Yet the whole argument based upon it is a perpetual reasoning in a circle. Ask the Necessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his doctrine. His answer is, because "the Will _always_ is as the greatest apparent good." Cite now such facts as those stated above in contradiction of his a.s.sumption, and his answer is ready. There must be, in all such cases, some perceived or felt ground of preference, or there could be no act of Will in the case. There must have been, for example, some point in s.p.a.ce more eligible than any other for the location of the universe, and this must have been the reason why G.o.d selected the one he did. Ask him why he makes this declaration? His reply is, because "the Will is always as the greatest apparent good." Thus this a.s.sumption becomes premise or conclusion, just as the exigence of the theory based upon it demands. Nothing is so convenient and serviceable as such an a.s.sumption, when one has a very difficult and false position to sustain.

But who does not see, that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle?

To a.s.sume the proposition, "the Will always is as the greatest apparent good," in the first instance, as the basis of a universal theory, and then to a.s.sume the truth of that proposition as the basis of the explanation of particular facts, which contradict that theory, what is reasoning in a circle if this is not? No one has a right to a.s.sume this proposition as true at all, until he has first shown that it is affirmed by all the phenomena of the Will. On its authority he has no right to explain a solitary phenomenon. To do it is not only to reason in a circle, but to beg the question at issue.

MOTIVES CAUSE ACTS OF WILL, IN WHAT SENSE.

II. We are also prepared to notice another a.s.sumption of President Edwards, which, if admitted in the sense in which he a.s.sumes it as true, necessitates the admission of the Necessitarian scheme, to wit: that the determination of the Will is always _caused_ by the Motive present to the mind for putting forth that determination. "It is that motive," he says, "which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest which determines the Will." Again, "that every act of the Will has some cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of Will, whatsoever, is excited by some motive." "But if every act of the Will is excited by some motive, then that motive is the cause of that act of the Will." "And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives."

If we grant the principle here a.s.sumed, the conclusion follows of necessity. But let us inquire in what sense motive and volition sustain to each other the relation of cause and effect. _The presence and action of one power causes the action of another, so far, and so far only, as it necessitates such action; and causes its action in a particular direction, so far only as it necessitates its action in that direction, in opposition to every other_. Now the action of one power may cause the action of another, in one or both these ways.

1. It may necessitate its action, and necessitate it in one direction in opposition to any and every other. In this sense, fire causes the sensation of pain. It necessitates the action of the Sensibility, and in that one direction. Or,

2. One power may necessitate the _action_ of another power, but not necessitate its action in one direction in opposition to any or all others. We have seen, in a former chapter, that the Motive causes the action of the Will in this sense only, that it necessitates the Will to act in some direction, but not in one direction in distinction from another. Now the error of President Edwards lies in confounding these two senses of the word _cause_. He a.s.sumes that when one power causes the action of another in any sense, it must in every sense. It is readily admitted, that in one sense the Motive causes the action of the Will. But when we ask for the reason or cause of any one particular choice in distinction from another, we find it, not in the motive, but in the power of willing itself.

OBJECTION--PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.

III. We are also prepared to notice the great objection of Necessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here maintained. How, it is asked, shall we account, on this theory, for _particular_ volitions? The power to will only accounts for acts of Will in _some_ direction, but not for one act in distinction from another. This distinction must be accounted for, or we have an event without a cause. To this argument I reply,

1. It a.s.sumes the position in debate, to wit: that there cannot be consequents which are not necessarily connected with particular antecedents, which antecedents necessitate these particular consequents in distinction from all others.

2. To account for any effect, all that can properly be required is, to a.s.sign the existence and operation of a cause adequate to the production of such effects. Free-agency itself is such a cause in the case now under consideration. We have here given the existence and operation of a cause which must produce one of two effects, and is equally capable, under the circ.u.mstances, of producing either. Such a cause accounts for the existence of such an effect, just as much as the a.s.signment of an antecedent necessarily producing certain consequents, accounts for those consequents.

