In certain parts of the state the crops planted by the negroes were in good condition in April, 1865, but after the invasions they were neglected, and in thousands of cases the negroes went away and left them.

In the white counties conditions were as bad as it was possible to be.

Half of the people in them had been supported by state and county aid which now failed. Nearly all the men were injured or killed, and there were no negroes to work the farms. The women and the children did everything they could to plant their little crops in the spring of 1865, but often not even seed corn was to be had. All over the state, where it was possible, the returning soldiers planted late crops of corn, and in the Black Belt they were able to save some of the crops planted by the negroes. But in the white counties, especially in the northern part of the state, nothing could be done. Often the breadwinner had been killed in the war, and the widow and orphans were left to provide for themselves. The late crops were almost total failures because of the drought, not one-tenth of the crop of 1860 being made. In this section everything that would support life had been stripped from the country by the contending armies and the raiding bands of desperadoes. A double warfare had devastated the country, "tories" raiding their neighbors and _vice versa_; and the bitter state of feeling prevented neighbor from relieving neighbor. But the "Unionists," who were sure that their turn had come, wanted the dest.i.tute cared for, even if some were fed "who curse us as traitors." This part of the country had been supported by the central Black Belt counties, but in 1865 the supply was exhausted. In the cotton counties there was enough to support life, and had the negroes remained at home and worked, they would not have suffered. As it was, those who left the plantation were decimated by disease and want. Soon after the occupation, the army officers distributed the supplies captured from the Confederates among the needy whites and blacks who applied for aid. But many out of reach of aid starved, and especially did this happen among the aged and helpless who made no appeal for aid, but who died in silence from want of shelter and food.

After several months the Freedmen's Bureau, under the charge of General Swayne, who was a man of discretion and common sense, and who understood the real state of affairs, extended its a.s.sistance to the dest.i.tute whites. Among the negroes the Bureau created much of the misery it relieved, for in the cotton belt there was enough to support life; and had the negroes not flocked to the Bureau, they would have lived in plenty.

Besides, the aged and infirm negroes were not a.s.sisted by the Bureau, but remained with their master's people, who took care of them. But the generous a.s.sistance extended by that much-abused inst.i.tution saved many a poor white from starvation. In the fall of 1865, 139,000 dest.i.tute whites were reported to the provisional government. They were mostly in the mountain counties of north and northeast Alabama, though in southeast Alabama there was also much want. And in Governor Parsons's last message to the legislature (December, 1865), he stated that those in need of food numbered 250,000.[719] A state commissioner for the dest.i.tute was appointed to cooperate with General Swayne and the Freedmen's Bureau. The legislature appropriated $500,000 in bonds to buy supplies for the poor, but the att.i.tude of Congress toward the Johnson state governments prevented the sale of state securities. However, the governor went to the West and succeeded in getting some supplies. In December, 1865, it was believed that there were 200,000 people who needed a.s.sistance in some degree.

The failure of the crops in 1865 left affairs in even a worse condition than before. Small farmers could not subsist while making a new crop, and many widows and children were in great need. Some of the latter walked thirty or forty miles for food for themselves and for those at home.[720]

In January, 1866, the state commissioner, M. H. Cruikshank, reported to Governor Patton that 52,921 whites were entirely dest.i.tute. These were mostly in the counties of Bibb, Shelby, Jefferson, Talladega, St. Clair, Cherokee, Blount, Jackson, Marshall, all white counties; nine other counties had not been heard from.[721] During the same month, a Freedmen's Bureau official who travelled through the counties of Talladega, Bibb, Shelby, Jefferson, and Calhoun reported that the suffering among the whites was appalling, especially in Talladega County. The Freedmen's Bureau had neglected the poor whites, though there was little suffering in the richer sections where the negroes lived. He stated that near Talladega many white families were living in the woods with no shelter except the pine boughs, and this in the middle of winter.[722]

In Randolph County, in January, 1866, the probate judge said that 5000 persons were in need of aid. Most of these had been opposed to the Confederacy. The "unionists" complained that the Confederate foragers had discriminated against them, which, while very likely true, was more than offset by the depredations of the tories and Federals on the Confederate sympathizers. All accounts agree that the Confederate sympathizers were in the worse condition; many of them had not tasted meat for months. But charges were brought that the probate judges of the provisional government, who certainly were not strong Confederates, did not fairly distribute provisions among the "d.a.m.ned tories," as the latter complained that they were called.[723] The state commissioner could relieve only about one-tenth of the dest.i.tute whites. In January, 1866, he gave a.s.sistance in the form of meal, corn (and sometimes a little meat) to 5245 whites and 2426 blacks; in February, to 13,083 whites and to 4107 blacks; and in March, to 17,204 whites and to 5877 blacks, most of whom were women and children, the men receiving a.s.sistance being old, infirm, or crippled.

