"Got it," he said.

Later in a discussion with the president, Rice explained what she was trying to do with Rumsfeld. The CIA and the military had to be totally integrated on the ground. One person had to be running the show. It was a cla.s.sic case of unity of command. It wasn't simply a handoff - pa.s.sing the ball from the CIA to the military - because the CIA was going to stay and increase its presence. She and the president often spoke in sports a.n.a.logies.

"Mr. President," she said, "you have to have a quarterback for this."

"Am I not the quarterback?" he asked. "No, I think you're the coach."

SEVERAL DAYS LATER there was a second FUBAR meeting, when it was still not clear who was in charge. Steve Hadley thought that Rumsfeld was too frequently separating his military plan from the CIA operations and operatives on the ground. Rumsfeld did not see the CIA as an available instrument. It was not just a matter of who was in charge, it was critical to have a clear, articulated strategy that incorporated military and CIA functions. Though Hadley was only the deputy national security adviser, Rice encouraged him to speak directly with Rumsfeld.

"Mr. Secretary," Hadley said as the two walked out of a meeting around this time, "somebody needs to pick this up and design a strategy. Quite frankly, it's yours for the taking."

"Then I'll take it," Rumsfeld said.

Powell weighed in later with Rumsfeld. The secretary of state could see that the CIA was buying its way across Afghanistan, at least trying, giving out rice, guns and cash. He told Rumsfeld that the president was expecting something to happen, and Rumsfeld had to figure out how to get his arms around it. Rumsfeld was in charge whether he wanted it or not.

Rumsfeld did not respond directly, but he was stirred up. He went back to the Pentagon and directed his policy shop, headed by Undersecretary Douglas Feith, to draft a paper outlining an overall Afghanistan strategy. He wanted it in six hours. On October 16, the SECRET - CLOSE HOLD papers flying around Feith's office included a six-page "Draft for Discussion" t.i.tled "U.S. Strategy on Afghanistan." Another, which reflected both the policy imperative and Rumsfeld's mood, was labeled "How to Get More People into Afghanistan."

WHEN TENET WAS back he called Hadley for a read.

How does it go? Tenet asked.

"Not real well," Hadley said. "John," he said, referring to McLaughlin, "kind of got pushed around on this issue of who's in control, and the president's confused and this is not good."

Tenet said he had been emphatic that his paramilitary teams worked for the CINC.

Yeah, Hadley agreed, but the only person who seemed not to understand that was Don Rumsfeld. What was not clear was Rumsfeld's motive. Was it his way of inviting the CIA to work with him? Or was it his way to shift blame? It also was not clear that Rumsfeld wanted the CIA part or that he knew how to integrate the forces. In any case, Hadley suggested that Tenet should get it sorted out.

For Rumsfeld, the difficulty ill.u.s.trated the critical importance of getting boots on the ground - U.S. military boots, his boots. He did not command the CIA paramilitary teams, and he still had none of his own. He increased the pressure on everyone involved in the chain of command. He was relentless as he laid down his own withering carpet of fire. Senior generals put their heads down on their desks in despair. Two attempts to get a Special Forces team into Afghanistan were aborted because of bad weather. Worse than not being there would be a crash.

VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY chaired the NSC on October 17 because Bush was traveling in Asia. The day before, an American F/A-18 Hornet jet had bombed some supply warehouses used by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Kabul. Rumsfeld explained that the U.S. had thought they were Taliban military depots. He said the ICRC had given the wrong coordinates for its own warehouses.

He sped through a briefing on Special Forces teams going into Afghanistan. Tenet talked about CIA teams already on the ground. His Alpha team had arrived. "Guys met with Dostum this morning and with several of his commanders. We put in a big chunk of money. ; "We have 120 tons of ammo in Germany tonight. We're going to deliver 60 tons in the north. We're going to try to get an airfield up and running, up within 48 hours. Dostum said he'll be in Mazar-e Sharif in one week.

"We're trying to get Ismail Khan and Khalili to meet with Dostum." Karim Khalili, leader of the second-strongest opposition party to the Taliban, controlled pockets of territory in central Afghanistan near Bamiyan. The CIA was anxious to get ammo and support in to Dostum, and coordinate among the warlords friendly to the U.S.

