ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL PROPENSITIES.--EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED.

1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural propensities, such as the appet.i.tes, the love of esteem, of power, &c., I would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly explained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting this subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed necessary. When any physical power operates upon any of the organs of sense, or when any thought is present in the Intelligence, the state of the Sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called a _sensation_ or _emotion_. When any feeling arises impelling the Will to seek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion, this impulsive state of the Sensibility is called a _desire_. When the Will concurs with the desire, a complex state of mind results, called a _wish_. Wish is distinguished from Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the action of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, const.i.tutes a wish morally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction, and the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the desire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds true in regard to the action of all the propensities. The excitement of the propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, const.i.tutes desire--a feeling in itself dest.i.tute of all moral qualities. The action of the Will in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, const.i.tutes a complex state of mind morally right or wrong.

ANGER, PRIDE, AMBITION, &c.

Anger, for example, as prohibited by the moral law, is not a mere _feeling_ of displeasure awakened by some injury, real or supposed, perpetrated by another. This state, on the other hand, consists in the surrendering of the Will to the control of that feeling, and thus acting from malign impulse. Pride also is not the mere _desire_ of esteem. It consists in voluntary subjection to that propensity, seeking esteem and admiration as the great end of existence. Ambition, too, is not mere desire of power, but the voluntary surrendering of our being to the control of that propensity. The same, I repeat, holds true in respect to all the propensities. No mere excitement of the Sensibility, irrespective of the action of the Will, has any moral character. In the action of the Will in respect to such states--action which must arise in some direction under such circ.u.mstances--moral guilt, or praiseworthiness, arises.

I might here adduce other cases in ill.u.s.tration of the same principle; as, for example, the fact that intemperance in food and drink does not consist, as a moral act or state, in the mere strength of the appet.i.te--that is, in the degree in which it is excited in the presence of its appropriate objects. Nor does it consist in mere excess in the quant.i.ty partaken of--excess considered as an external act. It consists, on the other hand, in the surrendering of the voluntary power to the control of the appet.i.te. The excess referred to is the _consequent_ and _index_ of such voluntary subjection. The above examples, however, are abundantly sufficient to ill.u.s.trate the principle.

RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS.

2. We will now contemplate the element of the Will in those complex phenomena denominated _religious affections_. The position which I here a.s.sume is this, that whatever in such affections is morally right and praiseworthy, that which is directly referred to, where such affections are required of us, is the voluntary element to be found in them. The voluntary element is directly required. Other elements are required only on the ground that their existence is conditioned upon, and necessarily results from, that of the voluntary element. This must be admitted, or we must deny the position established in the last Chapter, to wit: that all the requirements of the Moral law are fully met in the right action of the Will.

SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.

My object now is to show, that this is the light in which the subject is really presented in the Scriptures. I will cite, as examples, the three cardinal virtues of Christianity, Repentance, Love, and Faith. The question is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as mere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? Are they not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or as acts of Will? Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such acts?

REPENTANCE.

In regard to Repentance, I would remark, that the term is scarcely used at all in the Old Testament. Other terms and phrases are there employed to express the same thing; as for example, "Turn ye;" "Let the wicked forsake his way;" "Let him turn unto the Lord;" "He that confesseth and forsaketh his sins shall find mercy," &c. In all such pa.s.sages repentance is most clearly presented as consisting exclusively of voluntary acts or intentions. The commands requiring it are, therefore, fully met in such acts. In the New Testament this virtue is distinguished from G.o.dly Sorrow, the state of the Sensibility which accompanies its exercise. As distinguished from the action of the Sensibility, what can it be, but a voluntary state, as presented in the Old Testament? When the mind places itself in voluntary harmony with those convictions and feelings which attend a consciousness of sin as committed against G.o.d and man, this is the repentance recognized and required as such in the Bible. It does not consist in the mere _conviction_ of sin; for then the worst of men, and even devils, would be truly repentant. Nor does it consist in the states of the Sensibility which attend such convictions; else Repentance would be G.o.dly Sorrow, from which the Bible, as stated above, definitely distinguishes it. It must consist in a voluntary act, in which, in accordance with those convictions and feelings, the mind turns from sin to holiness, from selfishness to benevolence, from the paths of disobedience to the service of G.o.d.

