All that the Anzacs have seen for themselves, or heard from their own extreme left or from aeroplanes, leads them to believe that the Turkish reinforcements to the Suvla theatre came over the high shoulder of Tekke Tepe or through Anafarta Sagir about dawn this morning and that the enemy are in some strength now along the ridge between Anafarta Sagir and Ismail Oglu Tepe with a few hundred on Kiretch Tepe Sirt: the Turkish centre was a gift to us yesterday; certainly yesterday forenoon; now it can only be won by hard fighting. But the Turks have not yet had time to work round on to the high ridges east of Suvla Bay and although a few Turks did pa.s.s over Kavak Tepe, it seems to be now clear of any enemy. There is no sign of life on the bare Eastern slope of that mountain. Probably one half of the great crescent of hills which encircles the Suvla plain and, in places, should overlook the Narrows, still lies open to an advance.

So together we composed a message to Stopford and G.o.dley sent it off by telephone--now rigged up between the two Corps Headquarters: the form was filled in by G.o.dley; hence his counter signature:--

TO:--G.O.C., IXth Corps.

Sender's number. Day of month. In reply to N.Z.G. 103 9 number AAA

After speaking to Birdwood and G.o.dley think most important use fresh troops could be put to if not urgently required to reinforce would be the occupation as early as possible of the commanding position running through square 137-119 AAA Ismail Oglu Tepe are less vital to security of base.

SIR IAN HAMILTON.

_From_ _Place_ Fisherman's Hut.

_Date_ 2 p.m. 9th August, 1915.

A. J. G.o.dLEY, Maj. Gen.

Took leave of the Anzacs and the Anzac Generals about 4.30 p.m. The whole crowd were in tip-top spirits and immensely pleased with the freedom and largeness of their newly conquered kingdom. We of the G.H.Q.

were bitten by this same spirit; Suvla took second place in our minds and when we got on board the _Arno_ the ugly events of the early morning had been shaken, for the moment, out of our minds. But, on the sail home, we were able to look at the Peninsula as a whole. Because the Anzacs, plus the 13th Division of the New Army, had carried through a brilliant stroke of arms was a reason, not for shutting our eyes to the slowness of the Suvla Generals, but for spurring them on to do likewise.

There is nothing open to them now--not without efforts for which they are, for the time being, unfit--but Kavak Tepe and the Aja Liman Anafarta ridge. So, on arrival at 6 p.m., wrote out the following message from myself to General Stopford:--

"I am in complete sympathy with you in the matter of all your Officers and men being new to this style of warfare and without any leaven of experienced troops on which to form themselves. Still I should be wrong if I did not express my concern at the want of energy and push displayed by the 11th Division. It cannot all be want of experience as 13th have shown dash and self-confidence. Turks were almost negligible yesterday once you got ash.o.r.e. To-day there was nothing to stop determined commanders leading such fine men as yours. Tell me what is wrong with the 11th Division. Is it the Divisional Generals or Brigadiers or both?

I have a first-rate Major General I can send at once and can also supply two competent Brigadiers. You must get a move on or the whole plan of operations is in danger of failing, for if you don't secure the AJA LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge without delay the enemy will. You must use your personal influence to insist on vigorous and sustained action against the weak forces of the Turks in your front, and while agreeing to the capture of W Hills and spur mentioned in C.G.S. letter to you of to-day, it is of vital importance to the whole operation that you thereafter promptly take steps to secure the ridge without possession of which SUVLA BAY is not safe. You must face casualties and strike while the opportunity offers and remember the AJA LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge is your princ.i.p.al and dominant objective and it must be captured. Every day's delay in its capture will enormously multiply your casualties. I want the name of the Brigadier who sent the message to say his left was retiring owing to a strong attack and then subsequently reported that the attack in question has never developed. Keep Birdwood informed as he may be able to help you on your right flank."

[Ill.u.s.tration: LIEUT. GEN SIR A. J. G.o.dLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. _"Elliott and Fry phot."_]

This message seemed so important that it was sent by hand of h.o.r.e-Ruthven and another Officer by special destroyer. Braithwaite tells me that, when he was at 9th Corps Headquarters to-day he showed General Stopford the last two paragraphs of this memo which I had written when toning down the wording of a General Staff draft:--

"C.G.S.

"(1) I do not think much good rubbing it into these fellows, there are very few Turks opposed to them. We have done it, and that was right, but we must not overdo it.

"(2) But the men ought to be made to understand that really the whole result of this campaign may depend on their quickly getting a footing on the hills right and left of Anafarta. Officers and rank and file must be made to grasp this.

"(3) If Lindley and his new men were kept intact and thrown in on the Anzac flank, surely they ought to be able to make a lodgment.

(_Initialled_), "IAN H."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 2: Must have meant south-east?--IAN H., 1920.]

[Footnote 3: Long afterwards--long after the Dardanelles Commission had finished their Report--I had the curiosity to get permission to look at the log of the _Exmouth_ (Rear-Admiral Nicholson) to see how my cable had been translated. Here it is, very much Bowdlerized:--"Sent 11.45, received 11.59. Sir I. Hamilton to Rear-Admiral 3. Urgent. 'Understand _Arno_ drawing fires. Can this be stopped and _Arno_ sent (to) _Mercedes_ to water at once? _Arno_ specially put at my disposal by Vice-Admiral and I may require her at any moment.'" The _Mercedes_ was the ship with our military drinking water.]

