x.x.x. _Laelius._ I am not ignorant, Scipio, that such is your opinion, for I have often heard you say so. But I do not the less desire, if it is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best of these three forms of commonwealths. For it may be of some use in considering[307] * * *

x.x.xI. * * * And each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of him who governs it. Therefore, in no other const.i.tution than that in which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode, than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. And if it be not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all.

And how can there be this character of equality, I do not say under a monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in those const.i.tutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canva.s.sed and solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not really in their free power, though others ask them for them? For they are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of public authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted to those only of ancient families and large fortunes. But in a free people, as among the Rhodians and Athenians, there is no citizen who[308] * * *

x.x.xII. * * * No sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance, when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of riches. But if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they say that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy; inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws, judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune and life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is the only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a commonwealth, that is to say, a const.i.tution of the people. It is on this principle that, according to them, a people often vindicates its liberty from the domination of kings and n.o.bles; while, on the other hand, kings are not sought for among free peoples, nor are the power and wealth of aristocracies. They deny, moreover, that it is fair to reject this general const.i.tution of freemen, on account of the vices of the unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined, and directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community, nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they a.s.sert that this necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so const.i.tuted that the good of all cla.s.ses is the same; while the conflicting interests that prevail in other const.i.tutions inevitably produce dissensions; therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is still more rare, since, as Ennius expresses it,

In kingdoms there's no faith, and little love.

Wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice of the law equal, by what rule can the a.s.sociation of citizens be held together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? For if the fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality--if genius cannot be equally the property of all--rights, at least, should be equal among those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a republic but an a.s.sociation of rights?[309] * * *

x.x.xIII. But as to the other political const.i.tutions, these democratical advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the name which they claim. For why, say they, should we apply the name of king, the t.i.tle of Jupiter the Beneficent, and not rather the t.i.tle of tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over a degraded mult.i.tude? For a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they must. But how could Sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of her political inst.i.tution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch, good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood royal? As to aristocrats, Who will endure, say they, that men should distinguish themselves by such a t.i.tle, and that not by the voice of the people, but by their own votes? For how is such a one judged to be best either in learning, sciences, or arts?[310] * * *

x.x.xIV. * * * If it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the pa.s.sengers. But if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust itself--and, if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose the n.o.blest--then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy that the safety of the State consists, especially as nature has not only appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort in high virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the desire of obedience towards these, their natural lords. But they say this aristocratical State is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men, who, through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and powerful men, but also those who are n.o.bly born, are necessarily the best. And so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the State, these chiefs obstinately retain the t.i.tle of n.o.bles, though they want the essence of n.o.bility. For riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit and insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more deformed than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the n.o.blest.

But when virtue governs the Commonwealth, what can be more glorious?

When he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no l.u.s.t or pa.s.sion; when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites and educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which he does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to his fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for all, there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a chief ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require elected magistrates.

It was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of the few. Thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of the mult.i.tude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted their security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not allow the people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their rulers.

For as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of, it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues; and there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and dignities, so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and iniquitous. For as equal honor is given to the most n.o.ble and the most infamous, some of whom must exist in every State, then the equity which they eulogize becomes most inequitable--an evil which never can happen in those states which are governed by aristocracies. These reasonings, my Laelius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought forward by those that so highly extol this form of political const.i.tution.

x.x.xV. Then Laelius said: But you have not told us, Scipio, which of these three forms of government you yourself most approve.

_Scipio._ You are right to shape your question, which of the three I most approve, for there is not one of them which I approve at all by itself, since, as I told you, I prefer that government which is mixed and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately.

But if I must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply and exclusively, I must confess I prefer the royal one, and praise that as the first and best. In this, which I here choose to call the primitive form of government, I find the t.i.tle of father attached to that of king, to express that he watches over the citizens as over his children, and endeavors rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce them to slavery. So that it is more advantageous for those who are insignificant in property and capacity to be supported by the care of one excellent and eminently powerful man. The n.o.bles here present themselves, who profess that they can do all this in much better style; for they say that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at least as much faith and equity. And, last of all, come the people, who cry with a loud voice that they will render obedience neither to the one nor the few; that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as liberty; and that all men who serve either kings or n.o.bles are deprived of it. Thus, the kings attract us by affection, the n.o.bles by talent, the people by liberty; and in the comparison it is hard to choose the best.

_Laelius._ I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the other branches of the question, if you leave this primary point undetermined.

x.x.xVI. _Scipio._ We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty bound to begin with Jupiter.

_Laelius._ Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which resembles that poem?

_Scipio._ Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned and unlearned extol as the universal king of all G.o.ds and men.

How so? said Laelius.

Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father of all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the G.o.ds are governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect that this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be cla.s.sed among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report.

What men do you mean? said Laelius.

Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have arrived at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a single Mind[311]. * * *

x.x.xVII. But if you please, my Laelius, I will bring forward evidences which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous.

Those, said Laelius, are what I want.

_Scipio._ You are aware that it is now not four centuries since this city of ours has been without kings.

_Laelius._ You are correct; it is less than four centuries.

_Scipio._ Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or city? is it a long time?

_Laelius._ It hardly amounts to the age of maturity.

_Scipio._ You say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since there was a king in Rome.

_Laelius._ And he was a proud king.

_Scipio._ But who was his predecessor?

_Laelius._ He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the same praise on all his predecessors as far back as Romulus, who reigned about six centuries ago.

_Scipio._ Even he, then, is not very ancient.

_Laelius._ No; he reigned when Greece was already becoming old.

_Scipio._ Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous people?

_Laelius._ Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans.

Then Scipio said: But with respect to the present question, we do not so much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if intelligent men, at a period so little remote, desired the government of kings, you will confess that I am producing authorities that are neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant.

x.x.xVIII. Then Laelius said: I see, Scipio, that you are very sufficiently provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair judge, authorities are worth less than arguments.

Scipio replied: Then, Laelius, you shall yourself make use of an argument derived from your own senses.

_Laelius._ What senses do you mean?

_Scipio._ The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen to feel angry with any one.

_Laelius._ That happens rather oftener than I could wish.

_Scipio._ Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to triumph over your judgment?

No, by Hercules! said Laelius; I imitate the famous Archytas of Tarentum, who, when he came to his villa, and found all its arrangements were contrary to his orders, said to his steward, "Ah! you unlucky scoundrel, I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am in a rage with you."

Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of glory, or the l.u.s.ts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find a certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by the force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and this, in truth, is the n.o.blest portion of our nature; for when conscience reigns, it allows no resting-place to l.u.s.t, violence, or temerity.

_Laelius._ You have spoken the truth.

_Scipio._ Well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your approbation?

_Laelius._ More than anything upon earth.

_Scipio._ Then you would not approve that the evil pa.s.sions, which are innumerable, should expel conscience, and that l.u.s.ts and animal propensities should a.s.sume an ascendency over us?

_Laelius._ For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious.