BUSH CALLED NICK Calio, the White House chief of congressional liaison, to the Oval Office.

"Nicky," Bush said, "you take this, you get this up to them now. We're not..."

Calio had a perplexed look on his face.

"Do you know about this?" Bush asked. He was furious about leaks to the news media.

"Can I see it?" Calio asked, as Bush handed him a single sheet of paper. Calio read quickly. It was a memo to Powell, O'Neill, Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Tenet and FBI Director Mueller. Subject: "Disclosures to Congress." The order, signed by Bush, said that only the so-called Big Eight - the Republican and Democratic leaders of both Senate and House, and the chairmen and ranking members of the two intelligence committees - could receive cla.s.sified information or sensitive law enforcement information.

"No," Calio said, saying that he had not seen it.

"Well, they were supposed to tell you," the president said, referring to Andy Card or the White House counsel.

(That morning The Washington Post had run a front page story headlined "FBI, CIA Warn Congress of More Attacks" that I had coauth.o.r.ed with Susan Schmidt. The story focused on a cla.s.sified briefing that CIA and FBI officials had given on the Hill earlier in the week. We reported the high probability of another terrorist attack, and said one intelligence official had told Congress there was a "100 percent" chance of an attack if the United States retaliated with military force in Afghanistan.) Calio tried to explain to the president that such a restriction would be a disaster. It would be like cutting off oxygen to 527 of the 535 members of Congress.

"I don't care. Get it up there. This is what's going to happen," Bush ordered.

"Okay," said Calio, "but I just want to tell you that you can expect - "

"I'm not defending it," Bush said. "Do you get the picture here?"

Calio nodded.

"Get it up there to them, okay?"

"Fine," Calio said.

"It's tough s.h.i.t," the president said.

Bush later talked with Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee. It was the longest conversation Graham had ever had with Bush, and he heard a real stream of Texas profanity.

Calio then undertook what was basically an intense Middle East-style shuttle diplomacy between Bush and the Congress trying to bring both toward the middle. Finally Bush agreed to lift the order. He had sent the message that he could cut them off if he wanted.

SECRETARY RUMSFELD APPEARED at a press conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on Friday with President Karimov. Karimov said that Uzbekistan would grant the U.S. use of its airs.p.a.ce and one of its airfields for humanitarian and search and rescue operations, and was ready to step up cooperation for the exchange of intelligence.

A reporter asked what the United States had offered in exchange. "There have been no specific quid pro quos if that is what you are looking for," Rumsfeld replied.

Karimov quickly added, "I would like to emphasize that there has been no talk of quid pro quos so far."

Rumsfeld, his eye down the road, said what Karimov wanted 10 hear. "The interest of the United States is of a long-standing relationship with this country," he a.s.sured all, "and not something that 15 focused on the immediate problem alone."

AT THE NSC meeting that morning, General Franks joined in on the secure video from CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa.

"Tommy, are we ready to go?" Bush asked.

"Yes, sir, we're ready to go."

"We need a summary of the targets," the president said.

The first day's strike was going to be somewhat small - only about 31 targets overall. They were going to use about 50 cruise missiles, 15 land-based bombers and about 25 strike aircraft from aircraft carriers. They would attack bin Laden training camps, the Taliban air defense system and any concentrations of al Qaeda if there were any that could be located.

Defense was also rescrubbing the so-called no strike list, targets that were not supposed to be hit - power plants, schools, hospitals and especially mosques - to show it was not an attack against the Afghan population. The list was to be updated each day.

"We need to discuss rules of engagement," Myers said, proposing that they do it the next day by secure video.

The president said he had told Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert and Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott of the coming strikes. He said he would inform House Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt.

When they turned to freezing terrorist a.s.sets, one of Bush's favorite instruments, Powell said, "Hezbollah and Hamas will go on the list of organizations subject to the financial war on terror."

