EXERCISES IN PARSING.

Nom. case. Intran. verb. Nom. case. Intran. verb.

Men labor. The sun sets.

Armies march. The moon rises.

Vessels sail. The stars twinkle.

Birds fly. The rain descends.

Clouds move. The river flows.

Mult.i.tudes perish. The nation mourns.

Your improvement in grammar depends, not on the number of words which you pa.r.s.e, but on the _attention_ which you give the subject. _You may pa.r.s.e the same exercises several times over._

For the gratification of those who prefer it, I here present another

DIVISION OF VERBS.

Verbs are of two kinds, transitive and intransitive.

A verb is transitive when the action affects an object; as, "Earthquakes _rock_ kingdoms; thrones and palaces _are shaken_ down; and potentates, princes, and subjects, _are buried_ in one common grave."

The nominative to a pa.s.sive verb, is the _object_, but not the _agent_, of the action.

A verb is intransitive when it has no object; as, "The waters _came_ upon me;" "I _am_ he who _was_, and _is_, and _is_ to _come_."

As an exercise on what you have been studying, I will now put to you a few questions, all of which you ought to be able to answer before you proceed any farther.

QUESTIONS NOT ANSWERED IN PARSING.

With what two general divisions of grammar does the second lecture begin?--Of what does Etymology treat?--Of what does Syntax treat?--On what is based the true principle of cla.s.sification?--How do you ascertain the part of speech to which a word belongs?--What is meant by its _manner_ of meaning?--Name the ten parts of speech.--Which of these are considered the most important?--By what sign may a noun be distinguished?--How many kinds of nouns are there?--What belong to nouns?--What is gender?--How many genders have nouns?--What is person?--How many persons have nouns?--What is number?--How many numbers have nouns?--What is case?--How many cases have nouns?--Does case consist in the _inflections_ of a noun?--How many kinds of verbs are there?--By what sign may a verb be known?--What belong to verbs?--What is synthesis?--What is a.n.a.lysis?--What is parsing?--Repeat the order of parsing the noun.--Repeat the order of parsing the verb.--What rule do you apply in parsing a noun in the possessive case?--What rule, in parsing a noun in the nominative case?--What rule applies in parsing a verb?--What is meant by government?--Explain rules 3, 4, and 12.--By what rule are the nominative and objective cases of nouns known?--By what sign can you distinguish a transitive from an intransitive verb?--Do transitive verbs ever express a _moral_ action?--Are intransitive and neuter verbs ever used as transitive?--Give some examples of transitive verbs with _personal_ and _verbal_ objects.--What rule do you apply in parsing a noun in the objective case?--Explain rule 20.--In parsing a verb agreeing with a noun of mult.i.tude conveying _plurality_ of idea, what rule do you apply?

QUESTIONS ON THE NOTES.

Whether the learner be required to answer the following questions, or not, is, of course, left _discretionary_ with the teacher. The author takes the liberty to suggest the expediency of _not_, generally, enforcing such a requisition, _until the pupil goes through the book a second time._

Name some participial nouns.--What are abstract nouns?--What is the distinction between abstract nouns and adjectives?--What are natural nouns?--Artificial nouns?--What is the distinction between _material_ and _immaterial_ nouns?--Are nouns ever of the masculine and feminine gender?--Give examples.--When are nouns, naturally neuter, converted into the masculine or feminine gender?--Give examples.--Speak some nouns that are always in the singular number.--Some that are always plural.--Speak some that are in the same form in both numbers.--Name _all_ the various ways of forming the plural number of nouns.--Of what number are the nouns _news, means, alms_, and _amends_?--Name the plurals to the following compound nouns, _handful, cupful, spoonful, brother-in-law, court-martial_.

NOTES ON PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR.

Perhaps no subject has, in this age, elicited more patient research, and critical investigation of original, const.i.tuent principles, formations, and combinations, than the English language. The legitimate province of philology, however, as I humbly conceive, has, in some instances, been made to yield to that of philosophy, so far as to divert the attention from the combinations of our language which refinement has introduced, to radical elements and a.s.sociations which no way concern the progress of literature, or the essential use for which language was intended. Were this retrogressive mode of investigating and applying principles, to obtain, among philologists, the ascendency over that which accommodates the use of language to progressive refinement, it is easy to conceive the state of barbarism to which society would, in a short time, be reduced. Moreover, if what some call the philosophy of language, were to supersede, altogether, the province of philology as it applies to the present, progressive and refined state of English literature, the great object contemplated by the learned, in all ages, namely, the approximation of language, in common with every thing else, to that point of perfection at which it is the object of correct philology to arrive, would be frustrated.

