When I look back at this time, it feels like the end of an important chapter for me-in a good way. Coaching the Lakers was like having a wild, tempestuous fling with a beautiful woman. And now it was time to move on and try something new.

CHAPTER 19

CHOP WOOD, CARRY WATER

Forget mistakes, forget failures, forget everything, except what you're going to do now and do it. Today is your lucky day.

WILL DURANT

I'd just started my sabbatical in Australia when I got a call from Jeanie. She said the situation with the Lakers was dire. The team had gone into a tailspin and the new coach, Rudy Tomjanovich, had resigned. Could I come back and save the team?

I can't say I was surprised. Rudy was a good coach who had won two championships with the Houston Rockets, but he had inherited a no-win situation in Los Angeles. What's more, Rudy had just completed treatment for cancer and just wasn't up to the job physically or emotionally.

The team wasn't up to the job either. The roster had been decimated in the off-season. Not only did the Lakers trade Shaq, but they also lost Karl Malone to retirement, Rick Fox to the Celtics (he retired a few months later), and Gary Payton and Fish to free agency. There were a few new players who came over from Miami in the Shaq trade-forward Lamar Odom, guard Caron Butler, and center/forward Brian Grant, who had knee issues. Kobe was trying to carry this as-yet-formless bunch all by himself but couldn't.

I told Jeanie that returning to L.A. was out of the question. I wasn't prepared to give up the rest of my trip, included a tour of New Zealand by motorcycle with my brothers. Nor did I have any interest in trying to rescue a team that was long past salvaging. "How about next season?" Jeanie asked.

"I'll think about it," I replied.

I suppose I might have felt a momentary flicker of schadenfreude, but, in fact, the demise of the Lakers didn't make me happy. I'd worked hard to transform the team into a champion, and it was painful to watch my former a.s.sistant coach, Frank Hamblen, try in vain to hold things together at the end of the 200405 season. This was the first time the Lakers had failed to make the playoffs since the early 1990s.

When I returned home, I talked to a number of other teams with open coaching positions, including New York, Cleveland, and Sacramento. But none of those jobs appealed to me as much as the idea of rebuilding the Lakers from the ground up-something I hadn't had the chance to do the first time around. But before I said yes, I needed to get a read on whether Kobe and I could work together again.

I hadn't talked to Kobe since our tense end-of-the-season meeting a year earlier. Since then, I'd published The Last Season, in which I revealed my frustrations about trying to coach him during the turbulent 200304 season. I had no idea what kind of reception I'd get from him, but when I called I didn't sense any hard feelings. Kobe's only request was for me to be more discreet with the media and not share personal information about him with reporters. That seemed reasonable.

I think we both realized that in order to succeed we needed each other's support and goodwill. Prior to the 200405 season, Kobe had boasted that as long as he played for the Lakers, the team would never fall below .500. But that's exactly what happened: The Lakers tied for last place in the Pacific Division with a 34-48 record. That turned out to be a real wake-up call for Kobe. He'd never known such failure before, and it forced him to acknowledge that he'd have to wholeheartedly join forces with others if he was going to win any more championships.

I knew that if I accepted the job, my first crucial task would be to restore the team's lost pride. To my mind the sports pundits and fans had turned on Kobe and blamed him-unfairly-for breaking up the Lakers' great championship lineup. I thought my return might help put some of that noise to sleep. I was also intrigued by the possibility of building a new championship team centered on Kobe instead of Shaq. But to make that happen, Kobe and I would have to forge a deeper, more collaborative relationship, and he'd have to grow into a different kind of leader than he'd been in the past. That would take time, I knew, but I didn't see any insurmountable obstacles in the way. Kobe seemed as eager as I was to bury the past and move on.

When I met with Dr. Buss to hammer out the details of a three-year deal, I needed his a.s.surance that I'd be given a bigger role in personnel decisions and not be kept in the dark, as had been the case during the Shaq-versus-Kobe stand-off in 200304. Dr. Buss agreed but turned down my other request-getting part ownership of the team. Instead he offered me a salary increase and explained that he planned to hand over control of the Lakers to his six children. As part of that move, he'd brought in his son, Jim, to learn the business so that he could eventually take over the basketball side of the Lakers. Meanwhile, Jeanie would continue overseeing sales, marketing, and finance.

Jim Buss had been promoted to VP of player personnel when I returned in the 2005 postseason. He was eager to draft Andrew Bynum, a talented high-school center from New Jersey, and asked me to take a look at him when he came to L.A. for a tryout. My only reservation about Andrew was his running gait, which would lead to serious knee problems later on. But otherwise I thought he had the potential to develop into a formidable big man. I gave the deal my okay, and we made him the tenth pick overall. At seventeen, he was the youngest player ever to be drafted by the NBA.

