302-5).

"It appears, then, that Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept the general evolution theory. But are there any theological authorities to justify this view of the matter?

"Now, considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations, it might hardly be expected _a priori_ that writers of earlier ages should have given expression to doctrines harmonizing in any degree with such very modern views; nevertheless, this is certainly the case, and it would be easy to give numerous examples.

It will be better, however, to cite one or two authorities of weight.

Perhaps no writer of the earlier Christian ages could be quoted whose authority is more generally recognized than that of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the mediaeval period for St. Thomas Aquinas: and since the movement of Luther, Suarez may be taken as an authority, widely venerated, and one whose orthodoxy has never been questioned.

"It must be borne in mind that for a considerable time even after the last of these writers no one had disputed the generally received belief as to the small age of the world, or at least of the kinds of animals and plants inhabiting it. It becomes, therefore, much more striking if views formed under such a condition of opinion are found to harmonize with modern ideas concerning 'Creation' and organic Life.

"Now St. Augustin insists in a very remarkable manner on the merely derivative sense in which G.o.d's creation of organic forms is to be understood; that is, that G.o.d created them by conferring on the material world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions."

Mr. Mivart then cites certain pa.s.sages from St. Augustin, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Cornelius a Lapide, and finally adds:--

"As to Suarez, it will be enough to refer to Disp. xv. sec.

2, No. 9, p. 508, t.i. edition Vives, Paris; also Nos. 13--15.

Many other references to the same effect could easily be given, but these may suffice.

"It is then evident that ancient and most venerable theological authorities distinctly a.s.sert _derivative_ creation, and thus their teachings harmonize with all that modern science can possibly require."

It will be observed that Mr. Mivart refers solely to Suarez's fifteenth Disputation, though he adds, "Many other references to the same effect could easily be given." I shall look anxiously for these references in the third edition of the "Genesis of Species." For the present, all I can say is, that I have sought in vain, either in the fifteenth Disputation, or elsewhere, for any pa.s.sage in Suarez's writings which, in the slightest degree, bears out Mr. Mivart's views as to his opinions.[1]

[Footnote 1: The edition of Suarez's "Disputationes" from which the following citations are given, is Birckmann's, in two volumes folio, and is dated 1630.]

The t.i.tle of this fifteenth Disputation is "De causa formali substantiali," and the second section of that Disputation (to which Mr. Mivart refers) is headed, "Quomodo possit forma substantialis fieri in materia et ex materia?"

The problem which Suarez discusses in this place may be popularly stated thus: According to the scholastic philosophy every natural body has two components--the one its "matter" (_materia prima_), the other its "substantial form" (_forma substantialis_). Of these the matter is everywhere the same, the matter of one body being indistinguishable from the matter of any other body. That which differentiates any one natural body from all others is its substantial form, which inheres in the matter of that body, as the human soul inheres in the matter of the frame of man, and is the source of all the activities and other properties of the body.

Thus, says Suarez, if water is heated, and the source of heat is then removed, it cools again. The reason of this is that there is a certain "_intimius principium_" in the water, which brings it back to the cool condition when the external impediment to the existence of that condition is removed. This _intimius principium_, is the "substantial form" of the water. And the substantial form of the water is not only the cause (_radix_) of the coolness of the water, but also of its moisture, of its density, and of all its other properties.

It will thus be seen that "substantial forms" play nearly the same part in the scholastic philosophy as "forces" do in modern science; the general tendency of modern thought being to conceive all bodies as resolvable into material particles and forces, in virtue of which last these particles a.s.sume those dispositions and exercise those powers which are characteristic of each particular kind of matter.

But the Schoolmen distinguished two kinds of substantial forms, the one spiritual and the other material. The former division is represented by the human soul, the _anima rationalis_; and they affirm as a matter, not merely of reason, but of faith, that every human soul is created out of nothing, and by this act of creation is endowed with the power of existing for all eternity, apart from the _materia prima_ of which the corporeal frame of man is composed. And the _anima rationalis_, once united with the _materia prima_ of the body, becomes its substantial form, and is the source of all the powers and faculties of man--of all the vital and sensitive phenomena which he exhibits--just as the substantial form of water is the source of all its qualities.