3. If, as this objection affirms, an act of Will, when there is no perceived or felt reason for that act in distinction from every other, is equivalent to an event without a cause; then it would be as impossible for us to _conceive_ of the former as of the latter. We cannot even conceive of an event without a cause. But we can conceive of an act of Will when no reason, but the power of willing, exists for that particular act in distinction from others. We cannot conceive of an event without a cause. But we _can_ conceive of the mind's selecting odd, for example, instead of even, without the Intellect or Sensibility impelling the Will to that act in distinction from others. Such act, therefore, is not equivalent to an event without a cause. The objection under consideration is consequently wholly baseless.

FACTS LIKE THE ABOVE WRONGLY ACCOUNTED FOR.

IV. The manner in which Necessitarians sometimes endeavor to account for acts of Will in which a selection is made between objects perceived and felt to be perfectly equal, requires attention. Suppose that A and B are before the mind. One or the other is to be selected, or no selection at all is to be made. These objects are present to the mind as perfectly equal. The Intelligence and Sensibility are in a state of entire equilibrium between them. Now when one of these objects is selected in distinction from the other, this act of Will is to be accounted for, it is said, by referring back to the determination to make the selection instead of not making it. The Will does not choose between A and B, at all. The choice is between choosing and not choosing. But mark: To determine to select A or B is one thing. To select one in distinction from the other, is quite another. The former act does not determine the Will towards either in distinction from the other. This last act remains to be accounted for. When we attempt to account for it, we cannot do it, by referring to the Intelligence or Sensibility for these are in a state of perfect equilibrium between the objects. We can account for it only by falling back upon the power of willing itself, and admitting that the Will is free, and not subject to the law of Necessity.

CHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL--HOW TREATED BY NECESSITARIANS.

V. The manner in which Necessitarians treat facts of this kind, to wit, choosing between things perceived and felt to be equal, also demands a pa.s.sing notice. Such facts are of very little importance, one way or the other, they say, in mental science. It is the height of folly to appeal to them to determine questions of such moment as the doctrine of Liberty and Necessity. I answer: Such facts are just as important in mental science, as the fall of a piece of gold and a feather, in an exhausted receiver, is in Natural Philosophy. The latter reveals with perfect clearness the great law of attraction in the material universe. The former reveals with equal conspicuousness the great law of Liberty in the realm of mind. The Necessitarian affirms, that no act of Will is possible, only in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence, or of the strongest impulse of the Sensibility. Facts are adduced in which, from the necessity of the case, both Faculties must be in a state of perfect equilibrium. Neither can impel the Will in one direction, in distinction from the other. In such circ.u.mstances, if the doctrine of Necessity is true, no acts of Will are possible. In precisely these circ.u.mstances acts of Will do arise. The doctrine of Necessity therefore is overthrown, and the truth of that Liberty is demonstrated. So important are those facts which Necessitarians affect to despise. True philosophy, it should be remembered, never looks contemptuously upon facts of any kind.

PALPABLE MISTAKE.

VI. We are prepared to notice a palpable mistake into which Necessitarians have fallen in respect to the use which the advocates of the doctrine of Liberty design to make of the fact, that the Will can and does select between objects perceived and felt to be equal.

"The reason why some metaphysical writers," says President Day, "have laid so much stress upon this apparently insignificant point, is probably the _inference_ which they propose to draw from the position which they a.s.sume. If it be conceded that the mind decides one way or the other indifferently, when the motives on each side are perfectly equal, they infer that this may be the fact, in all _other_ cases, even though the motives to opposite choices may be ever so unequal. But on what ground is this conclusion warranted? If a man is entirely indifferent which of two barley-corns to take, does it follow that he will be indifferent whether to accept of a guinea or a farthing; whether to possess an estate or a trinket?" The advocates of the doctrine of Liberty design to make, and do make, no such use of the facts under consideration, as is here attributed to them. They never argue that, because the Will can select between A and B, when they are perceived and felt to be equal, therefore, when the Will acts in one direction, in distinction from another, it is always, up to the moment of such action, impelled in different directions by feelings and judgments equally strong. What they do argue from such facts is, that the Will is subject to the law of Liberty and not to that of Necessity. If the Will is subject to the latter, then, when impelled in different directions by Motives equally strong (as in the cases above cited), it could no more act in the direction of one in distinction from the other, than a heavy body can move east instead of west, when drawn in each direction by forces perfectly equal. If the Will is subject to the law of Necessity, then, in all instances of selection between objects known and felt to be equal, we have an event without a cause. Even the Necessitarians, many of them at least, dare not deny that, under these very circ.u.mstances, selection does take place. They must, therefore, abandon their theory, or admit the dogma, of events without causes.

