Volume II Part 25 Gallipoli Diary

Volume II Part 25

The ammunition supply at all times up to the operation of 6th August was a difficult problem. Frequently we had to be rationed to a very small allowance per battery per day, and the guns of the heavy battery were for some time not permitted to fire more than two rounds per day and then only by special permission of the C.R.A.

On 20th June I was first informed that H.E. for 18-pr. was to be supplied, and shortly afterwards a small supply for experiment was landed at Anzac. I think I am right in saying my share was 15 rounds per battery.

On 2nd August our first supply of H.E. arrived, but only 150 rounds per battery.

During the first few months of the campaign, when our stocks of ammunition were desperately low, our guns and gunners had to suffer considerable casualties without being able to effectively reply.

Our batteries were of necessity in many cases under direct observation of the enemy, and only the splendid work of the detachments in building earthworks for their protection made it possible to carry on.

Under the protection of the banks of a small ravine near the beach, our artificers established a workshop, and the extraordinary ingenuity and skill displayed in the repairing and replacing of damaged guns earned for the artificers our most grateful appreciation and thanks.

On 25th August I was evacuated suffering from enteric.

These notes only apply to the right sector, which I commanded.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 17: Now Major-General Sir Charles Rosenthal, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.--IAN H. 1920.]

APPENDIX III

The Dispatch of a Commander-in-Chief is not a technical doc.u.ment. In it the situation should be set forth, as briefly and clearly as may be, together with a few words indicative of the plan of G.H.Q. for coping with it. After that comes a narrative which ends with thanks to those individuals and units who have earned them. A Dispatch should be so written that civilians can follow the facts stated without trouble: it should not be too technical. But when the Military Colleges and Academies at Camberley, Duntroon, Kingston, West Point and in the European and j.a.panese capitals set to work in a scientific spirit to apportion praise or blame they are more influenced by the actual instructions and orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief _before and during the battle_, than by any after-the-event stories of what happened. They are glad to know the intentions of the Commander, but his instructions i.e., the actual steps he took to give practical effect to those intentions, are what really interest them.

When I came to write my Dispatch of the 11th December, so much about the actual course of events at Suvla was still obscure, that it had become desirable either to write the narrative in a more technical form than was customary or else to publish my actual instructions simultaneously with the Dispatch. I chose the latter course. The authorities had raised objections to several pa.s.sages in the Dispatch, and in every case but one, where they had wished me to add something which was not, in my opinion, correct, I had met them. No objection had been raised to the inclusion of my instructions. At 9 p.m. on the night of the 6th January (the Dispatch being due to appear next morning) I received a letter by Special Messenger from the War Office telling me the Press Bureau were wiring to all those to whom the Dispatch had been issued to suppress the instructions!

Whatever the reason of this action may have been, its result was clear enough: my Dispatch was eviscerated at the very moment it was stepping on to the platform. Had I known that these instructions, now given, were to have been cut out, my Dispatch would have been differently written.

IAN H., 1920.

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS.

TO VICE-ADMIRAL, COMMANDING EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON,

_17th July, 1915._

SIR,--I have the honour to forward a series of tables drawn up to show in detail the men, animals, vehicles, stores, etc., which it will be required to land in connection with the forthcoming operations. I shall be grateful if you will let me know as early as possible if you consider that any part of the programme indicated presents especially serious difficulties or is likely to require modification.

In informing me of the results of your consideration, I shall be obliged if you will let me know what craft you intend to use in carrying out the disembarkations referred to in tables B, C, D and E, so that detailed arrangements with regard to embarkation and to the allocation of troops, etc., to boats may be prepared.

2. Immediately after the disembarkation of the details referred to in the attached tables it will be necessary, if the operations are successful, to land 5,000 to 7,000 horses in order to render the force sufficiently mobile to carry the operations to a conclusion. Details as to disembarkation of these horses will be forwarded to you later. In the meantime the horses will be collected at Alexandria, and should subsequently be brought up to Mudros or Imbros, to begin arriving on August 6th.

It will also be necessary to land the remaining portions of the units referred to in the tables (first line transport, etc.), and, further, the remaining units of the formations to which they belong. In this latter category will be included three batteries of heavy artillery with mechanical transport. It will not be required to land any of the above until after August 7th, and details as to numbers, order of disembarkation, etc., will be forwarded to you later.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, (_Signed_) IAN HAMILTON,

_General, Commanding_ _Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._

TABLE A.

TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND GRADUALLY AT ANZAC COVE BEFORE THE MORNING OF THE 3RD OF AUGUST. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THESE DISEMBARKATIONS BY NIGHT, AND THE MOVEMENTS CAN BEGIN AS SOON AS IT IS CONVENIENT TO THE NAVAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITIES.

+--------------------+--------+------------------------------+-------------- | Vehicles. |Animals.| Stores. | Remarks.

| | | | | Nil | Nil | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Nil | 200 | |By August 1st.

_a_ If possible, an additional 3,000,000 S.A.A. should be landed, so that half the reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ash.o.r.e before operations begin (see Table "C" Remarks).

_b_ If possible, the following additional gun ammunition should also be landed, so that the full reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ash.o.r.e before operations begin:--

10 pr. 3,000 rounds} 18 pr. 10,000 rounds} See Table "C" Remarks.

6" Howitzer 1,000 rounds}

TABLE B.

TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT ANZAC COVE ON THE NIGHTS OF AUGUST 3RD/4TH, AUGUST 4TH/5TH AND AUGUST 5TH/6TH.

_a_ These units to move from h.e.l.les to Mudros as follows:--

1 Brigade } Night, 1 Field Company} 28th/29th July.

1 Brigade } Night, 1 Field Company} 29th/30th July.

1 Brigade } Night, 1 Field Company} 30/31st July.

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