CHAPTER VIII.

Annexation of Texas--Causes that led to annexation--Message of the President--General Scott's letters regarding William Henry Harrison--Efforts to reduce General Scott's pay--Letter to T.P.

Atkinson on the slavery question--Battle of Palo Alto, and of Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, and Buena Vista--"The hasty plate of soup"--Scott's opinion of General Taylor--Scott ordered to Mexico--Proposal to revive the grade of lieutenant general, and to appoint Thomas H. Benton--Scott reaches the Brazos Santiago--Confidential dispatch from Scott to Taylor--Co-operation of the navy--Letters to the Secretary of War as to places of rendezvous--Arrival and landing at Vera Cruz, and its investment, siege, and capture--Letter to foreign consuls--Terms of surrender--Orders of General Scott after the surrender.

The Congress of the United States, on February 27, 1845, pa.s.sed joint resolutions providing for the annexation of Texas, and they were approved by President Tyler on the 1st of March. A convention was called by President Jones, of Texas, to meet on the 4th of the succeeding July, to consider the matter of annexation to the United States. The convention ratified the proposal, and prepared a const.i.tution for Texas as a State in the American Union. The question of annexation was submitted to a vote of the people of Texas and ratified by a large majority. On December 29th following, a joint resolution of the Congress of the United States was pa.s.sed, which declared Texas admitted as a State into the Union.

It may be interesting to take a retrospective view of the causes, or rather the means, by which this important measure was brought about.

In the winter of 1842-'43 there appeared in a newspaper published at Baltimore a letter of Mr. Thomas W. Gilmer, a member of Congress from Virginia, urging the annexation of Texas. He argued among other things that the British Government had designs on Texas; that it proposed a political and military domination of the country, with a view to the abolition of slavery. At this time Texas and Mexico were at war. It was at once charged by the opponents of the scheme of annexation that Mr. Gilmer, who was known as the close political friend of Mr. John C.

Calhoun, was simply acting as the mouthpiece of the latter. It will be remembered by those who are conversant with the proceedings of Congress that Mr. Calhoun, in the Senate in 1836, had offered some resolutions looking to the annexation of Texas. Mr. Webster, who was known as opposed to the measure, was the only member of President Harrison's Cabinet who remained with President Tyler. He resigned his portfolio as Secretary of State, and was succeeded by Mr. Hugh S.

Legare, of South Carolina, who, dying very soon after his appointment, was succeeded by Mr. Abel P. Upshur, of Virginia. Both of the latter named were known friends of the annexation scheme. There appeared not long after the publication of the Gilmer letter, in the Richmond Enquirer, a letter from General Andrew Jackson to Mr. Brown, in reply to a letter of Mr. Brown, in which he indorsed a copy of Mr. Gilmer's letter and asking General Jackson's views on the subject. General Jackson's reply was a thorough and hearty approval of the proposed immediate annexation of Texas. General Jackson's letter was dated from the Hermitage, his residence near Nashville, Tenn., March 12, 1843.

The letter of General Jackson produced a profound effect throughout the country. Although out of office, old, and in the retirement of private life, he exercised more influence than any man living in the United States.

Mr. Calhoun succeeded Mr. Upshur as Secretary of State, and he was known as a friend of annexation. Mr. Van Buren, replying to a letter from Mr. William T. Hammett, a representative in Congress from Mississippi, announced his opposition to the immediate annexation of Texas, because it would produce a war with Mexico. He expressed himself in favor of the measure when it could be done peaceably and honorably. Mr. Clay announced his opposition to the measure. In December, 1843, the British Premier, Lord Aberdeen, in a dispatch to Sir Richard Packenham, British Minister at Washington, denied that Great Britain had any design on Texas, but announced (which was superfluous, and not germane to the charge which he felt called upon to deny) that "Great Britain desires and is constantly exerting herself to procure the general abolition of slavery throughout the world." This provoked a correspondence between Mr. Calhoun and the British Minister. In his annual message to Congress at the commencement of the session of 1843-'44 the President expressed himself very strongly in regard to war being waged by Mexico against Texas. The proposed treaty for annexation was rejected by the Senate June 8, 1844, by a vote of thirty-five to sixteen. Mr. Benton presented a plan for the peaceful acquisition of Texas, but the Senate refused to adopt it.