My biggest concern about recruiting players right out of high school has always been the temptations of the NBA life. Many young players get so seduced by the money and fame that they never develop into mature young men or live up to their promise as athletes. In my view, the key to becoming a successful NBA player is not learning the coolest highlight-reel moves. It's learning how to control your emotions and keep your mind focused on the game, how to play through pain, how to carve out your role on the team and perform it consistently, how to stay cool under pressure and maintain your equanimity after crushing losses or ecstatic wins. In Chicago we had a phrase for this: going from a basketball player to a "professional" NBA player.

For most rookies it takes three or four years to get there. But I told Andrew that we were going to fast-track him because of the key role we envisioned for him on the team. I explained that if he pledged to dedicate himself to the task, I'd pledge to support him all the way. Andrew a.s.sured me that I didn't need to worry about his maturity; he was serious about stepping up. And he stayed true to his word. By the next season he would be the Lakers' new starting center.

Andrew wasn't the only player on the team who required this kind of training. We had several young players who needed to be schooled in the basics-including Smush Parker, Luke Walton, Brian Cook, Sasha Vujacic, Von Wafer, Devin Green, and Ronny Turiaf. Instead of a deficit, I saw this as an opportunity to build the new team from the bottom up, with a core group of young players who could learn the system together and provide us with a lot of energy off the bench. Given the team's makeup, I found myself being less authoritarian and a more patient father figure than usual. This was a team that was crawling its way up from infancy-a new experience for me-and I had to nurture the players' confidence with care.

One major hurdle to get over with my new team was the lack of consistent scoring options beyond Kobe. I'd originally hoped that Lamar Odom would fill that bill. A former number-four pick overall who averaged 15-plus points a game, Lamar was a graceful six-ten forward with a freewheeling style of play that reminded me of Scottie Pippen. He was great at pulling down rebounds and pushing the ball up court to break down the defense in the open floor. With his size, agility, and playmaking skill, Lamar created matchup problems for a lot of teams, and I thought we might be able to turn him into a strong "point forward" a la Pippen. But Lamar had trouble learning the intricacies of the system and his game often fell apart when we needed him the most. I found that the best way to use Lamar was to give him the freedom to react spontaneously to whatever was happening on the floor. Whenever I tried to box him in to a set role, his spirit seemed to deflate.

There were others whose performance didn't quite match my expectations. Shortly after I returned, we picked up Kwame Brown in a trade with Washington, hoping to add some muscle to our front line. We knew that Kwame had been a disappointing number-one pick overall for the Wizards, but, at six feet eleven and 270 pounds, he had a good one-on-one game and the strength and quickness to defend the top big men in the league. What we didn't know until much later was that he didn't have any confidence in his outside shot. At one point during a game against Detroit, Kobe came over to the bench, laughing. "You might as well take Kwame out of the game, Phil," he said. "He just told me not to pa.s.s him the ball because he might get fouled and have to shoot a free throw."

Another player who had looked promising at first but lacked mental toughness was Smush Parker. Although on paper veteran Aaron McKie and European newcomer Sasha Vujacic looked stronger than Smush, he outplayed them both in training camp and scored 20 points in three of the first four regular-season games, so we anointed him starting point guard. Smush was a slight, crafty player who was good at slipping through defenses to attack the basket and playing tough, full-court defense. His shooting was erratic, but his spirited play helped energize the offense and get us off to a strong start that season.

But Smush had had a difficult childhood that left him fragile emotionally and limited his ability to bond with others. When he was young, his mother had died of AIDS. If everything was going his way, Smush could be the most energetic player on the floor. But when the pressure mounted, he had a hard time holding himself together. He was a time bomb waiting to explode.

Meanwhile Kobe continued to excel. In the first part of the season I told him to let loose since the team had yet to master the system-and he responded by shooting for the history books. Kobe scored 40-plus points in twenty-three games during the regular season and averaged a career-high 35.4 points. The highlight was his 81-point game against the Toronto Raptors in January at the Staples Center. He got ticked off in the third quarter when the Raptors went ahead by 18 points and he erupted for 55 points in the second half to lead the team to a 122104 victory. Kobe's 81 was the second-highest total in NBA history, behind Wilt Chamberlain's legendary 100-point game in 1962. What made Kobe's performance different was the variety of shots he took from all over the floor, including 7 three-pointers-which didn't exist in the NBA in Wilt's day. To put Kobe's performance in perspective, the highest total Michael Jordan ever hit in a game was 69.

