| The counsels of the Marquis de Mondejar rejected.

| Ma.s.sacre of the prisoners at Granada.

| Don John appointed to supreme command. Spring 1569.

| The Moorish population of Granada removed into the | interior.

Under these circ.u.mstances, if the advice of the Marquis de Mondejar had been followed, the rebellion might in all probability have soon been quelled. Unwilling to drive the Moors to despair, he advocated a policy of conciliation, and attempted, though not always with success, to restrain the fanaticism and cruelty of his soldiers. Unfortunately, he was violently opposed by Diego Deza, who urged a war of extermination. The wish of Diego prevailed, and the Marquis of Los Veles, a n.o.bleman of the district who held the office of Adelantado of the neighbouring province of Murcia, was appointed to the command of an army which was to operate from the east. The stern old veteran proceeded to conduct the war with such ferocity that he earned the name of the 'Iron-headed Devil.' The Spanish soldiery, formed chiefly of local levies, retainers of the n.o.bles, and volunteers, were allowed to satisfy their unquenchable hatred of the Moriscoes, and proceeded to rival, if not surpa.s.s, the atrocities of the rebels. Even peaceful villages were sacked: the men were cut down without remorse; the women, when they escaped a worse fate, were sold into slavery. Meanwhile, in the town of Granada itself, some hundred and fifty Moors, who had been arrested on suspicion, were ma.s.sacred in cold blood by the order of Deza (March 1569). Death in open war was better than such a fate. The Moors, driven to despair, had no alternative but to fight to the last. The war was not marked by any great battles; the rebels, holding but few towns, and unable to meet the enemy in the open field, betook themselves to the hilly districts, where a confused though hard-fought struggle of races and creeds was carried on. The government, however, was scarcely likely to succeed as long as the bickerings between Mondejar and his rivals continued. In the spring of 1569, Philip, anxious to check these cabals, appointed Don John, his half-brother, the illegitimate son of Charles V., to the supreme command. At the same time he was forbidden to take the field, and as he was only twenty-two years old he was to be guided by a council of war, of which Deza and Mondejar both were members. The only result, therefore, of the change was that the quarrel was transferred from the camp to the council, where finally the views of Deza triumphed. In June, 1569, the whole of the Moorish inhabitants of the town of Granada, amounting to some three thousand five hundred souls, were ordered to leave the city for the interior, where they were to find new homes. Mondejar, remonstrating at this act, was removed from his post; and on the 19th of October, Philip, who had come to Cordova to be nearer the scene of operations, issued an edict in which he proclaimed that the war henceforth would be carried on with 'fire and blood.'

| On a.s.sa.s.sination of Aben-Humeya, Aben-Aboo succeeds.

Philip had now definitely committed himself to the views of Deza; yet, owing to the incapacity of Los Veles, the royal army met with scant success. At the close of the year, Aben-Humeya fell a victim to the vengeance of one of the women of his seraglio. His death was no loss to the cause of the Moriscoes, for although a man of much energy, and of some ability, he had become intoxicated by success, and by his jealousy, his selfishness, his licence, and his cruelty, had forfeited the popularity he once enjoyed. Aben-Aboo, who succeeded him as King, was a man of higher integrity and patriotism, and of greater constancy and courage. He succeeded in obtaining the sanction of his election from the Pasha of Algiers, in the name of the Sultan, and under his rule the revolt spread eastwards to the very borders of Murcia, and a.s.sumed a more formidable aspect than ever.

| Don John takes the field. Jan. 1570.

| Submission of Moriscoes. May 1570.

