7. If this doctrine is true, at the final Judgment the conscience and intelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the condemned. Suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed at that Day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, to wit, that G.o.d himself had placed these beings where but one course of conduct was possible to them, and that course they could not but pursue, to wit, the course which they did pursue, and that for having pursued this course, the only one possible, they are now to be "punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of G.o.d and the glory of his power," must not the intelligence of the universe p.r.o.nounce such a sentence unjust? All this must be true, or the doctrine of Necessity is false. Who can believe, that the pillars of G.o.d's eternal government rest upon such a doctrine?

8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might with the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the chemist, as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary result of the circ.u.mstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal retribution, probation based on such a principle?

9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential particulars, identical with _Fatalism_ in its worst form. All that Fatalism ever has maintained, or now maintains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot control nor resist, are placed in circ.u.mstances in which they cannot but pursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This doctrine has never affirmed, that, in the Necessitarian sense, men cannot "do as they please." All that it maintains is, that they cannot but please to do as they do. Thus this doctrine differs not one "jot or t.i.ttle," from Necessity. No man can show the want of perfect ident.i.ty between them. Fatalists and Necessitarians may differ in regard to the origin of this Necessity. In regard to its nature, the only thing material, as far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not differ at all.

10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the Will of _man_, we must maintain, that the Will of _G.o.d_ is subject to the same law. This is universally admitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in maintaining the necessity of all acts of the Divine Will, the following conclusions force themselves upon us:

(1.) MOTIVES which necessitate the determinations of the Divine Will, are the sole originating and efficient causes in existence. G.o.d is not the first cause of anything.

(2.) To motives, which of course exist independently of the Divine Will, we must ascribe the origin of all created existences. The glory of originating "all things visible and invisible," belongs not to Him, but to motives.

(3.) In all cases in which creatures are required to act differently from what they do, as in all acts of sin, they are in reality required not only to resist and overcome the omnipotent determinations of the Divine Will, but also the _motives_ by which the action of G.o.d's Will is necessitated. We ask Necessitarians to look these consequences in the face, and then say, whether they are prepared to deny, or to meet them.

11. Finally, if the doctrine under consideration is true, in all instances of the transgression of the moral law, men are, in reality, required to produce an event which, when it does exist, shall exist without a cause. In circ.u.mstances where but one event is possible, and that cannot but arise, if a different event should arise, it would undeniably be an event without a cause. To require such an event under such circ.u.mstances, is to require an event without a cause, the most palpable contradiction conceivable. Now just such a requirement as this is laid upon men, in all cases of disobedience of the moral law, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. In all such cases, according to this doctrine men are placed in circ.u.mstances in which but one act is possible, and that must arise, to wit: the act of disobedience which is put forth. If, in these circ.u.mstances, an act of obedience should be put forth, it would be an event without a cause, and in opposition also to the action of a necessary cause. In these identical circ.u.mstances, the act of obedience is required, that is, an act is required of creatures, which, if it should be put forth, would be an event without a cause. Has a G.o.d of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as that? How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such a difficulty?

DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY--DIRECT ARGUMENT.

II. We will now, as a second general argument, consider the position, that the Will is subject in its determinations to the relation of Liberty, in opposition to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, that as the phenomena of the Will must fall under one or the other of these relations, and as it has been shown, that they cannot fall under that of Necessity, but one supposition remains. They must fall under that of Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. The intrinsic absurdity of supposing that a being, all of whose actions are necessary, is still accountable for such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity for ever. A few additional considerations are deemed requisite, in order to present the evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will.

1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the doctrine of Liberty, as above defined, is distinctly apprehended, it is spontaneously recognized by every mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the facts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the Will.

This doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations of the universal Intelligence. This is the highest possible evidence of the truth of the doctrine.

2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of conduct might have been different from what it was. I will venture to affirm, that there is not a person on earth, who has not this conviction resting upon his mind in respect to his own past life. It is important to a.n.a.lyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon our present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that if our circ.u.mstances had been different, we might have acted differently from what we did. A man, for example, says to himself--"At such a time, and in such circ.u.mstances, I determined upon a particular course of conduct.

