Each captain is expressly ordered, on penalty of 300 guilders, _to keep near_[1] the flag officer under whom he serves. Also he is to have his guns in a serviceable condition. The squadron under Vice-Admiral Jan Evertsen is to lie or sail immediately ahead of the admiral. Further Captain Pieter Floriszoon (who provisionally carries the flag at the mizen as rear-admiral) is always to remain with his squadron close astern of the admiral; and the Admiral Tromp is to take his station between both with his squadron. The said superior officers and captains are to stand by one another with all fidelity; and each squadron when another is vigorously attacked shall second and free the other, using therein all the qualities of a soldier and seaman.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] The Dutch has 'troppen' = to gather round (_cf._ our 'trooping the colour'). De With's corresponding order has 'dat zij allen bij den anderen ... gesloten zou den blijven.' _Supra_, p. 86.

II

ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR 1653 AND 1654

INTRODUCTORY

The earliest known 'Fighting Instructions' in any language which aimed at a single line ahead as a battle formation, were issued by the Commonwealth's 'generals-at-sea' on March 29, 1653, in the midst of the Dutch War. This is placed beyond doubt by an office copy amongst the Duke of Portland's MSS. at Welbeck Abbey.[1] It is of high importance for the history of naval tactics that we are at last able to fix the date of these memorable orders. Endless misapprehension on the subject of our battle formations during the First Dutch War has been caused by a chronological error into which Mr. Granville Penn was led in his _Memorials of Penn_ (Appendix L). Sir William Penn's copy of these Instructions is merely dated 'March 1653,'[2] and his biographer hazarded the very natural conjecture that, as this is an 'old style' date, it meant 'March 1654.' This would have been true of any day in March before the 25th, but as we now can fix the date as the 29th, we know the year is really 1653 and not 1654.[3] There was perhaps some anxiety on Mr. Penn's part to get his hero some share in the orders, and as William Penn was not appointed one of the 'generals-at-sea' till December 2, 1653, he could not officially have had the credit of orders issued in the previous March. This point however is also set at rest by the Welbeck copy, which besides the date has the signatures of the generals, and they are those of Blake, Deane and Monck. Penn did not sign them at all, but this really in no way affects his claim as a tactical reformer. For as he was vice-admiral of the fleet and an officer of high reputation, his share in the orders was probably as great as that of anyone else.

The winter of 1652-3 was the turning point of the war. The summer campaign had shown how serious the struggle was to be, and no terms for ending it could be arranged. Large reinforcements consequently had been ordered, and Monck and Deane nominated to a.s.sist Blake as joint generals-at-sea for the next campaign. Four days later, on November 30, 1652, Blake had been defeated by Tromp off Dungeness, and several of his captains were reported to have behaved badly. An inquiry was ordered, and the famous 'Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea,'

prepared by Sir Harry Vane by order of Parliament for the better enforcement of discipline, were put in force. Notwithstanding these vigorous efforts to increase the strength and efficiency of the sea service, it was not till after the first action of the new campaign that an attempt was made to improve the fleet tactics. The action off Portland on February 18, 1653, and the ensuing chase of Tromp, marked the first real success of the war; but though the generals succeeded in delivering a severe blow to the Dutch admiral and his convoy, it must have been clear to everyone that they narrowly escaped defeat through a want of cohesion between their squadrons. On the 19th and 20th Tromp executed a masterly retreat, with his fleet in a crescent or obtuse-angle formation and his convoy in its arms, but nowhere is there any hint that either side fought in line ahead.[4] On the 25th the fleet had put into Stokes Bay to refit, and between this time and March 29 the new orders were produced.[5]

The first two articles it will be seen are practically the same as the 'Supplementary Instructions' on p. 99, but in the third, relating to 'general action,' instead of the ships engaging 'according to the order presented,' as was enjoined in the previous set, 'they are to endeavour to keep in a line with the chief,' as the order which will enable them 'to take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy.' Article 6 directs that where a flagship is distressed captains are to endeavour to form line between it and the enemy. Article 7 however goes still further, and enjoins that where the windward station has been gained the line ahead is to be formed 'upon severest punishment,' and a special signal is given for the manoeuvre. Article 9 provides a similar signal for flagships.

