Buchanan's Journal of Man, September 1887.

by Various.

THE CONCORD SYMPOSIUM AND THEIR GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

Let no one accuse the critic of irreverence, who doubts the wisdom of universities, and of pedantic scholars who burrow like moles in the mouldering remnants of antiquity, but see nothing of the glorious sky overhead. While I have no reverence for barren or wasted intellect, I have the profoundest respect for the fruitful intellect which produces valuable results--for the vast energy of the lower cla.s.s of intellectual powers, which have developed our immense wealth of the physical sciences and their useful applications. Indescribably grand they are. The mathematicians, chemists, geologists, astronomers, botanists, zoologists, anatomists, and the numerous masters of dynamic sciences and arts, have lifted the world out of the ruder elements of barbarism and suffering.

But, as for the cla.s.s of speculative talkers, whose self-sufficiency prompts them to a.s.sume the name of philosophers, to which they have no right, what have they ever done either to promote human welfare, or to a.s.sist human enlightenment and reveal the mysteries of life? Have they not always been as blind as owls, bats, and moles, to daylight progress? Are they not at this time utterly and _unconsciously_ blind to the progress of spiritual sciences, to the revelations of psychometry and anthropology--placing themselves, indeed, in that hopeless cla.s.s who are too ignorant to know their ignorance, too far in the dark to know or suspect that there is any light?

A remnant of these worshippers of antiquity still holds its seances at Concord, Ma.s.s., and publishes its amazingly dry _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_. With the unconscious solemnity of earnestness, it still digs into Aristotle's logic and speculations--the dryest material that was ever used to benumb the brains of young collegians, and teach them how _not to reason_, for Aristotle never had a glimmering conception of what the process of reasoning is. Yet all Concordians are not Aristotelians; some of them have more modern ideas, and a vigorous, though misdirected, mentality.

Prof. W. T. Harris, the leader of the Concordians, to whose lucubrations the newspapers give ample s.p.a.ce, as those of the representative man, made a second attempt to explore the Aristotelian darkness, in which his first essay was totally lost.

If there is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous, it is not even a step from the absurd to the ludicrous and amusing. The professional wit or joker is never so richly amusing as the man who is utterly unconscious that he is in the least funny, while heroically in earnest. The professed comedian never furnishes so much amus.e.m.e.nt as the would-be heroic tragedian, who, like the Count Joannes, furnishes uproarious merriment for the whole evening.

I have seen nothing in our Boston newspapers quite so amusing as the very friendly and sympathetic report of Prof. Harris' most elaborate and laborious comments on the SYLLOGISMS, which reminds one of Hopkinson's metaphysical and elaborate disquisition on the nature, properties, relations, and essential ent.i.ty of a salt-box. We do not laugh at the professor as we did at Daniel Pratt, the "Great American Traveller," whose travels are now ended; for, aside from his metaphysical follies, Prof. Harris is a man of real merit and great intellectual industry, whose services in education will ent.i.tle him to be remembered; but when the metaphysical impulse seizes him,

"Who would not laugh if such a fool there be, Who would not weep if Atticus were he."

The lecture of Prof. Harris was reported in the _Boston Herald_, in the style of a gushing girl with her first lover, as a "NEW STEP IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY," attended by a full audience as "a rare treat" "_like buckwheat-cakes fresh from the griddle_," for "Prof.

Harris took a decidedly _new step in Philosophy_," giving "an insight which _no philosopher, ancient or modern, has attained_." Again, speaking of it privately, Prof. Harris said, "I got hold of the idea three or four years ago, and I have been trying to work it out since.

I regard it as my _best contribution to philosophy_." "_Montes parturiunt_," What do they bring forth? Is it a mouse of respectable size? The _Boston Herald_, which is generally smart, though never profound, says of the symposium, "It has set up Aristotle this year as its golden calf to be worshipped." "But when you ask the question, what does all this talk amount to, it is difficult to give an affirmative answer." "It is simply threshing straw over, again and again." But it is not aware that the Concord straw is merely the dried weeds that Lord Bacon cut up and threw out of the field of respectable literature over two hundred and sixty years ago. "What man (says the _Herald_), with any serious purpose in life, has any time to waste over what somebody thinks Aristotle ought to have thought or said."

And my readers may ask, why give the valuable s.p.a.ce of the JOURNAL OF MAN to examining such trash? Precisely because _it is trash_, and yet occupies a place of honor, standing in the way of progress and representing the tendencies of education for centuries, which still survive, though they may be said to have gone to seed. Concord represents University philosophy, as a dude represents fashion, and as University philosophy is a haughty antagonist of all genuine philosophy, it is important to ill.u.s.trate its worthlessness.