President Tyler in his last message again referred to the war between Mexico and Texas, and said: "I repeat now what I then said, that after eight years of feeble and ineffectual efforts to recover Texas, it was time that the war should have ceased."

When the convention of the Whig party met at Harrisburg, Pa., December 4, 1839, to nominate a candidate for the presidency, General Scott's name was presented. He had addressed a number of letters to members of the convention urging that, if there appeared any prospect of success, Mr. Clay should be selected, and if not, that the choice should fall on General William Henry Harrison. The total number of votes in the convention was two hundred and fifty-four. Of these, General Scott received the votes of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Vermont, and Michigan--in all, sixty-two. The States which had voted for General Scott gave their votes eventually to General Harrison, who received the nomination. General Scott said of General Harrison, "But the nomination and success of General Harrison," if his life had been spared some four years longer, would have been no detriment to the country. With excellent intentions and objects, and the good sense to appoint able counselors, the country would not have been r.e.t.a.r.ded in its prosperity nor disgraced by corruption in high places. No one can, of course, be held responsible for sudden deaths among men. A single month in office ended President Harrison's life, when the plaint of Burke occurred to all, "What shadows we are, what shadows we pursue!"

In June, 1841, Major-General Macomb having died, General Scott was called to take up his residence in Washington as general in chief of the army. Among his first orders was one which put a stop to arbitrary and illegal punishments in the army.

An effort was made in the House of Representatives of the next Congress in 1844 to reduce his pay, but being resisted by Charles J.

Ingersoll, of Philadelphia, and ex-President John Quincy Adams, it was voted down by a large majority. Mr. Adams, in the course of his remarks in opposition to the resolution, said that he "felt bound to declare that he did think it a very ill reward for the great and eminent services of General Scott during a period of thirty odd years, in which there were some as gallant exploits as our history could show, and in which he had not spared to shed his blood, as well as for more recent services of great importance in time of peace--services of great difficulty and great delicacy--now to turn him adrift at his advanced age.... That he could not for a moment harbor in his heart the thought that General Scott, if he had received from the Government thousands of dollars more than he had, would have received one dollar which he did not richly deserve at the hands of his country."

On February 9, 1843, he wrote from Washington to T.P. Atkinson, of Danville, Va., in reply to a letter from that gentleman, asking his opinions on the question of slavery. Mr. Atkinson was the son of an old friend of General Scott, and the letter was written to him as a probable candidate for the presidency. He took the position in this letter that Congress had no power under the Const.i.tution to interfere with or legislate on the question of slavery within the States. He argued that it was the duty of Congress, however, to receive, refer, and report upon pet.i.tions which might be presented to it on the question of slavery, as on all other questions. He did not blame masters for not liberating their slaves, as he thought it would benefit neither the masters nor the slaves. He, however, held it to be the duty of slave owners to employ all means not incompatible with the safety of both master and slave to meliorate slavery even to extermination. He held that, with the consent of owners or payment of just compensation, Congress might legislate in the District of Columbia, although it would be dangerous to contiguous States.

He also, in March, 1845, in reply to a letter from J.C. Beckwith, corresponding secretary of a peace convention, wrote that he always maintained the moral right to wage a just and necessary war.

In March, 1845, as stated, Congress pa.s.sed a joint resolution for the annexation of the republic of Texas, and in July of that year Brigadier-General Zachary Taylor, then commanding the first department of the United States army in the Southwest, was ordered to Texas. He embarked at New Orleans with fifteen hundred troops, and in August established his camp at Corpus Christi. Re-enforcements were dispatched to him rapidly, and in November his command amounted to about four thousand men.

On March 8, 1846, General Taylor, under orders from Washington, moved his army toward the Rio Grande, and on the 28th of that month encamped on that river opposite the Mexican city of Matamoros. He here erected a fort called Fort Brown, which commanded the city of Matamoros. The Mexican troops near Matamoros were at the same time busily engaged in fortifying the city. General Pedro de Ampudia, who commanded the Mexican forces at Matamoros, on April 12, 1846, addressed General Taylor a note requiring that within twenty-four hours he should retire from his position at Fort Brown and march beyond the Neuces, stating that the governments of Mexico and the United States were engaged in negotiations regarding the annexation of Texas, and that a failure or refusal of General Taylor to comply with this demand would be regarded by his Government as a declaration of war on the part of the United States. General Taylor replied in substance that he was there with his army under orders of his Government, that he declined to retire beyond the Neuces, and that he stood ready to repel any attack which might be made upon him. Soon after this correspondence General Mariano Arista was placed in the command formerly held by General Ampudia, and in May, with an army of six thousand men, he crossed the Rio Grande and attacked General Taylor at Palo Alto, and was signally defeated.

General Arista retreated on the next day to Resaca de la Palma, where he was again defeated and his army routed, and he retired across the Rio Grande. General Taylor was now promoted to the rank of major general, and on May 18th took possession of Matamoros without opposition.

On September 9th he arrived at Monterey with about six thousand seven hundred men, chiefly volunteers. General Ampudia held the command here with ten thousand regular Mexican troops. General Taylor a.s.saulted his position on September 19th, and after five days of almost continual fighting General Ampudia surrendered. General Taylor then transferred his headquarters to Monterey, but guarded the city of Saltillo with a strong force. He was about making an advance on San Luis Potosi, when a large portion of his force was ordered to join General Scott at Vera Cruz.

Concentrating his forces, some five thousand in number, he learned that General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna was concentrating a force of twenty thousand men at San Luis Potosi, with a view to attack him. On February 21, 1847, he took position at a mountain pa.s.s called Buena Vista, a few miles from Saltillo, where, being attacked the next day by the Mexican army under General Santa Anna, he defeated them, and Santa Anna retreated to San Luis Potosi. This brief statement of the magnificent and almost unprecedented campaign of General Taylor is necessary to understand the part taken by General Scott in the war with Mexico.

General Scott was notified early in May, 1846, that he might be ordered to a.s.sume the command on the Mexican frontier. He expressed his disinclination to this duty, because it was, as he expressed it, "harsh and unusual for a senior, without re-enforcements, to supersede a meritorious junior, and that he doubted whether that was the right season, or the Rio Grande the right basis, for offensive operations against Mexico," and suggested a plan to conquer a peace, which he afterward planned and executed. Political reasons to some extent delayed action in sending General Scott to Mexico, and his views on the proper campaign in Mexico were not approved by President Polk.

General Scott thought that unless his plan met the full approval and support of the Government, it might result disastrously, and expressed the sentiment, which became afterward a byword, that "soldiers had a far greater dread of a fire upon the rear than of the most formidable enemy in the front." The President declined to order him to the command.

Pending these affairs, the Secretary of War one day called at General Scott's office and found that he was absent. General Scott, on returning, learning that the secretary had called, wrote him a note in explanation of his absence, saying that "he had only stepped out for the moment to take a hasty plate of soup." This was also made a byword, and was used with a view to injure General Scott, or rather to ridicule him by his political opponents when he was a candidate of the Whig party for President in 1852. The successes of General Taylor had endeared him to the whole country, and his praises were in every one's mouth. Congress pa.s.sed a resolution of thanks, with a promise to present him with a sword in recognition of his services. General Scott wrote to the Kentucky senators, to Hon. Jefferson Davis, and others in Congress, suggesting that instead of a sword the higher honor of a gold medal should be voted him, and this suggestion was adopted.

General Scott made an indors.e.m.e.nt on the resolution of Congress voting this medal, recommending that it be made in the highest style of art.

About this time he was called upon by some Whig members of Congress to inquire if General Taylor was a Whig, and if he would not be a proper person for the Whigs to nominate as their candidate for the presidency.

General Scott spoke of him to these inquirers as a man who had the true basis of a great character--pure, uncorrupted morals combined with indomitable courage. Kind-hearted, sincere, and hospitable in a plain way, he had no vice but prejudice, many friends, and no enemies.

He also related an anecdote showing General Taylor's unscrupulous honesty and high sense of honor.

General Scott made repeated requests during the summer and autumn of 1846 to be ordered to Mexico. On November 23d he received the following order:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, _November 23, 1846_.

