VI. The new philosophy, which is the work of future ages, and the result of the new method.

Bacon's grand motive in his attempt to found the sciences anew was the intense conviction that the knowledge man possessed was of little service to him. "The knowledge whereof the world is now possessed, especially that of nature, extendeth not to magnitude and certainty of works."[49] Man's sovereignty over nature, which is founded on knowledge alone, had been lost, and instead of the free relation between things and the human mind, there was nothing but vain notions and blind experiments. To restore the original commerce between man and nature, and to recover the _imperium hominis_, is the grand object of all science. The want of success which had hitherto attended efforts in the same direction had been due to many causes, but chiefly to the want of appreciation of the nature of philosophy and its real aim. Philosophy is not the science of things divine and human; it is not the search after truth. "I find that even those that have sought knowledge for itself, and not for benefit or ostentation, or any practical enablement in the course of their life, have nevertheless propounded to themselves a wrong mark, namely, satisfaction (which men call Truth) and not operation."[50] "Is there any such happiness as for a man's mind to be raised above the confusion of things, where he may have the prospect of the order of nature and error of man? But is this a view of delight only and not of discovery? of contentment and not of benefit? Shall he not as well discern the riches of nature's warehouse as the beauty of her shop? Is truth ever barren? Shall he not be able thereby to produce worthy effects, and to endow the life of man with infinite commodities?"[51] Philosophy is altogether practical; it is of little matter to the fortunes of humanity what abstract notions one may entertain concerning the nature and the principles of things.[52] This truth, however, has never yet been recognized;[53] it has not yet been seen that the true aim of all science is "to endow the condition and life of man with new powers or works,"[54]

or "to extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of man."[55] Nevertheless, it is not to be imagined that by this being proposed as the great object of search there is thereby excluded all that has. .h.i.therto been looked upon as the higher aims of human life, such as the contemplation of truth. Not so, but by following the new aim we shall also arrive at a _true_ knowledge of the universe in which we are, for without knowledge there is no power; truth and utility are in ultimate aspect the same; "works themselves are of greater value as pledges of truth than as contributing to the comforts of life."[56] Such was the conception of philosophy with which Bacon started, and in which he felt himself to be thoroughly original. As his object was new and hitherto unproposed, so the method he intended to employ was different from all modes of investigation hitherto attempted. "It would be," as he says, "an unsound fancy and self-contradictory, to expect that things which have never yet been done can be done except by means which have never yet been tried."[57] There were many obstacles in his way, and he seems always to have felt that the first part of the new scheme must be a _pars destruens_, a destructive criticism of all other methods. Opposition was to be expected, not only from previous philosophies, but especially from the human mind itself. In the first place, natural antagonism might be looked for from the two opposed sects, the one of whom, in despair of knowledge, maintained that all science was impossible; while the other, resting on authority and on the learning that had been handed down from the Greeks, declared that science was already completely known, and consequently devoted their energies to methodizing and elaborating it. Secondly, within the domain of science itself, properly so called, there were two "kind of rovers" who must be dismissed. The first were the speculative or logical philosophers, who construe the universe _ex a.n.a.logia hominis_, and not _ex a.n.a.logia mundi_, who fashion nature according to preconceived ideas, and who employ in their investigations syllogism and abstract reasoning. The second cla.s.s, who were equally offensive, consisted of those who practised blind experience, which is mere [v.03 p.0146] groping in the dark (_vaga experientia mera palpatio est_), who occasionally hit upon good works or inventions, which, like Atalanta's apples, distracted them from further steady and gradual progress towards universal truth. In place of these straggling efforts of the una.s.sisted human mind, a graduated system of helps was to be supplied, by the use of which the mind, when placed on the right road, would proceed with unerring and mechanical certainty to the invention of new arts and sciences.

Such were to be the peculiar functions of the new method, though it has not definitely appeared what that method was, or to what objects it could be applied. But, before proceeding to unfold his method, Bacon found it necessary to enter in considerable detail upon the general subject of the obstacles to progress, and devoted nearly the whole of the first book of the _Organum_ to the examination of them. This discussion, though strictly speaking extraneous to the scheme, has always been looked upon as a most important part of his philosophy, and his name is perhaps as much a.s.sociated with the doctrine of Idols (_Idola_) as with the theory of induction or the cla.s.sification of the sciences.

The doctrine of the kinds of fallacies or general cla.s.ses of errors into which the human mind is p.r.o.ne to fall, appears in many of the works written before the _Novum Organum_, and the treatment of them varies in some respects. The cla.s.sification in the _Organum_, however, not only has the author's sanction, but has received the stamp of historical acceptation; and comparison of the earlier notices, though a point of literary interest, has no important philosophic bearing. The _Idola_ (_Nov. Org._ i. 39)[58]