The "material substantial forms" are those which inform all other natural bodies except that of man; and the object of Suarez in the present Disputation, is to show that the axiom "_ex nihilo nihil fit_," though not true of the substantial form of man, is true of the substantial forms of all other bodies, the endless mutations of which const.i.tute the ordinary course of nature. The origin of the difficulty which he discusses is easily comprehensible. Suppose a piece of bright iron to be exposed to the air. The existence of the iron depends on the presence within it of a substantial form, which is the cause of its properties, e.g. brightness, hardness, weight. But, by degrees, the iron becomes converted into a ma.s.s of rust, which is dull, and soft, and light, and, in all other respects, is quite different from the iron. As, in the scholastic view, this difference is due to the rust being informed by a new substantial form, the grave problem arises, how did this new substantial form come into being? Has it been created? or has it arisen by the power of natural causation? If the former hypothesis is correct, then the axiom, "_ex nihilo nihil fit_,"

is false, even in relation to the ordinary course of nature, seeing that such mutations of matter as imply the continual origin of new substantial forms are occurring every moment. But the harmonization of Aristotle with theology was as dear to the Schoolmen, as the smoothing down the differences between Moses and science is to our Broad Churchmen, and they were proportionably unwilling to contradict one of Aristotle's fundamental propositions. Nor was their objection to flying in the face of the Stagirite likely to be lessened by the fact that such flight landed them in flat Pantheism.

So Father Suarez fights stoutly for the second hypothesis; and I quote the princ.i.p.al part of his argumentation as an exquisite specimen of that speech which is a "darkening of counsel."

"13. Secundo de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus (sc.

materialibus) dicendum est non fieri proprie ex nihilo, sed ex potentia praejacentis materiae educi: ideoque in effectione harum formarum nil fieri contra illud axioma, _Ex nihila nihil fit_, si recte intelligatur. Haec a.s.sertio sumitur ex Aristotele 1. Physicorum per totum et libro 7. Metaphyss.

et ex aliis authoribus, quos statim referam. Et declaratur breviter, nam fieri ex nihilo duo dicit, unum est fieri absolute et simpliciter, aliud est quod talis effectio fit ex nihilo. Primum proprie dicitur de re subsistente, quia ejus est fieri, cujus est esse: id autem proprie quod subsist.i.t et habet esse; nam quod alteri adjacet, potius est quo aliud est.

Ex hac ergo parte, formae substantiales materiales non fiunt ex nihilo, quia proprie non fiunt. Atque hanc rationem reddit Divus Thomas I parte, quaestione 45, articulo 8, et quaestione 90, articulo 2, et ex dicendis magis explicabitur. Sumendo ergo ipsum _fieri_ in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri ex nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte praesupposita, ex quo fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum de novo fiunt, non fiunt ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex praesupposita materia, ex qua componuntur, et ita non fiunt, secundum se totae, sed secundum aliquid sui. Formae autem harum rerum, quamvis revera totam suam ent.i.tatem de novo accipiant, quam antea non habebant, quia vero ipsae non fiunt, ut dictum est, ideo neque ex nihilo fiunt. Attamen, quia latiori modo sumendo verb.u.m illud _fieri_ negari non potest: quia forma facta sit, eo modo quo nunc est, et antea non erat, ut etiam probat ratio dubitandi posita in principio sectionis, ideo addendum est, sumpto _fieri_ in hac amplitudine, fieri ex nihilo non tamen negare habitudinem materialis causea intrinsece componentis id quod fit, sed etiam habitudinem causae materialis per se causantis et sustentantis formam quae fit, seu confit. Diximus enim in superioribus materiam et esse causam compositi et formae dependentis ab ilia: ut res ergo dicatur ex nihilo fieri uterque modus causalitatis negari debet; et eodem sensu accipiendum est illud axioma, ut sit verum: _Ex nihilo nihil fit_, scilicet virtute agentis naturalis et finiti nihil fieri, nisi ex praesupposito subjecto per se concurrente, et ad compositum et ad formam, si utrumque suo modo ab eodem agente fiat. Ex his ergo recte concluditur, formas substantiales materiales non fieri ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex materia, quae in suo genere per se concurrit, et influit ad esse, et fieri talium formarum; quia, sicut esse non possunt nisi affixae materiae, a qua sustententur in esse: ita nec fieri possunt, nisi earum effectio et penetratio in eadem materia sustentetur. Et haec est propria et per se differentia inter effectionem ex nihilo, et ex aliquo, propter quam, ut infra ostendemus, prior modus effciendi superat vim finitam naturaliam agentium, non vero posterior.

"14. Ex his etiam constat, proprie de his formis dici non creari, sed educi de potentia materiae."[1]

[Footnote 1: Suarez, _loc. cit_. Disput. xv. -- ii.]

If I may venture to interpret these hard sayings, Suarez conceives that the evolution of substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature, is conditioned not only by the existence of the _materia prima_, but also by a certain "concurrence and influence" which that _materia_ exerts; and every new substantial form being thus conditioned, and in part, at any rate, caused, by a pre-existing something, cannot be said to be created out of nothing.

But as the whole tenor of the context shows, Suarez applies this argumentation merely to the evolution of material substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature. How the substantial forms of animals and plants primarily originated, is a question to which, so far as I am able to discover, he does not so much as allude in his "Metaphysical Disputations." Nor was there any necessity that he should do so, inasmuch as he has devoted a separate treatise of considerable bulk to the discussion of all the problems which arise out of the account of the Creation which is given in the Book of Genesis. And it is a matter of wonderment to me that Mr. Mivart, who somewhat sharply reproves "Mr. Darwin and others" for not acquainting themselves with the true teachings of his Church, should allow himself to be indebted to a heretic like myself for a knowledge of the existence of that "Tractatus de opere s.e.x Dierum," I in which the learned Father, of whom he justly speaks, as "an authority widely venerated, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned," directly opposes all those opinions, for which Mr. Mivart claims the shelter of his authority.

In the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first book of this treatise, Suarez inquires in what sense the word "day," as employed in the first chapter of Genesis, is to be taken. He discusses the views of Philo and of Augustin on this question, and rejects them. He suggests that the approval of their allegorizing interpretations by St. Thomas Aquinas, merely arose out of St. Thomas's modesty, and his desire not to seem openly to controvert St. Augustin--"voluisse Divus Thomas pro sua modestia subterfugere vim argumenti potius quam aperte Augustinum inconstantiae arguere."

Finally, Suarez decides that the writer of Genesis meant that the term "day" should be taken in its natural sense; and he winds up the discussion with the very just and natural remark that "it is not probable that G.o.d, in inspiring Moses to write a history of the Creation which was to be believed by ordinary people, would have made him use language, the true meaning of which it is hard to discover, and still harder to believe."[1]

[Footnote 1: "Tractatus de opere s.e.x Dierum, seu de Universi Creatione, quatenus s.e.x diebus perfecta esse, in libro Genesis cap. i.

refertur, et praesertim de productioue hominis in statu innocentiae."

Ed. Birckmann, 1622.]

And in chapter xii. 3, Suarez further observes:--

"Ratio enim retinendi veram significationem diei naturalis est illa communis, quod verba Scripturae non sunt ad metaphoras transferenda, nisi vel necessitas cogit, vel ex ipsa scriptura constet, et maxime in historica narratione et ad instructionem fidei pertinente: sed haec ratio non minus cogit ad intelligendum proprie dierum numerum, quam diei qualitatem, QUIA NON MINUS UNO MODO QUAM ALIO DESTRUITUR SINCERITAS, IMO ET VERITAS HISTORIAE. Secundo hoc valde confirmant alia Scripturae loca, in quibus hi s.e.x dies tanquam veri, et inter se distincti commemorantur, ut Exod. 20 dicitur, _s.e.x diebus operabis et facies omnia opera tua, septimo autem die Sabbatum Domini Dei tui est_. Et infra: _s.e.x enim diebus fecit Dominus caelum et terram et mare et omnia quae in eis sunt_, et idem repet.i.tur in cap. 31. In quibus locis sermonis proprietas colligi potest tum ex aequiparatione, nam c.u.m dicitur: _s.e.x diebus operabis_, propriissime intelligitur: tum quia non est verisimile, potuisse populum intelligere verba illa in alio sensu, et e contrario incredibile est, Deum in suis praeceptis tradendis illis verbis ad populum fuisse loquutum, quibus deciperetur, falsum sensum concipiendo, si Deus non per s.e.x veros dies opera sua fecisset."

These pa.s.sages leave no doubt that this great doctor of the Catholic Church, of unchallenged authority and unspotted orthodoxy, not only declares it to be Catholic doctrine that the work of creation took place in the s.p.a.ce of six natural days; but that he warmly repudiates, as inconsistent with our knowledge of the Divine attributes, the supposition that the language which Catholic faith requires the believer to hold that G.o.d inspired, was used in any other sense than that which He knew it would convey to the minds of those to whom it was addressed.

And I think that in this repudiation Father Suarez will have the sympathy of every man of common uprightness, to whom it is certainly "incredible" that the Almighty should have acted in a manner which He would esteem dishonest and base in a man.

But the belief that the universe was created in six natural days is hopelessly inconsistent with the doctrine of evolution, in so far as it applies to the stars and planetary bodies; and it can be made to agree with a belief in the evolution of living beings only by the supposition that the plants and animals, which are said to have been created on the third, fifth, and six days, were merely the primordial forms, or rudiments, out of which existing plants and animals have been evolved; so that, on these days, plants and animals were not created actually, but only potentially.

The latter view is that held by Mr. Mivart, who follows St. Augustin, and implies that he has the sanction of Suarez. But, in point of fact, the latter great light of orthodoxy takes no small pains to give the most explicit and direct contradiction to all such imaginations, as the following pa.s.sages prove. In the first place, as regards plants, Suarez discusses the problem:--

"_Quomodo herba virens et caetera vegetabilia hoc [tertio] die fuerint producta._[1]

[Footnote 1: "Propter haec ergo sententia illa Augustini et propter nimiam obscuritatem et subtilitatem ejus difficilis creditu est: quia verisimile non est Deum inspira.s.se Moysi, ut historiam de creatione mundi ad fidem totius populi adeo necessariam per nomina dierum explicaret, quorum significatio vix inveniri et difficillime ab aliquo credi posset." _(Loc.

cit._ Lib. I. cap. xi. 42.)]