"SIR: The President several days since communicated in person to you his orders to repair to Mexico to take command of the forces there a.s.sembled, and particularly to organize and set on foot an expedition to operate on the Gulf coast, if, on arriving at the theater of action, you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all the circ.u.mstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means provided or to be provided for accomplishing it are committed to you, in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage.

"The objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them. Of this you must be the judge when preparations are made and the time for action arrived. Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"W.L. MARCY, _Secretary of War_.

"_General_ WINFIELD SCOTT."

General Scott was impressed with the belief that Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of War, and Hon. Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, the Secretary of the Treasury, had the fullest confidence in his ability, and favored giving him the substantial direction of the war. He was also impressed with the kindness and confidence extended to him by President Polk, but on his arrival in New Orleans he was shown a letter from Alexander Barrow, then a Senator in Congress from Louisiana and a personal friend of General Scott, informing him that the President had asked that the grade of lieutenant general be established in the army, and that on the pa.s.sage of such an act by Congress it was the intention of the President to confer this rank, and consequently the command of the army, upon Thomas H. Benton, then a Senator from Missouri. This was a great shock to General Scott, and he attributed it to political motives. He reasoned this way: "Scott is a Whig; therefore the Democracy is not bound to observe good faith with him. His successes may be turned to the prejudice of the Democratic party. We must, however, profit by his military experience, and if successful, by force of patronage and other helps, continue to crown Benton with the victory, and thus triumph both in the field and at the polls."

He reached the Brazos Santiago, near the mouth of the Rio Grande, in Christmas week, and proceeded from there to Camargo, where he expected to meet General Taylor, but, by some mismanagement or delay, his notification to General Taylor did not reach the latter.

A confidential dispatch from General Scott to General Taylor was opened, read, and freely discussed at headquarters at Monterey. A duplicate was sent forward, but the party in charge of it was killed at Villa Gran and the dispatch delivered to General Santa Anna. Taylor had made a movement toward Tampico, and hence did not receive the first dispatch delivered at Tampico. In the later dispatch General Scott had written him that he might have his choice of two armies--either remain as the commander of Northern Mexico, or accompany General Scott in command of a division toward the City of Mexico, with every a.s.surance in either case of confidence and support.

General Scott antic.i.p.ated the difficulty of timely concentration of forces off the Brazos large enough to give hope of success. He thought it necessary to have fifteen thousand troops, of which five thousand were to be regulars, and to have the co-operation of the navy. The time named for the concentration was the middle of January, so that the army might reach Vera Cruz by February 1st. He had requested the advice of General Taylor on these matters and all others in regard to the proposed campaign. He had intimated, in a letter of November 15th, that it would be necessary to withdraw a large number of troops from General Taylor, and thus reduce him to the defensive, while he thought it absolutely necessary for success that General Taylor should have a force sufficient to act offensively in the direction of San Luis Potosi. In addition to the volunteers and regulars at Tampico and those moving there, he desired that Worth's division of regulars, Duncan and Taylor's field batteries, a thousand mounted men, and all the volunteer infantry that could be spared be sent to General Taylor, only retaining a force sufficient to hold Monterey and protect his communications to Point Isabel. From New Orleans General Scott had written the Secretary of War that he approved of the rendezvous at Pensacola rather than at Brazos for the ordnance and ordnance stores.

He also urged that volunteers be forwarded rapidly to Brazos.

Subsequently he wrote the Secretary of War asking that ships with troops and supplies be ordered to Lobos Island. He addressed a letter to General George M. Brooke, commanding at New Orleans, giving detailed orders of what he required of him. He also wrote to Commodore Conner, and made suggestions about joint operations.

Failing to meet General Taylor, as he hoped and endeavored to do, with a view of a full and free conference, he felt compelled to issue orders detaching from the army of the Rio Grande such regular troops as were deemed necessary to lead the volunteers for the capture of Vera Cruz and the move on the capital, leaving General Taylor with a force sufficient to maintain himself at Monterey. He intended, had he seen General Taylor, to advise him to contract his line to the Rio Grande. General Taylor, supported by the authorities in Washington, favored the movement on the City of Mexico from Monterey and _via_ San Luis Potosi, but General Scott had already formulated and determined on the movement which he made with such brilliant success. Orders were accordingly issued from Camargo, January 3, 1847, for the movement of troops from Monterey, and General Scott returned to Brazos Santiago.