Ever since Kobe was a rookie, the question of whether he would become "the next Michael Jordan" had been the subject of endless speculation. Now that Kobe's game had matured, this no longer seemed like a frivolous question. Even Jordan has said that Kobe is the only player who can be compared to him, and I have to agree. Both men have an extraordinary compet.i.tive drive and are virtually impervious to pain. Michael and Kobe have both played some of their best games under crippling conditions-from food poisoning to broken bones-that would sideline lesser mortals for weeks. Their incredible resilience has made the impossible possible, allowing each of them to make game-turning shots with packs of defenders hanging all over them. That said, their styles are different. Michael was more likely to break through his attackers with his power and strength, while Kobe often tries to finesse his way through ma.s.s pileups.

As their coach, it's the differences between them that intrigue me more than their similarities. Michael was stronger, with bigger shoulders and a st.u.r.dier frame. He also had large hands that allowed him to control the ball better and make subtle fakes. Kobe is more flexible-hence, his favorite nickname, "Black Mamba."

The two men relate to their bodies differently as well. Trainer Chip Schaefer, who worked extensively with both players, says that Kobe treats his body like a finely tuned European sports car, while Michael was less regimented in his behavior and given to indulging his taste for good cigars and fine wine. Still, to this day Schaefer marvels at how graceful Michael was as he moved up the floor. "What I do for a living is all about athletic movement, and I've never seen anybody else move like that," he says. "The only word for it is beautiful."

The differences between Michael's and Kobe's shooting styles are also p.r.o.nounced. Michael was a more accurate shooter than Kobe. He averaged nearly 50 percent from the field during his career-an extraordinary figure-and was often in the 53 percent to 54 percent range during his prime. Kobe averages a respectable 45 percent, but his hot streaks tend to go longer than Michael's did. Jordan was also more naturally inclined to let the game come to him and not overplay his hand, whereas Kobe tends to force the action, especially when the game isn't going his way. When his shot is off, Kobe will pound away relentlessly until his luck turns. Michael, on the other hand, would shift his attention to defense or pa.s.sing or setting screens to help the team win the game.

No question, Michael was a tougher, more intimidating defender. He could break through virtually any screen and shut down almost any player with his intense, laser-focused style of defense. Kobe has learned a lot from studying Michael's tricks, and we often used him as our secret weapon on defense when we needed to turn the direction of a game. In general, Kobe tends to rely more heavily on his flexibility and craftiness, but he takes a lot of gambles on defense and sometimes pays the price.

On a personal level, Michael was more charismatic and gregarious than Kobe. He loved being with his teammates and security guards, playing cards, smoking cigars, and joking around. Kobe is different. He was reserved as a teenager, in part because he was younger than the other players and hadn't been able to develop his social skills in college. When Kobe joined the Lakers, he avoided fraternizing with his teammates. But his inclination to keep to himself shifted as he grew older. Increasingly, Kobe put more energy into getting to know the other players, especially when the team was on the road. During our second series of championships, he became the life of the party.

Both Michael and Kobe have impressive basketball IQs, but I wouldn't call either of them "intellectual" in the conventional sense of the word. Michael attended the University of North Carolina and is gifted at math, but he didn't show much interest in the books I gave him to read while I was his coach. Nor did Kobe, for that matter, though now he picks my brain regularly for book suggestions, especially ones about leadership. Kobe could have attended any college he wanted, but he skipped that step because he was in too much of a hurry to conquer the NBA. Still, he must have wondered whether he made the right choice, because in the summer of 1997 he strapped on a backpack and took a course in advanced Italian at UCLA.

One of the biggest differences between the two stars from my perspective was Michael's superior skills as a leader. Though at times he could be hard on his teammates, Michael was masterful at controlling the emotional climate of the team with the power of his presence. Once he bought into the triangle, he knew instinctively how to get the players on board to make it work.

Kobe had a long way to go before he could make that claim. He talked a good game, but he'd yet to experience the cold truth of leadership in his bones, as Michael had. Soon that too would begin to change.

Midway through the 200506 season, the players began to feel comfortable playing within the system, and they were starting to win games-even when Kobe wasn't breaking any records. I was thrilled to see the team progress faster than expected. We finished the regular season with an 11-3 run and rolled into the playoffs with a 45-37 record, an eleven-game b.u.mp over the previous season.

