Son plan actuel consiste a chercher a nous bloquer de front, pour nous maintenir sur l'etroit terrain que nous avons conquis, et a nous y rendre la vie intenable en bombardant les camps et surtout les plages de debarquement. C'est ainsi que les quatre batteries de grosses pieces recemment installees entre Erenkeui et Yenishahr ont apporte au ravitaillement des troupes une gene qu'on peut dire dangereuse, puisque la consommation dans dernieres journees a legerement depa.s.se le ravitaillement.

Au resume nous sommes bloques de front et pris par derriere. Et cette situation ira en empirant du fait des maladies, resultant du climat, de la chaleur, du bivouac continuel, peut etre des epidemies, et du fait que la mer rendra tres difficile tout debarquement des la mauvaise saison, fin aout.

Ceci pose, comment employer les gros renforts attendus. Plusieurs solutions se presentent a l'esprit.

Primo, en Asie.

C'est la premiere idee qui se presente; etant donne l'interet de se rendre maitre de la region Yenishahr-Erenkeui, qui prend nos plages de debarquement a revers.

Mais c'est la une mesure d'un interet defensif, qui ne fera pas faire un pas en avant. Il est permis d'autre part de penser que les canons des monitors anglais, qui sont sans doute destines a detruire les defenses du detroit, commenceront par nous debarra.s.ser des batteries de l'entree. Enfin nous disposerons d'ici peu d'un front de mer Seddul-Bahr Eski Hissarlick, dont les pieces puissantes contrebattront efficacement les canons d'Asie.

Secundo, vers Gaba-Tepe.

Au Sud de Gaba Tepe s'etend une plaine que les cartes disent accessible au debarquement. Des troupes debarquees la se trouvent a 8 kilometres environ de Maidos, c'est a dire au point ou la presqu'ile est la plus etroite.

Sans nul doute, trouveront elles devant elles les memes difficultes qu'ici et il sera necessaire notemment de se rendre maitre des montagnes qui dominent la plaine au Nord. Mais alors que la prise d'Achi Baba ne sera qu'un grand succes militaire, qui nous mettra le lendemain devant les escarpements de Kilid-Bahr, l'occupation de la region Gaba Tepe-Maidos nous placerait au dela des detroits, nous permettrait d'y const.i.tuer une base ou les sous-marins de la mer de Marmara pourraient indefiniment s'approvisionner.

Si le barrage des Dardanelles n'etait pas brise, il serait tourne.

Tertio, vers Boulair.

Cette solution apparait comme le plus radicale, celui qui dejouerait le plan de l'ennemi. Constantinople serait directement menace par ce coup retentissant.

Toute la question est de savoir si, avec leurs moyens nouveaux, les monitors, les Amiraux sont en mesure de proteger un debarquement, qui comme celui du 25 avril necessiterait de nombreux bateaux.

En resume, j'ai l'honneur d'emettre l'avis de poser nettement aux Amiraux la question du debarquement a Boulair, d'y faire reconnaitre l'etat actuel des defenses par bateaux, avions et si possible agents, sans faire d'acte de guerre pour ne pas donner l'eveil.

Au cas ou le debarquement serait juge impossible, j'emet l'avis d'employer les renforts dans la region Gaba-Tepe, ou les Australiens ont deja implante un solide jalon.

Concurremment, je pense qu'il serait du plus vif interet pour hater la decision, de creer au Gouvernement Turc des inquietudes dans d'autres parties de l'Empire, pour l'empecher d'amener ici toutes ses forces.

Dans cet ordre d'idees on peut envisager deux moyens. L'un, le plus efficace, est l'action russe ou bulgare. La Grece est mal placee geographiquement pour exercer une action sur la guerre. Seule la Bulgarie, par sa position geographique, prend les Turcs a revers.

Sans doute, a voir la facon dont les Turcs amenent devant nous les troupes et les canons d'Adrianople, ont ils un accord avec la Bulgarie, mais la guerre des Balkans prouve que la Bulgarie n'est pas embarra.s.see d'un accord si elle voit ailleurs son interet. La question est donc d'offrir un prix fort a la Bulgarie.

L'autre est de provoquer des agitations dans differentes parties de l'Empire, d'y faire operer des destructions par des bandes, d'obliger les Turcs a y envoyer du monde. Cela encore vaut la peine d'y mettre le prix.

Je suis, avec un profond respect, mon General,

Votre tres devoue, (_Sd._) GOURAUD.

Boarded a destroyer at 11.15 a.m. and sailed straight for Gully Beach.

Then into dinghy and paddled to sh.o.r.e where I lunched with de Lisle at the 29th Divisional Headquarters. Hunter-Weston had come up to meet me from Corps Headquarters.

