Note.--Others think that G.o.d is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power, should not come to pa.s.s, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said, that G.o.d could bring it about, that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.

Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to G.o.d's nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to G.o.d's nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to G.o.d, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive G.o.d as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for they think that they would thus destroy G.o.d's power. If, they contend, G.o.d had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with G.o.d's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to a.s.set that G.o.d is indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from G.o.d's supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of G.o.d has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to G.o.d an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that G.o.d understands an infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that G.o.d is perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pa.s.s everything over which his power extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to G.o.d's omnipotence.

Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to G.o.d), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of G.o.d, we must take these words in some significance quite different from those they usually bear. For intellect and will, which should const.i.tute the essence of G.o.d, would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will prove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as G.o.d is prior to all things by reason of his causality (Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of G.o.d. Wherefore the intellect of G.o.d, in so far as it is conceived to const.i.tute G.o.d's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence. This seems to have been recognized by those who have a.s.serted, that G.o.d's intellect, G.o.d's will, and G.o.d's power, are one and the same. As, therefore, G.o.d's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.

For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of one of them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in respect to its existence. Now the intellect of G.o.d is the cause both of the essence and the existence of our intellect; therefore, the intellect of G.o.d in so far as it is conceived to const.i.tute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone can easily see.

PROP. XVIII. G.o.d is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

Proof.--All things which are, are in G.o.d, and must be conceived through G.o.d (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.) G.o.d is the cause of those things which are in him.

This is our first point. Further, besides G.o.d there can be no substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to G.o.d. This is our second point. G.o.d, therefore, is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIX. G.o.d, and all the attributes of G.o.d, are eternal.

Proof.--G.o.d (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.) necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its definition; therefore, G.o.d is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further, by the attributes of G.o.d we must understand that which (by Def.

iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should be involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the attributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is also evident from the manner in which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of G.o.d; it is evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of G.o.d, like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the eternity of G.o.d, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.

PROP. XX. The existence of G.o.d and his essence are one and the same.

Proof.--G.o.d (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of G.o.d which explain his eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal existence--in other words, that which const.i.tutes G.o.d's essence const.i.tutes at the same time his existence. Wherefore G.o.d's existence and G.o.d's essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.

Coroll. I.--Hence it follows that G.o.d's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.

Coroll. II--Secondly, it follows that G.o.d, and all the attributes of G.o.d, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is absurd.

PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of G.o.d must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

Proof.--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition to be denied), that something in some attribute of G.o.d can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or duration; for instance, the idea of G.o.d expressed in the attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of G.o.d, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of G.o.d, it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has const.i.tuted the idea of G.o.d (for so far it is supposed to be finite); therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not const.i.tuted the idea of G.o.d, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.) must necessarily exist.

We have now granted, therefore, thought not const.i.tuting the idea of G.o.d, and, accordingly, the idea of G.o.d does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as const.i.tuting, and also as not const.i.tuting, the idea of G.o.d), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of G.o.d expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of G.o.d (for we may take any example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first point.

Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of G.o.d, for instance, the idea of G.o.d expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.

Now thought being an attribute of G.o.d, must necessarily exist unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of G.o.d (supposing the latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of G.o.d, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that, thought being given, the idea of G.o.d necessarily flowed therefrom. Therefore the idea of G.o.d expressed in thought, or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of G.o.d, cannot have a limited duration, but through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.

Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from G.o.d's absolute nature.

PROP. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of G.o.d, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.

Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one.

PROP. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of G.o.d, or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.

Proof.--A mode exists in something else, through which it must be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in G.o.d, and solely through G.o.d can be conceived. If therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of G.o.d, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely. A mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of G.o.d, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily and as infinite.

PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by G.o.d does not involve existence.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is self--caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that G.o.d is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, G.o.d is cause of the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. G.o.d must be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. G.o.d is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

Proof.--If this be denied, then G.o.d is not the cause of the essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax. iv.) be conceived without G.o.d. This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore, G.o.d is the cause of the essence of things.

Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.

For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their existence--in a word, G.o.d must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer by the following corollary.

Corollary.--Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of G.o.d, or modes by which the attributes of G.o.d are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.

PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by G.o.d; and that which has not been conditioned by G.o.d cannot condition itself to act.

Proof.--That by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence G.o.d by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.

xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by G.o.d, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is absurd.

PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by G.o.d to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the third axiom.

PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been thus conditioned by G.o.d (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.).

But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of G.o.d; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of G.o.d is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore, follow from some attribute of G.o.d, in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.

and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of G.o.d. But from G.o.d, or from any of his attributes, in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by G.o.d or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite, and has a conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this cause or this modification (for the reason by which we established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.

Q.E.D.

Note.--As certain things must be produced immediately by G.o.d, namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which, nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without G.o.d, it follows:--1. That G.o.d is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of G.o.d cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.

xxiv. Coroll.). 2. That G.o.d cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.

But all things which are, are in G.o.d, and so depend on G.o.d, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Proof.--Whatsoever is, is in G.o.d (Prop. xv.). But G.o.d cannot be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, G.o.d is not only the cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.

xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).

If they be not conditioned by G.o.d (Prop. xxvi.), it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by G.o.d, it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should render themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is contingent. Q.E.D.

Note.--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura naturans), and nature viewed as pa.s.sive (natura naturata). I say to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) G.o.d, in so far as he is considered as a free cause.

By nature viewed as pa.s.sive I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of G.o.d, or of any of the attributes of G.o.d, that is, all the modes of the attributes of G.o.d, in so far as they are considered as things which are in G.o.d, and which without G.o.d cannot exist or be conceived.

PROP. x.x.x. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of G.o.d and the modifications of G.o.d, and nothing else.

Proof.--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save G.o.d, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in G.o.d, and cannot without G.o.d either be or be conceived. Therefore the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of G.o.d and the modifications of G.o.d, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

PROP. x.x.xI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to pa.s.sive nature and not to active nature.