Compared with preceding orders, these new ones appear nothing less than revolutionary. But it is by no means certain that they were so. Here again it must be remarked that it is beyond all experience for such sweeping reforms to be so rigorously adopted, and particularly in the middle of a war, without their having been in the air for some time previously, and without their supporters having some evidence to cite of their having been tried and tried successfully, at least on a small scale. The natural presumption therefore is that the new orders only crystallised into a definite system, and perhaps somewhat extended, a practice which had long been familiar though not universal in the service. A consideration of the men who were responsible for the change points to the same conclusion. Blake, the only one of the three generals who had had experience of naval actions, was ash.o.r.e disabled by a severe wound, but still able to take part, at least formally, in the business of the fleet. Deane, another soldier like Blake, though he had commanded fleets, had never before seen an action, but had done much to improve the organisation of the service, and at this time, as his letters show, was more active and ardent in the work than ever. Monck before the late cruise had never been to sea at all, since as a boy he sailed in the disastrous Cadiz expedition of 1625; but he was the typical and leading scientific soldier of his time, with an unmatched power of organisation and an infallible eye for both tactics and strategy, at least so far as it had then been tried. Penn, the vice-admiral of the fleet, was a professional naval officer of considerable experience, and it was he who by a bold and skilful movement had saved the action off Portland from being a severe defeat for Blake and Deane. Monck's therefore was the only new mind that was brought to bear on the subject. Yet it is impossible to credit him with introducing a revolution in naval tactics. All that can be said is that possibly his genius for war and his scientific and well-drilled spirit revealed to him in the traditional minor tactics of the seamen the germ of a true tactical system, and caused him to urge its reduction into a definite set of fighting instructions which would be binding on all, and would co-ordinate the fleet into the same kind of h.o.m.ogeneous and handy fighting machine that he and the rest of the Low Country officers had made of the New Model Army. In any case he could not have carried the thing through unless it had commended itself to the experience of such men as Penn and the majority of the naval officers of the council of war. And they would hardly have been induced to agree had they not felt that the new instructions were calculated to bring out the best of the methods which they had empirically practised.

How far the new orders were carried out during the rest of the war is difficult to say. In both official and unofficial reports of the actions of this time an almost superst.i.tious reverence is shown in avoiding tactical details. Nevertheless that a substantial improvement was the result seems clear, and further the new tactics appear to have made a marked impression upon the Dutch. Of the very next action, that off the Gabbard on June 2, when Monck was left in sole command, we have a report from the Hague that the English 'having the wind, they stayed on a tack for half an hour until they put themselves into the order in which they meant to fight, which was in file at half cannon-shot,' and the suggestion is that this was something new to the Dutch. 'Our fleet,' says an English report by an eye-witness, 'did work together in better order than before and seconded one another.'

Then there is the important testimony of a Royalist intelligencer who got his information at the Hague on June 9, from the man who had brought ash.o.r.e the despatches from the defeated Dutch fleet. After relating the consternation which the English caused in the Dutch ranks as well by their gunnery as their refusal to board, he goes on to say, 'It is certain that the Dutch in this fight (by the relation and acknowledgment of Tromp's own express sent hither, with whom I spoke) showed very great fear and were in very great confusion, and the English he says fought in excellent order.'[6]

Again, for the next battle--that of the Texel--fought on July 31 in the same year, we have the statement of Hoste's informant, who was present as a spectator, that at the opening of the action the English, but not the Dutch, were formed in a single line close-hauled. 'Le 7 Aoust' [_i.e._ N.S.], the French gentleman says, 'je decouvris l'armee de l'amiral composee de plus de cent vaisseaux de guerre. Elle etait rangee en trois escadrons et elle faisoit vent-arriere pour aller tomber sur les Anglois, qu'elle rencontra le meme jour a peu pres en pareil nombre rangez _[sic]_ sur une ligne qui tenoit plus de quatre lieues Nord-Nord-Est et Sud-Sud-Ouest, le vent etant Nord-Ouest. Le 8 et le 9 se pa.s.serent en des escarmouches, mais le 10 on en _[sic]_ vint a une bataille decisive. Les Anglois avoient essaie de gagner le vent: mais l'amiral Tromp en aiant toujours conserve l'avantage, et l'etant range sur une ligne parallele a celle des Anglois arriva sur eux,' &c. This is the first known instance of a Dutch fleet forming in single line, and, so far as it goes, would tend to show they adopted it in imitation of the English formation.[7] At any rate, so far as we have gone, the evidence tends to show that the English finally adopted the regular line-ahead formation in consequence of the orders of March 29, 1653, and there is no indication of the current belief that they borrowed it from the Dutch.