CHAPTER VI.

CONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY WITH THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

THE argument on which Necessitarians chiefly rely, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in support of that of Necessity, is based upon the Divine prescience of human conduct. The argument runs thus: all acts of the Will, however remote in the distant future, are foreknown to G.o.d.

This fact necessitates the conclusion, that such acts are in themselves certain, and, consequently, not free, but necessary. Either G.o.d cannot foreknow acts of Will, or they are necessary. The reply to this argument has already been antic.i.p.ated in the Introduction. The Divine prescience is not the truth to which the appeal should be made, to determine the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible. This I argue, for the obvious reason, that of the _mode_, _nature_, and _degree_, of the Divine prescience of human conduct we are profoundly ignorant. These we must know with perfect clearness, before we can affirm, with any certainty, whether this prescience is or is not consistent with the doctrine of Liberty. The Divine prescience is a truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. The doctrine of Liberty is, as we have seen, a truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. It is also a fact, as affirmed by the universal consciousness of man. How do we know that these two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other? How do we know but that, if we understood the _mode_, to say nothing of the nature and degree of the Divine prescience, we should not perceive with the utmost clearness, that this truth consists as perfectly with the doctrine of Liberty, as with that of Necessity.

If G.o.d foresees events, he foreknows them as they are, and not as they are not. If they are free and not necessary, as free and not necessary he foresees them. Having ascertained by consciousness that the acts of the Will are free, and having, from reason and revelation, determined, that G.o.d foreknows such acts, the great truth stands revealed to our mind, that G.o.d does and can foreknow human conduct, and yet man in such conduct be free; and that the mode, nature, and degree, of the former are such as most perfectly to consist with the latter.

I know with perfect distinctness, that I am now putting forth certain acts of Will. With equal distinctness I know, that such acts are not necessary, but free. My present knowledge is perfectly consistent with present freedom. How do I know but that G.o.d's foreknowledge of future acts is equally consistent with the most perfect freedom of such acts.

Perhaps a better presentation of this whole subject cannot be found than in the following extract from Jouffroy's "Introduction to Ethics." The extract, though somewhat lengthy, will well repay a most attentive perusal.

DANGER IN REASONING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH WE FOREKNOW EVENTS TO THAT OF DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

"To begin, then, with a very simple remark: if we conceive that foreknowledge in the Divine Being acts as it does in us, we run the risk of forming a most incorrect notion of it, and consequently, of seeing a contradiction between it and liberty, that would disappear altogether had we a truer notion. Let us consider that we have not the same faculty for foreseeing the future as we have of reviewing the past; and even in cases where we do antic.i.p.ate it, it is by an induction from the past.

This induction may amount either to certainty, or merely to probability.

It will amount to certainty when we are perfectly acquainted with necessary causes, and their law of operation. The effects of such causes in given circ.u.mstances having been determined by experience, we can predict the return of similar effects under similar circ.u.mstances with entire certainty, so long at least as the present laws of nature remain in force. It is in this way that we foresee, in most cases, the physical occurrences, whose law of operation is known to us; and such foresight would extend much further, were it not for unexpected circ.u.mstances which come in to modify the result. This induction can never go beyond probability, however, when we consider the acts of free causes; and for the very reason that they are free, and that the effects which arise from such causes are not of necessary occurrence, and do not invariably follow the same antecedent circ.u.mstances. Where the question is, then, as to the acts of any free cause, we are never able to foresee it with certainty, and induction is limited to conjectures of probability.