false notions of things, or erroneous ways of looking at nature, are of four kinds: the first two innate, pertaining to the very nature of the mind and not to be eradicated; the third creeping insensibly into men's minds, and hence in a sense innate and inseparable; the fourth imposed from without. The first kind are the _Idola Tribus_, idols of the tribe, fallacies incident to humanity or the race in general. Of these, the most prominent are--the p.r.o.neness to suppose in nature greater order and regularity than there actually is; the tendency to support a preconceived opinion by affirmative instances, neglecting all negative or opposed cases; and the tendency to generalize from few observations, or to give reality to mere abstractions, figments of the mind. Manifold errors also result from the weakness of the senses, which affords scope for mere conjecture; from the influence exercised over the understanding by the will and pa.s.sions; from the restless desire of the mind to penetrate to the ultimate principles of things; and from the belief that "man is the measure of the universe," whereas, in truth, the world is received by us in a distorted and erroneous manner. The second kind are the _Idola Specus_, idols of the cave, or errors incident to the peculiar mental or bodily const.i.tution of each individual, for according to the state of the individual's mind is his view of things. Errors of this cla.s.s are innumerable, because there are numberless varieties of disposition; but some very prominent specimens can be indicated. Such are the tendency to make all things subservient to, or take the colour of some favourite subject, the extreme fondness and reverence either for what is ancient or for what is modern, and excess in noting either differences or resemblances amongst things. A practical rule for avoiding these is also given: "In general let every student of nature take this as a rule, that whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon with particular satisfaction is to be held in suspicion."[59] The third cla.s.s are the _Idola Fori_, idols of the market-place, errors arising from the influence exercised over the mind by mere words. This, according to Bacon, is the most troublesome kind of error, and has been especially fatal in philosophy. For words introduce a fallacious mode of looking at things in two ways: first, there are some words that are really merely names for non-existent things, which are yet supposed to exist simply because they have received a name; secondly, there are names hastily and unskilfully abstracted from a few objects and applied recklessly to all that has the faintest a.n.a.logy with these objects, thus causing the grossest confusion.

The fourth and last cla.s.s are the _Idola Theatri_, idols of the theatre, _i.e._ fallacious modes of thinking resulting from received systems of philosophy and from erroneous methods of demonstration. The criticism of the demonstrations is introduced later in close connexion with Bacon's new method; they are the rival modes of procedure, to which his own is definitely opposed. The philosophies which are "redargued" are divided into three cla.s.ses, the sophistical, of which the best example is Aristotle, who, according to Bacon, forces nature into his abstract schemata and thinks to explain by definitions; the empirical, which from few and limited experiments leaps at once to general conclusions; and the superst.i.tious, which corrupts philosophy by the introduction of poetical and theological notions.

Such are the general causes of the errors that infest the human mind; by their exposure the way is cleared for the introduction of the new method.

The nature of this method cannot be understood until it is exactly seen to what it is to be applied. What idea had Bacon of science, and how is his method connected with it? Now, the science[60] which was specially and invariably contemplated by him was natural philosophy, the great mother of all the sciences; it was to him the type of scientific knowledge, and its method was the method of all true science. To discover exactly the characteristics and the object of natural philosophy it is necessary to examine the place it holds in the general scheme furnished in the _Advancement_ or _De Augmentis_. All human knowledge, it is there laid down, may be referred to man's memory or imagination or reason. In the first, the bare facts presented to sense are collected and stored up; the exposition of them is _history_, which is either natural or civil. In the second, the materials of sense are separated or divided in ways not corresponding to nature but after the mind's own pleasure, and the result is _poesy_ or feigned history. In the third, the materials are worked up after the model or pattern of nature, though we are p.r.o.ne to err in the progress from sense to reason; the result is _philosophy_, which is concerned either with G.o.d, with nature or with man, the second being the most important. Natural philosophy is again divided into speculative or theoretical and operative or practical, according as the end is contemplation or works. Speculative or theoretical natural philosophy has to deal with natural substances and qualities and is subdivided into physics and metaphysics. Physics inquires into the efficient and material causes of things; metaphysics, into the formal and final causes. The princ.i.p.al objects of physics are concrete substances, or abstract though physical qualities. The research into abstract qualities, the fundamental problem of physics, comes near to the metaphysical study of _forms_, which indeed differs from the first only in being more general, and in having as its results a _form_ strictly so called, _i.e._ a nature or quality which is a limitation or specific manifestation of some higher and better-known genus.[61] Natural philosophy is, therefore, in ultimate resort the study of _forms_, and, consequently, the fundamental problem of philosophy in general is the discovery of these _forms_.

"On a given body to generate or superinduce a new nature or natures, is the work and aim of human power.... Of a given nature to discover the form or true specific difference, or nature-engendering nature (_natura naturans_) or source of emanation (for these are the terms which are nearest to a description of the thing), is the work and aim of human knowledge."[62]

The questions, then, whose answers give the key to the whole Baconian philosophy, may be put briefly thus--What are [v.03 p.0147] forms? and how is it that knowledge of them solves both the theoretical and the practical problem of science? Bacon himself, as may be seen from the pa.s.sage quoted above, finds great difficulty in giving an adequate and exact definition of what he means by a form. As a general description, the following pa.s.sage from the _Novum Organum_, ii. 4, may be cited:--

"The form of a nature is such that given the form the nature infallibly follows.... Again, the form is such that if it be taken away the nature infallibly vanishes.... Lastly, the true form is such that it deduces the given nature from some source of being which is inherent in more natures, and which is better known in the natural order of things than the form itself."[63]

From this it would appear that, since by a _nature_ is meant some sensible quality, superinduced upon, or possessed by, a body, so by a form we are to understand the cause of that nature, which cause is itself a determinate case or manifestation of some general or abstract quality inherent in a greater number of objects. But all these are mostly marks by which a form may be recognized, and do not explain what the form really is. A further definition is accordingly attempted in Aph. 13:--

"The form of a thing is the very thing itself, and the thing differs from the form no otherwise than as the apparent differs from the real, or the external from the internal, or the thing in reference to the man from the thing in reference to the universe."

This throws a new light on the question, and from it the inference at once follows, that the forms are the permanent causes or substances underlying all visible phenomena, which are merely manifestations of their activity.