"Praecipua enim difficultas hic est, quam attingit Div. Thomas I, par. qu. 69, art. 2, an haec productio plantarum hoc die facta intelligenda sit de productione ipsarum in proprio esse actuali et formali (ut sic rem explicerem) vel de productione tantum in semine et in potentia. Nam Divus Augustinus libro quinto Genes, ad liter, cap. 4 et 5 et libro 8, cap. 3, posteriorem partem tradit, dicens, terram in hoc die accep.i.s.se virtutem germinandi omnia vegetabilia quasi concepto omnium illorum semine, non tamen statim vegetabilia omnia produxisse.

Quod primo suadet verbis illis capitis secundi. _In die quo fecit Deus coelum et terram et omne virgultum agri priusquam, germinaret_. Quomodo enim potuerunt virgulta fieri antequam terra germinaret nisi quia causaliter prius et quasi in radice, seu in semine facta sunt, et postea in actu producta?

Secundo confirmari potest, quia verb.u.m illud _germinet terra_ optime exponitur potestative ut sic dicam, id est, accipiat terra vim germinandi. Sicut in eodem capite dicitur _crescite et multiplicamini_. Tertio potest confirmari, quia actualis productio vegetabilium non tarn ad opus creationis, quam ad opus propagationis pertinet, quod postea factum est. Et hanc sententiam sequitur Eucherius lib. 1, in Gen. cap. 11, et illi faveat Glossa, interli. Hugo. et Lyran. dum verb.u.m _germinet_ dicto modo exponunt. NIHILOMINUS CONTRARIA SENTENTIA TENENDA EST: SCILICET, PRODUXISSE DEUM HOC DIE HERBAM, ARBORES, ET ALIA VEGETABILIA ACTU IN PROPRIA SPECIE ET NATURA. Haec est communis sententia Patrum.--Basil, homil. 5; Exaemer. Ambros.

lib. 3; Exaemer. cap. 8,11, et 16; Chrysost, homil. 5 in Gen.

Damascene, lib. 2 de Fid. cap. 10; Theodor. Cyrilli. Bedae, Glossae ordinariae et aliorum in Gen. Et idem sent.i.t Divus Thomas, _supra_, solvens argumenta Augustini, quamvis propter reverentiam ejus quasi problematice semper procedat. Denique idem sentiunt omnes qui in his operibus veram successionem et temporalem distinctionem agnoscant."

Secondly, with respect to animals, Suarez is no less decided:--

_De animalium ratione carentium productione quinto et s.e.xto die facta._[1]

"32. Primo ergo n.o.bis certum sit haec animantia non in virtute tantum aut in semine, sed actu, et in seipsis, facta fuisse his diebus in quibus facta narrantur. Quanquam Augustinus lib. 3, Gen. ad liter, cap. 5 in sua persistens sententia contrarium sentire videatur."

[Footnote 1: _Loc. cit._ Lib. II. cap. vii. et viii. 1, 32, 35.]

But Suarez proceeds to refute Augustin's opinions at great length, and his final judgment may be gathered from the following pa.s.sage:--

"35. Tertio dicendum est, haec animalia omnia his diebus producta esse, IN PERFECTO STATU, IN SINGULIS INDIVIDUIS, SEU SPECIEBUS SUIS, JUXTA UNIUSCUJUSQUE NATURAM.... ITAQUE FUERUNT OMNIA CREATA INTEGRA ET OMNIBUS SUIS MEMBRIS PERFECTA."

As regards the creation of animals and plants, therefore, it is clear that Suarez, so far from "distinctly a.s.serting derivative creation,"

denies it as distinctly and positively as he can; that he is at much pains to refute St. Augustin's opinions; that he does not hesitate to regard the faint acquiescence of St. Thomas Aquinas in the views of his brother saint as a kindly subterfuge on the part of Divus Thomas; and that he affirms his own view to be that which is supported by the authority of the Fathers of the Church. So that, when Mr. Mivart tells us that Catholic theology is in harmony with all that modern science can possibly require; that "to the general theory of evolution, and to the special Darwinian form of it, no exception ... need be taken on the ground of orthodoxy;" and that "law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the Patristic ideal of creation," we have to choose between his dictum, as a theologian, and that of a great light of his Church, whom he himself declares to be "widely venerated as an authority, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned."

But Mr. Mivart does not hesitate to push his attempt to harmonize science with Catholic orthodoxy to its utmost limit; and, while a.s.suming that the soul of man "arises from immediate and direct creation," he supposes that his body was "formed at first (as now in each separate individual) by derivative, or secondary creation, through natural laws" (p. 331).