By the English admirals the new system must have been regarded as a success. For the Fighting Instructions of 1653 were reissued with nothing but a few alterations of signals and verbal changes by Blake, Monck, Disbrowe, and Penn, the new 'admirals and generals of the fleet of the Commonwealth of England,' appointed in December 1653, when the war was practically over. They are printed by Granville Penn (_Memorials of Penn_, ii. 76), under date March 31, 1655, but that cannot be the actual date of their issue, for Blake was then in the Mediterranean, Penn in the West Indies, and Monck busy with his pacification of the Highlands. We must suspect here then another confusion between old and new styles, and conjecture the true date to be March 31, 1654, that is just before Monck left for Scotland, and a few days before the peace was signed. So that these would be the orders under which Blake conducted his famous campaign in the Mediterranean, Penn and Venables captured Jamaica, and the whole of Cromwell's Spanish war was fought.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Hist. MSS. Com._ XIII. ii. 85. It is from a transcript of this copy made for Dr. Gardiner that I have been permitted to take the text below.

A set of 'Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in Sailing'

accompanies them.

[2] _British Museum, Shane MSS._ 3232, f. 81.

[3] The Sloane copy is not quite identical with that in the Portland MSS. The variations, however, are merely verbal and in a few signals, and are of such a nature as to be accounted for by careless transcription.

[4] Hoste, the author of the first great treatise on Naval Tactics, quotes Tromp's formation as a typical method of retreat; but his account is vitiated by what seems a curious mistake. He says: 'Il rangea son armee en demi-lune et il mit son convoi au milieu: c'est a dire que son vaisseau faisait au vent l'angle obtus de la demi-lune, et les autres s'etendoient de part (_sic_) et d'autre _sur les deux lignes du plus- pres_ pour former les faces de la demi-lune qui couvroient le convoi. Ce fut en cet ordre qu'il fit vent arriere, foudroiant a droite et a gauche tous les anglois qui s'approchent' But if with the wind aft his two quarter lines bore from the flagship seven points from the wind, the formation would have been concave to the enemy and the convoy could not have been _au milieu_. (_Evolutions Navales_, pp. 90, 95, and plate 29, p. 91.) The pa.s.sage is in any case interesting, as showing that what was then called the crescent or half-moon formation was nothing but our own 'order of retreat,' or 'order of retreat reverted,' of Rodney's time. As defined by Sir Charles Knowles in 1780, the order of retreat reverted was formed on two lines of bearing, _i.e._ by the seconds of the centre ship keeping two points abaft her starboard and larboard beams respectively. In the simple order of retreat they kept two points before the beam.

[5] No reference to these orders appears in the correspondence of the generals at this time, unless it be in a letter of John Poortmans, deputy-treasurer of the fleet, to Robert Blackbourne, in which he writes on March 9: 'The generals want 500 copies of the instructions for commanders of the state's ships printed and sent down.' (_S.P. Dom._ 48, f. 65.)

[6] _Clarendon MSS._ 45, f. 470.

[7] Hoste, _Evolutions Navales_, p. 78. Dr. Gardiner declared himself sceptical as to the genuineness of the French gentleman's narrative, mainly on the ground of certain inaccuracies of date and detail; but, as Hoste certainly believed in it, it cannot well be rejected as evidence of the main features of the action for which he used it.

_COMMONWEALTH ORDERS_, 1653.[1]

[+Duke of Portland's MSS.+]

_By the Right Honourable the Generals and Admirals of the Fleet.

Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in fighting_.

First. Upon the discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the general, which is to be striking the general's ensign, and making a weft,[2] two frigates [3] appointed out of each squadron are to make sail, and stand with them so nigh as they may conveniently, the better to gain a knowledge of them what they are, and of what quality, and how many fireships and others, and in what posture[4] the fleet is; which being done the frigates are to speak together and conclude in that report they are to give, and accordingly repair to their respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and not to engage if the enemy[5] exceed them in number, except it shall appear to them on the place they have the advantage:

Ins. 2nd. At sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the 2nd place, and his squadron, as also the rear-admiral, or he that commandeth in chief in the 3rd place, and his squadron, are to make what sail they can to come up with the admiral on each wing, the vice-admiral on the right wing, and the rear-admiral on the left wing, leaving a competent distance for the admiral's squadron if the wind will permit and there be sea-room enough.