The president bristled. "We have a long-term campaign against terrorism," he said, "but first things first. We'll get to the others in due course." The wait and delay was getting to him. Al Qaeda and Afghanistan had to receive all the energy now. After he got his latest feeling of frustration off his chest he reminded them, yes, he was not backing off. "I'm committed to an overall effort in the war on terror." *

Powell said that some of the international relief organizations were worried about dropping food to the Taliban and were trying to identify which villages were not controlled by them.

Wolfowitz said there was good flow into Uzbekistan. Already nine of the necessary 67 planeloads had arrived and they would now be ready by October 7 when they hoped bombing would begin. He said, "We have 33,000 people in the theater. We had 21,000 in the theater September 10." So 12,000 had been recently deployed, though no U.S. military were yet inside Afghanistan.

AT CIA HEADQUARTERS, Hank had hung a sign outside his office door taken from a recruiting poster used by British explorer Ernest Shackleton for his 1914 Antarctica expedition.

It read, "Officers wanted for hazardous journey. Small Wages. Bitter cold. Long months of complete darkness. Constant danger. Safe return doubtful. Honour and recognition in case of success."

Inside, Hank was about to dispatch the most important message of his career to the field. Approved by Tenet and Cofer Black, it was addressed to about a dozen stations and bases in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which were running secret a.s.sets and sources inside Afghanistan. This included the tribal allies and the Northern Alliance. The message also went to Gary's Jawbreaker team on the ground and to several other CIA paramilitary teams that were preparing to go in-country.

The three-page message, headed "Military Strategy," listed these points: 1. Instruct all tribal allies to ground and identify all their aircraft immediately.

2. Instruct the tribals to cease all significant military movement - basically to stand down and hold in place.

3. The future plan was to have the opposition forces drive to isolate enemy forces, but to wait before moving.

4. Instruct all a.s.sets throughout Afghanistan to begin sabotage operations immediately everywhere. This would include tossing hand grenades through Taliban offices, disrupting Taliban convoys, pinning down those moving Taliban supplies and ammunition, and generally making pests of themselves. (This would be the first employment of concerted lethal force in Bush's war on terrorism.) 5. Informing all of them that paramilitary insertions would go forward in the south and be combined with more specific air strikes.

6. All would have to define no strike zones - hospitals, schools.

7. All tribal factions and leaders should identify and locate primary targets.

8. a.s.sets should try to identify possible escape routes out of Afghanistan for bin Laden and his al Qaeda leadership - and then try to set up reconnaissance of the routes for interdiction.

9. Be prepared to interrogate and exploit prisoners.

10. a.s.sess humanitarian needs.

They were instructed to share the full text with General Franks to make sure of complete transparency with the military commander.

Hank closed the message, "We are fighting for the CT [counterterrorist] objectives in the Afghan theater and although this sets high goals in very uncertain, shifting terrain, we are also fighting for the future of CIA/DOD integrated counterterrorism warfare around the globe. While we will make mistakes as we chart new territory and new methodology, our objectives are clear, and our concept of partnership is sound."

Leaflets to be dropped into Afghanistan were prepared with a crude drawing of a military tank wedged between two small Afghan-style buildings.

In Pashto, Dari and English, the leaflet read, "The Taliban are using civilian areas to hide their equipment, endangering everyone in the area. Flee any area where military equipment or personnel are located."

ON SAt.u.r.dAY MORNING, October 6, at 8:30 A.M., the president was at Camp David for the secure video NSC meeting. Tensions over the disputed province of Kashmir were flaring.

"We're watching India," Powell said. "We're waiting for a readout of Blair conversations."

The British prime minister had promised to make calls to defuse the intensifying situation with Pakistan over Kashmir. "We've instructed our amba.s.sadors to go into capitals - then we'll decide whether the president needs to call." By way of understatement, he added, "Want to head this thing off."

On Israel, Powell referred to Sharon's statement that Israel would not allow itself to become Czechoslovakia. "Sharon's behavior in the last few days borders on the irrational," Powell said, thinking he might say that about the Israeli leader on a regular basis.