Are the forms, then, forces? At times it seems as if Bacon had approximated to this view of the nature of things, for in several pa.s.sages he identifies forms with laws of activity. Thus, he says--

"When I speak of forms I mean nothing more than those laws and determinations of absolute actuality which govern and const.i.tute any simple nature, as heat, light, weight, in every kind of matter and subject that is susceptible of them. Thus the form of heat or the form of light is the same thing as the law of heat or the law of light."[64]

"Matter rather than forms should be the object of our attention, its configurations and changes of configuration, and simple action, and law of action or motion; for forms are figments of the human mind, unless you will call those laws of action forms."[65] "Forms or true differences of things, which are in fact laws of pure act."[66] "For though in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies, performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law, yet in philosophy this very law, and the investigation, discovery and explanation of it, is the foundation as well of knowledge as of operation. And it is this law, with its clauses, that I mean when I speak of forms."[67]

Several important conclusions may be drawn from these pa.s.sages. In the first place, it is evident that Bacon, like the Atomical school, of whom he highly approved, had a clear perception and a firm grasp of the _physical_ character of natural principles; his _forms_ are no ideas or abstractions, but highly general physical properties. Further, it is hinted that these general qualities may be looked upon as the modes of action of simple bodies. This fruitful conception, however, Bacon does not work out; and though he uses the word _cause_, and identifies _form_ with _formal cause_, yet it is perfectly apparent that the modern notions of cause as dynamical, and of nature as in a process of flow or development, are foreign to him, and that in his view of the ultimate problem of science, cause meant _causa immanens_, or underlying substance, effects were not consequents but manifestations, and nature was regarded in a purely statical aspect. That this is so appears even more clearly when we examine his general conception of the unity, gradation and function of the sciences. That the sciences are organically connected is a thought common to him and to his distinguished predecessor Roger Bacon. "I that hold it for a great impediment towards the advancement and further invention of knowledge, that particular arts and sciences have been disincorporated from general knowledge, do not understand one and the same thing which Cicero's discourse and the note and conceit of the Grecians in their word _circle learning_ do intend. For I mean not that use which one science hath of another for ornament or help in practice; but I mean it directly of that use by way of supply of light and information, which the particulars and instances of one science do yield and present for the framing or correcting of the axioms of another science in their very truth and notion."[68] In accordance with this, Bacon placed at the basis of the particular sciences which treat of G.o.d, nature and man, one fundamental doctrine, the _Prima Philosophia_, or first philosophy, the function of which was to display the unity of nature by connecting into one body of truth such of the highest axioms of the subordinate sciences as were not special to one science, but common to several.[69] This first philosophy had also to investigate what are called the advent.i.tious or transcendental conditions of essences, such as Much, Little, Like, Unlike, Possible, Impossible, Being, Nothing, the logical discussion of which certainly belonged rather to the laws of reasoning than to the existence of things, but the physical or real treatment of which might be expected to yield answers to such questions as, why certain substances are numerous, others scarce; or why, if like attracts like, iron does not attract iron.

Following this summary philosophy come the sciences proper, rising like a pyramid in successive stages, the lowest floor being occupied by natural history or experience, the second by physics, the third, which is next the peak of unity, by metaphysics.[70] The knowledge of the peak, or of the one law which binds nature together, is perhaps denied to man. Of the sciences, physics, as has been already seen, deals with the efficient and material, _i.e._ with the variable and transient, causes of things. But its inquiries may be directed either towards concrete bodies or towards abstract qualities. The first kind of investigation rises little above mere natural history; but the other is more important and paves the way for metaphysics.

It handles the configurations and the appet.i.tes or motions of matter. The configurations, or inner structure of bodies, include dense, rare, heavy, light, hot, cold, &c.,--in fact, what are elsewhere called simple natures.

Motions[71] are either simple or compound, the latter being the sum of a number of the former. In physics, however, these matters are treated only as regards their material or efficient causes, and the result of inquiry into any one case gives no general rule, but only facilitates invention in some similar instance. Metaphysics, on the other hand, treats of the formal or final cause of[72] these same substances and qualities, and results in a general rule. With regard to forms, the investigation may be directed either towards concrete bodies or towards qualities. But the forms of substances "are so perplexed and complicated, that it is either vain to inquire into them at all, or such inquiry as is possible should be put off for a time, and not entered upon till forms of a more simple nature have been rightly investigated and discussed."[73] "To inquire into the form of a lion, of an oak, or gold, nay, even of water or air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the _form_ of dense, rare, hot, cold, &c., as well configurations as motions, which in treating of physic I have in [v.03 p.0148] great part enumerated (I call them forms of the first cla.s.s), and which (like the letters of the alphabet) are not many, and yet make up and sustain the essences and forms of all substances--this, I say, it is which I am attempting, and which const.i.tutes and defines that part of metaphysic of which we are now inquiring." Physics inquires into the same qualities, but does not push its investigations into ultimate reality or reach the more general causes. We thus at last attain a definite conclusion with regard to forms, and it appears clear that in Bacon's belief the true function of science was the search for a few fundamental physical qualities, highly abstract and general, the combinations of which give rise to the simple natures and complex phenomena around us. His general conception of the universe may therefore be called mechanical or statical; the cause of each phenomenon is supposed to be actually contained in the phenomenon itself, and by a sufficiently accurate process could be sifted out and brought to light. As soon as the causes are known man regains his power over nature, for "whosoever knows any form, knows also the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon every variety of matter, and so is less restrained and tied in operation either to the basis of the matter or to the condition of the efficients."[74]

