It was two very unhappy people standing on Pier Seven in Manila, wondering if they would ever see each other again, if the U.S.A.T.

Was.h.i.+ngton could outmaneuver the subs in the Pacific, and if our U.S.

Army could survive a frontal attack by the j.a.panese.

Roosevelt must have known the war was coming. In 1937 he branded the j.a.panese as "aggressors" in their undeclared war in China and called for quarantine against her. The j.a.panese answered him by sinking the U.S.S. Panay and machine-gunning her crew.

In the late '30s, with the world situation becoming increasingly dangerous, Germany and Italy both arming in Europe, and j.a.pan increasing its manpower, Roosevelt wanted to cut the Regular Army by 51 %, the National Guard by 35% and the Reserves by 33% in order to balance his budget. It seems he was rather naive, 'or possibly just the politician worrying about reelection.

Gen. MacArthur, who was Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, told Roosevelt, "Mr. President, when the next war is lost, it will be Roosevelt's War, not MacArthur's." Fortunately, MacArthur was able to save the Army from the cuts.

In Sept, 1940, Germany, Italy and j.a.pan signed the Tripart.i.te Pact. In July, 1941, Roosevelt told Gen. Marshall to draw up war plans. With his a.s.sistants, Gen. Wedemeyer and Gen. Gerow; they concluded that Hitler was the enemy to be stopped j.a.pan and Italy could come later.

It was Roosevelt who said, "In politics, nothing happens by accident!

You can bet it was planned!"

In July, 1941, Roosevelt again placed sanctions against j.a.pan to keep U. S. oil, sc.r.a.p iron and raw materials from reaching her sh.o.r.es. He issued several executive directives which made war between the U.S.

and j.a.pan inevitable. He froze all a.s.sets in the U.S. He closed the Panama Ca.n.a.l to j.a.panese s.h.i.+pping.

In August, 1941, Roosevelt placed an embargo on all goods except food.

During the same month the United States cracked the j.a.panese code, after which he knew what Tokyo was thinking,

j.a.pan reported that "Roosevelt's decisions had created a situation so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer."

Tojo immediately called another million reservists to the colors.

John Costello, a British historian, said that Roosevelt received a positive war warning on Nov. 26, and possibly as early as Nov. 6th that war would break out on Dee. 7th. He stated, "Roosevelt was not only expecting war, but knew exactly when it would break out." Even with the j.a.panese Fleet approaching Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt issued explicit orders to the military: "Do not initiate hostilities against j.a.panese under any circ.u.mstances!" It now seems that Roosevelt not only expected the "Day of Infamy," but needed it to get the support of the American people, to get them sufficiently aroused to fight a war.

He also wanted to be sure that j.a.pan would be branded "the aggressor."

That night the radio announced that the "j.a.panese have marched from Aparri (on the north coast of Luzon) to Tuguegarao and have activated the airfield." Now we could expect more frequent bombing.

"Tokyo Rose" was urging us to surrender, or, "Experience a certain death!" She continued: "All American aid is going to Europe! America is giving Lend-lease aid to Britain and to Russia, but there is none for the Philippines." She was right!

December 12, '41: Dr. Allen and I had a Filipino soldier's wife on the operating table at 0800 hours ready for a sterilization operation. She was thirty-four years old and had seventeen children. During her last pregnancy, which she had delivered ten days before, she became greatly swollen with edema (severe kidney disease). Another pregnancy would probably kill her.

Bomb began to fall. I shouted, "Everybody downstairs-under the hospital!" After the" All Clear," we returned to the operating room to find our patient had retrieved her clothing and departed for safer areas.

Again the wounded were coming in. This time we were ready

for them. The operating room was all set up and ready to go.

Radio from USAFFE: Capt. Eugene C Jacobs, M.C, promoted to Major.

Heard that a strong j.a.panese force had landed at Legaspi accompanied by a large naval escort.

During the next ten days, while we treated our sick and wounded, and buried our dead, nearly one-hundred various sized j.a.panese s.h.i.+ps were quietly a.s.sembling in the Lingayen Gulf, only twenty-five miles from Baguio. We had neither airpower nor naval forces to deter them.

The Army Air Corps had been about

75% destroyed, and Admiral Hart would not risk his small Asiatic Fleet in battle; he took off for Australia.

At dawn on the morning of Dec. 22, '41, some 60,000 veteran Nipponese troops of Lt. Gen. Masahatu Homma's crack 14th Army from China swarmed ash.o.r.e between Vigan and Dagupun, twenty-five to fifty miles from Baguio.

Maj. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright had four divisions (11th, 21st, 31st, and 1 10th) of the Philippine Army on the beaches to prevent a landing. When the cruisers and destroyers opened fire with their big guns, there was great confusion on the beaches; many recent recruits buried their rifles in the sand, and took off for the mountains. "This was not their kind of war!"

