Elements of Morals - Part 39
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Part 39

[154] Diagnosis in medicine is the art of determining a disease by means of the symptoms or signs it presents.

[155] _Imitation of Jesus Christ_, I., xii.

[156] We should, however, make a distinction between the pa.s.sion for wine and drunkenness. One can have this pa.s.sion without giving up to it.

Drunkenness is the habit of yielding to it.

[157] _Sentimentality_ is false sensibility, and not exaggerated sensibility. _Softness_ is a vague expression. Patriotism may by exaggeration become _fanaticism_; but this is equally true of other sentiments--of the religious sentiment, for example.

[158] Chap. III., 19.

[159] Plato in the Phaedo (trad. de Saisset, p. 31) seems to condemn the idea of combating pa.s.sion by pa.s.sion: "To exchange one sensual pleasure for another," he says, "one grief for another, one fear for another, and to do like those who get small change for a piece of money, is not the path which leads to virtue. Wisdom is the only true coin against which all the others should be exchanged.... Without wisdom all other virtues are but shadows of virtues, a virtue the slave of vice, wherein there is nothing wholesome nor true. True virtue is free from all pa.s.sion." Nothing more true and more n.o.ble; but there is in this doctrine nothing contrary to that of Bossuet. The question is not to exchange one pa.s.sion for another, for such an act is devoid of all moral character, but to exchange pa.s.sion against wisdom and virtue; and all we want to know is the means.

Now experience confirms what Bossuet has said, namely, that one cannot immediately triumph over a pa.s.sion, especially when at its zenith, and that it is necessary to turn one's thoughts upon other objects and appeal to more innocent pa.s.sions or to pa.s.sions, if not less ardent, at least more n.o.ble, such as patriotism or the religious sentiment.

[160] _Confessions_, VIII., v.

[161] The virtues of the pagans have been often depreciated, and St.

Augustine himself, great an admirer as he was of antiquity, called them, nevertheless, _splendid vices_ (_vitia splendida_). They are often regarded as induced by pride rather than by a sincere love of virtue. We should beware of such interpretations, for once on the road of moral pessimism, there is no reason for stopping at anything. We may as well maintain that there are a thousand forms of pride, and that self-love often sets its glory in pretending to overcome itself. "We must therefore not wonder to find it coupled with the greatest austerity, and, in order to destroy itself, make us bravely a companion of it, for whilst it ruins itself in one place, it starts up again in another." It may be seen by this pa.s.sage of La Rochefoucauld, that it is of no use to interpret the pagan virtues in a bad sense, for the argument can be retorted. It is better to regard virtue as sincere and true wherever we meet with it, so long as there are no proofs to the contrary.

[162] _Traite de morale_, III., 2.

[163] The theory of _inadmissible sanct.i.ty_ consisted in maintaining that man, having reached a state of sanct.i.ty, could never again, whatever he might do, fall from it.

[164] _The Dignity of Sciences_, VII., iii.

[165] Essays on the Human Understanding, II., xxi.

[166] Epictetus, II., xxiii. (T. W. Higginson's transl.).

[167] _De Officiis_, I., x.x.x.

[168] The greatest tragic actor at Rome, and a contemporary of Roscius, the greatest comic actor.--TRANSLATOR.

[169] _De Officiis_, I., x.x.xi.

[170] _Memorabilia of Socrates_, IV., iv.

[171] Seneca, on Anger, III., 38. To tell the truth, Seneca forgave himself sometimes too easily perhaps, as, for example, on the day when he defended the murder of Agrippina; we are often too much disposed to imitate him.

[172] _Imitation of Jesus Christ_, I., xi.

[173] _Doctrine de la Vertu_, trad. fr. p. 170.

We give here this catechism as an example of what might be done in a course of morals. The teacher can modify its form and developments as he thinks best.

[174] We can see by this that Kant understood youth. In a Socratic interrogation of this kind, the pupil, distrusting his powers, will always begin by being silent. It is only when he perceives that he knows what was asked him, that he ventures to answer, and answers well.

[175] We give this as a useful supplement to Chapter VIII. It is a lecture formerly delivered on the _Union of Cla.s.ses_ (1867, _Revue des cours litteraires_, v., p. 42).... We beg to be pardoned for what negligences of style may have crept into the improvisation.