Rumsfeld, back from his whirlwind trip, reported that he had been rather successful as a diplomat. The Saudis, he said, were gracious and warm, even complimentary. The only negative was their worry that the United States was unhappy, and he believed he had "tamped down" that idea. But the Saudis definitely need senior-level attention regularly.

In Uzbekistan, they had closed the deal on access. "The Uzbeks were friendlier at the end of the meeting than the beginning."

Rumsfeld said that he needed an increase on the ceiling for reserves, up to 300,000 from the current level of 50,000. "We need more headroom."

"You want to do it on Monday?" Bush asked. ; ; "Yes," Rumsfeld said.

Though some 80 countries had made offers to help, only the British would partic.i.p.ate in the first wave of strikes.

"The bombers that need to leave Missouri are about to leave," Rumsfeld continued. "And that will be noticed." The radar-evading B-2 Stealth bombers that were partic.i.p.ating in the initial strikes in Afghanistan were being deployed directly from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and would have to leave 15 or more hours in advance, potentially tipping off the start of operations.

"Let them go," the president said. "Try some disinformation."

"We'll tell people they are full of food," Rumsfeld said.

"When is the humanitarian drop?" Rice asked.

"From 2:30 to 3:30 D.C. time," Myers said, "about two hours after the start of military action. And the threat to the aircraft will be gone by then." The meager air defense system of the Taliban was, they hoped, going to be pulverized in the first strikes.

The president said he would announce the attacks in a brief appearance on national television on Sunday. "We'll certainly have a statement. We'll circulate to the princ.i.p.als for review."

"We need a 'go' for the operation," Rumsfeld said.

"Go," Bush said. "It's well thought through. It's the right thing to do."

THE MORNING OF Sunday, October 7, Karl Rove was at his home in Northwest Washington. The days since the terrorist attacks had not been Rove's happiest. Though he had known Bush for 28 years and been his strategic adviser, Rove had been excluded from the war cabinet and NSC meetings. Bush and Cheney had deemed it impossible to have the controversial political guy in on the war discussions. It would send the wrong message.

Rove could see their point, but at the same time, politics was a continuing element of the presidency even during war, not to be ignored. Bush and Rove both believed that the Bush presidency would be judged largely on his performance dealing with September 11.

On one of the days shortly after the attacks, Rove was in the Oval Office and Bush had told him, Just like my father's generation was called in World War II, now our generation is being called. His father had signed up for the Navy, sworn in as a seaman second cla.s.s in 1942 on his 18th birthday. They were being called to serve when they were in their 50s.

"I'm here for a reason," Bush said, "and this is going to be how we're going to be judged."

Rove, 50, had been hailed by many, including Bush himself, as e architect of the 2000 victory. Just before September 11, The Weekly Standard, a plugged-in conservative magazine, had run a cover story, "The Impresario, Karl Rove, Orchestrator of the Bush White House." A large, respectful drawing of Rove, intellectual, learned and carrying a presidential folder, graced the cover. A miniature, clownish-looking Bush was in the breast pocket of Rove's-jacket.

That Monday, the White House Office of Strategic Initiatives, which Rove headed, had sent around a two-page a.n.a.lysis of the latest polling data.

This was Rove's Racing Form, which he studied methodically.

"The president's job approval is stronger than ever." The numbers were 84 to 90 percent.

"The president's recent job approval increase is unprecedented even for a time of crisis." Bush's job approval had been around 55 percent before September 11 and the jump to 90 percent in the ABC News/Washington Post poll "is unparalleled in modern polling." Sudden crises had in the past triggered an immediate increase in a president's job approval. "The durability of such increases is usually only seven to ten months," meaning presidents sink back to normal approval averages rather quickly.

Bush's father had an approval rating of 59 percent before the Gulf War began, but it jumped to 82 percent at the height of the crisis. Forty-one weeks later, it was back to 59 percent.

