If we take our ideas of G.o.d from the nature of things, where we find a mixture of good and evil, this G.o.d, just like the good and evil of which we experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant, sometimes good, and sometimes malevolent; and therefore, instead of exciting our love, must generate distrust, fear, and uncertainty. There is then no real difference between natural religion, and the most gloomy and servile superst.i.tion. If the theist sees G.o.d only in a favourable light; the bigot views him in the most hideous light. The folly of the one is cheerful, that of the other is melancholy; but both are equally delirious.

65.

If I draw my ideas of G.o.d from theology, he appears to inspire aversion.

Devotees, who tell us, that they sincerely love their G.o.d, are either liars or fools, who see their G.o.d only in profile. It is impossible to love a being, the very idea of whom strikes us with terror, and whose judgments make us tremble. How can we, without being alarmed, look upon a G.o.d, who is reputed to be barbarous enough to d.a.m.n us? Let not divines talk to us of a filial, or respectful fear, mixed with love, which men ought to have for their G.o.d. A son can by no means love his father, when he knows him to be cruel enough to inflict upon him studied torments for the least faults he may commit. No man upon earth can have the least spark of love for a G.o.d, who reserves chastis.e.m.e.nts, infinite in duration and violence, for ninety-nine hundredths of his children.

66.

The inventors of the dogma of eternal h.e.l.l-torments have made of that G.o.d, whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in men is the last act of wickedness. Every sensible mind must revolt at the bare recital of the torments, inflicted on the greatest criminal; but cruelty is much more apt to excite indignation, when void of motives. The most sanguinary tyrants, the Caligulas, the Neros, the Domitians, had, at least, some motives for tormenting their victims. These motives were, either their own safety, or the fury of revenge, or the design of frightening by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity of making a display of their power, and the desire of satisfying a barbarous curiosity. Can a G.o.d have any of these motives? In tormenting the victims of his wrath, he would punish beings, who could neither endanger his immoveable power, nor disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the other hand, the punishments of the other life would be useless to the living, who cannot be witnesses of them. These punishments would be useless to the d.a.m.ned, since in h.e.l.l there is no longer room for conversion, and the time of mercy is past. Whence it follows, that G.o.d, in the exercise of his eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself, and insult the weakness of his creatures. I appeal to the whole human race;--is there a man who feels cruel enough coolly to torment, I do not say his fellow-creature, but any sensible being whatever, without emolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having any thing to fear? Confess then, O theologians, that, even according to your own principles, your G.o.d is infinitely more malevolent than the worst of men.

Perhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments.

I answer, that we cannot offend a G.o.d, whose happiness is infinite; that the offences of finite beings cannot be infinite; that a G.o.d, who is unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that the offences of his creatures should be eternal; that a G.o.d, infinitely good, can neither be infinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures an infinite duration, solely for the pleasure of eternal torments.

Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery, or the blindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine of eternal punishments.

If there is a G.o.d, whom we can offend or blaspheme, there are not upon earth greater blasphemers than those, who dare to say, that this same G.o.d is a tyrant, perverse enough to delight, during eternity, in the useless torments of his feeble creatures.

67.

To pretend, that G.o.d can be offended at the actions of men, is to annihilate all the ideas, which divines endeavour to give us, in other respects, of this being. To say, that man can trouble the order of the universe; that he can kindle the thunder in the hands of his G.o.d; that he can defeat his projects, is to say, that man is stronger than his G.o.d, that he is the arbiter of his will, that it depends upon him to change his goodness into cruelty. Theology continually pulls down, with one hand, what it erects with the other. If all religion is founded upon a G.o.d, who is provoked and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpable contradiction.

All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of the Deity. But no sooner do they display his conduct, than we see nothing but imprudence, want of foresight, weakness and folly. G.o.d, it is said, created the world for himself; and yet, hitherto, he has never been able to make himself suitably honoured by it. G.o.d created men in order to have, in his dominions, subjects to render him their homage; and yet, we see men in continual revolt against him.

68.

They incessantly extol the divine perfections; and when we demand proofs of them, they point to his works, in which, they a.s.sure us, these perfections are written in indelible characters. All these works are, however, imperfect and perishable. Man, who is ever regarded as the most marvellous work, as the master-piece of the Deity, is full of imperfections, which render him disagreeable to the eyes of the almighty Being, who formed him. This surprising work often becomes so revolting and odious to its author, that he is obliged to throw it into the fire. But, if the fairest of G.o.d's works is imperfect, how can we judge of the divine perfections? Can a work, with which the author himself is so little pleased, induce us to admire the ability of its Maker? Man, considered in a physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberless evils, and to death. Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of faults; yet we are unceasingly told, that he is the most beautiful work of the most perfect of beings.

69.

In creating beings more perfect than men, it appears, that heretofore G.o.d has not better succeeded, nor given stronger proofs of his perfection.

Do we not see, in many religions, that angels, have even attempted to dethrone him? G.o.d proposed the happiness of angels and men; yet, he has never been able to render happy either angels or men;--the pride, malice, sins, and imperfections of the creatures have always opposed the will of the perfect Creator.