"How do we get people into the south?" asked Rumsfeld.

Tenet mentioned a minor Pashtun tribal leader the agency had contact with. His name was Hamid Karzai. Gentle-looking with a salt-and-pepper beard, Karzai, 44, spoke perfect English. "Karzai is operating around Tarin Kowt. It's a beachhead - we can get a CIA team in. We are trying to get food and ammo dumped down there. The U.K. is in no better position than we are."

They turned to the hot topic of anthrax. The powder in the letter mailed to Senator Daschle's office had been found to be potent, prompting officials to suggest its source was likely an expert capable of producing the bacteria in large amounts. Tenet said, "I think it's AQ" - meaning al Qaeda. "I think there's a state sponsor involved. It's too well thought out, the powder's too well refined. It might be Iraq, it might be Russia, it might be a renegade scientist," perhaps from Iraq or Russia.

Scooter Libby, Cheney's chief of staff, said he also thought the anthrax attacks were state-sponsored. "We've got to be careful on what we say." It was important not to lay it on anyone now. "If we say it's al Qaeda, a state sponsor may feel safe and then hit us thinking they will have a bye because we'll blame it on al Qaeda."

"I'm not going to talk about a state sponsor," Tenet a.s.sured them.

"It's good that we don't," said Cheney, "because we're not ready to do anything about it."

ON OCTOBER 18, Cheney reported to the NSC that an alarm in the White House had gone off, signaling the presence of radioactive, chemical or biological agents. Everyone who had been there might have been exposed. He seemed worried but no one else knew what to say. Later it was determined to have been a false alarm.

IN AFGHANISTAN ABOUT 10:20 P.M. on Friday, October 19, Gary's Jawbreaker team marked a landing zone on the Shamali Plains. The first U.S. Special Forces A-team, Team 555, "Triple Nickel," was finally on its way in after numerous weather delays. Two MH-53J Pave Low helicopters, the Air Force's largest, missed the target zone and landed far apart from each other. Army Chief Warrant Officer David Diaz, the leader of the 12-member A-team, hopped out, unsure and worried that it might be bad.

Hey guys, how you doing? Gary asked. Welcome to Afghanistan. He introduced himself - yes, CIA. Get your stuff on the truck. We have hot tea, rice and chicken waiting for you. Your room is ready, everything but the phone number for a concierge.

Diaz and his men were surprised. They had expected they would have to live in tents. They were the essential eyes-on-target that the American pilots needed to bomb front lines. Each man was responsible for about 300 pounds of gear and supplies, including equipment needed to laser-designate targets.

At the same time, two teams of Special Forces and Army Rangers were launching a.s.saults on an airfield and a compound near Kandahar that had been used by Mullah Omar. These were largely demonstration raids, orchestrated to show capability and to gather intelligence. U.S. soldiers left behind posters of photographs of New York firefighters hoisting the American flag at the World Trade Center, and workers raising a flag at the destroyed section of the Pentagon.

PRESIDENT BUSH, STILL in the midst of his five-day trip to the APEC summit in Shanghai, kept in touch through an evening secure video teleconference.

The princ.i.p.als met for a little over an hour on Sat.u.r.day, October 20. Rumsfeld gave a briefing on military operations. Some 90 to 100 sorties were planned, some of which would be directed to support the opposition forces. "We have Special Forces at the front line," he was at last able to report, "and we're beginning to get some good stuff. We have a second team that's 30 miles from the front and a third team that's going to go in with Fahim.

"I'm going to confirm that one or more Special Forces have gone in," said the secretary. It was time to make public that the campaign had moved beyond bombing, that U.S. forces were on the ground. Strikes were also planned for Mazar-e Sharif, he said.

"Are we hitting Taliban defending Kabul on the Shamali Plains?" Cheney asked. He was keeping up with the intelligence which showed reports from Jawbreaker saying that Fahim was waiting for the bombing of the Taliban front lines.

"It's on the agenda," Rumsfeld said, "we'll work it today. The problem with the A-team with Fahim is it's not on the front line, it's 30 to 40 miles back."

Tenet said, "Ismail Khan has IRGC ties but we want to put a team in on Wednesday." Khan's ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were well known, but he had a large following in the western part of Afghanistan and would help rout the Taliban and al Qaeda in the far regions of the country.