I might have determined upon a different and opposite course. Why did I not?" These affirmations are not based upon the conviction, that, in different circ.u.mstances, we might have done differently. In all such affirmations we take into account nothing but the particular circ.u.mstances in which our determinations were formed. It is in view of these circ.u.mstances exclusively, that we affirm that our determinations might have been different from what they were. Let the appeal be made to any individual whatever, whose mind is not at the time under the influence of any particular theory of the Will. You say, that at such a time, and under such circ.u.mstances, you determined upon a particular course, that you might then have resolved upon a different and opposite course, and that you blame yourself for not having done so. Is not this your real meaning? "If my circ.u.mstances had been different, I might have resolved upon a different course." No, he would reply. That is not my meaning. I was not thinking at all of a change of circ.u.mstances, when I made this affirmation. What I mean is, that in the circ.u.mstances in which I was, I might have done differently from what I did. This is the reason why I blame myself for not having done so. The same conviction, to wit: that without any change of circ.u.mstances our past course of life might have been different from what it was, rests upon every mind on earth in which the remembrance of the past dwells. Now this universal conviction is totally false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The doctrine of the Liberty of the Will must be true, or the universal Intelligence is a perpetual falsehood.

3. In favor of the doctrine of Liberty, I next appeal to the direct, deliberate, and universal testimony of consciousness. This testimony is given in three ways.

(1.) In the general conviction above referred to, that without any change of circ.u.mstances, our course of conduct might have been the opposite of what it was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the Liberty of the Will, can account for this conviction.

(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind, consciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these identical circ.u.mstances, either of two or more acts of Will is equally possible. Every man in such circ.u.mstances is as conscious of such power as he is of his own existence. In confirmation of these affirmations, let any one make the appeal to his own consciousness, when about to put forth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious that either of two or more different determinations is, in the same circ.u.mstances, equally possible, as he is of any mental state whatever.

(3.) In reference to all deliberate determinations of Will in time past, the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most positive, that, in the same identical circ.u.mstances, determinations precisely opposite might have been originated. Let any one recall any such determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined differently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He cannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he will be, that he might have acted [determined] differently. All these affirmations of consciousness are false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.

4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the phenomena of the Will, and those of the other faculties, the Sensibility for example, is a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a truth of universal consciousness. A man is taken out of a burning furnace, with his physical system greatly injured by the fire. As a consequence, he subsequently experiences much suffering and inconvenience. For the injury done him by the fire, and for the pain subsequently experienced, he never blames or reproaches himself. With self-reproach he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, did I not come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of Nebuchadnezzar? Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as a consequence of that injury? Suppose, now, that his fall into the furnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of self-murder. For that determination, and for not having, in the same circ.u.mstances, determined differently, he will ever after reproach himself, as most guilty in the sight of G.o.d and man. How shall we account for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance, and for its presence in the latter? If the appeal should be made to the subject, his answer would be ready. In respect to the injury and pain, in the circ.u.mstances supposed, they could not but be experienced. Such phenomena, therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. In the condition in which the determination referred to was formed, a different and opposite resolution might have been originated. That particular determination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. How shall we account for this distinction, which all mankind agree in making, between the phenomena of the Sensibility on the one hand, and of the Will on the other? But one supposition accounts for this fact, the universal consciousness, that the former are necessary, and the latter free that in the circ.u.mstances of their occurrence the former may not, and the latter may, be different from what they are.

5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the words, obligation, merit and demerit, &c., are words without meaning. A man is, we will suppose, by Divine Providence, placed in circ.u.mstances in which he cannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, which is the same thing, put forth given determinations. When it is said that, in these identical circ.u.mstances, he ought to pursue a different and opposite course, or to put forth different and opposite determinations, what conceivable meaning can we attach to the word _ought_, here? There is nothing, in the circ.u.mstances supposed, which the word, _ought_, or obligation, can represent. If we predicate merit or demerit of an individual thus circ.u.mstanced, we use words equally without meaning.

Obligation and moral desert, in such a case, rest upon "airy nothing,"

without a "local habitation or a name."

On the other hand, if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all times equally possible to an individual; that when he chooses the one, he might, in the same identical circ.u.mstances, choose the other; infinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obligation, merit and demerit, when it is said that an individual thus circ.u.mstanced ought to do the right and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or punishment, when he does the one, or does not do the other. The ideas of obligation, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, and probation with reference to a state of moral retribution, are all chimeras, on any other supposition than that of the Liberty of the Will. With this doctrine, they all perfectly harmonize.

6. All moral government, all laws, human and Divine, have their basis in the doctrine of Liberty; and are the perfection of tyranny, on any other supposition. To place creatures in circ.u.mstances which necessitate a given course of conduct, and render every other course impossible, and then to require of them, under the heaviest sanctions, a different and opposite course--what can be tyranny if this is not?

OBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS.