70.

All religion is obviously founded upon this principle, that _G.o.d does what he can, and man what he will_. Every system of religion presents to us an unequal combat between the Deity on one part, and his creatures on the other, in which the former never comes off to his honour. Notwithstanding his omnipotence, he cannot succeed in rendering the works of his hands such as he would have them. To complete the absurdity, there is a religion, which pretends, that G.o.d himself has died to redeem mankind; and yet, men are not farther from any thing, than they are from what G.o.d would have them.

71.

Nothing is more extravagant, than the part, theology makes the Divinity act in every country. Did he really exist, we should see in him the most capricious, and senseless being. We should be compelled to believe, that G.o.d made the world only to be the theatre of his disgraceful wars with his creatures; that he created angels, men, and demons, only to make adversaries, against whom he might exercise his power. He renders men free to offend him, malicious enough to defeat his projects, too obstinate to submit; and all this merely for the pleasure of being angry, appeased, reconciled, and of repairing the disorder they have made. Had the Deity at once formed his creatures such as he would have them, what pains would he not have spared himself, or, at least, from what embarra.s.sments would he not have relieved his theologians!

Every religion represents G.o.d as busy only in doing himself evil. He resembles those empirics, who inflict upon themselves wounds, to have an opportunity of exhibiting to the public the efficacy of their ointment.

But we see not, that the Deity has. .h.i.therto been able radically to cure himself of the evil, which he suffers from man.

72.

G.o.d is the author of all; and yet, we are a.s.sured that evil does not come from G.o.d. Whence then does it come? From man. But, who made man? G.o.d. Evil then comes from G.o.d. If he had not made man as he is, moral evil or sin would not have existed in the world. The perversity of man is therefore chargeable to G.o.d. If man has power to do evil, or to offend G.o.d, we are forced to infer, that G.o.d chooses to be offended; that G.o.d, who made man, has resolved that man shall do evil; otherwise man would be an effect contrary to the cause, from which he derives his being.

73.

Man ascribes to G.o.d the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing beforehand whatever will happen; but this prescience seldom turns to his glory, nor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man. If G.o.d foreknows the future, must he not have foreseen the fall of his creatures? If he resolved in his decrees to permit this fall, it is undoubtedly because it was his will that this fall should take place, otherwise it could not have happened. If G.o.d's foreknowledge of the sins of his creatures had been necessary or forced, one might suppose, that he has been constrained by his justice to punish the guilty; but, enjoying the faculty of foreseeing, and the power of predetermining every thing, did it not depend upon G.o.d not to impose upon himself cruel laws, or, at least, could he not dispense with creating beings, whom he might be under the necessity of punishing, and rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree? Of what consequence is it, whether G.o.d has destined men to happiness or misery by an anterior decree, an effect of his prescience, or by a posterior decree, an effect of his justice? Does the arrangement of his decrees alter the fate of the unhappy? Would they not have the same right to complain of a G.o.d, who, being able to omit their creation, has notwithstanding created them, although he plainly foresaw that his justice would oblige him, sooner or later, to punish them?

74.

"Man," you say, "when he came from the hand of G.o.d, was pure, innocent, and good; but his nature has been corrupted, as a punishment for sin."

If man, when just out of the hands of his G.o.d, could sin, his nature was imperfect. Why did G.o.d suffer him to sin, and his nature to be corrupted?

Why did G.o.d permit him to be seduced, well knowing that he was too feeble to resist temptation? Why did G.o.d create _satan_, an evil spirit, a tempter? Why did not G.o.d, who wishes so much good to the human race, annihilate once for all so many evil genii, who are naturally enemies of our happiness; or rather, why did G.o.d create evil spirits, whose victories and fatal influence over mankind, he must have foreseen? In fine, by what strange fatality in all religions of the world, has the evil principle such a decided advantage over the good principle, or the divinity?

75.

There is related an instance of simplicity, which does honour to the heart of an Italian monk. One day, while preaching, this pious man thought he must announce to his audience, that he had, thank heaven, at last discovered, by dint of meditation, a sure way of rendering all men happy.

"The devil," said he, "tempts men only to have in h.e.l.l companions of his misery. Let us therefore apply to the Pope, who has the keys of heaven and h.e.l.l; let us prevail upon him to pray to G.o.d, at the head of the whole church, to consent to a reconciliation with the devil, to restore him to favour, to reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put an end to his malicious projects against mankind." Perhaps the honest monk did not see, that the devil is at least as useful as G.o.d to the ministers of religion. They have too much interest in their dissensions, to be instrumental in an accommodation between two enemies, upon whose combats their own existence and revenues depend. Let men cease to be tempted and to sin, and the ministry of priests will be useless. Manicheism is evidently the hinge of every religion; but unhappily, the devil, invented to clear the deity from the suspicion of malice, proves to us, every moment, the impotence or unskilfulness of his celestial adversary.

76.