[Footnote 4: There is a hiatus in my diary here which I must try and bridge over by a footnote especially as my story seems to run off the rails when I say that "nothing further" had come in from Suvla. At 10.50 a.m. a further cable did come in from Suvla:--

"Approximate position of troops under General Hammersley this morning.

Two battalions 33rd Brigade sea to S.E. corner of Salt Lake: will be moved forward shortly to connect if possible with Anzac troops. Two battalions 33rd holding Yilghin Burnu. Position on Hill 500 yards East Yilghin Burnu not yet certain. From Yilghin Burnu 31st Brigade holds line through Baka Baba crossroads, thence North to about 118 0 2. 32nd and 34th Brigades ordered forward from Hill 10 (117 R) where they spent night to line 118 M.R.W. to fill gap with Tenth Division. Detailed information of Tenth Division not yet definite: will report later.

Consider Major-General Hammersley and troops under him deserve great credit for result attained against strenuous opposition and great difficulty."

Manifestly, the data in this cable were not enough to enable me to form any opinion of my own as to the credit due to anyone; but every soldier will understand that it was up to me to respond:

"To G.O.C. 8th Corps.

"From General Sir Ian Hamilton.

"You and your troops have indeed done splendidly. Please tell Hammersley how much we hope from his able and rapid advance."

I made no written note of this 10.50 a.m. cable (or of my reply to it) at the time and, eighteen months later, no mental note of it remained, probably because it had only added some detail to the news received during the night. But I had reason to regret this afterwards when I came to read the final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, paragraph 89.

There I see it stated that "with regard to this message" (my pat on the back for Hammersley) "Sir Frederick Stopford informed us that the result of the operations on the night of the 6th and day of the 7th was not as satisfactory as he would have liked but he gathered from Sir Ian Hamilton's congratulations that his dispositions and orders had met with the latter's approval"

As to my actual feelings that forenoon, I do remember them well. At sunrise victory seemed a.s.sured. As morning melted into mid-day my mind became more and more uneasy at the scant news about the Irish Division and at the lack of news of a further advance of the 11th Division. This growing anxiety drove me to quit my headquarters and to take ship for Suvla.]

[Footnote 5: The Admiral's wireless had said, so I was told:--"It is important we should meet--shall I come to Kephalos or are you coming to Suvla?" As stated in text I did not get this cable at the time nor did I ever get it. Four years later the signal logs of the only ships through which the message could have pa.s.sed; viz., _Triad_, _Exmouth_, _Chatham_, were searched and there is no trace of it. So I think it must have been drafted and overlooked.--IAN H., 1920.

Aspinall's cable:--"Just been ash.o.r.e where I found all quiet AAA. No rifle fire, no artillery fire and apparently no Turks AAA. IXth Corps resting AAA. Feel confident that golden opportunities are being lost and look upon the situation as serious." I received this next morning from Braithwaite.--IAN H., 1920.]

[Footnote 6: Looking to the distance of Sulajik, the Brigade might have been expected to move in about an hour and a half. But, as I did not know at the time, or indeed till two years later, this Brigade was _not_ concentrated. Only two battalions were at Sulajik; the other two, the 6th East Yorks and the 9th West Yorks, were in possession of Hill 70, vide map.--IAN H., 1920.]

[Footnote 7: My Aide-de-Camp, George Brodrick, has permitted me to use the following extract from a letter of his written to his father, Lord Midleton, at the time.

"I went to Suvla with Sir Ian in the afternoon of August 8th, and we arrived to find 'Nothing doing.' The beaches and hillsides covered with our men almost like a Bank Holiday evening at Hampstead Heath. Vague sh.e.l.ling by one of our monitors was the only thing which broke the peace of a most perfect evening--a glorious sunset.

"We went over to the Destroyer where General Stopford had his Headquarters, and I fancy words of exhortation were spoken to him. We slept on the Triad, Admiral de Robeck's Yacht. I had a camp bed on the Bridge, so as to hear any happenings during the night. About dawn our Monitors started to sh.e.l.l the heights behind Anafarta and a sort of a.s.sault was made; the Turkish battery opened with shrapnel, and our fellows did not seem to get very far.

"We went ash.o.r.e on 'A' beach about 8 a.m. and walked up to Stopford's Headquarters, as he had gone ash.o.r.e the night before. They all seemed a very lifeless crew, with but little knowledge of the general situation and no spirit in them. We made our way on across some rocky scrubby country towards Brigade Headquarters; fairly heavy rifle fire was going on, and after about two miles bullets began to ping unpleasantly all round us. I persuaded Sir Ian to lie down behind a rock, much against his will, and went on myself another 150 yards to where the Brigade Staff were sitting in a dip behind a stone wall. They told me that about 800 Turks were in front of them with no machine guns. We had 3 Battalions in the firing line and two in reserve and yet could not get on."]

[Footnote 8: Only one Company we hear now.--IAN H., 15.8.15.]

CHAPTER XVI

KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES

_10th August, 1915. Imbros._ Had to remain at G.H.Q. all day--the worst of all days. My visit to Anzac yesterday had infected me with the hopes of G.o.dley and Birdwood and made me feel that we would recover what we had missed at Suvla, and more, if, working from the pivot of Chunuk Bair, we got hold of the rest of Sari Bair.