Such is the operation, and such are the limits of human foresight. Our minds foresee the future by induction from the past; this foresight can never attain certainty except in the case of causes and effects connected by necessary dependence; when the effects of free causes are to be antic.i.p.ated, as all such effects are contingent, our foresight must be merely conjecture."

MISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

"If, now, we attempt to attribute to the Deity the same mode of foresight of which human beings are capable, it will follow, as a strict consequence, that, as G.o.d must know exactly and completely the laws to which all the necessary causes in nature are subject--laws which change only according to his will,--he can foresee with absolute certainty all events which will take place in future. The certain foresight of effects, therefore, which is to us possible only in particular cases, and which, even then, is always liable to the limitation that the actual laws of nature are not modified,--this foresight, which, even when most sure, is limited and contingent, must be complete and absolute certainty in G.o.d, supposing his foreknowledge to be of like kind with ours.

But it is evident that, according to this hypothesis, the Deity cannot foresee with certainty the volitions of free causes any more than we can; for, as his foresight is founded, as ours is, upon the knowledge of the laws which govern causes, and as the law of free causes is precisely this, that their volitions are not necessary, G.o.d cannot calculate, any more than a human being can, the influence of motives, which, in any given case, may act upon such causes. Even his intelligence can lead no further than to conjectures, more probable, indeed, than ours, but never amounting to certainty. According to this hypothesis, we must, therefore, say either that G.o.d can foresee, certainly, the future volitions of men, and that man, therefore, is not a free being, or that man is free, and that G.o.d, therefore, cannot, any more than we can, foresee his volitions with certainty; and thus Divine prescience and human free-will are brought into direct contradiction.

But, gentlemen, why must there be this contradiction? Merely because we suppose that G.o.d foresees the future in the same way in which we foresee it; that his foreknowledge operates like our own. Now, is this, I ask, such an idea as we ought to form of Divine prescience, or such an idea as even the partisans of this system, which I am opposing, form? Have we any reason for thus imposing upon the Deity the limitation of our own feebleness? I think not.

Unendowed as we are, with any faculty of foreseeing the future, it may be difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in G.o.d. But yet can we not from a.n.a.logy form such an idea? We have now two faculties of perception--of the past by memory, of the present by observation; can we not imagine a third to exist in G.o.d--the faculty of perceiving the future, as we perceive the past? What would be the consequence? This: that G.o.d, instead of conjecturing, by induction, the acts of human beings from the laws of the causes operating upon them, would see them simply as the results of the free determinations of the will. Such perception of future acts no more implies the necessity of those actions, than the perception of similar acts in the past. To see that effects arise from certain causes is not to force causes to produce them; neither is it to compel these effects to follow. It matters not whether such a perception refers to the past, present, or future; it is merely a perception; and, therefore, far from producing the effect perceived, it even presupposes this effect already produced.

I do not pretend that this vision of what is to be is an operation of which our minds easily conceive. It is difficult to form an image of what we have never experienced; but I do a.s.sert, that the power of seeing what no longer exists is full as remarkable as that of seeing what has as yet no being, and that the reason of our readily conceiving of the former is only the fact that we are endowed with such a power: to my reason, the mystery is the same.

But whatever may or may not be in reality the mode of Divine foreknowledge, or however exact may be the image which we attempt to form of it, it always, I say,--and this is the only point I am desirous of proving,--it always remains a matter of uncertainty, which cannot be removed, whether the Divine foreknowledge is of a kind like our own, or not; and as, in the one case, there would not be the same contradiction that there is in the other, between our belief in Divine foreknowledge and human freedom, it is proved true, I think, that no one has a right to a.s.sert the existence of such a contradiction, and the necessity that human reason should choose between them."

SINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS.