The dubious and wildering track struck out by those innovators and visionaries who absurdly endeavor to teach modern English, by rejecting the authority and sanction of custom, and by conducting the learner back to the original combinations, and the detached, disjointed, and barbarous constructions of our progenitors, both prudence and reason, as well as a due regard for correct philology, impel me to shun. Those modest writers who, by bringing to their aid a little sophistry, much duplicity, and a wholesale traffic in the swelling phrases, "philosophy, reason, and common sense," attempt to overthrow the wisdom of former ages, and show that the result of all the labors of those distinguished philologists who had previously occupied the field of grammatical science, is nothing but error and folly, will doubtless meet the neglect and contempt justly merited by such consummate vanity and unblushing pedantry. Fortunately for those who employ our language as their vehicle of mental conference, custom will not yield to the speculative theories of the visionary.

If it would, improvement in English literature would soon be at an end, and we should be tamely conducted back to the Vandalic age.

As the use of what is commonly called the philosophy of language, is evidently misapplied by those who make it the test of _grammatical certainty_, it may not be amiss to offer a few considerations with a view to expose the fallacy of so vague a criterion.

All reasoning and investigation which depend on the philosophy of language for an ultimate result, must be conducted _a posteriori_.

Its office, according to the ordinary mode of treating the subject, is to trace language to its origin, not for the purpose of determining and fixing grammatical a.s.sociations and dependances, such as the agreement, government, and mutual relations of words, but in order to a.n.a.lyze combinations with a view to develop the first principles of the language, and arrive at the primitive meaning of words. Now, it is presumed, that no one who has paid critical attention to the subject, will contend, that the original import of single words, has any relation to the syntactical dependances and connexions of words in general;--to gain a knowledge of which, is the leading object of the student in grammar. And, furthermore, I challenge those who have indulged in such useless vagaries, to show by what process, with their own systems, they can communicate a practical knowledge of grammar. I venture to predict, that, if they make the attempt, they will find their systems more splendid in theory, than useful in practice.

Again, it cannot rationally be contended, that the radical meaning has any efficiency in controlling the signification which, by the power of a.s.sociation, custom has a.s.signed to many words;--a signification _essentially different_ from the original import. Were this the case, and were the language now to be taught and understood in compliance with the original import of words, it would have to undergo a thorough change; to be a.n.a.lyzed, divided, and sub-divided, almost _ad infinitum_. Indeed, there is the same propriety in a.s.serting that the Gothic, Danish, and Anglo-Saxon elements in our language, ought to be p.r.o.nounced separately, to enable us to understand our vernacular tongue, that there is in contending, that their primitive meaning has an ascendency over the influence of the principle of a.s.sociation in changing, and the power of custom in determining, the import of words. Many of our words are derived from the Greek, Roman, French, Spanish, Italian, and German languages; and the only use we can make of their originals, is to render them subservient to the force of custom in cases in which general usage has not varied from the primitive signification. Moreover, let the advocates of a mere philosophical investigation of the language, extend their system as far as a radical a.n.a.lysis will warrant them, and, with Horne Tooke, not only consider adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections, as abbreviations of nouns and verbs, but, on their own responsibility, apply them, in teaching the language, _in compliance with their radical import_, and what would such a course avail them against the power of custom, and the influence of a.s.sociation and refinement? Let them show me one grammarian, produced by such a course of instruction, and they will exhibit a "philosophical" miracle. They might as well undertake to teach architecture, by having recourse to its origin, as represented by booths and tents. In addition to this, when we consider the great number of obsolete words, from which many now in use are derived, the original meaning of which cannot be ascertained, and, also, the mult.i.tude whose signification has been changed by the principle of a.s.sociation, it is preposterous to think, that a mere philosophical mode of investigating and teaching the language, is the one by which its significancy can be enforced, its correctness determined, its use comprehended, and its improvement extended. Before what commonly pa.s.ses for a philosophical manner of developing the language can successfully be made the medium through which it can be comprehended, in all its present combinations, relations, and dependances, it must undergo a thorough retrogressive change, in all those combinations, relations, and dependances, even to the last letter of the alphabet. And before we can consent to this radical modification and retrograde ratio of the English language, we must agree to revive the customs, the habits, and the precise language of our progenitors, the Goths and Vandals. Were all the advocates for the introduction of such philosophical grammars into common schools, at once to enter on their pilgrimage, and recede into the native obscurity and barbarity of the ancient Britons, Picts, and Vandals, it is believed, that the cause of learning and refinement would not suffer greatly by their loss, and that the good sense of the present age, would not allow many of our best teachers to be of the party.