The subject of Prof. Harris' lecture was "Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism, Compared with that of Hegel." As these two were the great masters of obscurantism, the lecture should have been, of course, as perfect a specimen as either of darkness and emptiness. Omitting the definitions of syllogisms, which are familiar to all collegians, but too intolerably tedious to be inflicted on my readers, we find a very unexpected specimen of common sense following the talk about syllogisms, which embodied Aristotle's ideas of Reason. Here it is: "Logic is often called the art of reasoning, and many people study it with a view to mastering an art of correct thinking, hoping thereby to get an instrument useful in the acquirement of truth. It may be doubted, however, whether the mind gets much aid in the pursuit of truth by studying logic." There is no doubt at all about it,--not one rational individual out of a hundred thousand collegians will confess that he ever got any benefit in reasoning or in pursuing truth from Aristotle's syllogistic formula. "All men are mortal--Socrates is a man, and therefore Socrates is mortal."

Why, then, such a flourish of trumpets over some new trick in playing with syllogism, when the whole thing is utterly worthless? And the Professor upsets himself in his own lecture, thus: "If the middle tub is contained in the big tub, and the little tub is contained in the middle tub, then the little tub is contained in the big tub." Hegel says: "Common sense in its reaction against such logical formality and artificiality turned away in disgust, and was of the opinion that it could do without such a science as logic." Most true, Philosopher Hegel, you have absurdities of your own on a gigantic scale, but you do well to reject the petty absurdities of Aristotle.

How does Prof. Harris rise up from Hegel's fatal blow? He rises like Antaeus from touching the earth, and triumphantly shows that syllogisms are the most necessary of all things to humanity in its mundane existence; that, in fact, we have all been syllogizing ever since we left the maternal bosom to look at the cradle, the cat, and the dog.

In fact we never could have grown up to manhood, much less to be Concordian philosophers, if we had not been syllogizing all the days of our life, and, indeed, it is probable we shall continue syllogizing to all eternity, in the next life, if we have any growth in knowledge at all. Blessed be the memory of Aristotle, the great original and unrivalled discoverer of the syllogism, by means of which all human knowledge has been built up, and "blessed be the man (as Sancho Panza said) who first invented sleep," by which we are relieved, to rest after the mighty labors of the syllogism.

And lo! we have been syllogizing all these years, alike when we listen to the nocturnal yowl of the tomcat, and to the morning song of the lark; alike, when we smell the rose, seize the orange, or devour the tempting oyster. In syllogism do we live and move, and have our being.

This is the grand discovery--the last great contribution to philosophy from Concord's greatest philosopher. We suddenly discover that we have been syllogizing like philosophers, as Mrs. Malaprop discovered that her children had been speaking English. The ill.u.s.tration of this overwhelming discovery is peculiarly happy, for he applies it to the discovery of a red flannel rag in the back yard or garden, and, after detecting the red flannel by syllogism, he advances to the grander problem of showing how, by philosophic methods, we can actually distinguish an old tin can from an elephant. To enjoy this fully, the reader must take it himself from the reported lecture.

"The act of recognition is an unconscious syllogistic process in the second figure of the syllogism. I perceive something scarlet in the garden. So far I recognize a host of attributes; it is a real object; the place, surroundings and color are recognized.

The sensations were so familiar that the recognition was inconceivably rapid. Then comes a slower process. The scarlet is an attribute. What can the object be? I think it is a piece of red flannel. The inference comes almost to the surface of consciousness, but I have reasoned unconsciously: This object is red. A piece of flannel is red; therefore this may be a piece of red flannel. The middle term is predicate in both premises. The unknown object is red. A familiar object (flannel) is red.

Hence, I recognize this as flannel. I identify the unknown object with what is familiar in my mind. But the logician will say that this reasoning is on the invalid mode of the second figure, from which you can never draw an affirmative conclusion.

Precisely so, if you mean a necessary conclusion. But sense-perception uses affirmative modes of the second figure and derives probable knowledge therefrom. I make probable knowledge more certain by verifying the inference or correcting it. I go to the garden and pick up the object, and see the threads and fiber of the wool. Or perhaps I find it was a piece of red paper. But whatever it was, at the end I can say what I have seen, only in so far as I have recognized or identified it.