General Swayne of the Freedmen's Bureau helped Cruikshank in every way he could, and took charge of some of the negroes. But owing to the failure of the crops in 1865, the situation was growing worse, and there was no hope for any relief until the summer of 1866 when vegetables and corn would ripen.[724]

In May, 1866, Governor Patton said that of 20,000 widows and 60,000 orphans, three-fourths were in need of the necessaries of life, that they had been able to do very little for themselves, even those who had land being unable to work it to any advantage, and that their corn crop of the previous year had failed.[725] There is little doubt that many died from lack of food and shelter during 1865 and 1866, but in the disordered times incomplete records were kept. Many cases of starvation were reported, especially in north Alabama, but few names can now be obtained. Near Guntersville there were three cases of starvation, while hundreds were in an almost perishing condition. From Marshall County, where, it was said, there were 2180 helpless and dest.i.tute persons and 2000 who were able to work, but could get nothing to do, it was reported that not more than twenty people had more than enough to supply their own needs. The people of Cherokee County, when on the verge of starvation, appealed to south Alabama for aid. They asked for corn, and said that if they could not get it they must leave the country. Hundreds, they said, had not tasted meat for months, and farm stock was in a wretched condition. Nashville sent $15,000 and Montgomery $10,000 to buy provisions for them.[726] From Coosa County much distress was reported among the old people, widows, children, refugees, and the families whose heads had returned from the army too late to make a crop. However, the negroes in this section who had remained on their farms had made good crops and were doing well.[727] In the valley of the Coosa, in northeast Alabama, several cases of starvation were reported. One woman went seventeen miles for a peck of meal, but died before she could reach home with it. Another, after fasting three days, walked sixteen miles to obtain supplies, and failing, died. One family lived on boiled greens, with no salt nor pepper, no meat nor bread. An old woman, living eighteen miles from Guntersville, walked to that village to get meal for her grandchildren. It has been estimated that there were 20,000 people in the five counties south of the Tennessee river--Franklin, Lawrence, Morgan, Marshall, De Kalb--in a state of want bordering on starvation.[728]

The majority of the dest.i.tute whites never appealed for aid, but managed, though half starved, to live until better times. Numbers left the land of famine and went where there was plenty, and where they could get work.

Others who could not emigrate and those broken in spirit received a.s.sistance. From January to September, 1866, 15,000 to 20,000 whites, and 4000 to 14,000 negroes were aided each month by the Freedmen's Bureau and by the state. Most of these were women and children, the rule being not to a.s.sist able-bodied whites except in extreme cases.

In 1866 the state succeeded in selling some of its bonds, and raised money in other ways. Much was spent for supplies for the poor, for in 1866 the crops almost failed again. From November, 1865, to September, 1866, the Freedmen's Bureau and the state commissioner issued, to black and white, 3,789,788 rations. There were also large donations from the West and from Tennessee and Kentucky. After this the Freedmen's Bureau gave less, though during the year from September, 1866, to September, 1867, it issued 214,305 rations to whites and 274,399 to blacks. To the whites, and partly to the blacks, the issue of provisions was made under the general supervision of General Swayne, and through state agents in each county who were acceptable to Swayne.[729]

In November, 1867, the Freedmen's Bureau reported that there were 10,000 whites and 50,000 blacks without means of support, and 450,000 rations per month were asked for. It would have been much better to have put an end to relief work, since by this time the officials of the Freedmen's Bureau were very active in politics and showed a disposition to report their political henchmen as dest.i.tute and in need of support. And in another way there was much abuse of the charity of the government, for some broken-down, spiritless people would never work for themselves as long as they could draw rations for nothing. The negroes, especially, were demoralized by the issue of rations. Fear of the contempt of their neighbors would drive all but the meaner cla.s.s of whites back to work, but the negro came to believe that he would be supported the rest of his life by the government.