With both Generals I rode a couple of miles up the Gully seeing the 87th Brigade as we went. When we got to the mouth of the communication trench leading to the front of the Indian Brigade, Bruce of the Gurkhas was waiting for us, and led me along through endless sunken ways until we reached his firing line.

Every hundred yards or so I had a close peep at the ground in front through de Lisle's periscope. The enemy trenches were sometimes not more than 7 yards away and the rifles of the Turks moving showed there was a man behind the loophole. Many corpses, almost all Turks, lay between the two lines of trenches. There was no sh.e.l.ling at the moment, but rifle bullets kept flopping into the parapet especially when the periscope was moved.

At the end of the Gurkha line I was met by Colonel Wolley Dod, who took me round the fire trenches of the 86th Brigade. The Dublin Fusiliers looked particularly fit and jolly.

Getting back to the head of the Gully I rode with Hunter-Weston to his Corps Headquarters where I had tea before sailing.

When I got to Imbros the Fleet were firing at a Taube. She was only having a look; flying around the shipping and Headquarters camp at a great height, but dropping no bombs. After a bit she scooted off to the South-east. c.o.x dined.

_15th June, 1915. Imbros._ Yesterday I learned some detail about the conduct of affairs the other day--enough to make me very anxious indeed that no tired or nervy leaders should be sent out with the new troops.

So I have sent K. a cable!--

"(No. M.F. 334). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener.

"With reference to the last paragraph of your telegram No. 5250, cipher, and my No. M.F. 313. I should like to submit for your consideration the following views of the qualities necessary in an Army Corps Commander on the Gallipoli Peninsula. In that position only men of good stiff const.i.tution and nerve will be able to do any good. Everything is at such close quarters that many men would be useless in the somewhat exposed headquarters they would have to occupy on this limited terrain, though they would do quite good work if moderately comfortable and away from constant sh.e.l.l fire. I can think of two men, Byng and Rawlinson.

Both possess the requisite qualities and seniority; the latter does not seem very happy where he is, and the former would have more scope than a cavalry Corps can give him in France."

Left camp the moment I got this weight off my chest; boarded the _Savage_, or rather jumped on her ladder like a chamois and scrambled on deck like a monkey. It was blowing big guns and our launch was very nearly swamped. Crossing to h.e.l.les big seas were making a clean sweep of the decks. Jolly to look at from the bridge.

After a dusty walk round piers and beaches lunched with Hunter-Weston before inspecting the 155th and 156th Brigades. On our road we were met by Brigadier-Generals Erskine and Scott-Moncrieff. Walked the trenches where I chatted with the regimental officers and men, and found my compatriots in very good form.

Went on to the Royal Naval Division Headquarters where Paris met me.

Together we went round the 3rd Marine Brigade Section under Brigadier-General Trotman. These old comrades of the first landing gave me the kindliest greetings.

Got back to 8th Corps Headquarters intending to enjoy a cup of tea _al fresco_, but we were reckoning without our host (the Turkish one) who threw so many big sh.e.l.l from Asia all about the mound that, (only to save the tea cups), we retired with dignified slowness into our dugouts.

Whilst sitting in these funk-holes, as we used to call them at Ladysmith, General Gouraud ran the gauntlet and made also a slow and dignified entry. He was coming back with me to Imbros. As it was getting late we hardened our hearts to walk across the open country between Headquarters and the beach, where every twenty seconds or so a big fellow was raising Cain. Fortune favouring we both reached the sea with our heads upon our shoulders.

An answer is in to our plea for a Western scale of ammunition, guns and howitzers. They cable sympathetically but say simply they can't. Soft answers, etc., but it would be well if they could make up their minds whether they wish to score the next trick in the East or in the West. If they can't do that they will be doubly done.

A purely pa.s.sive defence is not possible for us; it implies losing ground by degrees--and we have not a yard to lose. If we are to remain we must keep on attacking here and there to maintain ourselves! But; to expect us to attack without giving us our fair share--on Western standards--of high explosive and howitzers shows lack of military imagination. A man's a man for a' that whether at h.e.l.les or Ypres. Let me bring my lads face to face with Turks in the open field, we _must_ beat them every time because British volunteer soldiers are superior individuals to Anatolians, Syrians or Arabs and are animated with a superior ideal and an equal joy in battle. Wire and machine guns prevent this hand to hand, or rifle to rifle, style of contest. Well, then the decent thing to do is to give us sh.e.l.ls enough to clear a fair field.