The embarkation for Vera Cruz was delayed by the non-arrival of the troops from Monterey and want of transportation. The Lobos Islands was selected as the place of rendezvous. This point is one hundred and twenty miles from Vera Cruz. When the greater part of the troops had arrived, they sailed past Vera Cruz and anch.o.r.ed, on March 7th, at Anton Lizardo, from which point it was determined to make the necessary reconnoissances.

General Scott was at this time ignorant of the movement of General Santa Anna toward Monterey, and expected, on landing or attempting to land, to be met by a formidable force of the enemy. On March 9th, the weather proving good, the fleet, consisting of some eighty vessels, including transports, moved up the coast with the naval steamers and five gunboats. General Scott was on board of the Ma.s.sachusetts, and as she moved up, the troops from the decks of the vessels cheered him with great enthusiasm. The anchorage was made outside the range of the enemy's guns. General Scott had provided sixty-seven surf boats, and in these and some cutters fifty-five hundred men--the boats being steered by sailors furnished by Commodore David Conner--pa.s.sed the Ma.s.sachusetts and repeated their cheers to the commanding general. The whole force was landed at half past five in the afternoon, without the loss of a man or a boat and without serious opposition from the enemy.

The remainder of the force was soon landed, amounting in all to something less than twelve thousand men.

The following appeared in the New Orleans Bulletin of March 27, 1847: "The landing of the American army at Vera Cruz has been accomplished in a manner that reflects the highest credit on all concerned; and the regularity, precision, and promptness with which it was effected has probably never been surpa.s.sed, if it has been equaled, in modern warfare. The removal of a large body of troops from numerous transports into boats in an open sea, their subsequent disembarkation on the sea beach, on an enemy's coast, through a surf, with all their arms and accouterments, without a single error or accident, requires great exertion, skill, and sound judgment.

"The French expedition against Algiers in 1830 was said to be the most complete armament in every respect that ever left Europe; it had been prepared with labor, attention, experience, and nothing had been omitted to insure success, and particularly in the means and facilities for landing the troops. This disembarkation took place in a wide bay, which was more favorable than an open beach directly on the ocean, and (as in the present instance) without any resistance on the part of the enemy; yet only nine thousand men were landed the first day, and from thirty to forty lives were lost by accidents or upsetting of boats; whereas on the present occasion twelve thousand men were landed in one day, without, so far as we have heard, the slightest accident or loss of life."

Both the city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa were strongly garrisoned and well provisioned. It was General Santa Anna's opinion that the garrison at Vera Cruz and the castle could successfully resist a siege until the annual breaking out of the yellow fever, upon which he depended to cause the withdrawal of the American troops; hence he devoted himself to the collection of troops to advance on General Taylor. General Scott says: "The walls and forts of Vera Cruz in 1847 were in good condition. Subsequent to its capture by the French, under Admiral Baudin and the Prince de Joinville, in 1838, the castle had been greatly extended, almost rebuilt, and its armament about doubled. Besides, the French were allowed to reconnoiter the city and castle and choose their positions of attack without the least resistance, the Mexicans deprecating the war with that nation, and hence ordered not to fire the first gun. Of that injunction the French were aware. When we approached, in 1847, the castle had the capacity to sink the entire American navy." Soon after the landing was effected, General Scott, accompanied by Colonel Joseph G. Totten and other officers of his staff, reconnoitered the land side of the city, the reconnoissance of the water front having been previously made.

The city was now completely invested, and all communication with the interior cut off. A complete blockade had been established by Commodore Conner. Several officers applied to General Scott for the privilege of leading storming parties. They were thanked, but no orders were given. In a meeting with his staff--Colonel Totten, chief engineer; Lieutenant-Colonel Ethan A. Hitchc.o.c.k, acting inspector general; Captain Robert E. Lee, engineer; and Lieutenant Henry L.

Scott, acting adjutant general--General Scott spoke as follows: "We, of course, gentlemen, must take the city and castle before the return of the _vomito_--if not by head-work, by the slow scientific process of storming, and then escape by pushing the conquest into the healthy interior. I am strongly inclined to attempt the former, unless you can convince me that the other is preferable. Since our thorough reconnaissance, I think the suggestion practicable with a very moderate loss on our part. The second method would no doubt be equally successful, but with the cost of an immense slaughter to both sides, including noncombatants, Mexican men, women, and children, because a.s.saults must be made in the dark, and the a.s.sailants dare not lose time in taking and guarding prisoners without incurring the certainty of becoming captives themselves, till all the strongholds of the place are occupied. The horrors of such slaughter as that, with the usual terrible accompaniment, are most revolting. Besides these objections, it is necessary to take into account the probable loss of some two thousand, perhaps three thousand, of our best men in an a.s.sault, and I have received but half the number promised me. How, then, could we hope to penetrate in the interior?... For these reasons," I added, quoting literally, "although I know our countrymen will hardly acknowledge a victory unaccompanied by a long butcher's bill (report of dead and wounded), I am strongly inclined--policy concurring with humanity--to forego their loud applause and 'aves vehement' and take the city with the least possible loss of life...."

General Scott's views were fully concurred in by Colonel Totten and others of his staff, and orders were issued for digging the trenches and the establishment of batteries. Very soon all outposts and sentries of the enemy were driven in. General Scott had warned the foreign consuls in the city of his proposed attack and had furnished them safe conducts out of the city, but they had not taken advantage of it. The marines of Commodore Conner's squadron, at his request, were now allowed to join the army, and, under command of Captain Alvin Edson, they were attached to the Third Artillery.

On the morning of the 10th the guns from the castle opened fire, but did very little damage. General Robert Patterson now joined Worth on his left, and extended the line of investment. Small parties of Mexicans were in sight in a valley, and a detachment under command of Colonel Cenovio approached the American camp and opened fire. The only damage done was the wounding of one soldier. General Gideon J. Pillow, with a part of his command and a six-pounder, opened fire on a large stone building occupied by the enemy and known as the magazine. They were soon driven off, and General Pillow advanced and attacked a small force in his front, driving them and occupying the magazine.

Colonels William T. Haskell's and Francis M. Wynkoop's regiments of Tennessee and Pennsylvania volunteers were moved on a small force on the road to Medelin, which retired, and two companies--one of artillery under command of Captain John R. Vinton, and one of infantry under command of Lieutenant A.P. Rogers--seized a point known as the limekiln, where it was proposed to plant a battery. General Twiggs moved on the 11th to extend the line of investment, which was now complete. General Scott then addressed a letter to the commanding officer of the city as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAMP WASHINGTON, BEFORE VERA CRUZ, "_March, 23, 1847_.

"The undersigned, Major-General Scott, general in chief of the armies of the United States of America, in addition to the close blockade of the coast and port of Vera Cruz previously established by the squadrons under Commodore Conner, of the navy of said States, having more fully invested the said city with an overwhelming army, so as to render it impossible that it should receive from without succor or re-enforcements of any kind, and having caused to be established batteries competent to the speedy destruction of said city, he, the undersigned, deems it due to the courtesies of war in like cases, as well as to the rights of humanity, to summon his Excellency the governor or commander in chief of the city of Vera Cruz to surrender the same to the army of the United States of America, present before the place. The undersigned, anxious to spare the beautiful city of Vera Cruz from the imminent hazard of demolition, its gallant defenders from a useless effusion of blood, and its peaceful inhabitants--women and children inclusive--from the inevitable horrors of a triumphant a.s.sault, addresses this summons to the intelligence, the gallantry, the patriotism, no less than the humanity, of his Excellency the governor and commander in chief of Vera Cruz. The undersigned is not accurately informed whether both the city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa be under the command of his Excellency, or whether each place has its own independent commander; but the undersigned, moved by the considerations adverted to above, may be willing to stipulate that if the city should by capitulation be garrisoned by a part of his troops no missile shall be fired from within the city or from its bastions or walls upon the castle, unless the castle should previously fire upon the city. The undersigned has the honor to tender his distinguished opponent, his Excellency the general and commander in chief of Vera Cruz, the a.s.surance of the high respect and consideration of the undersigned, WINFIELD SCOTT."