As late as October, 1868, it was reported that there was great want in middle and south Alabama, and soup houses were established by the state and the Bureau in Mobile, Huntsville, Selma, Montgomery, and other central Alabama towns.[730] The location of the soup kitchens, and the date, lead one to suspect that politics, perhaps, had something to do with the matter. These towns were the very places where there was less want than anywhere else in the state, but Grant was to be elected, and there were many negro votes.

For more than two years after the war in all the small towns were seen emaciated persons who had come long distances to get food. General Swayne thought the condition of the poor white much worse than that of the negro.

The latter, he said, was hindered by no wounds nor by a helpless family, for his aged and helpless kin were cared for at the old master's. The "refugees," as the poor whites were called who had but little and lost all by the war, lived in a different part of the country,--in the mountains and in the pine woods,--beyond the reach of work or help, clinging to the old home places in utter hopeless desolation. For the negro, Swayne thought, there was hope, but for the "refugee" there was none; he existed only.[731]

It was years before a large number of the people again attained a comfortable standard of living. Some gave up altogether. Many died in the struggle. Numbers left the country; others, in reach of a.s.sistance, became trifling and worthless from too much aid. In later years the opening of mines and the building of railroads in north Alabama, the lumber industry and the rapid development of south Alabama, saved the "refugee" from the fate that General Swayne thought was in store for him.

CHAPTER VI

CONFISCATION AND THE COTTON TAX

SEC. 1. CONFISCATION FRAUDS

Restrictions on Trade in 1865

At the time of the collapse of the Confederacy trade within the state of Alabama was subject to the following regulations: gold and silver was in no case to be paid for southern produce; all trade was to be done through officers appointed by the United States Treasury Department;[732] the state was divided into districts and sub-districts called agencies, under the superintendence of these Treasury agents, whose business it was to regulate trade, and collect captured, abandoned, and confiscable property; in making purchases of cotton, and other produce the agents were to pay only three-fourths of the value, or to purchase the produce at three-fourths its value, and then at once resell it to the former owner at full value, with permission to export or ship to the North; in order to get permission to sell, the owner must take the Lincoln amnesty oath of December 8, 1863; there was, besides, an internal revenue tax of two cents a pound, and a shipping fee of four cents a pound.[733] So for a month after the surrender the person who owned cotton near any port or place of sale had to sell to United States Treasury agents, or pretended agents, and have twenty-five per cent to fifty per cent of the value of his cotton deducted before it could be sent North. On May 9, 1865, a regulation provided that "all cotton not produced by persons _with their own labor_ or with the labor of _freedmen_ or others employed and _paid_ by them, must, before shipment to any port or place in a loyal state, be sold to and resold by an officer of the government ... and before allowing any cotton or other product to be shipped ... the proper officer must require a certificate from the purchasing agent or the internal revenue officer that the cotton proposed to be shipped had been resold by him or that 25 per cent of the value thereof has been paid to such purchasing agent in money."[734]

This was in accord with the general policy of Johnson, at first, viz. to punish the slaveholding cla.s.s and to favor the non-slaveholders. Cotton was then worth $250 or more a bale, and cotton raised by slave labor had to pay the 25 per cent tax--$60 to $75. However, the regulations ordered that no other fees were to be exacted after the fourth was taken. Nearly all the cotton not yet destroyed was in the Black Belt, and was raised by slave labor. The few people who had cotton raised by their own labor might sell it after paying the tax of three cents a pound, or $12 to $15 a bale.

May 22, 1865, the proclamation of the President removed restrictions on commercial intercourse except as to the right of the United States to property purchased by agents in southern states, and except as to the 25 per cent tax on purchases of cotton. No exceptions were made to the 25 per cent tax. The ports were to be opened to foreign commerce after July 1, 1865.[735] After June 30, 1865, restrictions as to trade were removed except as to arms, gray cloth, etc.[736] And after August 29, 1865, even contraband goods might be admitted on license.[737]