The momentum kept building, and we sailed to an unexpected 31 lead in the first round over the division-leading Phoenix Suns. Our game plan was to have Kobe draw double-teams, then feed Kwame and Lamar down low, a strategy that seemed to be working. Our come-from-behind win in game 4 was remarkable. With 0.7 seconds left in regulation, aided by a key steal by Smush, Kobe tossed up a baseline shot to tie the game, then hit a fallaway seventeen-footer with 0.2 seconds remaining for the win in overtime. "This is the most fun I've ever had," he said after the game. "Because this is us. This is us, the entire team, enjoying the moment with the entire city of Los Angeles."

We didn't celebrate for long. Hours before game 5 we learned that Kwame was being investigated for alleged s.e.xual a.s.sault in L.A. The charges were eventually dropped, but the reports distracted the players and kept us from putting the series away in game 5. Then the momentum shifted in the Suns' favor. In game 6 Smush was increasingly reluctant to shoot, so Kobe encouraged him to focus on putting pressure on point guard Steve Nash defensively and not to worry about scoring. Still, despite a heroic 50-point performance by Kobe, we went down in overtime. After the game Smush fell apart emotionally, having scored just 5 points on 12 shots. And the team headed back to Phoenix to face the Suns in game 7 on their home turf. It wasn't much of a contest. At the half I told Kobe to revert to our original strategy and feed Lamar and Kwame in the post. So he dialed his game back and took only 3 shots in the second half. Unfortunately, Lamar and Kwame were missing in action and scored a combined total of 20 points, despite endless opportunities. As the game devolved into a 12190 rout, the Lakers' worst loss ever in a game 7, I was reminded of how important character is when it comes to winning big games. What this team needed was more heart.

Not only did the team have some weaknesses, but so did I-a serious hip problem. I had hip replacement surgery just before the start of our 200607 training camp. This restricted my ability to move up and down the floor to monitor each player's performance during practice, and I had to learn to coach games from a specially designed chair. Interestingly, though I worried that my limited mobility might diminish my authority, just the opposite occurred. I learned to be forceful without being overbearing-further lessons in the school of less is more.

The 200607 season started with a flourish, but things got rocky in the second half when several players-including Lamar, Kwame, and Luke Walton-were down with injuries. The lineup got so thin at one point that I had to use six-five guard Aaron McKie as our power forward and Andrew Bynum took over at center. In February the team went into free fall, losing thirteen out of sixteen games in a single stretch. By mid-March Kobe was fed up and took matters into his own hands. Which worked for about two weeks. He scored 50-plus points in five of seven games and we won all but two. However, the other players complained about never seeing the ball, and I asked Kobe to back off.

Usually I tried to work the tail end of a season so that the team peaked going into the playoffs. But there was no hope of that happening this time. The team's chemistry was shot, and we'd run out of magic tricks. We ended the season with a 4-8 run and I finally gave up on Smush, replacing him with rookie Jordan Farmar, who was quicker and more reliable at covering fleet-footed guards.

But we needed a lot more than speed to keep pace with Phoenix in the first round. If anything, the Suns were an even stronger team that year. They'd won the Pacific Division t.i.tle three years in a row and had the best point guard in the business, Nash, who had previously won two straight MVP awards. The Suns certainly didn't lack confidence. Before game 1, the Los Angeles Times ran a story that included an excerpt from Sports Ill.u.s.trated writer Jack McCallum's book :07 Seconds or Less, in which Suns coach Mike D'Antoni critiqued several of our players' defensive flaws. "Kwame is awful," he said. "Odom's a very average defender. Vujacic can't guard anybody. And Bryant in the open floor takes chances that aren't good."

I didn't agree with Mike's a.s.sessment, but I was impressed by the Suns' level of chutzpah going into the series. Still, I thought we could surprise them again, if only we could stay focused.

That turned out to be a big "if." Throughout the series I showed the players clips of the movie Hustle & Flow, because, in my opinion, they needed more of both to outmaneuver the Suns. Obviously, they didn't get the message. The team sleepwalked through the first two games in Phoenix, then came alive to win in game 3 in L.A., only to fall back into a doze and lose the series, 41. I was so frustrated by the team's low energy in the decisive game 4 that I threw a mock fit and sent everyone home early from practice the next day. But lack of hustle (not to mention flow) was only part of the problem. We needed a blast of more seasoned talent to turn this team into a viable contender. Some of the young players I'd hoped would evolve into champions just couldn't hold their own in the clutch.

I wasn't the only one losing patience. Kobe was furious that the team hadn't made any significant personnel moves since trading Shaq to Miami. After game 5, he told reporters he was tired of being "a one-man show," scoring 50 points a game and losing. "I'm not with that," he said. "I'm about winning. I want to win championships and win them now. So, [the Lakers] have some decisions to make."