Soon thousands of j.a.panese veterans, on bicycles, were pedaling south on the highway bordering the South China Sea. Our Scouts picked off hundreds of j.a.ps as they rode by, but in a few hours were completely out of ammunition. The j.a.ps and their bicycles kept right on coming.

Sporadic wounded were appearing at the hospital. Major Joe Ganahl, a well known polo player, was one of these. He had been fighting a rear-guard action with his big" 155s"-coming down from Vigan. He said, "I'm going to have to destroy my 155s as they are trapped." When we got his wounds dressed, he took off in his jeep down the road, looking like the "Spirit of'76."

We were beginning to note that the j.a.panese .25 caliber was not causing near the tissue damage caused by the U.S. .30, .38 and .45 cal.

Frequently, when using the telephone, we could hear j.a.panese voices using our lines. We could usually get them off by saying, "Mos.h.i.+, mos.h.i.+! (h.e.l.lo) and sayonara (good-bye)."

We transferred our few remaining patients to civilian hospitals in Baguio and made preparations to move out.

As the j.a.panese Imperial Army advanced up the mountains toward Baguio on both roads, the Naguillian Trail, and the Kennon Road, our two companies of the 43rd Philippine Scouts, outnumbered ten to one, were becoming more and more desperate. We could hear the big explosions as they blew bridges and oil tanks.

Finally, we were aware of rifle fire-it sounded like corn popping.

Realizing that Camp Hay would soon be overrun by j.a.panese troops, we prepared and loaded our equipment on hospital vehicles. We were not anxious to be the first military

unit in the Philippines to surrender. We were well informed as to the j.a.panese cruelty and treachery in China; we didn't want any part of it.

Chapter II

THE ORANGE PLAN (WPO III)

Dee. 23, 1941 (my wedding anniversary): Finally, orders arrived from USAFFE Headquarters in Manila: "ORANGE PLAN III IS NOW IN EFFECT!

EVACUATE CAMP JOHN HAY! PROCEED TO JOIN FIL-AMERICAN FORCES IN BATAAN!

MACARTHUR".

The j.a.panese forces controlled both roads leading from Baguio to Bataan. The only available exits from Baguio were over rugged mountains, some a mile high. The nearest road leading to Bataan that still might be open was through Balete Pa.s.s, fifty miles to the southeast.

I worried about feeding my medical detachment (two Army nurses and thirty enlisted personnel) following along behind the companies of the 43rd Infantry of Scouts. I told Col. Horan that I would like my detachment to be the "point" that would lead the way through to Bataan. To my surprise, he seemed pleased and agreed. I told him, "I'm ready to move out!" He answered,

"OK!"

Our medics quickly mounted hospital transportation and drove down the southeast road into the valley, past the entrance to the Antomoc Gold Mine and on to the end of the pavement. As we abandoned our vehicles, we disabled them so the j.a.panese would be unable to use them. We then placed our first-aid materials and my little medical bag on litters, and started up the trail at a rather rapid pace. In the hot sun we soon became exhausted and realized we would have to go slower and rest frequently.

About three hours up the trail, we came upon a.s.sociated Press Correspondent Clark Lee trudging along. Resting with him on the path for a few minutes, we swapped stories; he reported: "Lingayen city has been bombed! Many Filipinos are fleeing south through the central plains with all their belongings. I came up to Baguio yesterday; soldiers had dynamite boxes ready to blow the bridges on the Naguillian Trail. I saw Major Ganahl and asked him what happened to our North Luzon Forces. Joe answered, 'h.e.l.l! We are the North Luzon Forces!"

We never saw Clark Lee again, but later learned that he found a short-cut through St. Nicholas and Tayug to the central plain, where he had a brush with the j.a.ps on his way to Bataan. He proved an old saying, "He travels fastest who travels alone!" He later wrote a very interesting book about his experiences in the Philippines, "They Call It Pacific."

Our two nurses were having difficulty keeping up with the troops on the steep and often narrow trails. Our equipment was becoming too heavy to carry; little by little, it fell by the wayside: litters, gas masks, helmets, pup tents, tarps, blankets, mosquito nets, etc. As we moved up the mountains, we noticed natives using mirrors to signal planes. We didn't know whether they were trying to blind the pilots or wave them away. Two more fatiguing hours and we reached the large Lusod Saw Mill, operated' by the American Jorgensen family.

A soldier came running up the path; he shouted, "Col. Horan has had a heart attack!" Back down the trail I went for about an hour, when I found the colonel in agony beside the path. A quarter of morphine, a swallow of whiskey and an hour's rest revived him enough to continue.

The Jorgensen family were gracious hosts; they had apparently been stocking up on food for several months, getting ready for this day.

They shared their Christmas dinner with us-our last warm meal.

Because the mountains were so rugged, we decided that tile nurses should remain with the Jorgensens to share their fate, along with several American miners' wives, who were joining them-to sit out the war.