At Monday's NSC meeting, October 22, Tenet said with a burst of optimism that they were ready to unleash the tribals.

"They've been unleashed all along," Rumsfeld snapped. "Franks has said they can move." The static situation on the ground was because of Northern Alliance inaction. Franks was not holding them back. Fahim was playing with them - sitting and waiting for U.S. bombers to do his work.

EVEN IN THE midst of uncertainty and tensions about what was or was not happening on the ground, there were still moments of levity. At one point, the president asked General Franks, "Tommy, how are you?"

"Sir," he replied, "I'm finer than the hair on a frog's back." Later during the same meeting, Armitage, who was reporting for State, said, "Mr. President, your diplomats aren't finer than frog's hair, but they're meaner than rust and tougher than woodp.e.c.k.e.r lips."

But the atmosphere was generally one of deference to authority, especially by Franks to Rumsfeld. In another meeting, Rumsfeld said something, and the president asked Franks, "Tommy, what do you think?"

"Sir, I think exactly what my secretary thinks, what he's ever thought, what he will ever think, or whatever he thought he might think."

Despite the deference, Franks and his staff found ways to circ.u.mvent Rumsfeld's rigid control and use the informal old-boy network of current and former military officers to keep Powell and Armitage in the loop on plans that might affect the State Department. Armitage called it "under the blanket." He loved to get the latest intelligence or gossip to pa.s.s immediately to Powell, telling his informants, "Feed the beast."

ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, President Bush gathered with his NSC in the Situation Room. It was the 14th day of bombing.

Hank said that the first Special Forces A-team was now within 500 meters of the Taliban front line. But nothing was moving. The mercurial Fahim was out of Afghanistan, visiting Tajikistan to the north, but he wanted the Special Forces team to direct ma.s.sive air strikes at the Taliban front lines.

"The lack of air attack on Taliban is emboldening the Taliban," Hank explained in his Southern accent, "and demoralizing the Northern Alliance forces. Nothing is going to happen until Fahim comes back."

What do you mean! thought Rice. What was Fahim doing out of the country? But she didn't interrupt.

Arms and ammunition to Fahim's forces of several thousand were on the way, Hank said. The CIA was continuing to deliver millions of dollars in cash. In contrast, he said, Dostum, who was outnumbered at least three to one, was leading a cavalry charge on Mazar-e Sharif, the northern city of 200,000.

Cavalry in the 21st century? Bush and the others were astounded.

"How do you a.s.sess our progress toward our objectives?" Rice asked.

"Well," Hank said, rather plaintively referring to the latest color-coded map called "A Guide to Territorial Control in Afghanistan," which was cla.s.sified TOP SECRET, "we are getting yellow across the board and it should be green up north and it's not."

Yellow across the board meant no gain of territory.

"We need to see a measure of effectiveness," Rice said, "that degrades 50 percent through bombing and defections." In military terms, a degradation of 50 percent or more means a force or unit is considered ineffective. The yellow cloaked the failure to degrade. The Alliance either controlled territory or it didn't. "We don't see that - we don't see what we're doing up there," Rice said.

The war cabinet had had many discussions of the Afghan culture, and the deadly joke was, "You can't buy an Afghan but you can rent one." It was a world of no permanent, even semipermanent loyalties. The warlords followed money and victory. They were attracted to the winning side, would shift in the blink of an eye. At the moment there was plenty of money, but no measurable sign of victory. To be effective, money and a sense of inevitable victory needed to be mutually reinforcing.

Powell thought the weeks after the beginning of the Afghanistan bombing campaign were a dark and confused period. More than usual, it was unclear what was real, especially on the ground in Afghanistan, a potentially disastrous cash-and-carry undertaking. As the former top military man, he found it best to try to "stay in his lane," as he put it, pay attention to his role as chief diplomat and avoid military second-guessing.

But Powell couldn't resist. What was the objective besides just bombing? he wondered. He had an Army man's distrust of air-power and a belief in the doctrine of ma.s.sing force on a single objective.

"Should we ma.s.s in one place?" he asked, veering out of his lane. "Should we focus on Mazar?" Get that, and then they could do other things.