Rove took the polling information to Bush, and explained that if history was a guide, they had about 30 to 40 weeks before the polls returned to the norm.

"Don't waste my time with it," Bush told Rove, pretending to have no interest but looking at the data. Later Bush recalled their discussion of the poll numbers, which he said are a snapshot that might be inaccurate 24 hours later. "My job is not to worry about the political consequences, and I don't," the president maintained. It was Rove's job, and Bush knew that Rove managed the account with an unparalleled intensity and devotion to mission. This was definitely one thing that somebody else could handle better.

At the same time, the president carefully monitored his political standing. On this, like all matters, there was a scorecard.

Rove also kept in touch with the party apparatus and leading conservatives. One important-looking confidential communication came in to Rove from one of Bush senior's friends, so Rove took it to the Oval Office.

Roger Ailes, former media guru for Bush's father, had a message, Rove told the president. It had to be confidential because Ailes, a flamboyant and irreverent media executive, was currently the head of FOX News, the conservative-leaning television cable network that was enjoying high ratings. In that position, Ailes was not supposed to be giving political advice. His back-channel message: The American public would tolerate waiting and would be patient, but only as long as they were convinced that Bush was using the harshest measures possible. Support would dissipate if the public did not see Bush acting harshly.

ABOUT 8:30 A.M. Rove's phone rang.

"I suggest you be at the office at about 11 o'clock," the most recognizable voice said from Camp David. Things are going to happen. Get my drift? Bush asked over the nonsecure phone line. "I'm going to speak to the country this afternoon. And, so be there."

Rove arrived at the White House about 11 A.M. A serious amateur historian, he hung out with his notebook.

Rove walked up to the White House Treaty Room on the second floor where Bush was to give his televised announcement. He looked around. On the right was the painting that gave the room its name: President McKinley supervising the signing of the treaty ending the Spanish-American War in that room. The painting included the corner of the room where the chair and cameras were set up for Bush. ; At 12:30 P.M., the president was in his chair ready to address the nation. Someone came in to apply the president's makeup. Five minutes later someone announced that there was a leak, one of the networks had said this was the beginning of the war. the nation. Someone came in to apply the president's makeup. Five minutes later someone announced that there was a leak, one of the networks had said this was the beginning of the war.

"They don't get it," Bush said in a loud voice. "The war already began. It began on September 11th."

Card and Rice were conferring off to the side, and the president seemed irritated that he was not in on the discussion. "What is it?" he called out.

Card told him it was the Pentagon. "They're asking for more authority."

"I've told them they have whatever authority they need," Bush said, "as long as it abides by the rule of low collateral." Commanders and pilots had discretion to hit targets as long as they expected it would only cause minimal damage to civilians. Anything that could cause high collateral damage or make it look or feel like a war against civilians had first to come to Rumsfeld and then him for approval.

At 12:40, the staff began clearing the Treaty Room.

Where are the cards with the text as a backup for the TelePrompTer? Bush asked. Someone brought him the cards. He did a dry run of the speech.

"You've got the paragraphing wrong," he said, and requested changes so the pauses would be more natural. Someone brought him a gla.s.s of water.

"We've done this before," Bush said impatiently to one of the crew members he recognized. "Let's get doing it."

The awkward moments of the countdown continued and Bush looked around.

"Big Al!" he said to a Secret Service agent he had run with. He asked where the agent had been on a recent run.

Silence.

One agent said he had done a five-minute mile.

"I'm impressed," Bush said, adding that he had recently had an excellent run, 21 minutes, 6 seconds for three miles. The second mile had been the slowest, the first and third were the good ones, he added.

Silence.

"Where's the pool?" Bush asked. The networks had just received notice and a camera and sound crew was on its way that would feed video and sound for all. Finally, at 12:50 the pool showed up. They were late and frantic, rushing to get set up in time. One pool member couldn't get fully hooked up.