Federal Claims to Confederate Property

The confiscation laws relating to private property under which the army and Treasury agents were acting in Alabama in 1865 were: (1) the act of July 17, 1862, which authorized the confiscation and sale of property as a punishment for "rebels"; (2) the act of March 12, 1863, which authorized Treasury agents to collect and sell "captured and abandoned"

property,--but a "loyal" owner might within two years after the close of the war prove his claim, and "that he has never given any aid or comfort"

to the Confederacy, and then receive the proceeds of the sales, less expenses; (3) the act of July 2, 1864, authorizing Treasury agents to lease or work abandoned property by employing refugee negroes. "Abandoned"

property was defined by the Treasury Department as property the owner of which was engaged in war or otherwise against the United States, or was voluntarily absent. According to this ruling all the property of Confederate soldiers was "abandoned" and might be seized by Treasury agents. North Alabama suffered from the operation of these laws from their pa.s.sage until late in 1865, the rest of Alabama only in 1865.

The blockade prevented the people from disposing of most of the cotton raised during the war; there were heavy crops in 1860, 1861, 1862, and small ones in 1863 and 1864. The number of bales produced in 1859 was 989,955; in 1860, about the same; and less in 1861 and 1862.

Comparatively little cotton was sent out on blockade-runners, and not very much was sent through the lines from the cotton belt proper, so that at the close of the war there were many thousands of bales of cotton in the central counties of the state. Cotton was selling for high prices--30 cents to $1.20 a pound, or $200 to $500 a bale. It was almost the sole dependence of the people to prevent the severest suffering. The state and Confederate governments had some kind of a claim on much of the cotton early in 1865. No one knew how much nor exactly where all of the Confederate cotton was stored, and it bore no marks that would distinguish it from private cotton. But the records surrendered by General Taylor and others showed who had subscribed to the Cotton or Produce Loan. Many thousand bales had been destroyed by the raiders in 1864 and 1865, and many thousand more had been burned by Confederate authorities to prevent its falling into the hands of the Federals.[738]

On October 30, 1864, a report was made to Secretary of the Treasury[739]

Trenholm which showed the amount of Confederate cotton in the southern states. By far the greater part that was still on hand was in Alabama. In this state the Confederacy had received as subscriptions to the Produce Loan, 134,252 bales, at an average cost of $101.55, in all, $13,633,621.90. Other sales or subscriptions on other products to this Produce or Cotton Loan raised the amount in Alabama to $16,691,500.

Alabama, as one of the producing states, and the one least affected by the ravages of war, furnished to all of these loans more produce than any other state.[740] The people, unable to sell their cotton abroad, exchanged some of it for Confederate bonds. Several thousand bales (6000 in 1864) were gathered by the cotton t.i.the. After shipping several thousand bales through the blockade, and smuggling some through the lines, and after some destruction by the enemy, or to prevent seizure by the enemy, there remained in the state, in the fall of 1864, 115,450 bales of Confederate cotton. Nearly all of this was destroyed in 1865, before the surrender, by Federals and Confederates, and very little remained which the Federal government could rightfully claim as Confederate property.

This claim was based on the theory that cotton subscribed to the Produce Loan was devoted to the aid of the Confederacy, in intention at least, and therefore was forfeited to the United States, even though the owner had never delivered the cotton or other produce, and though the United States held that the Confederacy could not legally acquire property.[741] There were three cla.s.ses of property claimed by the United States: (1) "captured" property or anything seized by the army and navy; (2) "abandoned" property, the owner being in the Confederate service, no matter whether his family were present or not; (3) "confiscable" property, or that liable to seizure and sale under the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862. Until 1865, all sorts of property were seized and used by the Federal forces, or, if portable, sent North for sale. Live stock, planting implements and machinery, wagons, etc., were in some cases sent North and sold;[742] but most was used on the spot.

After the surrender the Secretary of Treasury ordered household furniture, family relics, books, etc., to be restored to all "loyal" owners or to those who had taken the amnesty oath.[743] In no case had a person who could not prove his or her "loyalty" any remedy against seizure of property. Until the surrender the people of north Alabama were despoiled of all property that could be moved, and after the surrender the same policy was pursued all over the state, especially in regard to cotton. No right of property in cotton was there recognized, but by a previous law a "loyal" owner had until two years after the war to prove his claim and his "loyalty."[744]