Recognition proceeds by the second figure, and has chiefly the non-valid modes. But it may use the valid modes, though in a still less conscious manner. For instance, I recognized that the object was not an elephant by this valid form; every elephant is larger than a tin can; this object is not larger than a tin can; therefore, this object is necessarily not an elephant; or, by this other valid form, no elephant is as small as a tomato can; this object is just the size of a tomato can; hence this object is not an elephant. Had some one told me to look out and see an elephant, my perception would unconsciously have taken one of these forms. The scarlet is recognized as such only as it is identified with a previous impression of scarlet. Here is our third surprise in psychology. Unless there were a priori idea, sense-perception could never begin. More, unless there were a priori idea, it could not begin. For there must be two recognitions before there can be a first new idea from sense-perception. The fourth surprise is that directly with the first activity of perception in the second figure of the syllogism is joined a second activity which takes place in the form of the first figure of the syllogism. As soon as I perceived the red object to be a piece of flannel, I at once reinforced my sense-perception by unlocking all my previous store of knowledge stored up under the category of red flannel.

I unconsciously syllogized thus: 'All red flannel has threads of warp and woof and a rough texture, caused by the coa.r.s.e fibres of wool curling up stiffly; this is a piece of red flannel; hence this will be found to have these properties.' The act of recognition is a subsumption of the object under a cla.s.s by use of the second figure of the syllogism.

"Now begins the syllogistic activity under the form of the third figure. There are a variety of attributes which I recognize by the activity of the perceiving mind in the form of the first figure, as it recognizes the general cla.s.ses by the primary activity in the form of the second figure. These attributes are collected around the object as a centre of interest, and it is now the middle term. These give a new element of experience, thus: 'Major--this is a tin can; minor--it lies neglected in the garden; conclusion--tin cans get abandoned to neglect.' And so on, as to the use of the contents and the value of the can, running out into a long series of inferences."

As we have now reached the seventh heaven of Concord philosophy, and know how to distinguish an old tin can from an elephant, let us rest in peace, to meditate and enjoy its serene delights. We have had the supreme satisfaction of listening to the modern Plato, the leader at Concord. The _Herald_ has informed us that on another day "the school listened with great satisfaction to Prof. Harris, who is constantly adding to the deep impression he has already made, and to the high opinion in which he is held as the most acute and profound thinker of the times, in his field."

Lest the reader should fail to see in the foregoing what the _great contribution_ to philosophy is, let us look in the _Open Court_ of Chicago, which has a most affectionate partiality for metaphysical mystery. It says this "Best contribution to philosophy" "may be summed up thus," "We can perceive nothing but what we can identify with what was familiar already." If this were true, the babe could never perceive anything, as it begins without any knowledge, and it would be impossible for us to learn anything or acquire any new ideas. This is rather an amusing _discovery_! but it is barely possible or conceivable that there are some old fossils whose minds are in that melancholy condition.

P. S. After a few hours of repose to recover from mental fatigue and digest the new wisdom so suddenly let loose upon mankind, we discover the new aspect of the world of (Concord) philosophy. The great question of the future will be to syllogize or not to syllogize. Is it possible to distinguish an elephant from a tin can by any other method than the syllogism? When that question is decisively settled, if it ever can be settled (for metaphysical questions generally last through the centuries) Prof. Harris will have an opportunity to win still brighter laurels, and make still greater contributions to philosophy, by finding more syllogisms. Will he not prove that mathematics is the sphere of syllogism also, for if two and two make four, does not the conception of four a.s.sume the position of the major predicate, which is the generalized idea of one to a quadruple extent, and also of twos duplicated. Thus the major predicate, that four is two twos, involves the minor that two is the half of four and consequently that twice two is four. Q. E. D. The syllogism is irresistible.

If Prof. Harris should establish the mathematical syllogism and extend its power through all the realms of mathematics, as so industrious a thinker might easily do, he will have taken a step far in advance of Plato, and justly deserve a higher rank, for Plato (see his Phaedo) was terribly puzzled over the question how one and one make two. After much puzzling he decided finally that one and one became two "by _partic.i.p.ation in duality_." This was the first great step to introduce philosophy into mathematics. Let Prof. Harris consummate this great work either by syllogism or by "_partic.i.p.ation_."

Perhaps he may introduce us to a still greater "surprise" by showing that all metaphors and poetical figures of speech are constructed on syllogistic principles. It can be done, but we must not lift the veil of wisdom too hastily, or rush in where Concord philosophers "fear to tread." They have an endless future feast in the syllogisms, if they are faithful followers of Prof. Harris. But possibly there may be others attracted to Concord who would give the school something less dry than metaphysics, or, some other sort of metaphysics. One of their most esteemed orators made a diversion from the syllogism by presenting some other idea based on Aristotle, which ought to eclipse the syllogism, for, according to the report, he said "It is the most _momentous question that can engage the human attention_. It involves the _reality of G.o.d_, of personal existence, and freedom among men, and of immortality."