"Not Mazar," Hank replied, "but focus on the Shamali Plains." The area north of Kabul, the capital, was where the Northern Alliance's Fahim had the biggest, and seemingly best organized, concentration of force.

"Look," interjected General Myers, "we can do both."

"We have to get UBL and their leadership," the president said.

Cheney wanted to address the core issue. "Do we wait for the Northern Alliance, or do we have to go get involved ourselves, which is a wholly different proposition?" He knew that Rumsfeld was secretly working on contingency plans for putting some 50,000 to 55,000 U.S. troops on the ground - if that was the only way to win. Outright Americanization of the ground operation was the most sensitive issue. The stakes in the war were so high that they had to consider all available options.

Later at a princ.i.p.als' meeting that day, they discussed how disappointed they all were in Fahim, who was promising to move but then failing to advance. Hank reported that the Taliban forces opposite Fahim's lines had increased by an astonishing 50 percent. Satellite and other intelligence only weeks ago had shown anywhere from 6,000 to 10,000 Taliban fighters at the front. Now the count was 10,000 to 16,000.

Cheney, Powell and some of the others knew that during the 1991 Gulf War they wanted to degrade the Iraqi ground forces by 50 percent with bombing before launching the ground campaign. Instead of being 50 percent down, the Taliban were up 50 percent! What was going on?

RICE REALIZED SHE was going to have to deal with this. Normally she saw her job as twofold: first, to coordinate what Defense, State, the CIA and other departments or agencies were doing by making sure the president's orders were carried out; and second, to act as counselor - to give her private a.s.sessment to the president, certainly when he asked, perhaps if he didn't. In other words, she was to be the president's troubleshooter. This was trouble.

Two days later, on the evening of Thursday, October 25, Rice phoned the president's personal secretary, Ashley Estes.

"I need to talk to the president," she said. Could Ashley ask the president if it was okay for her to come to the residence for a few minutes? Access to the residence was a special privilege, and Bush only granted it to the senior White House staff. It was the end of the normal working day for the president, about 6:30 P.M.

The president had intentionally organized his White House so that Rice and others could come see him on the spur of the moment, he said in an interview. "All power should not go through an individual to the Oval Office." He had learned this from observing his father's presidency, especially during the first three years when Bush senior's White House Chief of Staff John Sununu controlled access with such an iron fist that those with bad news often couldn't get through. "I believe that a president must give people access," Bush also said, "that part of the job satisfaction of being a White House staffer is the capacity to talk to the president one-on-one."

His father's political strategist, Lee At.w.a.ter, had told him, "Access is power." Bush said he learned this firsthand in 1988 when his father, the vice president, was running for president. "I can remember going to the vice president's house, and they'd be getting ready to have the campaign team come over. And I would be there about, you know, about 20 minutes before they arrived so they would see me with Dad. They didn't have any idea. We were probably talking about the pennant race or, you know, a brother or sister. They didn't know that. They knew that I had access to him, that it was just me and him alone. It was a very interesting lesson. I watched my stature grow the more that I had access to him."

Cheney, Rice, Card, Hughes, Rove and Fleischer could just stop by and ask Ashley if he had five minutes or whatever might be needed. The president said it worked the other way around too. "It makes my job a heck of a lot easier to be able to have access to a lot of people" to get their feedback or reactions. "It was very likely that a Condi or a d.i.c.k Cheney would come in, and I'd say, 'What are you thinking now?' " a Condi or a d.i.c.k Cheney would come in, and I'd say, 'What are you thinking now?' "

Rice in particular was frequently pressing him. "She's a very thorough person, constantly mother-henning me," the president said.

Bush's leadership style bordered on the hurried. He wanted action, solutions. Once on a course, he directed his energy at forging on, rarely looking back, scoffing at - even ridiculing - doubt and anything less than 100 percent commitment. He seemed to harbor few, if any, regrets. His short declarations could seem impulsive.

"I know it is hard for you to believe, but I have not doubted what we're doing," Bush said in a later interview. "I have not doubted... . There is no doubt in my mind we're doing the right thing. Not one doubt."

Rice knew this characteristic. Yet doubt could be the handmaiden of sound policy, she thought. Careful reconsideration is a necessary part of any decision-making process. Rice felt it was her job to raise caution flags, even red lights if necessary, to urge the president to rethink.

