4. It is maintained that one cannot help seeing the faults of others: so be it; but one need not make it voluntarily an object.

It may be said that we cannot help but see. But that is not true. It is rare that our mind is so violently struck that it cannot help deciding. It is generally obliged to make an effort to look at things, and it is this voluntary looking at the faults of others which Christian prudence should correct in the persons whose function it is not to correct them.

5. Besides, even if we knew the evil for certain, it is not for us to make it known to others.

Whatever evidence we may think we have of the faults of our neighbor, Christian prudence forbids us to make these known to others when it is not inc.u.mbent on us or useful so to do.... This exercise does not only serve in regulating our speech and forestalling the consequences of rash judgments, but it is also of infinite service in regulating the mind and correcting the rashness of judgment at its very source; for one hardly ever allows one's mind to judge the faults of others, except to speak about them, and if one did not speak of them, one would insensibly stop trying to judge them.

6. But as it is not always possible to avoid judging, it becomes necessary to employ other remedies against the abuse of rash judgments.

(_a._) "The remedy for malignity is to fill one's heart with charity; to think often about the virtues and good qualities of others.

(_b._) "The remedy against haste is to accustom one's self to judge slowly and to take more time in looking at things.

(_c._) "The remedy against the too strong attachment to our own sentiments is to continually remember the weakness of our minds and the frequent mistakes we, as well as others, make."

Nicole goes so far in proscribing rash judgments, that he even forbids them regarding the dead (x.x.xv.), regarding ourselves (x.x.xvi.), even when they have good rather than evil for their object (x.x.xvii.), even regarding abstract maxims of morality (xli.); and he concludes by saying that the only reasonable method is silence! We recognize here the rigorism of the Jansenists.[42] It suffices to say that, as a general principle, one should neither judge nor p.r.o.nounce without investigation; but one must allow a little more lat.i.tude and liberty than does Nicole; for if all men agreed to keep silent, human society would be nothing but a semblance, a word void of sense. How could men get to love each other if they did not know each other? And how could they know each other if they did not talk to each other? We must, therefore, adhere to certain general principles without pretending to bring all words and thoughts under regulations.

=58. Of envy and delation.=--Among the vices which may lead to the greatest injustices, and which already in themselves are odious as sentiments, the most blameworthy and the vilest is the pa.s.sion of _envy_. We call envious him who suffers from the happiness of others, him who hates others because of the advantages they possess and the superiority they enjoy. In the first place, this sentiment is an injustice; for the happiness of one is not the cause of another's misfortune; the health of one does not make the other sick; Voltaire's wit is not the cause of the mediocrity of our own talents; beautiful women are not answerable for the ugliness of other women. Let the ill-favored one accuse nature or Providence, and there will be some reason in it, though it is a bad feeling; for it is a want of resignation to a wisdom the motives of which we cannot always divine; but to accuse the favored of fortune, is a shocking baseness of the heart. It is the hateful feature of a celebrated sect of these present days; they desire not the happiness of all, but the misfortune of all. Unable to procure the same advantages to all men, their ideal is general destruction. Their utopia is just the reverse of all other utopias. These believed they could secure to all the advantages reserved to a few. This new utopia, persuaded of the impossibility of the thing, have overthrown the problem and propose to reduce the more fortunate to the wretchedness of the less happy; and as among the number of heads they hit there are still some which retain a few advantages over the others, the work of destruction will go on till they shall have reached the level of universal degradation.

But, without speaking of the social envy, which has had so large a share in the revolutions of our time, what we ought above all to fight against is the individual envy which each of us has so much trouble in defending himself against in presence of the success of his neighbor. It is above all dangerous when _disputed_ goods are in question--things all cannot have at the same time--and which he who is in the enjoyment of them seems thereby to rob the others of: as, for instance, a situation one obtains at the expense of another, be it that he is more deserving of it, or more favored by fortune. In the first case, one should be just enough to recognize the rights of others to these things, and in the second, generous enough to forgive them the favors of chance. It is wanting in personal dignity to begrudge men their chances and good fortune; and even were these chances undeserved, it is still lowering one's self to do them the honor of envying them.

Envy comes close to another sentiment, less odious perhaps, and less unjust, but which is, nevertheless, unworthy of a right-feeling man; this is _resentment_, _rancor_, a _vindictive_ spirit. If we are commanded to return good for good, we are, on the other hand, forbidden to return evil for evil. For centuries it has been said: Eye for eye and tooth for tooth.

This is called retaliation (_lex talionis_). Christian morality has reformed this law of barbarous times. "It is written: eye for eye, tooth for tooth; but I say unto you: Love those who hate you; pray for those who persecute you and speak evil of you." Without insisting here on the _love for enemies_ (which is a duty of charity and not of justice), we will simply say that the spirit of vengeance is even contrary to justice.