The Attorney-General delivered an opinion, July 5, 1865, that cotton and other property seized by the agents or the army was _de facto_ and _de jure_, _captured_ property, and that neither the President nor the Secretary of the Treasury had the power to restore such property to the former owners. They must go through the courts, and under the laws only "loyal" claimants had any basis for claims, and "loyalty" must first be determined by the courts.[745] After the opinion of the Attorney-General, Secretary McCulloch followed it so far as captures by the army were concerned, but still continued to "revise the mistakes" of the cotton agents who "frequently seized the property of private individuals." Proof of "loyalty" was, however, required in all cases before restoration, and the fourteen cla.s.ses excepted by the amnesty proclamation of May 29, 1865, could get no restoration. In all cases the expenses charged against the property had to be paid before the owner could get it. After April 4, 1867, by request of the Joint Sub-Committee on Retrenchment, no further releases of any kind were made.[746] On March 30, 1868, a joint resolution of Congress covered into the Treasury all money received from sales of property in the South. After this only an act of Congress could restore the proceeds to the owner.[747]

The result was in the long run that the "disloyal" owners never received restoration of their property seized by the army, and by the Treasury agents during and after the war, but claim agents and perjurers have pursued a thriving business in proving "loyal" claims against the Treasury. "Disloyal" persons, whose property was liable to confiscation, and who could not recover in the Court of Claims, were, as decided by that body: those who served in the military, naval, or civil service of the state or the Confederacy; those who voted for secession or for secession candidates; those who furnished supplies to the Confederacy, engaged in business that aided the Confederacy, subscribed to its loans, resided or removed voluntarily within the Confederate lines, or sold produce to the Confederacy. Women who had sons or husbands in the Confederate army, or who belonged to "sewing societies," or made flags and clothing for, or furnished delicacies to, Confederate soldiers were "disloyal" and could not recover property. "Loyalty" had to be proven, not only for the original owner, but also for the heirs and claimants. The claims of deserters were allowed. In order to test the "loyalty" of claimants, they were asked to answer in writing lists of questions (numbering at various times 49, 62, 79, and 80 questions) regarding their conduct during the war. The questions covered several hundred points, and embraced every possible activity from 1861 to 1865. No man and few women who lived within the state until 1865 could, without perjury, pa.s.s the examination and prove a claim. Yet numbers have proved claims.[748]

Cotton Frauds and Stealing

The minority report of the Ku Klux Committee in 1872 a.s.serted that, of the 5,000,000 bales of cotton in the South at the close of the war, 3,000,000 had been seized by United States Treasury agents or pretended agents.[749]

The Gulf states, and especially Alabama, were for a year or more filled with agents and "cotton spies," seeking Confederate cotton and other property. They were paid a percentage of what they seized--25 to 50 per cent. Native scoundrels united with these, and all reaped a rich harvest.[750]

On much of the cotton subscribed to the Confederate Produce Loan the government had advanced a small amount to the owner and allowed him to keep it. In many cases no payment had been made. The farmer considered that the cotton still belonged to him, but that the Confederacy had a claim on a part of it. The records kept were imperfect, and few persons knew just what was Confederate cotton and what was not. Much of the cotton subscribed had been destroyed or sent to government warehouses in Selma, Mobile, Montgomery, and Columbus, where it was burned in April and May, 1865. Of course each man considered that the cotton destroyed was Confederate cotton, and that all left was private cotton. In most cases the claim of the government was very shadowy. Where cotton was still in the hands of the planter, private and government cotton could not be distinguished. The records did not show whether a man had kept or delivered the cotton he had subscribed to the Produce Loan. The agents proceeded upon the a.s.sumption that he had kept it, and that all he had kept was government cotton.[751] No proof to the contrary would convince the average agent. Secretary McCulloch said, "I am sure I sent some honest cotton agents South; but it sometimes seems very doubtful whether any of them remained honest very long."[752] It was said that Secretary Chase had foreseen the trouble that would result if the cotton were confiscated, and had proposed to leave all cotton in the hands of the former owners who then held it. When the records were certain, the cotton might be confiscated; but in most cases there were no correct records.