Ins. 3rd. As soon as they shall see the general engage, or make a signal by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag over the fore topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy next unto them; and in order thereunto all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to keep in a line with the chief unless the chief be maimed or otherwise disabled (which G.o.d forbid!), whereby the said ship that wears the flag should not come in to do the service which is requisite. Then every ship of the said squadron shall endeavour to keep[6] in a line with the admiral, or _he that commands in chief_[7] next unto him, and nearest the enemy.

Inst. 4th. If any squadron shall happen to be overcharged or distressed, the next squadron or ships are _speedily_[8] to make towards their relief and a.s.sistance upon a signal given them; which signal shall be, in the admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore topmast-head, the vice-admiral or he that commands in chief in the second place a pennant on the main topmast-head, [and] the rear-admiral's squadron the like.

Inst. 5th. If in case any ship shall be distressed or disabled for lack of masts, shot under water, or otherwise _in danger of sinking or taking, he or they_,[9] thus distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his jack or ensign, and those next him are strictly required to relieve him.

Inst. 6th. That if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy to stop a leak or mend what else is amiss, which cannot be otherwise repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen yard-arm or ensign staff, whereby the rest of the ships may have notice what it is for; and if it should be that the admiral or any flagship should do so, the ships of the fleet or the respective squadrons are to endeavour to _keep up in a line as close_[10] as they can betwixt him and the enemy, having always one eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition.

Inst. 7th. In case the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, and that other ships of the fleet are to windward of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard, or the mizen topmast,[11] every such ship then is to bear up into his wake, _and grain upon severest punishment_[12] In case the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part thereof to leeward of him, to the end such ships to leeward may come up into the line with their admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and bear up, none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or their luff to gain the wake or grain.

Inst. 8th. If the admiral will have any of the ships _to endeavour_[13] by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the enemy, he will put abroad a red flag at his spritsail, topmast shrouds, forestay or main topmast[14] stay. He that first discovers the signal shall make sail and hoist and lower his sail[15] or ensign, that the rest of the ships may take notice of it and follow.

Inst. 9th. If we put out a red flag on the mizen shrouds, or mizen yard-arm, we will have all the flagships to come up in the grain and wake[16] of us.

Inst. 10th. If in time of fight G.o.d shall deliver any of the enemy's ships into our hands, special care is to be taken to save their men as the present state of our condition will permit in such a case, but that the ships be immediately destroyed, by sinking or burning the same, so that our own ships be not disabled or any work interrupted by the departing of men or boats from the ships; and this we require all commanders to be more than mindful of.[17]

Inst. 11th. None shall fire upon any ship of the enemy that is laid aboard by any of our own ships, but so that he may be sure he endamage not his friend.

Inst. 12th. That it is the duty of commanders and masters of all small frigates,[18] ketches, and smacks belonging to the several squadrons to know the fireships belonging to the enemy, and accordingly by observing their motions to do their utmost to cut off their boats if possible, or, if opportunity be, that they lay them aboard, seize or destroy them. And to this purpose they are to keep to windward of their squadrons in time of service. But in case they cannot prevent the fireships [coming][19] on board by clapping between us and them (which by all means possible they are to endeavour), that then in such cases they show themselves men in such an exigent and steer on board them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from us and destroy them; which service (if honourably done) according to its merit shall be rewarded, but the neglect severely to be called to accompt.

Inst. 13th. That the fireships in the several squadrons endeavour to keep the wind; and they with the small frigates to be as near the great ships as they can, to attend the signal from the general or commander-in-chief, and to act accordingly. If the general hoist up a white flag on the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all small frigates in his squadron are to come under his stern for orders.

Inst. 14th. That if any engagement by day shall continue till night and the general shall please to anchor, then upon signal given they all anchor in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the 'Instructions for Sailing'; and if the general please to retreat without anchoring, the signal to be firing two guns, the one so nigh the other as the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like with two guns more.

Given under our hands at Portsmouth, this March 29th, 1653.

ROBERT BLAKE.

RICHARD DEANE.

GEORGE MONCK.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Re-issued in March 1654, by Blake, Monck, Disbrowe, and Penn, with some amendments and verbal alterations. As reissued they are in _Sloane MSS._ 3232, f. 81, and printed in Granville Penn's _Memorials of Sir William Penn_, ii. 76. All the important amendments in the new edition, apart from mere verbal alterations, are given below in notes to the articles in which they occur.

[2] '_Waft_ (more correctly written _wheft_). It is any flag or ensign stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a ship.'--Admiral Smyth (_Sailors' Word-Book_).