At last Philip, convinced of the inefficiency of Los Veles, removed him from his command, and allowed Don John to take the field, a.s.sisted by the Duke of Sesa, the grandson of Gonsalvo de Cordova. At the same time, fresh levies were raised from the towns of Andalusia, and many n.o.bles, with their retainers, flocked to the standard of the young and popular Don John, who at once marched to the district on the east of the Alpujarras, and, in spite of several reverses, gradually wore down the rebels. On January 28, the strong town of Galera was invested, to fall on February 7, after a desperate struggle; the reduction of Seron followed, and soon the whole country to the east of the Alpujarras was re-won. Meanwhile, the Duke of Sesa had been equally successful in the north. Gradually working his way across the Alpujarras, he secured his conquests by a line of forts, and, in May, united his forces with those of Don John at Padules. At the same time an amnesty was offered to those who would lay down their arms. The cause of the Moriscoes was now hopeless. On May 19, El Habaquin, a leading Moorish chieftain, agreed, in the name of Aben-Aboo, to the severe terms imposed by the conqueror. The 'Little King,' as the Moorish prince was called, was to make public submission to Don John; the lives of the Moriscoes should be spared, but, like their fellow-countrymen of Granada, they were to be removed from their native district and distributed elsewhere in Spain. At the last moment Aben-Aboo refused these humiliating terms, and attempted to raise once more the standard of revolt, only to fall by the hand of one of his subjects who had been bribed by the government.

| The Moriscoes settle in other parts of Spain. Edict | of Oct. 28, 1570.

The rebellion was now at an end. By the edict of October 28, every Morisco from within the disturbed districts,[61] including those who had remained loyal, was to be removed into the interior. Their houses and lands were declared forfeited to the Crown; but their flocks, their herds and their grain were, if they so wished, to be taken at a valuation. It was, however, ordered that families should not be divided, and the removal appears to have been effected in as humane a way as possible. The districts appointed for their settlements were in the territory of La Mancha, in the northern borders of Andalusia, in the Castiles, Estremadura, and Galicia. Flogging and forced labour on the galleys was threatened against any Moor who should leave his abode without leave, and death to any one who dared approach within ten leagues of Granada. The edict of 1566 continued in force; and by a subsequent one, to keep an Arabic book was declared an offence punishable with stripes and four years in the galleys. Andalusia now became a desert. Meanwhile, in spite of these cruel laws, the exiles enriched their new homes by their husbandry and industry until the year 1609, when the fanaticism and national hatred of the Spaniards led to the final expulsion of this unfortunate people from Spain itself. The treatment of the Moriscoes by the Spaniards forms one of the saddest episodes in history; yet, in justice, an Englishman should remember that the treatment of the Irish by Cromwell, if it was preceded by greater provocation, was fully as cruel.

-- 4. _Renewed struggle against the Turks.

The victory of Lepanto, 1571-1574_.

If the intolerance of Philip is responsible for the cruel proscription of the Protestants and the Moriscoes, his political interests at least did not lead him into such inconsistencies as those of other European sovereigns. Indeed, when we consider the att.i.tude of the great Powers in Europe towards the Turks at this moment, we shall be led to the conclusion that their policy with regard to heretics, as well as to infidels, was guided rather by political, than by religious considerations. The French, while they persecuted the Huguenots in their own country, were ever allying themselves with the Turks to oppose the Spaniard. Elizabeth of England, no doubt, gave grudging aid to the Calvinists abroad, and established a form of Protestantism in England; yet she proscribed the extreme Calvinists at home, and at times sought the alliance of the Turk; whereas if Philip was the persecutor of Protestants and infidels alike, the necessity of protecting Italy and Spain at least made him the resolute opponent of the infidel in the Mediterranean.

| League of Spain--Pope and Venice against the Turk.

| May 25, 1571.

The rebellion of the Moriscoes had not yet been crushed out, when on May 1, 1570, the messenger of Pius V. reached Spain, praying for the help of the most Christian King against the Turk. Solyman the Magnificent had ended his long and triumphant career in 1566. Although his successor, Selim II., possessed none of his father's qualities, the vigour of the late administration was still represented by the Grand Vizier Mahomet; and at the close of the year 1569, Piali, one of the commanders of the attack on Malta, and now brother-in-law of the Sultan, had started on an expedition against Cyprus. Philip gave a ready ear to the papal appeal, but meanwhile Nicosia, one of the most important Cypriot fortresses, fell (September 1570). Venice in despair attempted, though unsuccessfully, to make a separate treaty with the Sultan; and it was not until the 25th of May, 1571, that the difficulties and jealousies were surmounted, and that the League was finally concluded. Venice had wished that the League should confine itself to the protection of Cyprus; but Philip, not unnaturally, was anxious to extend its scope; and accordingly Spain, the Pope, and Venice agreed to form a perpetual alliance against the Moors of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, as well as against the Turk. They agreed to defend each other's territories, and to make no separate peace; each Power was to appoint a captain-general, and they should together decide on the plan of operations, while the supreme command was to be given to Don John of Austria. Finally, to defray the expenses of Philip, Pius granted a _cruzada_, and an _excusado_.[62] The treaty came too late to save the island of Cyprus; for on July 30, Famagusta had fallen, when Bragadino, the chief in command, was flayed alive, his skin stuffed and sent as a trophy to Constantinople. It was not till the 16th of the following September, that the fleet of the League finally left Messina. On reaching Corfu, intelligence was received that the Turkish fleet was in the Gulf of Lepanto. Against the advice of John Andrew Doria, who commanded the Genoese contingent, Don John was eager to close with his antagonist. He was supported in his opinion by the Marquis of Santa Cruz, the Grand Commander Requesens, and the young Alexander of Parma, as well as by the other captains-general, and on the 7th of October, the two fleets came in sight of each other. That of the Christians was composed of 264 vessels of all sizes, with 26,000 soldiers and 50,000 rowers and sailors aboard. That of the Turks, of some 300 vessels, and not less than 120,000 men.

| The battle of Lepanto. Oct. 7, 1571.

In the action which ensued it was the object of the Turkish admiral Piali to turn the wings of his adversary. This movement was, however, foiled by Barbarigo, who commanded the Venetian galleys on the left, and by John Andrew Doria on the right. They hugged the sh.o.r.e, and a terrible struggle ensued, in which the allies suffered severely. At last, the Venetians drove back their enemies, and though Barbarigo was mortally wounded, his loss was compensated by the death of Mahomet Sirocco, the Turkish admiral opposed to him. Meanwhile the centre, led by Don John, after a desperate conflict at close quarters, which resembled a fight on land rather than on the sea, was equally successful. Piali fell, and most of the Moslem's ships surrendered or were destroyed. Finally Uluch Ali, the Dey of Algiers, who had been severely handling the Genoese opposed to him, seeing that all was over, took refuge in flight, and the Christians remained the victors of one of the greatest naval combats of the century. The importance of the battle of Lepanto, which lasted for more than four hours, will be best appreciated when it is remembered that the Turks had never hitherto been beaten at sea. Although an accurate computation of the losses is not possible, it may with certainty be affirmed that those of the Turks were more than twice as heavy as those of their antagonists, and that not more than fifty of their vessels escaped. Among the captives were found, we are told, 12,000 Christians who had been condemned to the galleys.

| Delays and jealousies of the allies.

| Venice makes a separate treaty with the Turk. March | 7, 1573.

Some now thought that this crushing defeat should be followed by an immediate attack on Constantinople. The season, however, was far advanced, and it was decided to postpone further operations until the spring. The delay was fatal. An attempt was made to buy over Uluch Ali, a Calabrian renegade, who had not forgotten his Christian parents from whom he had been separated in youth. The offer was declined, and Uluch shortly took the command of the new fleet which the Turks had put on the sea with remarkable rapidity. Far different was the conduct of the allies. In Spain there was the usual procrastination. Nor were the interests of Spain and Venice the same; Philip desired to turn against the Moors of Africa, and extend his conquests there; Venice only cared to strengthen her position in the Levant. In vain did the aged Pontiff attempt to reconcile these conflicting views. He died in the following May, and although Philip's fears, that a Pope in the French interest would succeed him, were removed by the election of Cardinal Buoncampagno (Gregory XIII.), the papal 'Briefs of Fire'

were not of much avail. The allies, indeed, at last sent out another expedition under Don John, which found the Turkish fleet off Modon on October 7, 1572, the anniversary of the victory of Lepanto. But Uluch Ali declined the contest; he remained under the guns of the fortress, and at the end of the month the allies again dispersed. In the following March all hope of concerted action was destroyed by the news that Venice had come to terms with the Sultan; she surrendered Cyprus, and agreed to pay a three years' tribute to the Porte. The Turks could scarcely have hoped for better terms if they had won the battle of Lepanto.

| Don John reduces Tunis, Oct. 1573; but it and Goletta | are retaken by Uluch Ali, Sept. 1574.

| The victory of Lepanto a barren victory.