There is no cla.s.s of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent reverence, upon the truth, that "secret things belong to G.o.d," and those and those only, "that are revealed to us;" that "none by searching can find out G.o.d;" that "as the heavens are high above the earth, so are His ways above our ways, and His thoughts above our thoughts;" and that it is the height of presumption in us, to pretend to understand G.o.d's mode of knowing and acting. None are more ready to talk of mysteries in religion than they. Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine foreknowledge, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in favor of that of Necessity, is based entirely upon the a.s.sumption that they have found out and fully understand the _mode_ of the Divine prescience of human conduct; that they have so measured and determined the "ways and thoughts" of G.o.d, that they _know_ that he cannot foresee any but _necessary_ events; that among many events, all in themselves equally possible, and none of them necessary in distinction from others, he cannot foreknow which, in fact, will arise. We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he obtained this knowledge, so vast and deep; whence he has thus "found out the Almighty to perfection?" To me, the pretension to such knowledge appears more like presumption than that deep self-distrust and humiliation which becomes the Finite in the presence of the Infinite. This knowledge has not been obtained from revelation. G.o.d has never told us that He can foresee none but necessary events. Whether He can or cannot foresee events free as well as necessary, is certainly one of the "secret things" which G.o.d has not revealed. If we admit ourselves ignorant of the _mode_ of G.o.d's fore-knowledge of future events (and who will dare deny the existence of such ignorance in his own case?), the entire argument of the Necessitarian, based upon that fore-knowledge, in favor of his doctrine, falls to the ground at once.

NECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT.

To all that has been said above, the Necessitarian brings an objection which he deems perfectly unanswerable. It is this: If actions are free in the sense maintained in this treatise, then in themselves they are uncertain. If they are still certainly known to G.o.d, they are both certain and uncertain, at the same time. True, I answer, but not in the same sense. As far as the _powers_ of the agent are concerned, the action may be uncertain, while G.o.d at the same time may know certainly how he will exert his powers. In reference merely to the _powers_ of the agent, the event is uncertain. In reference to the mind of G.o.d, who knows instinctively how he will exert these powers, the event is certain.

CHAPTER VII.

BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY UPON THE PURPOSES AND AGENCY OF G.o.d, IN RESPECT TO HUMAN CONDUCT.

ALL truth is in harmony with itself. Every particular truth is, and must be, in harmony with every other truth. If the doctrine of Necessity be a.s.sumed as true, we must take one view of the relation of G.o.d's purposes and agency in respect to the conduct of moral agents. If, on the other hand, we a.s.sume as true the doctrine of Liberty, quite another and a different view, in respect to this whole subject, must be taken. In the remarks which I have to make upon this subject, I shall a.s.sume the truth of the doctrine of Liberty, together with those of the perfect Divine Omniscience, Wisdom, and Benevolence. The question now arises, in the light of all these great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes and agency sustain to human action? In what sense does G.o.d purpose, preordain, and bring to pa.s.s, the voluntary conduct of moral agents? To this question but one answer can be given, in the light of the truths before us. G.o.d purposes human action in this sense only: He determines himself to act in a given manner, because it is wisest and best for him to act in that manner, and in that manner only. He determines this, knowing how intelligent beings will act under the influence brought to bear upon them by the Divine conduct. He purposes and brings about, or causes human action in this sense only, that in the counsels of eternity, He, in the exercise of infinite wisdom and goodness, preordains, and at the time appointed, gives existence to the _motives_ and _influences_ under which moral agents do act, and in the light of which they voluntarily determine their own character and conduct.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE.

G.o.dS PURPOSES CONSISTENT WITH THE LIBERTY OF CREATURES.

1. We perceive the perfect consistency of G.o.d's purposes and agency with human liberty. If the motives and influences in view of which men do act, do not destroy their free agency,--a fact which must be true from the nature of the Will,--then G.o.d's purposes to give existence, and his agency in giving existence, to these motives and influences, cannot in any sense destroy, or interfere with such agency. This is a self-evident truth.

SENSES IN WHICH G.o.d PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND EVIL.