Nature thus presented itself to Bacon's mind as a huge congeries of phenomena, the manifestations of some simple and primitive qualities, which were hid from us by the complexity of the things themselves. The world was a vast labyrinth, amid the windings of which we require some clue or thread whereby we may track our way to knowledge and thence to power. This thread, the _filum labyrinthi_, is the new method of _induction_. But, as has been frequently pointed out, the new method could not be applied until facts had been observed and collected. This is an indispensable preliminary. "Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, can do and understand so much, and so much only, as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature; beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything." The proposition that our knowledge of nature necessarily begins with observation and experience, is common to Bacon and many contemporary reformers of science, but he laid peculiar stress upon it, and gave it a new meaning. What he really meant by observation was a competent natural history or collection of facts. "The firm foundations of a purer natural philosophy are laid in natural history."[75] "First of all we must prepare a _natural and experimental history_, sufficient and good; and this is the foundation of all."[76] The senses and the memory, which collect and store up facts, must be a.s.sisted; there must be a _ministration_ of the senses and another of the memory. For not only are instances required, but these must be arranged in such a manner as not to distract or confuse the mind, _i.e._ tables and arrangements of instances must be constructed. In the preliminary collection the greatest care must be taken that the mind be absolutely free from preconceived ideas; nature is only to be conquered by obedience; man must be merely receptive. "All depends on keeping the eye steadily fixed upon the facts of nature, and so receiving their images simply as they are; for G.o.d forbid that we should give out a dream of our own imagination for a pattern of the world; rather may He graciously grant to us to write an apocalypse or true vision of the footsteps of the Creator imprinted on his creatures."[77] Concealed among the facts presented to sense are the causes or forms, and the problem therefore is so to a.n.a.lyse experience[78], so to break it up into pieces, that we shall with certainty and mechanical ease arrive at a true conclusion. This process, which forms the essence of the new method, may in its entirety, as a ministration to the reason, be called a logic; but it differs widely from the ordinary or school logic in end, method and form. Its aim is to acquire command over nature by knowledge, and to invent new arts, whereas the old logic strove only after dialectic victories and the discovery of new arguments. In method the difference is even more fundamental. Hitherto the mode of demonstration had been by the syllogism; but the syllogism is, in many respects, an incompetent weapon. It is compelled to accept its first principles on trust from the science in which it is employed; it cannot cope with the subtlety of nature; and it is radically vitiated by being founded on hastily and inaccurately abstracted notions of things. For a syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the symbols of notions. Now the first step in accurate progress from sense to reason, or true philosophy, is to frame a _bona notio_ or accurate conception of the thing; but the received logic never does this. It flies off at once from experience and particulars to the highest and most general propositions, and from these descends, by the use of middle terms, to axioms of lower generality. Such a mode of procedure may be called _antic.i.p.atio naturae_ (for in it reason is allowed to prescribe to things), and is opposed to the true method, the _interpretatio naturae_, in which reason follows and obeys nature, discovering her secrets by obedience and submission to rule. Lastly, the very form of induction that has been used by logicians in the collection of their instances is a weak and useless thing. It is a mere enumeration of a few known facts, makes no use of exclusions or rejections, concludes precariously, and is always liable to be overthrown by a negative instance.[79] In radical opposition to this method the Baconian induction begins by supplying helps and guides to the senses, whose una.s.sisted information could not be relied on. Notions were formed carefully, and not till after a certain process of induction was completed.[80] The formation of axioms was to be carried on by a gradually ascending scale. "Then and only then may we hope well of the sciences, when in a just scale of ascent and by successive steps, not interrupted or broken, we rise from particulars to lesser axioms; and then to middle axioms, one above the other; and last of all to the most general."[81]

Finally the very form of induction itself must be new. "The induction which is to be available for the discovery and demonstration of sciences and arts must a.n.a.lyse nature by proper rejections and exclusions; and then, after a sufficient number of negatives, come to a conclusion on the affirmative instances, which has not yet been done, or even attempted, save only by Plato.[82] ... And this induction must be used not only to discover axioms, but also in the formation of notions."[83] This view of the function of exclusion is closely connected with Bacon's doctrine of forms, [v.03 p.0149] and is in fact dependent upon that theory. But induction is neither the whole of the new method, nor is it applicable to forms only. There are two other grand objects of inquiry: the one, the transformation of concrete bodies; the other, the investigation of the latent powers and the latent schematism or configuration. With regard to the first, in ultimate result it depends upon the theory of forms; for whenever the compound body can be regarded as the sum of certain simple natures, then our knowledge of the forms of these natures gives us the power of superinducing a new nature on the concrete body. As regards the latent process (_latens processus_) which goes on in all cases of generation and continuous development or motion, we examine carefully, and by quant.i.tative measurements, the gradual growth and change from the first elements to the completed thing. The same kind of investigation may be extended to many cases of natural motion, such as voluntary action or nutrition; and though inquiry is here directed towards concrete bodies, and does not therefore penetrate so deeply into reality as in research for forms, yet great results may be looked for with more confidence. It is to be regretted that Bacon did not complete this portion of his work, in which for the first time he approaches modern conceptions of change. The latent configuration (_latens schematismus_) or inward structure of the parts of a body must be known before we can hope to superinduce a new nature upon it. This can only be discovered by a.n.a.lysis, which will disclose the ultimate const.i.tuents (natural particles, not atoms) of bodies, and lead back the discussion to forms or simple natures, whereby alone can true light be thrown on these obscure questions. Thus, in all cases, scientific explanation depends upon knowledge of forms; all phenomena or secondary qualities are accounted for by being referred to the primary qualities of matter.