The last consideration which I shall give a philosophical manner of investigating and enforcing the English language, is, that by this mode of a.n.a.lyzing and reducing it to practice, _it cannot, in this age, be comprehended_ as the medium of thought. Were this method to prevail, our present literal language would become a dead letter. Of what avail is language, if it can not be understood? And how can it be accommodated to the understanding, unless it receive the sanction of common consent? Even if we admit that such a manner of unfolding the principles of our language, is more rational and correct than the ordinary, practical method, I think it is clear that such a mode of investigation and development, does not meet the necessities and convenience of ordinary learners in school. To be consistent, that system which instructs by tracing a few of our words to their origin, must unfold the whole in the same manner. But the student in common schools and academies, cannot afford time to stem the tide of language up to its source, and there dive to the bottom of the fountain for knowledge. Such labor ought not to be required of him.

His object is to become, not a philosophical antiquarian, but a practical grammarian. If I comprehend the design (if they have any) of our modern philosophical writers on this subject, it is to make grammarians by inculcating a few general principles, arising out of the genius of the language, and the nature of things, which the learner, by the exercise of his _reasoning powers_, must reduce to practice. His own judgment, _independent of grammar rules_, is to be his guide in speaking and writing correctly. Hence, many of them exclude from their systems, all exercises in what is called _false Syntax_. But these profound philological dictators appear to have overlooked the important consideration, that the great ma.s.s of mankind, and especially of boys and girls in common schools, _can never become philosophers;_ and, consequently, can never comprehend and reduce to practice their metaphysical and obscure systems of grammar. I wish to see children treated as _reasoning_ beings. But there should be a medium in all things. It is, therefore, absurd to instruct children as if they were already profound philosophers and logicians.

To demonstrate the utility, and enforce the necessity, of exercising the learner in correcting _false Syntax_, I need no other argument than the interesting and undeniable fact, that Mr. Murray's labors, in this department, have effected a complete revolution in the English language, in point of verbal accuracy. Who does not know, that the best writers of this day, are not guilty of _one_ grammatical inaccuracy, where those authors who wrote before Mr.

Murray flourished, are guilty of _five_? And what has produced this important change for the better? Ask the hundreds of thousands who have studied "Mr. Murray's exercises in FALSE SYNTAX." If, then, this view of the subject is correct, it follows, that the greater portion of our philosophical grammars, are far more worthy the attention of literary connoisseurs, than of the great ma.s.s of learners.

Knowing that a strong predilection for philosophical grammars, exists in the minds of some teachers of this science, I have thought proper, for the gratification of such, to intersperse through the pages of this work under the head of "PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES," an entire system of grammatical principles as deduced from what appears to me to be the most rational and consistent philosophical investigations. They who prefer this theory to that exhibited in the body of the work, are, of course, at liberty to adopt it.

_In general, a philosophical theory of grammar will be found to accord with the practical theory embraced in the body of this work.

Wherever such agreement exists, the system contained in these NOTES will be deficient, and this deficiency may be supplied by adopting the principles contained in the other parts of the work_.

OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CLa.s.sIFICATION OF WORDS.

According to the method in which philosophical investigations of language have generally been conducted, all our words should be reduced to two cla.s.ses; for it can be easily shown, that from the noun and verb, all the other parts of speech have sprung. Nay, more.

They may even be reduced to one. Verbs do not, in reality, _express_ actions; but they are intrinsically the mere _names_ of actions. The idea of action or being communicated by them, as well as the _meaning_ of words in general, is merely _inferential_. The principle of reasoning a.s.sumed by the celebrated Horne Tooke, if carried to its full extent, would result, it is believed, in proving that we have but one part of speech.

_Adnouns_ or _adjectives_ were originally nouns. _Sweet, red, white_, are the _names_ of qualities, as well as _sweetness, redness, whiteness_. The former differ from the latter only in their _manner_ of signification. To denote that the name of some quality or substance is to be used in connexion with some other name, or, that this quality is to be _attributed_ to some other name, we sometimes affix to it the termination _en, ed_, or _y;_ which signifies _give, add,_ or _join_. When we employ the words wood_en_, wooll_en_, wealth_y_, gra.s.s_y_, the terminations _en_ and _y_, by their own intrinsic meaning, give notice that we intend to _give, add, or join_, the names of some other substances in which are found the properties or qualities of _wood, wool, wealth_, or _gra.s.s_.