LOVE.

A single pa.s.sage will distinctly set before us the nature of _Love_ as required in the Bible--that love which comprehends all other virtues, and the exercise of which is the "fulfilling of the law." "Hereby," says the sacred writer, "we perceive the love of G.o.d." The phrase "_of G.o.d_"

is not found in the original. The pa.s.sage, as it there stands, reads thus: "By this we know _love;_" that is, we know the nature of the love which the Scriptures require, when they affirm, that "love is the fulfilling of the law." What is that in which, according to the express teaching of inspiration, we learn the nature of this love? "Because he laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." In the act of "laying down his life for us," we are here told, that the love required of us is embodied and revealed. What is the nature of this love? I answer,

1. It is not a conviction of the Intelligence, nor any excited state of the Sensibility. No such thing is here referred to.

2. It does and must consist exclusively in a voluntary act, or intention. "He laid down his life for us." What is this but a voluntary act? Yet this is love, the "love which is the fulfilling of the law."

3. As an act of Will, love must consist exclusively in a voluntary devotion of our entire powers to one end, the highest good of universal being, from a regard to the idea of duty. "He laid down his life for us." "We _ought_ to lay down our lives for the brethren." In each particular here presented, a universal principle is expressed and revealed. Christ "laid down his life for us," because he was in a state of voluntary consecration to the good of universal being. The particular act was put forth, as a means to this end. In a voluntary consecration to the same end, and as a means to this end, it is declared, that "we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." When, therefore, the Scriptures require love of us, they do not demand the existence of particular convictions of the Intelligence, nor certain states of the Sensibility. They require the voluntary consecration of our entire being and interests to the great end of universal good. In this act of consecration, and in the employment of all our powers and interests, under the control of this one intention, we fulfil the Law. We fully discharge all obligations, actual and conceivable, that are devolved upon us. The exercise of love, like that of repentance, is attended with particular convictions and feelings. These feelings are indirectly required in the precepts demanding love, and required, because when the latter does exist, the former will of course exist.

OF FAITH.

But little need be said in explanation of the nature of Faith. It is everywhere presented in the Bible, as synonymous with _trust_, reposing confidence, committing our interests to G.o.d as to a "faithful Creator."

Now Trust is undeniably a voluntary state of mind. "I know," says Paul, "in whom I have believed," that is, exercised faith, "that he is able to keep that which I have _committed_ to him against that day." Here the act of committing to the care of another, which can be nothing else than an act of Will, is presented as synonymous with Faith. Faith, then, does not consist in conviction, nor in any excited feelings. It is a voluntary act, _entrusting_ our interests to G.o.d as to a faithful Creator. The principle above established must apply to all religious affections of every kind.

SEC. II. GENERAL TOPICS SUGGESTED BY THE TRUTH ILl.u.s.tRATED IN THE PRECEDING SECTION.

Few truths are of greater practical moment than that ill.u.s.trated in the preceding section. My object, now, is to apply it to the elucidation of certain important questions which require elucidation.

CONVICTIONS, FEELINGS AND EXTERNAL ACTIONS--WHY REQUIRED, OR PROHIBITED.

1. We see why it is, that, while no mere external action, no state of the Intelligence or Sensibility, has any moral character in itself, irrespective of the action of the Will, still such acts and states are specifically and formally required or prohibited in the Bible. In such precepts the _effect_ is put for the _cause_. These acts and states are required, or prohibited, as the natural and necessary results of right or wrong intentions. The thing really referred to, in such commands and prohibitions, is not the acts or states specified, but the _cause_ of such acts and states, to wit: the right or wrong action of the Will.

Suppose, that a certain loathsome disease of the body would necessarily result from certain intentions, or acts of Will. Now G.o.d might prohibit the intention which causes that disease, in either of two ways. He might specify the intention and directly prohibit that; or he might prohibit the same thing, in such a form as this: Thou shalt not have this disease. Every one will perceive that, in both prohibitions, the same thing, precisely, would be referred to and intended, to wit: the intention which sustains to the evil designed to be prevented, the relation of a cause. The same principle, precisely, holds true in respect to all external actions and states of the Intelligence and Sensibility, which are specifically required or prohibited.

OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPECT TO SUCH PHENOMENA.

2. We also distinctly perceive the ground of our responsibility for the existence of external actions, and internal convictions and feelings.

Whatever effects, external or internal, necessarily result, and are or may be known to result, from the right or wrong action of the Will, we may properly be held responsible for. Now, all external actions and internal convictions and feelings which are required of or prohibited to us, sustain precisely this relation to the right or wrong action of the Will. The intention being given, the effect follows as a consequence.

For this reason we are held responsible for the effect.

FEELINGS HOW CONTROLLED BY THE WILL.

3. We now notice the _power of control_ which the Will has over the feelings.

(1.) In one respect its control is unlimited. It may yield itself to the control of the feelings, or wholly withhold its concurrence.

(2.) In respect to all feelings, especially those which impel to violent or unlawful action, the Will may exert a direct influence which will either greatly modify, or totally suppress the feeling. For example, when there is an inflexible purpose of Will not to yield to angry feelings, if they should arise, and to suppress them, as soon as they appear, feelings of a violent character will not result to any great extent, whatever provocations the mind may be subject to. The same holds true of almost all feelings of every kind. Whenever they appear, if they are directly and strongly willed down, they will either be greatly modified, or totally disappear.

(3.) Over the action and states of the Sensibility the Will may exert an indirect influence which is all-powerful. If, for example, the Will is in full harmony with the infinite, the eternal, the just, the right, the true and the good, the Intelligence will, of course, be occupied with "whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely and of good report," and the Sensibility, continually acted upon by such objects, will mirror forth, in pure emotions and desires, the pure thoughts of the Intelligence, and the hallowed purposes of the Will. The Sensibility will be wholly isolated from all feelings gross and sensual. On the other hand, let the Will be yielded to the control of impure and sensual impulse, and how gross and impure the thoughts and feelings will become.

In yielding, or refusing to yield, to the supreme control of the law of Goodness, the Will really, though indirectly, determines the action of the Intelligence and Sensibility both.

(4.) To present the whole subject in a proper light, a fixed law of the _affections_ demands special attention. A husband, for example, has pledged to his wife, not only kind intentions, but the exclusive control of those peculiar affections which const.i.tute the basis of the marriage union. Let him cherish a proper regard for the sacredness of that pledge, and the wife will so completely and exclusively fill and command her appropriate sphere in the affections, that, under no circ.u.mstances whatever, will there be a tendency towards any other individual. The same holds true of every department of the affections, not only in respect to those which connect us with the creature, but also with the Creator. The affections the Will may control by a fixed and changeless law.

Such being the relation of the Will to the Sensibility, while it is true that there is nothing right or wrong in any feelings, irrespective of the action of the Will, still the presence of feelings impure and sensual, may be a certain indication of the wrong action of the voluntary power. In such a light their presence should always be regarded.

RELATION OF FAITH TO OTHER EXERCISES MORALLY RIGHT.

4. In the preceding Section it has been fully shown, that love, repentance, faith, and all other religious exercises, are, in their fundamental and characteristic elements, phenomena of the Will. We will now, for a few moments, contemplate the relations of these different exercises to one another, especially the relation of _Faith_ to other exercises of a kindred character. While it is true, as has been demonstrated in a preceding Chapter, that the Will cannot at the same time put forth intentions of a contradictory character, such as sin and holiness, it is equally true, that it may simultaneously put forth acts of a h.o.m.ogeneous character. In view of our obligations to yield implicit obedience to G.o.d, we may purpose such obedience. In view of the fact, that, in the Gospel, grace is proffered to perfect us in our obedience, at the same time that we purpose obedience with all the heart, we may exercise implicit trust, or faith for "grace whereby we may serve G.o.d acceptably with reverence and G.o.dly fear." Now, such is our condition as sinners, that without a revelation of this grace, we should never purpose obedience in the first instance. Without the continued influence of that grace, this purpose would not subsequently be perfected and perpetuated. The purpose is first formed in reliance upon Divine grace; and but for this grace and consequent reliance, would never have been formed. In consequence of the influence of this grace relied upon, and received by faith, this same purpose is afterwards perfected and perpetuated. Thus, we see, that the purpose of obedience is really conditioned for its existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance upon Divine grace. The same holds true of the relation of Faith to all acts or intentions morally right or holy. One act of Will, in itself perfectly pure, is really conditioned upon another in itself equally pure. This is the doctrine of Moral Purification, or Sanctification by faith, a doctrine which is no less true, as a fact in philosophy, than as a revealed truth of inspiration.

CHAPTER XIII.

INFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL JUDGMENTS.

MEN OFTEN VOLUNTARY IN THEIR OPINIONS.

IT is an old maxim, that the Will governs the understanding. It becomes a very important inquiry with us, To what extent, and in what sense, is this maxim true? It is undeniable, that, in many important respects, mankind are voluntary in their opinions and judgments, and therefore, responsible for them. We often hear the declaration, "You ought, or ought not, to entertain such and such opinions, to form such and such judgments." "You are bound to admit, or have no right to admit, such and such things as true." Men often speak, also, of _pre-judging_ particular cases, and thus incurring guilt. A question may very properly be asked here, what are these opinions, judgments, admissions, pre-judgments, &c.? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence, or are they exclusively phenomena of the Will?

ERROR NOT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE, BUT THE WILL.

The proposition which I lay down is this, _that the Intelligence, in its appropriate exercise, can seldom if ever, make wrong affirmations; that wrong opinions, admissions, pre-judgments, &c., are in most, if not all instances, nothing else than phenomena, or a.s.sumptions of Will_. If the Intelligence can make wrong affirmations, it is important to determine in what department of its action such affirmations may be found.

PRIMARY FACULTIES CANNOT ERR.

Let us first contemplate the action of the _primary_ intellectual faculties--Sense, or the faculty of _external_ perception; Consciousness, the faculty of _internal_ observation; and Reason, the faculty which gives us _necessary_ and _universal truths_. The two former faculties give us phenomena external and internal. The latter gives us the logical antecedents of phenomena, thus perceived and affirmed, to wit: the ideas of substance, cause, s.p.a.ce, time, &c. In the action of these faculties, surely, real error is impossible.

SO OF THE SECONDARY FACULTIES.

Let us now contemplate the action of the secondary faculties, the Understanding and Judgment. The former unites the elements given by the three primary faculties into _notions_ of particular objects. The latter cla.s.sifies these notions according to qualities perceived. Here, also, we find no place for wrong affirmations. The understanding can only combine the elements actually given by the primary faculties. The Judgment can cla.s.sify only according to qualities actually perceived.

Thus I might go over the entire range of the Intelligence, and show, that seldom, if ever, in its appropriate action, it can make wrong affirmations.

ERROR, WHERE FOUND.--a.s.sUMPTION.

Where then is the place for error, for wrong opinions, and pre-judgments? Let us suppose, that a number of individuals are observing some object at a distance from them. No qualities are given but those common to a variety of objects, such as a man, horse, ox, &c.

The perceptive faculty has deceived no one in this case. It has given nothing but real qualities. The Understanding can only form a notion of it, as an object possessing these particular qualities. The Judgment can only affirm, that the qualities perceived are common to different cla.s.ses of objects, and consequently, that no affirmations can be made as to what cla.s.s the object perceived does belong. The Intelligence, therefore, makes no false affirmations. Still the inquiry goes round.