The several steps in the inductive investigation of the form of any nature flow readily from the definition of the form itself. For that is always and necessarily present when the nature is present, absent when it is absent, decreases and increases according as the nature decreases and increases. It is therefore requisite for the inquiry to have before us instances in which the nature is present. The list of these is called the table of _Essence and Presence_. Secondly, we must have instances in which the nature is absent; only as such cases might be infinite, attention should be limited to such of them as are most akin to the instances of presence.[84] The list in this case is called table of _Absence in Proximity_. Thirdly, we must have a number of instances in which the nature is present in different degrees, either increasing or decreasing in the same subject, or variously present in different subjects. This is the table of _Degrees_, or _Comparison_. After the formation of these tables, we proceed to apply what is perhaps the most valuable part of the Baconian method, and that in which the author took most pride, the process of exclusion or rejection. This elimination of the non-essential, grounded on the fundamental propositions with regard to forms, is the most important of Bacon's contributions to the logic of induction, and that in which, as he repeatedly says, his method differs from all previous philosophies. It is evident that if the tables were complete, and our notions of the respective phenomena clear, the process of exclusion would be a merely mechanical _counting out_, and would _infallibly_ lead to the detection of the cause or form. But it is just as evident that these conditions can never be adequately fulfilled. Bacon saw that his method was impracticable (though he seems to have thought the difficulties not insuperable), and therefore set to work to devise new helps, _adminicula_. These he enumerates in ii., _Aph._ 21:--_Prerogative Instances, Supports of Induction, Rectification of Induction, Varying the Investigation according to the Nature of the Subject, Prerogative Natures, Limits of Investigation, Application to Practice, Preparations for Investigation, the Ascending and Descending Scale of Axioms_. The remainder of the _Organum_ is devoted to a consideration of the twenty-seven cla.s.ses of Prerogative Instances, and though it contains much that is both luminous and helpful, it adds little to our knowledge of what const.i.tutes the Baconian method. On the other heads we have but a few scattered hints. But although the rigorous requirements of science could only be fulfilled by the employment of all these means, yet in their absence it was permissible to draw from the tables and the exclusion a hypothetical conclusion, the truth of which might be verified by the use of the other processes; such an hypothesis is called fantastically the First Vintage (_Vindemiatio_). The inductive method, so far as exhibited in the _Organum_, is exemplified by an investigation into the nature of heat.

Such was the method devised by Bacon, and to which he ascribed the qualities of absolute certainty and mechanical simplicity. But even supposing that this method were accurate and completely unfolded, it is evident that it could only be made applicable and produce fruit when the phenomena of the universe have been very completely tabulated and arranged.

In this demand for a complete natural history, Bacon also felt that he was original, and he was deeply impressed with the necessity for it;[85] in fact, he seems occasionally to place an even higher value upon it than upon his _Organum_. Thus, in the preface to his series of works forming the third part of the _Instauratio_, he says: "It comes, therefore, to this, that my _Organum_, even if it were completed, would not without the _Natural History_ much advance the _Instauration of the Sciences_, whereas the _Natural History_ without the _Organum_ would advance it not a little."[86] But a complete natural history is evidently a thing impossible, and in fact a history can only be collected by attending to the requirements of the _Organum_. This was seen by Bacon, and what may be regarded as his final opinion on the question is given in the important letter to Jean Antoine Baranzano[87] ("Redemptus": 1590-1622):--"With regard to the mult.i.tude of instances by which men may be deterred from the attempt, here is my answer. First, what need to dissemble? Either store of instances must be procured, or the business must be given up. All other ways, however enticing, are impa.s.sable. Secondly, the prerogatives of instances, and the mode of experimenting upon experiments of light (which I shall hereafter explain), will diminish the mult.i.tude of them very much.

Thirdly, what matter, I ask, if the description of the instances should fill six times as many volumes as Pliny's _History_? ... For the true natural history is to take nothing except instances, connections, observations and canons."[88] The _Organum_ and the _History_ are thus correlative, and form the two equally necessary sides of a true philosophy; by their union the new philosophy is produced.

_Summary._--Two questions may be put to any doctrine which professes to effect a radical change in philosophy or science. Is it original? Is it valuable? With regard to the first, it has been already pointed out that Bacon's induction or inductive method is distinctly his own, though it cannot and need not be maintained that the general spirit of his philosophy was entirely new.[89]