_p.r.o.nouns_ are a cla.s.s of nouns, used instead of others to prevent their disagreeable repet.i.tion. Participles are certain forms of the verb. Articles, interjections, adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, are contractions of abbreviations of nouns and verbs.

_An_ (_a, one_, or _one_) comes from _ananad_, to add, to heap.

_The_ and _that_, from the Anglo-Saxon verb _thean_, to get, a.s.sume.

_Lo_ is the imperative of _look_; _fy_, of _fian_, to hate; and _welcome_ means, it is _well_ that you are _come. In_ comes from the Gothic noun _inna_, the interior of the body; and _about_, from _boda_, the first outward boundary. _Through_ or _thorough_ is the Teutonic noun _thuruh_, meaning pa.s.sage, gate, door. _From_ is the Anglo-Saxon noun _frum_, beginning, source, author. He came _from (beginning)_ Batavia. _If_ (formerly written _gif, give, gin_) is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb _gifan_, to give. I will remain _if_ (_give_ or _grant that fact_) he will (_remain_.) _But_ comes from the Saxon verb _beon-utan_, to be-out. I informed no one _but (be-out, leave-out)_ my brother.

This brief view of the subject, is sufficient to elucidate the manner in which, according to Horne Tooke's principles, the ten parts of speech are reduced to one. But I am, by no means, disposed to concede, that this is the _true_ principle of cla.s.sification; nor that it is any more _philosophical_ or _rational_ than one which allows a more practical division and arrangement of words. What has been generally received as "philosophical grammar," appears to possess no stronger claims to that imposing appellation than our common, practical grammars. Query. Is not Mr. Murray's octavo grammar more worthy the dignified t.i.tle of a "Philosophical Grammar," than Horne Tooke's "Diversions of Purley," or William S.

Cardell's treatises on language? What const.i.tutes a _philosophical_ treatise, on this, or on any other subject? _Wherein_ is there a display of philosophy in a speculative, etymological performance, which attempts to develop and explain the elements and primitive meaning of words by tracing them to their origin, _superior_ to the philosophy employed in the development and ill.u.s.tration of the principles by which we are governed in applying those words to their legitimate purpose, namely, that of forming a correct and convenient medium by means of which we can communicate our thoughts? Does philosophy consist in ransacking the mouldy records of antiquity, in order to _guess_ at the ancient construction and signification of single words? or have such investigations, in reality, any thing to do with _grammar_?

Admitting that all the words of our language include, in their _original_ signification, the import of nouns or names, and yet, it does not follow, that they _now_ possess no other powers, and, in their combinations and connexions in sentences, are employed for no other purpose, than _barely_ to _name objects_. The _fact_ of the case is, that words are variously combined and applied, to answer the distinct and diversified purposes of _naming_ objects, _a.s.serting_ truths, _pointing out_ and _limiting_ objects, _attributing qualities_ to objects, _connecting_ objects, and so on; and on this _fact_ is founded the _true philosophical principle of the cla.s.sification of words_. Hence, an arrangement of words into cla.s.ses according to this principle, followed by a development and ill.u.s.tration of the principles and rules that regulate us in the proper use and application of words in oral and written discourse, appears to approximate as near to a true definition _of philosophical grammar_, as any I am capable of giving.

_Nouns_, or the names of the objects of our perceptions, doubtless const.i.tuted the original cla.s.s of words; (if I may be allowed to a.s.sume such a hypothesis as an _original_ cla.s.s of words;) but the ever-active principle of a.s.sociation, soon transformed nouns into verbs, by making them, when employed in a particular manner, expressive of affirmation. This same principle also operated in appropriating names to the purpose of attributing qualities to other names of objects; and in this way was const.i.tuted the cla.s.s of words called _adjectives_ or _attributes_. By the same principle were formed all the other cla.s.ses.

In the following exposition of English grammar on scientific principles, I shall divide words into seven cla.s.ses; _Nouns_ or _Names, Verbs, Adjectives, Adnouns_, or _Attributes, Adverbs, Propositions, p.r.o.nouns_, and _Conjunctions_ or _Connectives_.

For an explanation of the noun, refer to the body of the work.

PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES.