Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases arising under laws pa.s.sed by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Amba.s.sadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of Officers of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Amba.s.sadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature may a.s.sign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall const.i.tute from time to time.

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be committed; and shall be by Jury.

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust or profit, under the United States. But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.

XII [XI].

No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and reprisals; nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any t.i.tle of n.o.bility.

XIII [XII].

No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender in payment of debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of delay, until the Legislature of the United States can be consulted.

XIV [XIII].

The Citizens of each State shall be ent.i.tled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

XV [XIV].

Any person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor in any State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any other State, shall, on demand of the Executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence.

XVI [XV].

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and Magistrates of every other State.

XVII [XVI].

New States lawfully const.i.tuted or established within the limits of the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this Government ; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the members present in each House shall be necessary. If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to its admission. If the admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting.

XVIII [XVII].

The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form of Government; and shall protect each State against foreign invasions, and, on the application of its Legislature, against domestic violence.

XIX [XVIII].

On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this Const.i.tution, the Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.

XX [XIX].

The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound by oath to support this Const.i.tution.

XXI [XX].

The ratifications of the Conventions of__ States shall be sufficient for organizing this Const.i.tution.

XXII [XXI].

This Const.i.tution shall be laid before the United States in Congress a.s.sembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen, under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such Convention.

XXIII [XXII].

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Convention, that each a.s.senting Convention should notify its a.s.sent and ratification to the United States in Congress a.s.sembled; that Congress, after receiving the a.s.sent and ratification of the Conventions of__ States, should appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place for commencing proceedings under this Const.i.tution ; that after such publication, the Legislatures of the several States should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election of members of the House of Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature should meet at the time and place a.s.signed by Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their meeting, choose the President of the United States, and proceed to execute this Const.i.tution.

[A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in order to give leisure to examine the Report; which pa.s.sed in the Negative-N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Md. ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no The House then adjourned till tomorrow 11 OC.]

DEBATE ON WAR POWER.

AUGUST 17, 1787.

"To make war"

MR PINKNEY56 OPPOSED THE VESTING this power in the Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps. would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in Senate, so as to give no advantage to large States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace. OPPOSED THE VESTING this power in the Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps. would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in Senate, so as to give no advantage to large States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace.

Mr Butler.57 The Objections agst the Legislature lie in a great degree agst the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it. The Objections agst the Legislature lie in a great degree agst the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it.

Mr. M[adison][image]and Mr Gerry moved to insert "declare," "declare," striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks. striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.

Mr Sharman58 thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" better than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too much. thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" better than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too much.

Mr Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.

Mr. Elseworth. there is a material difference between the cases of making war, and making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of war, than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. peace attended with intricate & secret negociations.

Mr. Mason59 was agst giving the power of war to the Executive, because not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be ent.i.tled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred " was agst giving the power of war to the Executive, because not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be ent.i.tled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to "Make"

On the Motion to insert declare declare-in place of Make Make, [it was agreed to.]

N. H. no. Mas. abst. Cont. no.60 Pa. ay Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes-7; noes-2; absent-1.] Pa. ay Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes-7; noes-2; absent-1.]

Mr. Pinkney's motion to strike out whole clause, disagd. to without call of States.

Mr Butler moved to give the Legislature power of peace, as they were to have that of war.

Mr Gerry 2ds. him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise the power if vested in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may consequently give up part of the U. States. The Senate are more liable to be corrupted by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.

On the motion for adding "and peace" after "war"

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. [no] S. C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes-0; noes-10.]

Adjourned DEBATE ON TREATY POWER.

AUGUST 23,1787.

ART IX. SECT. 1. BEING RESUMED, to wit "The Senate of the U. S. shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Amba.s.sadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court."

Mr. (Madison) observed that the Senate represented the States alone, and that for this as well as other obvious reasons it was proper that the President should be an agent in Treaties.

Mr. Govr. Morris 61 61did not know that he should agree to refer the making of Treaties to the Senate at all, but for the present wd. move to add as an amendment to the section, after "Treaties"-"but no Treaty shall be binding on the U. S. which is not ratified by a law."

Mr Madison suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification of treaties of alliance for the purposes of war &c &c Mr. Ghorum.62 Many other disadvantages must be experienced if treaties of peace and all negociations are to be previously ratified-and if not prevously, the Ministers would be at a loss how to proceed-What would be the case in G. Britain if the King were to proceed in this manner? American Ministers must go abroad not instructed by the same Authority (as will be the case with other Ministers) which is to ratify their proceedings. Many other disadvantages must be experienced if treaties of peace and all negociations are to be previously ratified-and if not prevously, the Ministers would be at a loss how to proceed-What would be the case in G. Britain if the King were to proceed in this manner? American Ministers must go abroad not instructed by the same Authority (as will be the case with other Ministers) which is to ratify their proceedings.