The value of the method is the separate and more difficult question. It has been a.s.sailed on the most opposite grounds. Macaulay, while admitting the accuracy of the process, denied its efficiency, on the ground that an operation performed naturally was not rendered more easy or efficacious by being subjected to a.n.a.lysis.[90] This objection is curious when confronted with Bacon's reiterated a.s.sertion that the _natural_ method pursued by the una.s.sisted human reason is distinctly opposed to his; and it is besides an argument that tells so strongly against many sciences, as to be comparatively worthless when applied to any one. There are, however, more formidable objections against the method. It has been pointed out,[91] and with perfect justice, [v.03 p.0150] that science in its progress has not followed the Baconian method, that no one discovery can be pointed to which can be definitely ascribed to the use of his rules, and that men the most celebrated for their scientific acquirements, while paying homage to the name of Bacon, practically set at naught his most cherished precepts. The reason of this is not far to seek, and has been pointed out by logicians of the most diametrically opposed schools. The mechanical character both of the natural history and of the logical method applied to it resulted necessarily from Bacon's radically false conception of the nature of cause and of the causal relation. The whole logical or scientific problem is treated as if it were one of co-existence, to which in truth the method of exclusion is scarcely applicable, and the a.s.sumption is constantly made that each phenomenon has one and only one cause.[92] The inductive formation of axioms by a gradually ascending scale is a route which no science has ever followed, and by which no science could ever make progress. The true scientific procedure is by hypothesis followed up and tested by verification; the most powerful instrument is the deductive method, which Bacon can hardly be said to have recognized. The power of framing hypothesis points to another want in the Baconian doctrine. If that power form part of the true method, then the mind is not wholly pa.s.sive or recipient; it antic.i.p.ates nature, and moulds the experience received by it in accordance with its own constructive ideas or conceptions; and yet further, the minds of various investigators can never be reduced to the same dead mechanical level.[93] There will still be room for the scientific use of the imagination and for the creative flashes of genius.[94]

If, then, Bacon himself made no contributions to science, if no discovery can be shown to be due to the use of his rules, if his method be logically defective, and the problem to which it was applied one from its nature incapable of adequate solution, it may not unreasonably be asked, How has he come to be looked upon as the great leader in the reformation of modern science? How is it that he shares with Descartes the honour of inaugurating modern philosophy? To this the true answer seems to be that Bacon owes his position not only to the general spirit of his philosophy, but to the manner in which he worked into a connected system the new mode of thinking, and to the incomparable power and eloquence with which he expounded and enforced it. Like all epoch-making works, the _Novum Organum_ gave expression to ideas which were already beginning to be in the air. The time was ripe for a great change; scholasticism, long decaying, had begun to fall; the authority not only of school doctrines but of the church had been discarded; while here and there a few devoted experimenters were turning with fresh zeal to the unwithered face of nature. The fruitful thoughts which lay under and gave rise to these scattered efforts of the human mind, were gathered up into unity, and reduced to system in the new philosophy of Bacon.[95] It is a.s.suredly little matter for wonder that this philosophy should contain much that is now inapplicable, and that in many respects it should be vitiated by radical errors. The details of the logical method on which its author laid the greatest stress have not been found of practical service;[96] yet the fundamental ideas on which the theory rested, the need for rejecting rash generalization, and the necessity for a critical a.n.a.lysis of experience, are as true and valuable now as they were then.

Progress in scientific discovery is made mainly, if not solely, by the employment of hypothesis, and for that no code of rules can be laid down such as Bacon had devised. Yet the framing of hypothesis is no mere random guesswork; it is left not to the imagination alone, but to the _scientific imagination_. There is required in the process not merely a preliminary critical induction, but a subsequent experimental comparison, verification or proof, the canons of which can be laid down with precision. To formulate and show grounds for these laws is to construct a philosophy of induction, and it must not be forgotten that the first step towards the accomplishment of the task was made by Bacon when he introduced and gave prominence to the powerful logical instrument of exclusion or elimination.

It is curious and significant that in the domain of the moral and metaphysical sciences his influence has been perhaps more powerful, and his authority has been more frequently appealed to, than in that of the physical. This is due, not so much to his expressed opinion that the inductive method was applicable to all the sciences,[97] as to the generally practical, or, one may say, [v.03 p.0151] _positive_ spirit of his system. Theological questions, which had tortured the minds of generations, are by him relegated from the province of reason to that of faith. Even reason must be restrained from striving after ultimate truth; it is one of the errors of the human intellect that it will not rest in general principles, but must push its investigations deeper. Experience and observation are the only remedies against prejudice and error. Into questions of metaphysics, as commonly understood, Bacon can hardly be said to have entered, but a long line of thinkers have drawn inspiration from him, and it is not without justice that he has been looked upon as the originator and guiding spirit of what is known as the empirical school.

_Bacon's Influence._--It is impossible within our limits to do more than indicate the influence which Bacon's views have had on subsequent thinkers.

The most valuable and complete discussion of the subject is contained in T.

Fowler's edition of the _Novum Organum_ (introd. -- 14). It is there argued that, both in philosophy and in natural science, Bacon's influence was immediate and lasting. Under the former head it is pointed out (i.) that the fundamental principle of Locke's _Essay_, that all our ideas are product of sensation and reflection, is briefly stated in the first aphorism of the _Novum Organum_, and (ii.) that the whole atmosphere of that treatise is characteristic of the _Essay_. Bacon is, therefore, regarded by many as the father of what is most characteristic in English psychological speculation. As he himself said, he "rang the bell which called the wits together." In the sphere of ethics he is similarly regarded as a forerunner of the empirical method. The spirit of the _De Augmentis_ (bk. vii.) and the inductive method which is discussed in the _Novum Organum_ are at the root of all theories which have constructed a moral code by an inductive examination of human consciousness and the results of actions. Among such theories utilitarianism especially is the natural result of the application to the phenomenon of conduct of the Baconian experimental method. In this connexion, however, it is important to notice that Hobbes, who had been Bacon's secretary, makes no mention of Baconian induction, nor does he in any of his works make any critical reference to Bacon himself. It would, therefore, appear that Bacon's influence was not immediate.

In the sphere of natural science, Bacon's importance is attested by references to his work in the writings of the princ.i.p.al scientists, not only English, but French, German and Italian. Fowler (_op. cit._) has collected from Descartes, Ga.s.sendi, S. Sorbiere, Jean Baptiste du Hamel, quotations which show how highly Bacon was regarded by the leaders of the new scientific movement. Sorbiere, who was by no means partial to things English, definitely speaks of him as "celuy qui a le plus puissamment solicite les interests de la physique, et excite le monde a faire des experiences" (_Relation d'un voyage en Angleterre_, Cologne, 1666, pp.

