaven; _Jehovah_ causes the pestilence to descend upon his innocent people; seventy thousand subjects are exterminated to expiate the fault of a monarch, whom the goodness of G.o.d resolved to spare.

91.

Notwithstanding the various acts of injustice, with which all religions delight to blacken the Divinity, men cannot consent to accuse him of iniquity. They fear, that, like the tyrants of this world, truth will offend him, and redouble upon them the weight of his malice and tyranny.

They hearken therefore to their priests, who tell them, that their G.o.d is a tender father; that this G.o.d is an equitable monarch whose object in this world is to a.s.sure himself of the love, obedience and respect of his subjects; who gives them liberty of acting only to afford them an opportunity of meriting his favours, and of acquiring an eternal happiness, which he does not owe them. By what signs can men discover the tenderness of a father, who has given life to the greater part of his children merely to drag out upon the earth a painful, restless, bitter existence? Is there a more unfortunate present, than that pretended liberty, which, we are told, men are very liable to abuse, and thereby to incur eternal misery?

92.

By calling mortals to life, what a cruel and dangerous part has not the Deity forced them to act? Thrown into the world without their consent, provided with a temperament of which they are not masters, animated by pa.s.sions and desires inherent in their nature, exposed to snares which they have not power to escape, hurried away by events which they could not foresee or prevent, unhappy mortals are compelled to run a career, which may lead them to punishments horrible in duration and violence.

Travellers inform us, that, in Asia, a Sultan reigned, full of fantastical ideas, and very absolute in his whims. By a strange madness, this prince spent his time seated at a table, upon which were placed three dice and a dice-box. One end of the table was covered with pieces of silver, designed to excite the avarice of his courtiers and people. He, knowing the foible of his subjects, addresses them as follows: _Slaves, I wish your happiness. My goodness proposes to enrich you, and make you all happy. Do you see these treasures? Well, they are for you; strive to gain them; let each, in his turn, take the box and dice; whoever has the fortune to throw sixes, shall be master of the treasure. But, I forewarn you, that he who has not the happiness to throw the number required, shall be precipitated for ever into a dark dungeon, where my justice demands that he be burned with a slow fire._ Upon this discourse of the monarch, the company look at each other affrighted. No one wishes to expose himself to so dangerous a chance. _What!_ says the enraged Sultan, _does no one offer to play? I tell you then you must; My glory requires that you should play. Play then; obey without replying._ It is well to observe, that the dice of the despot are so prepared, that out of a hundred thousand throws, there is but one, which can gain the number required. Thus the generous monarch has the pleasure of seeing his prison well filled, and his riches seldom ravished from him. Mortals! this SULTAN is your G.o.d; his TREASURE IS HEAVEN; his DUNGEON IS h.e.l.l, and it is you who hold the DICE!

93.

Divines repeatedly a.s.sure us, that we owe Providence infinite grat.i.tude for the numberless blessings it bestows. They loudly extol the happiness of existence. But, alas! how many mortals are truly satisfied with their mode of existence? If life has sweets, with how much bitterness is it not mixed? Does not a single chagrin often suffice suddenly to poison the most peaceable and fortunate life? Are there many, who, if it were in their power would begin again, at the same price, the painful career, in which, without their consent, destiny has placed them?

They say, that existence is a great blessing. But is not this existence continually troubled with fears, and maladies, often cruel and little deserved? May not this existence, threatened on so many sides, be torn from us any moment? Where is the man, who has not been deprived of a dear wife, beloved child, or consoling friend, whose loss every moment intrudes upon his thoughts? There are few, who have not been forced to drink of the cup of misfortune; there are few, who have not desired their end. Finally, it did not depend upon us to exist or not to exist. Should the bird then be very grateful to the fowler for taking him in his net and confining him in his cage for his diversion?

94.

Notwithstanding the infirmities and misery which man is forced to undergo, he has, nevertheless, the folly to think himself the favourite of his G.o.d, the object of all his cares, the sole end of all his works. He imagines, that the whole universe is made for him; he arrogantly calls himself the _king of nature_, and values himself far above other animals. Mortal! upon what canst thou found thy haughty pretensions? It is, sayest thou, upon thy soul, upon thy reason, upon the sublime faculties, which enable thee to exercise an absolute empire over the beings, which surround thee. But, weak sovereign of the world; art thou sure, one moment, of the continuance of thy reign? Do not the smallest atoms of matter, which thou despisest, suffice to tear thee from thy throne, and deprive thee of life? Finally, does not the king of animals at last become the food of worms? Thou speakest of thy soul! But dost thou know what a soul is? Dost thou not see, that this soul is only the a.s.semblage of thy organs, from which results life? Wouldst thou then refuse a soul to other animals, who live, think, judge, and compare, like thee; who seek pleasure, and avoid pain, like thee; and who often have organs, which serve them better than thine?

Thou boastest of thy intellectual faculties; but do these faculties, of which thou art so proud, make thee happier than other animals? Dost thou often make use of that reason, in which thou gloriest, and to which religion commands thee not to listen? Are those brutes, which thou disdainest, because they are less strong or less cunning than thou art, subject to mental pains, to a thousand frivolous pa.s.sions, to a thousand imaginary wants, to which thou art a continual prey? Are they, like thee, tormented by the past, alarmed at the future? Confined solely to the present, does not what you call their _instinct_, and what I call their _intelligence_, suffice to preserve and defend them, and to supply them with all they want? Does not this instinct, of which thou speakest with contempt, often serve them better than thy wonderful faculties? Is not their peaceful ignorance more advantageous to them, than those extravagant meditations and worthless researches, which render thee unhappy, and for which thy zeal urges thee even to ma.s.sacre the beings of thy n.o.ble species? Finally, have these beasts, like so many mortals, a troubled imagination, which makes them fear, not only death, but likewise eternal torments?

Augustus, hearing that Herod, king of Judea, had put his sons to death, exclaimed: _It is much better to be Herod's hog, than his son_. As much may be said of man. This dear child of Providence runs far greater risks than all other animals; having suffered much in this world, does he not imagine, that he is in danger of suffering eternally in another?