Mr. Govr. Morris. As to treaties of alliance, they will oblige foreign powers to send their Ministers here, the very thing we should wish for. Such treaties could not be otherwise made, if his amendment shd. succeed. In general he was not solicitous to multiply & facilitate Treaties. He wished none to be made with G. Britain, till she should be at war. Then a good bargain might be made with her. So with other foreign powers. The more difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set on them.

Mr. Wilson. In the most important Treaties, the King of G. Britain being obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of them, is under the same fetters as the amendment of Mr. Morris will impose on the Senate. It was refused yesterday to permit even the Legislature to lay duties on exports. Under the clause, without the amendment, the Senate alone can make a Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some one particular port.

Mr. d.i.c.kinson63 concurred in the amendment, as most safe and proper, tho' he was sensible it was unfavorable to the little States; wch would otherwise have an concurred in the amendment, as most safe and proper, tho' he was sensible it was unfavorable to the little States; wch would otherwise have an equal equal share in making Treaties. share in making Treaties.

Docr. Johnson64 thought there was something of solecism in saying that the acts of a Minister with plenipotentiary powers from one Body, should depend for ratification on another Body. The Example of the King of G. B. was not parallel. Full & compleat power was vested in him-If the Parliament should fail to provide the necessary means of execution, the Treaty would be violated. thought there was something of solecism in saying that the acts of a Minister with plenipotentiary powers from one Body, should depend for ratification on another Body. The Example of the King of G. B. was not parallel. Full & compleat power was vested in him-If the Parliament should fail to provide the necessary means of execution, the Treaty would be violated.

Mr. Ghorum in answer to Mr. Govr Morris, said that negociations on the spot were not to be desired by us, especially if the whole Legislature is to have any thing to do with Treaties. It will be generally influenced by two or three men, who will be corrupted by the Amba.s.sadors here. In such a Government as ours, it is necessary to guard against the Government itself being seduced.

Mr. Randolph observing that almost every Speaker had made objections to the clause as it stood, moved in order to a further consideration of the subject, that the Motion of Mr. Govr. Morris should be postponed, and on this question [It was lost the States being equally divided.]

Ma.s.sts. no. Cont. no. N. J-ay-Pena. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay-N. C. no. S. C. no-Geo. no. [Ayes-5; noes-5.]

On Mr. Govr. Morris Motion Masts. no. Cont no. N. J. no. Pa. ay-Del. no-Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd S. C. no. Geo-no. [Ayes-1; noes-8; divided-l.j The several clauses of Sect: 1. art IX, were then separately postponed after inserting "and other public Ministers" next after "Amba.s.sadors."

Mr. Madison hinted for consideration, whether a distinction might not be made between different sorts of Treaties-Allowing the President & Senate to make Treaties eventual and of Alliance for limited terms-and requiring the concurrence of the whole Legislature in other Treaties.

The 1 st Sect. art IX. was finally referred nem: con: to the committee of Five, and the House then Adjourned.

OBJECTIONS OF EDMUND RANDOLPH, GEORGE.

MASON, AND ELBRIDGE GERRY.

SEPTEMBER 15, 1787.

MR. RANDOLPH ANIMADVERTING ON the indefinite and dangerous power given by the Const.i.tution to Congress, expressing the pain he felt at differing from the body of the Convention, on the close of the great & awful subject of their labours, and anxiously wishing for some accommodating expedient which would relieve him from his embarra.s.sments, made a motion importing "that amendments to the plan might be offered by the State Conventions, which should be submitted to and finally decided on by another general Convention." Should this proposition be disregarded, it would he said be impossible for him to put his name to the instrument. Whether he should oppose it afterwards he would not then decide but he would not deprive himself of the freedom to do so in his own State, if that course should be prescribed by his final judgment- Col : Mason 2ded. & followed Mr. Randolph in animadversions on the dangerous power and structure of the Government, concluding that it would end either in monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy ; which, he was in doubt, but one or other, he was sure. This Const.i.tution had been formed without the knowledge or idea of the people. A second Convention will know more of the sense of the people, and be able to provide a system more consonant to it. It was improper to say to the people, take this or nothing. As the Const.i.tution now stands, he could neither give it his support or vote in Virginia; and he could not sign here what he could not support there. With the expedient of another Convention as proposed, he could sign.

Mr. Pinkney. These declarations from members so respectable at the close of this important scene, give a peculiar solemnity to the present moment. He descanted on the consequences of calling forth the deliberations & amendments of the different States on the subject of Government at large. Nothing but confusion & contrariety could spring from the experiment. The States will never agree in their plans-And the Deputies to a second Convention coming together under the discordant impressions of their Const.i.tuents, will never agree. Conventions are serious things, and ought not to be repeated-He was not without objections as well as others to the plan. He objected to the contemptible weakness & dependence of the Executive. He objected to the power of a majority only of Congs over Commerce. But apprehending the danger of a general confusion, and an ultimate decision by the Sword, he should give the plan his support.

Mr. Gerry, stated the objections which determined him to withhold his name from the Const.i.tution. 1. the duration and re-eligibility of the Senate. 2. the power of the House of Representatives to conceal their journals. 3. the power of Congress over the places of election. 4. the unlimited power of Congress over their own compensations. 5. Ma.s.sachusetts has not a due share of Representatives allotted to her. 6. 3/5 of the Blacks are to be represented as if they were freemen 7. Under the power over commerce, monopolies may be established. 8. The vice president being made head of the Senate. He could however he said get over all these, if the rights of the Citizens were not rendered insecure 1. by the general power of the Legislature to make what laws they may please to call necessary and proper. 2. raise armies and money without limit. 3. to establish a tribunal without juries, which will be a Star-chamber as to Civil cases. Under such a view of the Const.i.tution, the best that could be done he conceived was to provide for a second general Convention.

On the question on the proposition of Mr Randolph. All the States answered-no On the question to agree to the Const.i.tution. as amended. All the States ay.

The Const.i.tution was then ordered to be engrossed.

And the House adjourned.

-Benjamin Franklin- CONCLUDING APPEAL FOR UNANIMITY.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1787.

THE ENGROSSED CONSt.i.tUTION BEING read, Docr. Franklin rose with a speech in his hand, which he had reduced to writing for his own conveniency, and which Mr. Wilson read in the words following.

Mr. President I confess that there are several parts of this const.i.tution which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them: For having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better information or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment of others. Most men indeed as well as most sects in Religion, think themselves in possession of all truth, and that whereever others differ from them it is so far error. Steele, a Protestant in a Dedication tells the Pope, that the only difference between our Churches in their opinions of the certainty of their doctrines is, the Church of Rome is infallible and the Church of England is never in the wrong. But though many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as of that of their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain french lady, who in a dispute with her sister, said "I don't know how it happens, Sister but I meet with no body but myself, that's always in the right"-"Il n'y a que moi qui a toujours raison."

In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Const.i.tution with all its faults, if they are such; because I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if well administered, and believe farther that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Const.i.tution. For when you a.s.semble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably a.s.semble with those men, all their prejudices, their pa.s.sions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an a.s.sembly can a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of the Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Const.i.tution because I expect no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best. The opinions I have had of its errors, I sacrifice to the public good-I have never whispered a syllable of them abroad-Within these walls they were born, and here they shall die-If every one of us in returning to our Const.i.tuents were to report the objections he has had to it, and endeavor to gain partizans in support of them, we might prevent its being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary effects & great advantages resulting naturally in our favor among foreign Nations as well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent unanimity. Much of the strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and securing happiness to the people, depends. on opinion, on the general opinion of the goodness of the Government, as well as of the wisdom and integrity of its Governors. I hope therefore that for our own sakes as a part of the people, and for the sake of posterity, we shall act heartily and unanimously in recommending this Const.i.tution (if approved by Congress & confirmed by the Conventions) wherever our influence may extend, and turn our future thoughts & endeavors to the means of having it well administered.

On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who may still have objections to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility-and to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this instrument.-He then moved that the Const.i.tution be signed by the members and offered the following as a convenient form viz. "Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States present the 17th. of Sepr. &c-In Witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names.

THE CONSt.i.tUTION.

The Const.i.tution of the United States (September 17, 1787) PAGE 397 Concluding Resolution for Ratification (September 17, 1787) PAGE 410 George Washington: Letter of Conveyance to Congress (September 17, 1787) PAGE 411 THE DELEGATES SIGNED THE completed Const.i.tution on September 17, 1787, took a concluding dinner at the City Tavern, and then left Philadelphia. The Const.i.tution they had drafted was the culmination not only of four and a half months of deliberation, but of the decade of const.i.tutional experimentation that began in 1776. The states had served as effective laboratories of liberty, and the lessons the framers drew as they reconst.i.tuted the national government came primarily from the experience of the states. Two days later, the Const.i.tution was published in a Philadelphia newspaper, and the public debate over its ratification began.

The first official step in the process of ratification was for the convention to transmit the Const.i.tution to Congress, which was in turn expected to ask the state legislatures to call elections for separate ratification conventions. In his letter submitting the Const.i.tution to Congress, George Washington, the convention president, struck a note that would resound throughout the ratification campaign. Forming a more perfect union did not require writing a perfect doc.u.ment, Washington implied; instead, Americans had to consider the range of problems and interests the convention had to solve and accommodate.

THE CONSt.i.tUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1787.

WE THE PEOPLE OF the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Const.i.tution for the United States of America.

ARTICLE. I.

Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be ent.i.tled to chuse three, Ma.s.sachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be a.s.sembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Cla.s.ses. The Seats of the Senators of the first Cla.s.s shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Cla.s.s at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Cla.s.s at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.