An objection which is brought by Necessitarians, in perpetual bar of an appeal to consciousness, to determine the fact whether the phenomena of the Will fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here demands special attention. Consciousness, it is said, simply affirms, that, in given circ.u.mstances, we do, in fact, put forth certain acts of Will. But whether we can or cannot, in these circ.u.mstances, put forth other and opposite determinations, it does not and cannot make any affirmation at all. It does not, therefore, fall within the province of Consciousness to determine whether the phenomena of the Will are subject to the relation of Liberty or Necessity; and it is unphilosophical to appeal to that faculty to decide such a question. This objection, if valid, renders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject; and as it const.i.tutes a stronghold of the Necessitarian, it becomes us to examine it with great care. In reply, I remark,

1. That if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the Will, it must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties the Intelligence, for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection to a test, by applying it to certain intellectual phenomena. We will take, as an example, the universal and necessary affirmation, that "it is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be."

Every one is conscious, in certain circ.u.mstances, of making this and other kindred affirmations. Now, if the objection under consideration is valid, all that we should be conscious of is the fact, that, under the circ.u.mstances supposed, we do, in reality, make particular affirmations; while, in reference to the question, whether, in the same circ.u.mstances, we can or cannot make different and opposite affirmations, we should have no consciousness at all. Now, I appeal to every man, whether, when he is conscious of making the affirmation, that it is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be, he is not equally conscious of the fact, that it is impossible for him to make the opposite affirmation whether, when he affirms that three and two make five, he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that three and two are six? In other words, when we are conscious of making certain intellectual affirmations, are we not equally conscious of an impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations? Every man is just as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his Intelligence fall under the relation of Necessity, as he is of making any affirmations at all. If this is not so, we cannot know but that it is possible for us to affirm and believe perceived contradictions. All that we could say is, that, as a matter of fact, we do not do it. But whether we can or cannot do it, we can never know. Do we not know, however, as absolutely as we know anything, that we _cannot_ affirm perceived contradictions? In other words, we do and can know absolutely, that our Intelligence is subject to the law of Necessity. We do know by consciousness, with absolute certainty, that the phenomena of the Intelligence, and I may add, of the Sensibility too, do fall under the relation of Necessity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty, whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation of Liberty? What then becomes of the objection under consideration?

2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the Intellect is under the law of Necessity, we are equally conscious that Will is under that of Liberty. We make intellectual affirmations; such, for example, as the propositions, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another, There can be no event without a cause, &c., with a consciousness of an utter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations. We put forth acts of Will with a consciousness equally distinct and absolute, of a possibility, in the same circ.u.mstances, of putting forth different and opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit and affirm the validity of the testimony of consciousness in the former instance. Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter?

3. The question, whether Consciousness can or cannot give us not only mental phenomena, but also the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena, cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory, in respect to what Consciousness can or cannot affirm. If we wish to know to what a witness is able to testify, we must not first determine what he can or cannot say, and then refuse to hear anything from him, except in conformity to such decisions. We must first give him a full and attentive hearing, and then judge of his capabilities. So in respect to Consciousness. If we wish to know what it does or does not, what it can or cannot affirm, we must let it give its full testimony, untrammelled by any pre-formed theories. Now, when the appeal is thus made, we find, that, in the circ.u.mstances in which we do originate given determinations, it affirms distinctly and absolutely, that, in the same identical circ.u.mstances, we might originate different and opposite determinations. From what Consciousness does affirm, we ought surely to determine the sphere of its legitimate affirmations.

4. The universal solicitude of Necessitarians to take the question under consideration from the bar of Consciousness is, in fact, a most decisive acknowledgment, on their part, that at that tribunal the cause will go against them. Let us suppose that all men were as conscious that their Will is subject to the law of Necessity, as they are that their Intelligence is. Can we conceive that Necessitarians would not be as solicitous to carry the question directly to the tribunal of Consciousness, as they now are to take it from that tribunal? When all men are as conscious that their Will is under the law of Liberty, as they are that their other faculties are under the relation of Necessity, no wonder that Necessitarians antic.i.p.ate the ruin of their cause, when the question is to be submitted to the bar of Consciousness. No wonder that they so solemnly protest against an appeal to that tribunal. Let the reader remember, however, that the moment the validity of the affirmations of Consciousness is denied, in respect to any question in mental science, it becomes infinite folly in us to reason at all on the subject; a folly just as great as it would be for a natural philosopher to reason about colors, after denying the validity of all affirmations of the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to reason.

DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN ALL MINDS.

III. I will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of Liberty; an argument, which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but which differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above presented. I argue the Liberty of the Will _from the existence of the idea of Liberty in the human mind, in the form in which it is there found_.