Immense it must be! Dominic Sampson would surely say "_Prodigious!_"

An attentive study of the obscure phraseology of this philosopher enables one to discover that the great and tragical question concerns the reality of reality, or what the reality is, and whether it is real or not, and how we can find it out. The way to find out whether that which we think is, is or is not, is to go back to Aristotle, who is the only man that ever understood the is-ness of the is. As the lecturer is reported to say, "The _first sign_ of a movement in the right direction is the serious attention now being devoted in many quarters to the writings of Aristotle, who, in this, as in many other things, will long remain the master of those that know." Evidently those that don't go to Aristotle don't know anything about life, freedom, G.o.d and immortality. How unfortunate we are, and how fortunate the professor is, must appear by his answer to the great question, reported as follows: "Prof. Davidson discussed at length the nature of phenomena, taking the underlying basis that time and s.p.a.ce are relations of the real to the phenomenal, and nothing but relations; also that we not only have ideas of reality, but that _these ideas are the realities themselves_. Then the question is, if the _concept of reality be reality itself_, how is this related to phenomena? There is a double relation, active and pa.s.sive. * * *

Eternal realities are known to us only as terms of phenomena. They are in ourselves, and from the exigencies of our intelligence."

Thus we understand nothing whatever exists but our own cogitations, or, as the sailor jocosely expressed it--"'Tis all in my eye"--and after these many years we are brought back to the famous expression of the Boston Transcendentalist, "we should not say _it rains, it snows_, we should say _I rain, I snow_." This, gentle, patient reader, is no burlesque, that you have been reading, it is the wisdom of the Concord Symposium of professors and authors meeting near the end of the 19th century, and basking in the smiles of _cultured_ Boston! or at least that portion which is devoted to the Bostonese idea of philosophy, and thinks the feeblest glimmer of antiquity worth more than the science of to-day. Such indeed are the sentiments of the President of Boston University. And as for the wisdom of Concord, the _Open Court_, which is good authority, says: "Dr. Harris and Prof. Davidson are, without doubt, the _pillars of the school_; but there is some difference of opinion as to which is its _indispensable support_." An intelligent spectator would say that more metaphysical ac.u.men and vigor has been displayed by DR. EDWARD MONTGOMERY than by all the remainder of those engaged in the blind hunt for philosophy at Concord.

On the last day of the Symposium, July 28, the report says "The burden has fallen wholly upon Prof. Harris, and he has borne it so as to excite the _wonder and admiration_ of his listeners. He _went to the very bottom of things_ as far as human thought could go, and there, as he put it, was on solid rock, with no possibility of scepticism. Both his forenoon and evening lectures were _masterly in their way_."

Exactly so; they were unsurpa.s.sed as a reproduction of the style and manner of the Aristotelian folly which held Europe fast in that wretched period called the Dark Ages, which preceded the dawn of intelligence with Galileo.

About one half of the reported lectures on Aristotle is, though cloudy, intelligible. The remainder is a fair specimen of that skimmy-dashy style of thought which glances over the surfaces of things and never reaches their substance or reality, yet boasts of its unlimited profundity because it does not know the meaning of profound.

Such thinking must necessarily end in falsity and folly, of which the lecture gives many specimens, which it is worth while to quote, to show what the devotees of antiquity call philosophy--thus:

"If we cannot know the ultimate nature of being, then philosophy is impossible, for philosophy differs from other kind of knowing by seeking a first principle." "The objects of philosophy then include those of ontology. They are first the nature of the ultimate being of the universe, the first principle, the idea of G.o.d."

This is not philosophy, but might be called theology, and not legitimate theology even, but supra-theological--for all sane theology admits that man cannot know G.o.d. It is a desperate, insane suggestion that we must know the unknowable, and that if we cannot do that we can have no philosophy. Of course men who think this way know nothing of philosophy, and are beyond the reach of reason.

Again, "in the nature of the truly independent and true being, it sees necessary transcendence of s.p.a.ce and time, and this is essential immortality." This is a fair specimen of the skimmy-dashy style.

Immortality is not a "transcendence of s.p.a.ce," if that means anything at all, but a conscious existence without end. Perhaps by "transcendence of s.p.a.ce" he means filling all the s.p.a.ce there is, and going considerably beyond it where there is no s.p.a.ce.

His idea of infinity is worthy of Aristotle or Hegel, to whom, in fact, it belongs--he says, "self-conditioning is the form of the whole, the form of that _which is its own other_." That something should be "its own other" is just as clear as that it should be its own mother or father. Do such expressions represent any ideas, or do metaphysicians use words as a subst.i.tute for ideas--verily they do, in Hegelian metaphysics, and the same thing is done in asylums for the insane.

Again, "our knowledge of quant.i.ty is a knowledge of what is universal and necessary, and _hence_ is not derived from experience." If this is true of the professor, he knew all of mathematics before he opened his eyes in the cradle. Common mortals know nothing of quant.i.ty or anything else, until they have had a little experience. If we know everything that is "universal and necessary" without experience, the little babes must be very wise indeed.

Again, "causal energy is essentially a _self-separation_, for in order that a cause A. may produce an effect in B. outside of it, cause A.

must detach or separate from itself the influence or energy which modifies B." What does the earth _detach from itself_ when it causes a heavy body to fall? In chemical catalysis what does the second body "detach from itself" to produce change in the first, which is changed by its mere presence. The a.s.sertion is but partially true, applying only to the transfer of force when one body strikes another. Aristotle has some thoroughly absurd suggestions on the same subject which Professor H. did not reproduce.

How does he grapple with the idea of G.o.d, which is the essence of his philosophy? Here it is: "The first principle as pure self-activity, must necessarily have the permanent form of _knowing of knowing_, for this root form of self-consciousness is entirely self-related. The self sees the essential self, the self-activity is the object of self." We are instructed! G.o.d _knows he knows_, and that is the very essence of his divinity--that is enough. In this profound expression we have the consummation of philosophy, for the purpose of his philosophy is to know G.o.d, "_Nunc dimittis_," we need to know nothing more,--_we know we know_, and so we are G.o.d's. "This line of thought brought up at every step some phase of Plato and Aristotle," said the professor, and we are thankful that he did not resurrect any more of the puerilities of Athenian ignorance. "Knowing of knowing" is quite enough, which he repeats to be emphatic. "All true being is in the form of the infinite or self-related, and related to itself as the _knowing of knowing_. All beings that are not this perfect form of self-knowing, either potentially or actually, must be parts of a system or world order which is produced in some way by true being or self-knowing. All potential self-knowings contain within themselves the _power to realize_ their self-knowledge, and are therefore free beings." This is a broad hint that men are G.o.ds and lands us in that realm of folly of which Mrs. Eddy is the presiding genius. She is much indebted to the Concord philosophers for lending their respectability to her labyrinth of self-contradictions.

One quotation more, to give the essence of this Concord philosophy.

"The Divine Being exists for himself as one object. This gives us the Logos, or the only-begotten. The Logos _knows himself_ as personal perfection, and also as _generated_, though in an infinite past time.

This is its recognition of its first principle and its unbegotten 'Father.' But whatever it knows in self-consciousness, it creates or makes to exist," and more of the same sort.

We are overwhelmed with such a flood of wisdom! How the professor attained so intimate, familiar, and perfect a knowledge of the infinite power, to which the fathomless depths of starry infinity are as nothing, is a great mystery. Was it by _Kabbala_ or by _Thaumaturgy_, or did he follow the sublime instructions of his great brother Plato, and thrust his head through the revolving dome of the universe, where the infinite truth is seen in materialized forms.

The "Divine" Plato (of whom Emerson said, "Plato is philosophy, and philosophy is Plato") described the immortal G.o.ds as driving up in chariots through the dome of the heavens to _get upon the roof_, and look abroad at infinite truth, as they stand or drive upon the revolving dome, followed by _ambitious souls who barely get their heads through the roof_ with difficulty, and catch a hasty glimpse of infinite truth, before they tumble back, or lame their wings, or perhaps drop into the body of some brute. The revolving dome and the ambitious souls peeping through the roof, would be a good subject for the next symposium. They might tell us whether these ambitious souls that peep through the roof are Concordian philosophers, or belong to the schools of Aquinas and _Duns Scotus_.

The philosophy of the Greeks is worth no more to-day than their chemistry or their physiology. The lingering superst.i.tion of believing because they had famous warriors, orators, statesmen, historians, poets, and sculptors, while entirely ignorant of science and philosophy, that their philosophic puerilities are worthy of adoration in the 19th century, a superst.i.tion which makes a fetish of the writings of Plato and Aristotle, has been tolerated long enough, and as no one has attempted to give a critical estimate of this effete literature since Lord Bacon did something in that way, I shall not much longer postpone this duty.

RECTIFICATION OF CEREBRAL SCIENCE.--In the October number the rectification of cerebral science as to psychic functions will be shown by appropriate engravings, showing how far the discoveries and doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim are sustained by positive science. In the further development of the subject, hereafter, the true value and proper position of the discoveries of Ferrier, and the continental vivisectionists will be explained, though but meagre contributions to psychology, they furnish very valuable additional information as to the functions of the brain.