Deserted by his allies, Don John, in the following October, sailed to the African coast and easily reduced the town of Tunis. He now dreamt of obtaining the invest.i.ture of the African kingdom from his half-brother. The jealousy of Philip was instantly aroused; he urged that the fortresses of Tunis and Goletta should be dismantled, and, although this was not done, they were left with such an insufficient force that Uluch Ali had little difficulty not only in retaking Tunis, but in reducing the fortress of Goletta (Sept. 1574). Such were the miserable results of the victory of Lepanto. It did not save the island of Cyprus, which henceforth belonged to the Porte; it was followed by the loss of Goletta, one of the few remaining conquests of Charles V. on the coast of Africa; it only served to display once more the jealousies of the European nations; and if for seventy years the Turks made no further advance, and never again seriously threatened the south-western sh.o.r.es of Europe, this was due far more to the internal decay of the Ottoman Empire, than to the victory of Lepanto itself.

-- 5. _The conquest of Portugal._

| Death of Sebastian, King of Portugal. Aug. 4, 1578.

| The Cardinal Henry succeeds; but dies. Jan. 31, 1580.

| Philip claims the crown, and sends an army under the | Duke of Alva.

On August 4, 1578, Sebastian, the young King of Portugal, was killed at the battle of Alcazar-Kebir as he was conducting a crazy campaign against Abd-el-Melek, the Sultan of Morocco. The death of the young King, who appears to have been half-mad, at once aroused the determination of Philip to secure the crown of Portugal, and thus finally unite the Iberian Peninsula under one hand. The successor of Sebastian was his great-uncle, Henry. He was a Cardinal, and over sixty-six years of age. Nevertheless, it was hoped that he might yet have children, and the Pope was asked to authorise his marriage. Philip declared his indignation at this interference of the Papacy with what were 'so clearly temporal affairs,' but was relieved from further apprehension by the death of the Cardinal-King on January 31, 1580. The only claimant whom Philip had now to dread was Antonio, prior of Crato.[63] He was the illegitimate son, by a converted Jewess, of Lewis, Duke of Beja, the great-uncle of Sebastian, but he had been secretly legitimised by his father, had entered the order of St. John of Malta, and was prior of the rich commandery of Crato. If his legitimacy could be established, no doubt he was the next male heir. Philip, however, refused to allow his claim, and a.s.serted his own right to the throne through his mother, the daughter of King Emanuel. To enforce this claim an army had been collected on the frontier under the Duke of Alva, which marched as soon as the intelligence of the Cardinal's death arrived. Those who did not submit were treated as rebels, and when the town of Setubal offered some slight resistance it was given over to pillage, 'because to deny the soldiers would have been a great injustice' (July 16, 1580).

| Antonio proclaimed King.

| Lisbon capitulates to Alva.

| Philip enters Lisbon. June 29, 1581.

Meanwhile, Antonio had been proclaimed King by a motley a.s.sembly of peasants at Santarem, and proceeded to Lisbon. In vain Pope Gregory XIII. attempted to mediate. To propitiate Philip, who had a pa.s.sion for relics, he sent a most precious gift, part of the body of one of the Holy Innocents; Philip accepted the gift, but declined his mediation, and for once did not procrastinate. The Marquis of Santa Cruz was despatched with the fleet to Setuval. There he took the Duke of Alva and his troops on board, and sailed for Lisbon. Antonio in vain attempted to resist. The citizens of Lisbon would not fight; they asked for terms, but had to capitulate at discretion; and Antonio, escaping with difficulty, reached Calais after many wanderings. The city of Lisbon was partly saved from pillage by Alva, but the neighbouring villages were sacked with such relentless cruelty that it even surpa.s.sed all that Alva could have imagined; and such was the insubordination of the soldiery that the Duke declared rope would fail him wherewith to hang his mutinous soldiers. At Oporto, the same scenes were repeated by the troops under Sancho d'Avila, an officer who had already earned an evil reputation for mutiny in the Netherlands. On the 29th of June, 1581, Philip made his entry into Lisbon. Those few n.o.bles who had dared to oppose him were treated with relentless cruelty; the majority attempted no resistance, and the people sullenly submitted. Antonio, with a price set on his head, wandered from court to court begging for a.s.sistance to regain his crown. In June, 1582, he succeeded in obtaining the help of a French fleet, which sailed to the Azores. The fleet, however, was dispersed by the Marquis of Santa Cruz; and for the rest of his life the unfortunate pretender found an asylum for the most part in England. Philip had gained his end, and Portugal was for a time united with Spain. The Spaniards, however, had never been liked in Portugal; the atrocities which accompanied the accession of Philip turned the dislike to hatred; and it was not many years before Portugal again threw off the hated yoke, and once for all declared her independence.

-- 6. _Internal Government of Philip II._

| The Government despotic; yet const.i.tutional forms | survive in Spain and its dependencies.

Although the government of Philip II. was practically a despotism, it would be a mistake to suppose that no const.i.tutional checks existed, or that they were entirely futile. The Cortes of Castile and Aragon still survived, and even in the subject provinces the old a.s.semblies were not done away with. In Castile, the Cortes nominally enjoyed deliberative powers; no edict could const.i.tutionally be issued except on their pet.i.tion, and no tax levied except by their consent. Yet if Philip often summoned them, if he did not interfere with their debates, if he listened to their pet.i.tions, these were constantly disregarded on the plea that it was not expedient that they should be granted; and, when occasion demanded it, royal ordinances were issued, and fresh taxes imposed, without waiting for their a.s.sent.

| The revolt of Saragossa, 1591.

| Interference with the privileges of Aragon.

The const.i.tutional rights of Aragon and its dependencies, Valencia and Catalonia, were even more extensive. Any member of the Cortes could present a memorial of grievances; until these grievances were redressed the session could not be closed; and no law could be pa.s.sed or tax imposed except by the unanimous vote of the a.s.sembly. The royal tribunals were subject to that of the Justiza, and any one who set foot in Aragon could escape from the jurisdiction of the royal courts by 'manifesting'--that is, by appealing to his aid. No foreigners could hold office in Aragon; the Inquisition, though established, met with constant opposition. With these privileges Philip came into open conflict when, in April, 1590, Antonio Perez, his secretary, fled to Aragon and claimed the protection of the Justiza (cf. pp. 307-9). On the pretext that Perez had, in the justification which he had just published, been guilty of blasphemy, he was, at the demand of the Inquisitors of Aragon, transferred to their own prison. The citizens of Saragossa at once rose against this violation of their 'fueros.' The Justiza was mobbed for having surrendered the prisoner; the royal representative, the Marquis of Almanara, was killed; and the Inquisitors, in fear of their lives, restored Perez to the 'Aljaferia,' or Justiza's prison. Four months later, another attempt on the part of the Inquisitors (September 1591) led to a renewed revolt, which was supported by the new Justiza, who had been just appointed. Philip forthwith ordered an army to march (October 24). The rebels had no army or organisation, and found little support, except from some of the more violent of the peasants, who betook themselves to brigandage. Accordingly, the royal army met with no resistance; and when it reached Saragossa on November 12, 1591, the city submitted without striking a blow. Although Philip published an amnesty, all the leading men who had taken any part were excepted; and the Justiza himself was executed, in violation of the law that he could not even be arrested unless by the order of the Cortes. A meeting of that body followed. In spite of the rule that it should be presided over by the King himself, or a prince of the blood, the chair was taken by Chinchon, the Archbishop of Saragossa, and the Cortes consented to the following invasion of their privileges. The King was to be allowed to nominate aliens as his viceroys; a definite time was to be fixed for presenting grievances; except for the voting of taxes, the right of any member to veto any measure was done away with, and matters were to be decided by the vote of the majority of each estate. This last concession practically made the King master of their decisions, since he had the power of adding to the number of deputies of each estate by summoning his nominees. Finally, for the appointment of the deputies of the Justiza, a complicated system was established which practically put the nomination in the King's hands, and made them the creatures of the royal will. Here, therefore, ended the real independence of the Cortes of Aragon, and of its Justiza. True, the country was not so severely taxed as Castile; yet, as in Castile itself, the shadow of const.i.tutional liberty alone remained, while the reality had departed.

| Government of Naples, Sicily, and Milan.