63-64). It was, however, Voltaire and the encyclopaedists who raised Bacon to the pinnacle of his fame in France, and hailed him as "le pere de la philosophie experimentale" (_Lettres sur les Anglois_). Condillac, in the same spirit, says of him, "personne n'a mieux connu que lui la cause de nos erreurs." So the _Encyclopedie_, besides giving a eulogistic article "Baconisme," speaks of him (in d'Alembert's preliminary discourse) as "le plus grand, le plus universel, et le plus eloquent des philosophes." Among other writers, Leibnitz and Huygens give testimony which is the more valuable as being critical. Leibnitz speaks of Bacon as "divini ingenii vir," and, like several other German authors, cla.s.ses him with Campanella; Huygens refers to his "bonnes methodes." If, however, we are to attach weight to English writers of the latter half of the 17th century, we shall find that one of Bacon's greatest achievements was the impetus given by his _New Atlantis_ to the foundation of the Royal Society (_q.v._). Dr Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), bishop of Rochester and first historian of the society, says that Bacon of all others "had the true imagination of the whole extent" of the enterprise, and that in his works are to be found the best arguments for the experimental method of natural philosophy (_Hist. of the Royal Society_, pp. 35-36, and Thomas Tenison's _Baconiana_, pp. 264-266).

In this connexion reference should be made also to Cowley's _Ode to the Royal Society_, and to Dr John Wallis's remarks in Hearne's _Preface to P.

Langtoft's Chronicle_ (appendix, num. xi.). Joseph Glanvill, in his _Scepsis Scientifica_ (dedication) says, "Solomon's house in the _New Atlantis_ was a prophetic scheme of the Royal Society"; and Henry Oldenburg (_c._ 1615-1677), one of the first secretaries of the society, speaks of the new eagerness to obtain scientific data as "a work begun by the single care and conduct of the excellent Lord Verulam." Boyle, in whose works there are frequent eulogistic references to Bacon, regarded himself as a disciple and was indeed known as a second Bacon. The predominating influence of Bacon's philosophy is thus clearly established in the generation which succeeded his own. There is abundant evidence to show that in the universities of Oxford and Cambridge (especially the latter) the new spirit had already modified the old curricula. Bacon has frequently been disparaged on the ground that his name is not mentioned by Sir Isaac Newton. It can be shown, however, that Newton was not ignorant of Bacon's works, and Dr Fowler explains his silence with regard to them on three grounds: (1) that Bacon's reputation was so well established that any definite mention was unnecessary, (2) that it was not customary at the time to acknowledge indebtedness to contemporary and recent writers, and (3) that Newton's genius was so strongly mathematical (whereas Bacon's great weakness was in mathematics) that he had no special reason to refer to Bacon's experimental principles.

If the foregoing examples are held sufficient to establish the influence of Bacon on the intellectual development of his immediate successors, it follows that the whole trend of typically English thought, not only in natural science, but also in mental, moral and political philosophy, is the logical fulfilment of Baconian principles. He argued against the tyranny of authority, the vagaries of unfettered imagination and the academic aims of unpractical dialectic; the vital energy and the reasoned optimism of his language entirely outweigh the fact that his contributions to the stock of actual scientific knowledge were practically inconsiderable. It may be freely admitted that in the domain of logic there is nothing in the _Organum_ that has not been more instructively a.n.a.lysed either by Aristotle himself or in modern works; at the same time, there is probably no work which is a better and more stimulating introduction to logical study. Its terse, epigrammatic phrases sink into the fibre of the mind, and are a healthy warning against crude, immature generalization.

While, therefore, it is a profound mistake to regard Bacon as a great constructive philosopher, or even as a lonely pioneer of modern thought, it is quite unfair to speak of him as a trifler. His great work consists in the fact that he summed up the faults which the widening of knowledge had disclosed in medieval thought, and in this sense he stands high among those who were in many parts of 16th-century Europe striving towards a new intellectual activity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. _Editions._--The cla.s.sical edition is that of R. L. Ellis, J.

Spedding and D. D. Heath, 1st ed., 1857; 2nd ed., 1870 (vols. i.-iii., philosophical writings; iv.-v., translations; vi.-vii., literary and professional works). B. Montagu's edition (17 vols., 1825-1834) is full but unscholarly. An extremely useful reprint (in one volume) of the philosophical works (with a few not strictly philosophical), based on the first Ellis-Spedding edition, was published by J. M. Robertson (London, 1905); besides the original introductions, it contains a useful summary by the editor of the various problems of Bacon's life and thought. Numerous cheap editions have lately been published, _e.g._ in the "World's Cla.s.sics"

(1901), and "New Universal Library" series (1905); Sidney Lee, _English Works of Francis Bacon_ (London, 1905).

Of particular works there are numerous editions in all the chief languages.