Nature, when we have been offended, calls forth in our hearts a spontaneous emotion, which inspires in us an aversion for the cause of the offense. This is a mere revolt of nature, innocent in itself, since it is the principle of the right of self-defense. But we should not yield to this thoughtless impulse; we should combat the desire to return evil for evil; for otherwise we place ourselves on a level with him whom we hate.

And here again we should distinguish between _anger_ and _rancor_. Anger is the immediate impression we receive from the wrong committed, and which may induce us to return evil for evil on the spot; but _rancor_ is hatred coldly kept up; it is the slow and calculated preparation for a revenge; it is the _remembrance_ of wrong carefully nursed: and it is this which is contrary to human dignity. Man should remember good, not evil: he who is capable of hatred is worthy of hatred, and would seem to have beforehand deserved the wrong he has been made to suffer. We do not go so far as to say that wrong must be pardoned as wrong, for that would be siding with injustice; but it should be pardoned to human nature, because it is weak, and we are no less liable to sin than others.

From these feelings of hatred, envy, rancor, covetousness, springs sometimes a vice which lowers the soul and corrupts it: this is _delation_. To report to one the wrong done by another; to superiors the wrongs done by our colleagues; to friends the evil said of them in their absence; to inform the authorities of the presence and lodgings of an outlaw, such are the faults designated by the term _delation_, and the essential characteristics of which are, that they are committed without the knowledge of the interested parties. It is evident, besides, that this term can nowise be applied to functionaries commissioned to watch and discover faults, or to those who complain of injustice done them, and finally where great crimes committed against society are in question, to those who, knowing the criminals, report them to the authorities.

=59. Distributive and remunerating justice--Equity.=--All the acts we have thus far enumerated, and which consist in doing no wrong to others, relate to what may be called _negative_ justice.[43]

There is another kind of justice, more positive, which consists, like charity, in doing good to others, not in the sense of liberality and a gift, but as a debt; only the question then is not a material debt, which obliges to return a thing loaned, or intrusted, or the venal value of that thing; but it is a moral debt in proportion to the merit and services it relates to. This kind of justice, which distributes goods, advantages, praises in proportion to certain efforts, capacities, virtues, is what is called _distributive_ justice, and, inasmuch as it rewards services, _remunerating_.

Distributive justice goes into effect every time when there is occasion to cla.s.sify men, to distribute among them offices, ranks, honors, degrees, etc. It is that which especially administrators who distribute places, have to exercise; also, examiners who give diplomas, learned societies who grant prizes, or take in new members; finally, critical judges who appreciate the merit of books, works of art, dramatic productions.

The administrators who have to fill posts, must above all consider the interests of the situation which is to be filled. Favoritism should be strictly excluded: the misuse of testimonials has been often pointed out; it is the plague of our administrations. They have not always all the influence attributed to them; but it is enough that it is thought they have any, to give rise to bad habits and a very serious laxity of morals.

They make you believe that success does not wholly depend on conscientious work, and that it requires, above all, the favor of the great (protections). It is, therefore, the duty of administrators to consider the merit of functionaries only, and not their patrons.

But even this rule is far from being sufficient: for personal merit is not everything; is not the only element to be considered; age, length of service, have also their value; for, in order that the State be well served, it is necessary that those who work for it, should have faith in the future; should know that their past services will be taken account of, that as they grow older and their burdens heavier, the State will come to their a.s.sistance in raising their functions. Thus must length of service be combined with merit and be itself a part of the merit. In many administrations, the division between these two elements is made by granting vacant posts half to length of service, half to choice. But the choice itself depends on various elements; for personal merit is itself composed of many elements: for example, which should be considered the higher, talent or work? A lively mind will accomplish more work in less time; but it may be negligent, forgetful, disorderly: a substantial mind, always ready, industrious, conscientious, offers better guarantees and more security; yet in difficult transactions, talent offers more resources. This shows how many practical difficulties have to be met in the choice of men. It is for experience and conscience to decide in each particular case. Morality can give no general rules, except negative rules: to avoid _nepotism_, _simony_,[44] guard against the arbitrary, against favor, testimonials, etc.

In examinations there are the same dangers to avoid: for here, also, it is unfortunately too much a general belief that favoritism is the rule, and that testimonials go for everything. The first duty is to set aside all personal interest, worldly influence, pressure from without. But all does not end here; for there remains to be seen what rule is to be followed in the choice of candidates.