An identical policy, although in a more exaggerated form, was pursued by Philip in Sicily, in Naples, and in Milan. Satisfied with getting the control of the central courts of justice, and of the supreme executive, into the hands of his nominees, Philip allowed the old a.s.semblies, the feudal and munic.i.p.al privileges, to continue. For the rest the royal authority was maintained by the Viceroy. He made use of cla.s.s and local jealousies; he played off n.o.ble against burgher and peasant, laity against clergy; he resorted to wholesale corruption, and kept an army, mainly composed of Spaniards, to fall back upon in the last resort; and, if at any time the Viceroy became too unpopular, he could always be made the scapegoat and removed. It was in Naples that the authority of the Viceroy was the least uncontrolled, that corruption was deepest, and the taxation heaviest; while Milan was protected by the privileges of the town and the pretensions of the archbishop, more especially under the well-known prelate, Carlo Borromeo; and in Sicily the feudal rights, and the munic.i.p.al privileges of such towns as Messina and Palermo, were too powerful to be entirely overthrown.

| The Central Councils.

Under such a system of government as this, it was inevitable that the real power should lie with the King and with those central councils which controlled the administrative and judicial system in the various parts of the empire. Of these there were as many as eleven,[64] of which the three following were the most important: the Council of State, the Council of Castile, and that of the Inquisition. The Council of the Inquisition has already been described (p. 279). The Council of State confined itself for the most part to foreign affairs. But since Philip looked upon Castile as the centre of his empire, it was but natural that the Council of Castile should become the most important. Its functions were mainly judicial; it heard appeals from inferior courts, and under Philip II. was mainly composed of lawyers. It enjoyed, however, other powers; it kept the Church in control, it drafted laws, and was generally consulted on all matters of state interest. In fact, it became practically the Council of State for the interior. The nomination of the members of these Councils was exclusively in the hands of the King. With the exception of the Council of State they were composed of ecclesiastics as well as laymen, but the n.o.bles rarely found a place there.

| Exclusion of n.o.bles from political power.

Excluded altogether from the Cortes of Castile, and with a very limited representation in that of Aragon,[65] the Spanish n.o.bility took but little part in political affairs at home. They had enormous revenues; they were exempted from taxation; they filled most of the offices in the royal household; they often commanded the royal armies and fleets abroad; they acted as amba.s.sadors, and as Viceroys in the dependent states and in the colonies; but at home they had little influence. They were no longer allowed to bear arms or levy their retainers, except in the royal service; and, except on special occasions, such as the rebellion of the Moriscoes, rarely appeared in the field unless on foreign service. The time which was not spent at court, was pa.s.sed on their wide domains, where they copied on a small scale the magnificence and the etiquette of the court. Living thus in proud isolation, with much wealth but little power, they refused to mix, or to intermarry with the lower cla.s.ses, and rapidly became a degenerate and useless cla.s.s like the n.o.bles of France in the eighteenth century.

The Councils, then, depending as they did on the royal will, were filled for the most part with the obsequious servants of a suspicious master who could ruin them at his pleasure, unless, indeed, as was sometimes the case, they were able to spread a net of intrigue round the King which he was, for a time at least, unable to break. If Philip usually asked the advice of his Councillors, he kept to his father's injunction, 'to depend on no one but himself.' He did not often appear at their sessions; sometimes he altered despatches before submitting them to his Councils; he generally received their opinions through a committee, or more often demanded a written report, which he took to his private cabinet and annotated with marginal comments. True to his boast, that 'with a bit of paper he ruled over both hemispheres,' he sat at his desk for hours together, sometimes a.s.sisted by a secretary, sometimes by his favourite daughter Isabella, often quite alone, and covered the state papers with notes in his crabbed hand with the a.s.siduity of a clerk, and not uncommonly with trivialities, of which a schoolboy might be ashamed. Under these circ.u.mstances the actual authority exercised by any individual depended on his personal influence, and that of his clique, with the King. Although Philip would allow his ministers considerable lat.i.tude as long as he trusted them, his suspicions were easily aroused. He made use of one minister against another; he learnt from each severally the views and opinions of the others; he adopted the same system of espionage with regard to them as he did, through his secret emissaries, abroad, and his suspicion once aroused, the fall of the minister or viceroy was not far off.

| The chief ministers.