The following are the most important:--T. Fowler, _Novum Organum_ (Oxford, 1878; ed. 1889), with notes, full introduction on Bacon's philosophy in all its relations, and a most valuable bibliography. This superseded the edition of G. W. Kitchin (Oxford, 1855). The _Essays_ have been edited more than twenty times since 1870; the following editions may be mentioned:--Archbishop Whately (6th ed., 1864); W. Aldis Wright (Lond., 1862); F. Storr and Gibson (Lond., 1886); E. A. Abbott (Lond., 1879); John Buchan (Lond., 1879); A. S. West (Cambridge, 1897); W. Evans (Edinburgh, 1897). A facsimile reprint of the 1st edition was published in New York (1904). _Advancement of Learning_:--W. Aldis [v.03 p.0152] Wright (Camb., 1866; 5th ed., 1900); F. G. Selby (1892-1895); H. Morley (1905); and, with the _New Atlantis_, in the "World's Cla.s.sics" series (introduction by Prof.

T. Case, Lond., 1906). _Wisdom of the Ancients and New Atlantis_, in "Ca.s.sell's National Library" (1886 and 1903). G. C. M. Smith, _New Atlantis_ (1900). J. Furstenhagen, _Kleinere Schriften_ (Leipzig, 1884).

_Biography._--J. Spedding, _The Life and Letters of Lord Bacon_ (1861), _Life and Times of Francis Bacon_ (1878); also Dr Rawley's _Life_ in the Ellis-Spedding editions, and J. M. Robertson's reprint (above); W. Hepworth Dixon, _Personal History of Lord Bacon_ (Lond., 1861), and _Story of Lord Bacon's Life_ (ib. 1862); John Campbell, _Lives of the Chancellors_ (Lond., 1845), ii. 51; P. Woodward, _Early Life of Lord Bacon_ (1902); T. Fowler, _Francis Bacon_ in "English Philos." series (Lond., 1881); R. W. Church's _Bacon_, in "Men of Letters" series (1884).

_Philosophy._--Beside the introductions in the Ellis-Spedding and T. Fowler editions, and general histories of philosophy, see:--Kuno Fischer, _Fr.

Bacon_ (1856, 2nd ed., 1875, Eng. trans. by John Oxenford, Lond., 1857); Ch. de Remusat, _Bacon, sa vie ... et son influence_ (1857, ed. 1858 and 1877); G. L. Craik, _Lord Bacon, his Writings and his Philosophy_ (3 vols., 1846-1847, ed. 1860); A. Dorner, _De Baconis Philosophia_ (Berlin, 1867; London, 1886); J. v. Liebig, _uber F. B. v. Verulam_ (Mannheim, 1863); Ad.

La.s.son, _uber B. v. Verulam's wissenschaftliche Principien_ (Berl., 1860); E. H. Bohmer, _uber F. B. v. Verulam_ (Erlangen, 1864); Ch. Adam, _Philos.

de Francis Bacon_ (Paris, 1890); Barthelemy St Hilaire, _etude sur Francis Bacon_ (Paris, 1890); R. W. Church, _op. cit._; H. Heussler, _F. Bacon und seine geschichtliche Stellung_ (Breslau, 1889); H. Hoffding, _History of Modern Philosophy_ (Eng. trans., 1900); J. M. Robertson, _Short History of Freethought_ (Lond., 1906); Sidney Lee, _Great Englishmen of the 16th century_ (Lond., 1904). For the relations between Bacon and Ben Jonson see _The Tale of the Shakespeare Epitaphs by Francis Bacon_ (New York, 1888); for Bacon's poetical gifts see an article in the _Fortnightly Review_ (March 1905).

For the Bacon-Shakespeare controversy see SHAKESPEARE.

(R. AD.; J. M. M.)

[1] See _Nic. Eth._ iv. 3. 3. 1123b.

[2] "I wax now somewhat ancient; one-and-thirty years is a great deal of sand in the hour-gla.s.s.... I ever bare a mind (in some middle place that I could discharge) to serve her majesty; not as a man born under Sol, that loveth honour; nor under Jupiter, that loveth business (for the contemplative planet carrieth me away wholly); but as a man born under an excellent sovereign, that deserveth the dedication of all men's abilities.... Again the meanness of my estate doth somewhat move me; for though I cannot accuse myself that I am either prodigal or slothful, yet my health is not to spend, nor my course to get. Lastly, I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends as I have moderate civil ends; for I have taken all knowledge to be my province; and if I could purge it of two sorts of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputations, confutations and verbosities, the other with blind experiments and auricular traditions and impostures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in industrious observations, grounded conclusions and profitable inventions and discoveries--the best state of that province. This, whether it be curiosity, or vain-glory, or nature, or (if one take it favourably) _philanthropia_, is so fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed. And I do easily see, that place of any reasonable commandment doth bring commandment of more wits than of a man's own.

And if your lordship shall find now, or at any time, that I do seek or affect any place whereunto any that is nearer to your lordship shall be convenient, say then that I am a most dishonest man. And if your lordship will not carry me on,... this I will do, I will sell the inheritance that I have, and purchase some lease of quick revenue, or some office of gain that shall be executed by deputy, and so give over all care of service, and become some sorry bookmaker, or a true pioneer in that mine of truth."--Spedding, _Letters and Life_, i. 108-109.

[3] Spedding, _Letters and Life_, i. 234-235, cf. i. 362. This letter, with those to Puckering or Ess.e.x and the queen, i. 240-241, should be compared with what is said of them by Macaulay in his _Essay_ on Bacon, and by Campbell, _Lives_, ii. 287.

[4] See _Letters and Life_, i. 289, ii. 34.

[5] See Macaulay's Essay on Bacon.

[6] The whole story of Ess.e.x is given in Spedding's _Letters and Life_. It is vigorously told by J. Bruce in the introduction to his _Correspondence of James VI. with Sir Robert Cecil_ (Camden Society, 1861).