Such a policy would have been generous and magnanimous, and would have had a good effect.[753] The plan of Chase was not accepted, and a carnival of corruption followed. In August, 1865, President Johnson wrote to General Thomas, "I have been advised that innumerable frauds are being practised by persons a.s.suming to be Treasury agents, in various portions of Alabama, in the collection of cotton pretended to belong to the Confederate States government."[754] The thefts of the Treasury agents and the worst characters of the army did much to arouse bitter feelings among the people who lost their only possession that could be turned into ready money. It was a.s.sumed, as a general rule, that all cotton belonged to the government until the real owner could prove his claim and his "loyalty," and of course he could seldom do this to the satisfaction of the agent or of the army officer who was bent on supplementing his pay. Cotton had been all along an object of the special hostility of Federals. The old southern belief that cotton was king and the hopes that Confederates had founded on this belief were well known. "Cotton is the root of all evil" was a common declaration of the invading army and of the cotton agents. When no other private property was taken or destroyed, cotton was sure to be. Every cotton-gin and press in reach of the armies was burned from 1863 to 1865.

There seemed to be an intense desire to destroy the royal power of King Cotton. As opportunity offered, officers in the army, contrary to orders, began to interest themselves in speculations in cotton--captured, purchased, or stolen. The small garrisons were not officered by the best men of the army, and many who would never have touched money from any other kind of plunder thought it perfectly legitimate to fill their pockets by the seizure and sale of cotton. They did not consider it defrauding the government, for the latter, they knew, had no more t.i.tle to it than they had.[755]

The disposition of the cotton collectors to regard the people as without rights resulted in the growth of a feeling on the part of the latter that it was perfectly legitimate to keep the government and its rascally agents from profiting by the use of Confederate property. In every way people began to hinder the agents and the army in its work of collecting cotton.

Colonel Hunter Brooke stated, in 1866, that most of the people who had subscribed cotton to the Confederate government or on whose cotton the Confederates had some claim utterly refused to recognize the t.i.tle of the United States to that property and refused to give any a.s.sistance to the authorities in tracing the cotton. At times the citizens rose in rebellion against the invasion of Treasury agents and the military escorts sent with them. A cotton spy was sent into Choctaw County to collect information about cotton stealing. He had an escort of twenty soldiers, but the people drove them out. A battalion of cavalry was then sent. Steamers sent up the rivers to get the cotton seized by the agents were sometimes fired upon.[756]

Not only cotton but stores collected on private plantations for the army, no matter whether private property or not, were seized. Horses and mules used in the Confederate service were taken, notwithstanding the terms of surrender and the fact that the Confederate soldiers owned the cavalry horses.[757] The counties of Cherokee, Franklin, Jackson, Jefferson, Lauderdale, Limestone, Madison, Morgan, St. Clair, Walker, and Winston--all white counties--lost princ.i.p.ally corn, fodder, provisions, harness, mules, horses, and wagons.[758]

As to cotton, much pure stealing was done by the followers of the army and thieving soldiers and some natives, but sooner or later the officials became implicated in it, since only by their permission could the commodity be shipped. A thieving southerner would find where a lot of cotton was stored and inform a soldier, usually an officer, who would make arrangements to ship the cotton, and the two would divide the profits.

Planters who were afraid that their cotton would be seized by Treasury agents went into partnership with Federal officers and shipped their cotton to New Orleans or to New York. No one outside the ring could ship cotton until five or ten dollars a bale was paid the military officers who controlled affairs. Along the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railway 10,000 bales of cotton were said to have been stolen from the owners and sold in Mobile and New Orleans. The thieves often paid $75 a bale to have the cotton pa.s.sed through to New Orleans.[759]

But all petty thievery went unnoticed when the Treasury agents began operations. They harried the land worse than an army of b.u.mmers. There was no protection against one; he claimed all cotton, and, unless bribed, seized it. Thousands of bales were taken to which the government had not a shadow of claim. In November, 1865, the _Times_ correspondent (Truman) stated that nearly all the Treasury agents in Alabama had been filling their pockets with cotton money, and that $2,000,000 were unaccounted for.

One agent took 2000 bales on a vessel and went to France. Their method of proceeding was to find a lot of cotton, Confederate or otherwise, and give some man $50 a bale to swear the cotton belonged to him, and that it had never been turned over to the Confederate States. Then the agent shipped the cotton and cleared $100 a bale.[760]

Secretary McCulloch said that the most troublesome and disagreeable duty that he was called upon to perform was the execution of the law in regard to Confederate property. The cotton agents, being paid by a commission on the property collected, were disposed to seize private property also.