If the number of those who are to be elected is fixed beforehand, as in contests, there is then already a great difficulty obviated: for there is but to be determined the order of merit of the candidates. But in many examinations the number is not fixed. It becomes then necessary to find a just medium between excess of severity and excess of indulgence. This medium is generally determined through the co-operation of different minds, of which some are inclined to severity and others to indulgence.

But one must not trust to this co-operation of others to arrive at a strict justice. It is clear that each, for his own part, must fix upon a mean, and endeavor to adhere to it as strictly as possible. In cases where there is occasion for cla.s.sification, one must, above all, consider the more substantial qualities, and not allow one's self to be too easily led away by mere appearances and surface-talent.

Thus, facility of speech, which in itself is a merit, should not have any advantage over sound learning, especially in regard to functions where speech-making plays no part. Presence of mind, ready wit, are also brilliant and precious qualities, but the absence of which does not always denote ignorance and incapacity.

In learned or political societies, which are recruited among themselves, the same principles of independence and impartiality should always predominate, except in cases of difference in circ.u.mstances. Talent is here the princ.i.p.al thing to go by, and which should prevail; length of service counts for nothing except where the merit is equal. The interest of science in learned societies, the interest of the State in political societies, should be the prime considerations.

Literary or artistic criticism comes under the same rules, only it has not for its object persons, but works. Here the danger to be feared is not exactly favor, but good fellowship: one upholds the other, the praise is mutual, and all severity is reserved for those who do not belong to the society. But, whether good fellowship or favor, all privilege-preference subst.i.tuted for the esteem the thing should be held in for its own sake, is contrary to justice. Criticism may, of course, be more or less severe--more or less laudatory; there is as much impropriety in constant blame as in constant praise; one must strike as near as possible a just mean between the two, and this mean may not be the same with the different critics; here comes in the part which individual temperament plays in the matter. But whatever rule each may adopt for himself, they must all apply it to the same end: there must be no undue respect for the person, and the interest of art must be alone considered.

CHAPTER VI.

DUTIES OF CHARITY AND SELF-SACRIFICE.

SUMMARY.

A retrospect of what distinguishes justice and charity.

=Duties of kindness.=--The lowest degree of charity is _kindness_: to wish others well leads to _doing_ them good.

=Civility.=--_Personal civility_; civility of the mind; civility of the heart.

=Modesty.=--Modesty is as much a duty to others as to ourselves.

=Peace among men.=--a.n.a.lysis of Nicole's dissertation _on the means of preserving peace among men_.--Citations from Kant on _society virtues_.

=Duties of friendship.=--Citations from Aristotle and Kant.

=Duties of benevolence.=--_Duties minima_: services which cost nothing.--Hospitality with the ancients.

=Good deeds.=--a.n.a.lysis of Seneca.

=Duties of benefactors.=--1, The benefaction consists rather in the sentiment than in the thing given; 2, one should not trouble one's self if the benefaction results in ingrat.i.tude; 3, degrees in benefactions: the necessary, the useful, the agreeable; 4, the manner of giving is often better than the gift itself; 5, one should not reproach benefactions; 6, benefaction consists sometimes in refusing; 7, benefaction should be disinterested.

=Duties of the person under obligation:=--1, Not to be too greedy; 2, a kindness should be accepted cheerfully; 3, one should remember a kindness.

=Kant's rules= regarding benevolence and grat.i.tude.

=Precautions required by benevolence:= Cicero's rules.

=Self-sacrifice.=--Different forms of self-sacrifice: The life, the property, the morality of others, etc.; clemency; forgiveness of injuries; love of enemies.

We have said that charity consists, above all, in doing good to men, whilst justice consists in doing them no wrong. It is true, there is a _positive_ justice, as there is a _negative_ justice; and this positive justice consists also in doing good to men, but it is a good which is _due_ them, which belongs to them by right, and which is itself an acknowledgment of that due and that right.

The good done to others in the exercise of the duties of charity is, on the contrary, something we take from our own; it is a _gift_; whilst the good done in the name of justice, is always a _debt_.

The lowest degree of the duty of charity consists in what are called duties of _kindliness_.

=60. Duties of kindliness.=--The first step to arrive at _doing_ good to men, is to _wish_ them well. _Kindliness_ is the road to _benevolence_.

Kindliness is that disposition which induces us to give others pleasure; to rejoice over their good fortune, to make them happy themselves, if not by our own kindnesses, if that is not in our power, at least by outward demonstrations of sympathy and affection.

=61. Civility.=--The lowest degree of this virtue, consists in using gentle and amiable manners in our intercourse with others, in not repelling them by a gruff and unsociable disposition; in wounding no one's feelings by the affectation of contempt and raillery, etc. This kind of surface-virtue, which is confined to the outward, is what is called _civility_.