To attempt to solve the problem by letting a single dirty Turk at the Maxim kill ten--twenty--fifty--of our fellows on the barbed wire,--ten--twenty--fifty--_each of whom is worth several dozen Turks_, is a sin of the Holy Ghost category unless it can be justified by dire necessity. But there is no necessity. The supreme command has only to decide categorically that the Allies stand on the defensive on the West for a few weeks and then Von Donop can find us enough to bring us through. Joffre and French, as a matter of fact, would hardly feel the difference. If the supreme command can't do that; and can't even send us trench mortars as subst.i.tutes, let them harden their hearts and wind up this great enterprise for which they simply haven't got the nerve.

If only K. would come and see for himself! Failing that--if only it were possible for me to run home and put my own case.

_16th June, 1915. Imbros._ Gouraud, a sympathetic guest, left for French Headquarters in one of our destroyers at 3.30 p.m. He is a real Sahib; a tower of strength. The Asiatic guns have upset his men a good deal. He hopes soon to clap on an extinguisher to their fire by planting down two fine big fellows of his own Morto Bay way: we mean to add a couple of old naval six-inchers to this battery. During his stay we have very thoroughly threshed out our hopes and fears and went into the plan which Gouraud thinks offers chances of a record-breaking victory. If the character of the new Commanders and the spirit of their troops are of the calibre of those on his left flank at h.e.l.les he feels pretty confident.

Talking of Commanders, my appeal for a young Corps Commander of a "good stiff const.i.tution" has drawn a startling reply:--

"(No. 5501, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to Sir Ian Hamilton. Your No.

M.F. 334. I am afraid that Sir John French would not spare the services of the two Generals you mention, and they are, moreover, both junior to Mahon, who commands the 10th Division which is going out to you. Ewart, who is very fit and well, would I think do. I am going to see him the day after to-morrow.

"Mahon raised the 10th Division and has produced an excellent unit. He is quite fit and well, and I do not think that he could now be left behind."

So the field of selection for the new Corps is to be restricted to some Lieutenant-General senior to Mahon--himself the only man of his rank commanding a Division and almost at the top of the Lieutenant-Generals!

Oh G.o.d, if I could have a Corps Commander like Gouraud! But this block by "Mahon" makes a record for the seniority fetish. I have just been studying the Army List with Pollen. Excluding Indians, Marines and employed men like Douglas Haig and Maxwell, there _are_ only about one dozen British service Lieutenant-Generals senior to Mahon, and, of that dozen only two are _possible_--Ewart and Stopford! There _are_ no others. Ewart is a fine fellow, with a character which commands respect and affection. He is also a Cameron Highlander whose father commanded the Gordons. As a presence nothing could be better; as a man no one in the Army would be more welcome. But he would not, with his build and const.i.tutional habit, last out here for one fortnight. Despite his soldier heart and his wise brain we can't risk it. We are unanimous on that point. Stopford remains. I have cabled expressing my deep disappointment that Mahon should be the factor which restricts all choice and saying,

"However, my No. M.F. 334[20] gave you what I considered to be the qualities necessary in a Commander, so I will do my best with what you send me.

"With regard to Ewart. I greatly admire his character, but he positively could not have made his way along the fire trenches I inspected yesterday. He has never approached troops for fifteen years although I have often implored him, as a friend, to do so. Would not Stopford be preferable to Ewart, even though he does not possess the latter's calm?"

I begin to think I shall be recalled for my importunity. But, in for a penny in for a pound, and I have fired off the following protest to a really disastrous cable from the War Office saying that the New Army is to bring _no_ 4.5-inch howitzers with it; no howitzers at all, indeed, except sixteen of the old, inaccurate 5-inch Territorial howitzers, some of which "came out" at Omdurman and were afterwards--the whole category--found so much fault with in South Africa. Unless they are going to have an August push in France they might at least have lent us forty-eight 4.5 hows. from France to see the New Army through their first encounter with the enemy. They could all be run back in a fast cruiser and would only be loaned to us for three weeks or a month. If the G.S. at Whitehall can't do those things, they have handed over the running of a world war to one section of the Army. I attach my ultimatum: I cannot make it more emphatic; instead of death or victory we moderns say howitzers or defeat:--

"(No. 5489, cipher, M.G.O.) From War Office to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Your No. M.F.

316. It is impossible to send more ammunition than we are sending you.

528 rounds per 18-pr will be brought out by each Division. Instead of 4.5-inch howitzers we are sending 16 5-inch howitzers with the 13th Division, as there is more 5-inch ammunition available. By the time that the last of the three Divisions arrive we hope to have supplied a good percentage of high explosive sh.e.l.ls, but you should try to save as much as you can in the meantime. Until more ammunition is available for them, we cannot send you any 4.5-inch howitzers with the other two Divisions, and even if more 5-inch were sent the fortnightly supply of ammunition for them would be very small."