Sometimes the best decision is to overrule an earlier one. Now events were their own caution flags. The static situation in Afghanistan might signal big trouble. On top of that, the news media was raising questions about progress, strategy, timetables and expectations. Newsweek magazine had used the dreaded "Q" word - quagmire - evoking Vietnam. A few days earlier, The Washington Post had run an op-ed article ent.i.tled "The Wrong Battle Plan," by Robert A. Pape, a University of Chicago expert on airpower. It began, "The initial U.S. air strategy against Afghanistan is not working."

"What's up?" Bush asked as Rice arrived in the Treaty Room. He had finished his daily physical fitness routine and was still (in his exercise clothes. He was not dripping sweat but had cooled down - perhaps the right time for such a conversation, if there ever was.

The south was dry, and the north was not moving, she said.

"And we've bombed everything we can think of to bomb, and still nothing is happening."

Bush sat down.

"You know, Mr. President," Rice said, "the mood isn't very good among the princ.i.p.als and people are concerned about what's going on." She said there was some hand-wringing.

The president jerked forward. Hand-wringing? He hated, absolutely hated the very idea, especially in tough times. He was getting some reports from Hughes and Rove about media stories, but not much more.

"I want to know if you're concerned about the fact that things are not moving?" Rice asked.

"Of course I'm concerned about the fact that things aren't moving!"

"Do you want to start looking at alternative strategies?"

"What alternative strategies would we be looking at?" he asked, as if the possibility had not crossed his mind. < "there="" always="" is="" the="" thought="" that="" you="" could="" use="" more="" americans="" in="" this.="" you="" could="" americanize="" this="" up="" front."="" that="" could="" mean="" substantial="" ground="" forces="" -="" several="" army="" or="" marine="" divisions.="" a="" division="" normally="" has="" about="" 15,000="" to="">

Bush was aware that in these very rooms some 35 to 40 years earlier, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had confronted similar decisions. Vietnam was the precedent.

"It hasn't been that long," the president said, referring to when the military action had begun.

"That's right."

"Do you think it's working?"

Rice did not really answer.

"We have a good plan," the president said. "You're confident in it?"

Kind of yes - maybe, Rice replied. He knew as well as she that the progress was yellow, not green.

They went back and forth. Rice was intentionally ducking and unwilling to take a firm position, worried it might tilt further discussion, close off options. Also she was unsure. She felt most comfortable when she knew precisely what the president was thinking, so she was sounding him out. But the president was on his chosen course and he had not really thought of shifting strategies.

The really important thing, she told the president, was for him to take the princ.i.p.als' pulse the next day, and if he was committed to the strategy, he better let people know it because he didn't want people starting to fall off.

Starting to fall off? Who was nervous? Who was concerned? The president wanted to take names.

Everybody is concerned, she confided. n.o.body is very sanguine or comfortable. They all have concerns about what they are achieving and might be able to achieve. He had heard some; she had heard more. He was going to have to make some tough decisions pretty soon - about whether they were just going to stay on course or whether they were going to try to make adjustments.

The NSC was going to meet the next morning, she mentioned, and that was the time to affirm the plan or consider changing it. Winter was coming to Afghanistan and the conditions would be brutal, and military gains on the ground could become increasingly difficult.

"I think it would be good if you expressed confidence in this plan. Or if you don't feel that, then we need to do something else." Did they need an alternative strategy? The important thing, she said, was for him to go think about it before the NSC meeting the next morning. Then, at the meeting, he could give his view. "You need to talk about this," she said at the end of their 15- to 20-minute talk.

"I'll take care of it," the president said.

FOR BUSH IT was a memorable discussion. Rice's job was to tell him things. Sometimes he liked to hear them, sometimes he didn't.

He found it an "interesting full circle" that the discussion took place in the Treaty Room where he had just 18 days earlier announced the commencement of military action. But he knew what he wanted to do the next morning.

"First of all," he later recalled, "a president has got to be the calcium in the backbone. If I weaken, the whole team weakens. If I'm doubtful, I can a.s.sure you there will be a lot of doubt. If my confidence level in our ability declines, it will send ripples throughout the whole organization. I mean, it's essential that we be confident and determined and united."