There was no authority at hand to check them. And people were disposed, he thought, to lay claim to Confederate cotton and "spirited away" much of it, while on the other hand much private property was taken by the agents.[761]

Five years later the testimony taken in Alabama at the instance of the minority members of the Ku Klux Committee exposed the methods of the cotton agents.[762] The country swarmed with agents or pretended agents and their spies or informers; the commission given was from one-fourth to one-half of all cotton collected; everybody's cotton was seized, but for fear of future trouble a proposition from the owner to divide was usually listened to and a peaceable settlement made; when private or public cotton was shipped it was consigned by bales and not by pounds; the various agents through whose hands it pa.s.sed were in the habit of "tolling" or "plucking" it, often two or three times, about one-fifth at a time; in this way a bale weighing 500 pounds would be reduced to 200 or 300 pounds; even after the private cotton arrived at Mobile or New Orleans, paying "toll" all the way, it was liable to seizure by order of some Treasury agent; as a rule, terms could be arranged by which a planter might keep one-fourth to three-fourths of his cotton, whether Confederate or not; it was safer for the agent to take a part of the cotton with the consent and silence of the owner than to steal both from the owner and from the government for which he pretended to work, and in this way the owners saved some for themselves; much private cotton was seized on the plantations near the rivers before the owners came home from the war; cotton seized in the Black Belt was shipped to Simeon Draper, United States cotton agent, New York, while that from north Alabama was sent to William P. Mellen, Cincinnati;[763] complaint was made by those few owners who succeeded in tracing their cotton that, after being reduced by "tolling" or "plucking,"[764] it was sold by the agent in the North, by samples which were much inferior to the cotton in the bales, and in this way the purchaser, who was in partnership with the agents, would pay ten or fifteen cents a pound for a lot of cotton certainly not worth more than that if the samples were honest, but which was really good cotton, worth 35 cents to $1.20 a pound in New York.

So in case the Secretary of the Treasury could be brought to "revise the mistakes" of his agents, the owner would get only the small sum paid in for inferior cotton, and even this was reduced by excessive charges and fees.[765] There was also complaint that when a lot of private cotton was seized and traced to Draper, the latter would inform the owners that only a small proportion of what had been seized was received,[766] and that had been sold at a low price. It was afterwards shown that Draper never gave receipts for cotton received. There was nothing businesslike about the cotton administration. Cotton was consigned to Draper or Mellen by the bale and not by the pound. A bale might weigh 200 or 500 pounds. As soon as cotton was seized the bagging was stripped off, and it was then repacked in order to prevent identification.[767] Many persons who knew nothing of the law and who saw that their property was unsafe were induced by the Treasury agents to surrender their cotton to the United States government, even though there might be no claim against it, the agents promising that the United States would pay to the owners the proceeds upon application to the Treasury Department. When the Secretary of the Treasury discovered this, and when the agent would certify that such was the case, his "mistake was revised" and the money received from the sale of cotton was refunded.[768] The owner had no remedy if the agent declined to certify, and he usually declined, since the cotton had probably never been turned over to the United States by him.

The experience of Hon. F. S. Lyon[769] is typical of many in the Black Belt. He stated[770] that after the surrender of Taylor, General Canby issued an order that all who had sold cotton to the Confederate government must now surrender it to United States authorities under penalty of confiscation of other property to make good the failure to deliver Confederate cotton. Under this order some cotton was seized to replace Confederate cotton that had disappeared. United States army wagons, guarded by soldiers, went over the country day and night, gathering cotton for persons who pretended to be Treasury agents. Lyon had 384 bales of Confederate cotton which were claimed by General Dustin, a cotton agent (later a carpet-bag politician), and Lyon agreed to haul it to the railroad, under an "agreement" with Dustin. But one night a train of army wagons, guarded by soldiers, came and carried off 26 bales, and the next day, 70 bales. (They had asked the manager "if he would accept $2000 and sleep soundly all night.") The wagons were traced to Uniontown, and the commanding officer there was induced to hold the cotton until the question was settled. General Hubbard, commanding the district, arrested one Ruter, who, with the soldiers, had taken the cotton. Ruter claimed to be acting under the authority of a cotton agent in Mississippi, but could show no evidence of his authority, and his name was not on the list of authorized agents. However, General Hubbard was ordered by superior authority to regard Ruter as a cotton agent and to discharge him. The 70 bales were lost.