If the Will is not free, the idea of Liberty is wholly inapplicable to any phenomenon in existence whatever. Yet this idea is in the mind. The action of the Will in conformity to it is just as conceivable as its action in conformity to the idea of Necessity. It remains with the Necessitarian to account for the existence of this idea in the human mind, in consistency with his own theory. Here the following considerations present themselves demanding special attention.

1. The idea of Liberty, like that of Necessity, is a _simple_, and not a _complex_ idea. This all will admit.

2. It could not have come into the mind from observation or reflection because all phenomena, external and internal, all the objects of observation and reflection, are, according to the doctrine of Necessity, not free, but necessary.

3. It could not have originated, as _necessary_ ideas do, as the logical antecedents of the truths given by observation and reflection. For example, the idea of s.p.a.ce, time, substance, and cause, are given in the Intelligence, as the logical antecedents of the ideas of body, succession, phenomena, and events, all of which are truths derived from observation or reflection. Now the idea of Liberty, if the doctrine of Necessity is true, cannot have arisen in this way because all the objects of observation and reflection are, according to this doctrine, necessary, and therefore their logical antecedents must be. How shall we account, in consistency with this theory, for the existence of this idea in the mind? It came not from perception external, nor internal, nor as the logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus perceived. Now if we admit the doctrine of Liberty as a truth of universal consciousness, we can give a philosophical account of the existence of the idea of Liberty in all minds. If we deny this doctrine, and consequently affirm that of Necessity, we may safely challenge any theologian or philosopher to give such an account of the existence of that idea in the mind. For all ideas, in the mind, do and must come from observation or reflection, or as the logical antecedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained. We have here an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Necessity is true.

4. All _simple_ ideas, with the exception of that of Liberty, have realities within or around us, corresponding to them. If the doctrine of Necessity is true, we have one solitary idea of this character, that of Liberty, to which no reality corresponds. Whence this solitary intruder in the human mind?

The existence of this idea in the mind is proof demonstrative, that a reality corresponding to it does and must exist, and as this reality is found nowhere but in the Will, there it must be found. Almost all Necessitarians are, in philosophy, the disciples of Locke. With him, they maintain, that all ideas in the mind come from observation and reflection. Yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea, that of Liberty, which never could thus have originated; because, according to their theory, no objects corresponding do or can exist, either as realities, or as the objects of observation or reflection. We have again an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.

5. The relation of the ideas of Liberty and Necessity to those of obligation, merit and demerit, &c., next demand our attention. If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the idea of Liberty is, as we have seen, a chimera. With it the idea of obligation can have no connection or alliance; but must rest exclusively upon that of Necessity. Now, how happens it, that no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever known to deny that of obligation, or of merit and demerit? How happens it, that the validity of neither of these ideas has ever, in any age or nation, been denied, except on the avowed authority of the doctrine of Necessity? Sceptics of the cla.s.s who deny moral obligation, are universally avowed Necessitarians. We may safely challenge the world to produce a single exception to this statement. We may challenge the world to produce an individual in ancient or modern times who holds the doctrine of Liberty, and denies moral obligation, or an individual who denies moral obligation on any other ground than that of Necessity. Now, how can this fact be accounted for, that the ideas of obligation, merit and demerit, &c., universally attach themselves to a chimera, the idea of Liberty, and stand in such irreconcilable hostility to the only idea by which, as Necessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed?

6. Finally, If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the phenomena of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and the Will, are given in Consciousness as alike necessary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in the mind, would not be likely to attach itself to either of these cla.s.ses of phenomena; and if to either, it would be just as likely to attach itself to one cla.s.s as to another. Now, how shall we account for the fact, that this idea always attaches itself to one of these cla.s.ses of phenomena, those of the Will, and never to either of the others? How is it that all men agree in holding, that, in the circ.u.mstances of their occurrence, the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility cannot but be what they are, while those of the Will may be otherwise than they are? Why, if this chimera, the idea of Liberty, attaches itself to either of these cla.s.ses, does it not sometimes attach itself to the phenomena of the Intelligence or Sensibility, as well as to those of the Will? Here, once again, we have an event without a cause, a distinction without a difference, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The facts before us can be accounted for only on the supposition, that the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility are given in Consciousness as necessary, while those of the Will are given as free.

THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE BIBLE.

IV. We will now, in the fourth place, raise the inquiry, an inquiry very appropriate in its place, and having an important bearing upon our present investigations, whether the doctrine of the Will, above established, is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible? The following considerations will enable us to give a decisive answer to this inquiry.

1. If the doctrine of the Will here maintained is not, and consequently that of Necessity is, the doctrine pre-supposed in the Scriptures, then we have two revelations from G.o.d, the external and internal, in palpable contradiction to each other. As the _works_ of G.o.d (see Rom. 1: 19, 20) are as real a revelation from him as the Bible, so are the necessary affirmations of our Intelligence. Now, in our inner being, in the depths of our Intelligence, the fact is perpetually revealed and affirmed--a fact which we cannot disbelieve, if we would--that we are not _necessary_ but _free_ agents. Suppose that, in the external revelation, the Scriptures, the fact is revealed and affirmed that we are _not free_ but _necessary_ agents. Has not G.o.d himself affirmed in one revelation what he has denied in another? Of what use can the internal revelation be, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the external?

Has the Most High given two such revelations as this?

2. In the Scriptures, man is presented as the subject, and, of course, as possessing those powers which render him the proper subject of command and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and punishment. Let us suppose that G.o.d has imparted to a being a certain const.i.tution, and then placed him in a condition in which, in consequence of the necessary correlation between his const.i.tution and circ.u.mstances, but one series of determinations are possible to him, and that series cannot but result. Can we conceive it proper in the Most High to prohibit that creature from pursuing the course which G.o.d himself has rendered it impossible for him not to pursue, and require him, under the heaviest sanctions, to pursue, under these identical circ.u.mstances, a different and opposite course--a course which the Creator has rendered it impossible for him to pursue? Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible? Does the Bible imply a system of mental philosophy which renders the terms, obligation, merit and demerit, void of all conceivable meaning, and which lays no other foundation for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny?

3. Let us now contemplate the doings of the Great Day revealed in the Scriptures, in the light of these two opposite theories. Let us suppose that, as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and separate ma.s.ses before the Eternal One, the Most High says to the one cla.s.s, "You, I myself placed in circ.u.mstances in which nothing but obedience was possible, and that you could not but render; and you, I placed in a condition in which nothing but disobedience was possible to you, and that you could not but perpetrate. In consequence of these distinct and opposite courses, each of which I myself rendered unavoidable, _you_ deserve and shall receive my eternal smiles; and _you_ as richly deserve and shall therefore endure my eternal frowns." What would be the response of an a.s.sembled universe to a division based upon such a principle? Is this the principle on which the decisions of that Day are based? It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and that of Necessity is, the doctrine of the Bible?

4. We will now contemplate another cla.s.s of pa.s.sages which have a bearing equally decisive upon our present inquiries. I refer to that cla.s.s in which G.o.d expresses the deepest regret at the course which transgressors have pursued, and are still pursuing, and the most decisive unwillingness that they should pursue that course and perish.

He takes a solemn oath, that he is not willing that they should take the course of disobedience and death, but that they should pursue a different and opposite course. G.o.d expresses no regret that they are in the _circ.u.mstances_ in which they are, but that in those circ.u.mstances they should take the path of disobedience, and not that of obedience.

Now, can we suppose, what must be true, if the doctrine of Necessity is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible, that G.o.d places his creatures in circ.u.mstances in which obedience is to them an impossibility, and in which they cannot but disobey, and then takes a solemn oath that he is not willing that they should disobey and perish, "but that they should turn from their evil way and live?" What is the meaning of the exclamation, "O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandment," if G.o.d himself had so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an impossibility to him? Is this the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible? On the other hand, how perfectly in place are all the pa.s.sages under consideration, on the supposition that the doctrine of Liberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed, and that consequently the obedience which G.o.d affirms Himself desirous that sinners should render, and his regret that they do not render, is always possible to them! One of the seven pillars of the Gospel is this very doctrine. Take it from the Bible, and we have "another Gospel."

5. One other cla.s.s of pa.s.sages claims special attention here. In the Scriptures, the Most High expresses the greatest _astonishment_ that men should sin under the influences to which he has subjected them. He calls upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the conduct of men under those influences. "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth,"

he exclaims, "for the Lord hath spoken; I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me." Now, let us suppose, as the doctrine of Necessity affirms, that G.o.d has placed sinners under influences under which they cannot but sin. What must we think of his conduct in calling upon the universe to unite with him in astonishment, that under these influences they should sin--that is, take the only course possible to them, the course which they cannot but take? With the same propriety, he might place a ma.s.s of water on an inclined plane, and then call upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the downward flow of the fluid. Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible?

SEC. 3. VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS.

We are now prepared for a consideration of certain miscellaneous questions which have an important bearing upon our present inquiries.

NECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS.