[Footnote 1: _History of the Colonies planted by the English on the Continent of North America_, by JOHN MARSHALL. 8vo. Philadelphia, 1824. Chap. X.]

The increasing complaints of the merchants, and the loud clamors of the nation, at length forced the British minister to abandon his pacific system; and war was declared against Spain on the 23d of October, 1739. A squadron, commanded by Admiral Vernon was detached for the West Indies, with instructions to act upon the defensive; and General Oglethorpe was ordered to annoy the settlements in Florida.[1]

[Footnote 1: _Historical Review of the Transactions of Europe, from the commencement of the War with Spain, in_ 1739, _to the Insurrection in Scotland, in_ 1745, by SAMUEL BOYSE. 8vo.. Dublin, 1748. Vol. I. p.

27.]

It now became necessary for Oglethorpe to take the most prompt and effective measures for the protection of the Colony; and, as his settlement had, from the beginning, been opposed by the Spaniards at St. Augustine, and would now have to encounter their resentful a.s.saults, he must put into requisition all his military force, and see to their adequate equipment. He immediately took measures for raising a troop of thirty rangers, to prevent the Spanish horse and Indians at St. Augustine from making incursions into the Province; and likewise to intercept the runaway negroes of Carolina, on their way through the country to join the Spaniards. At the same time he summoned four hundred Creeks, and six hundred Cherokee Indians to march down to the southern borders. He then viewed the arms of the militia, to ascertain that they were all in good order, and gave directions that powder, b.a.l.l.s, and flints, should be issued out of the magazine, for supplying each member with a proper quant.i.ty. But aware that all this would be too inconsiderable for effectual resistance, he perceived it to be expedient to seek the protection of the West India fleet, and to apply to the a.s.sembly of South Carolina for cooperation in a cause, in the event of which their own safety was involved. Accordingly he immediately sent up to Charlestown to desire a.s.sistance, and to consult measures with the commanders of the men of war then on the station, in order immediately to block up St. Augustine before the Spaniards could receive supplies and reinforcements from Cuba; which, if properly executed, the place would, in all probability, be soon reduced.[1] This application was laid before the General a.s.sembly, and, on the 8th of November, a Committee was appointed to take the same into consideration. Their Report was discussed in both Houses of a.s.sembly; but no decision was obtained.

[Footnote 1: See his letter in the _History of the Rise and Progress of Georgia_, HARRIS'S _Voyages_, II. p. 338, dated 21st of September, 1739.]

Having taken these preparatory measures, he returned to Frederica to make all the arrangements which the exigences of the case required, in the equipment of his own forces, and by calling upon his Indian allies; waiting, with impatience, however, the result of his application to the sister Colony.

Towards the middle of November a party of Spaniards landed in the night time upon Amelia island, and skulked in the thicket till morning, when two Highlanders, unarmed, went into the woods for fuel; upon whom the Spaniards fired, first five and then ten shot; which was heard by Francis Brooks, who commanded the scout-boat upon the coast.

He immediately made a signal to the Fort, which was then garrisoned by a detachment of General Oglethorpe's regiment. Upon this a party instantly went out, but they arrived too late, for they found their comrades dead, and that the a.s.sa.s.sins had taken to their boat, and put out to sea. The bodies of the soldiers were not only rent with shot, but most barbarously mangled and hacked. The periodical publication from which this account is taken, has the following remarks:[1]

"Whence it was apparent that the Spaniards had first, out of cowardice, shot them, and then, out of cruelty, cut and slashed them with their swords. If they had not been most scandalous poltroons, they would have taken the two unarmed men prisoners, without making any noise; and then they might have lurked in the wood till they had found an opportunity of getting a better booty, or at least of making more prisoners. And, if they had not been most barbarously cruel, they would have been satisfied with simply killing these unresisting men, (which might have been without such a volley of shot,) and not have so mangled their bodies after they were slain. From such cowardly and cruel foes no mercy can be expected; and every one sent against them must despair if he finds himself in danger of being overpowered, and wrought up to desperation and revenge when he finds himself any thing near upon an equal footing."

[Footnote 1: _Annals of Europe_, for 1739, p. 410.]

Upon being informed of this outrage, Oglethorpe fitted out and manned a gun boat, and pursued them by water and land, above a hundred miles; but they escaped. By way of reprisal, however, he pa.s.sed the St.

John's into Florida; drove in the guards of Spanish horse that were posted on that river; and advanced as far as a place called the Ca.n.a.llas; at the same time sending Captain Dunbar with a party to find out the situation and force of the fort at Picolata, near the river, upon what were then called "the lakes of Florida," eighty miles from the mouth of the river. They attacked the garrison, but were repulsed, having no artillery. They accomplished, however, the intentions of Oglethorpe, as they reconnoitred both that place and another fort called St. Francis.

In January he returned to Frederica, where he met with Captain Warren,[1] who had lately arrived with the Squirrel man of war. When their consultation was concluded, Captain Warren went and cruised off the Bay of St. Augustine, while Oglethorpe, with a detachment of troops on board of the boats, and some artillery, went up the Lakes of Florida, rowing by day, and sailing by night, so that he attacked the two forts Picolata and St. Francis, took both the same day, and made the soldiers in the garrisons prisoners of war.

[Footnote 1: Afterwards Sir PETER WARREN, an excellent naval officer.]

Captain Hugh Mackay, in a letter to Colonel Cecil, dated Frederica, 24th of January, 1740, says, "The General escaped very narrowly being killed by a cannon ball at Fort St. Francis, or, as the Spaniards called it, 'San Francisco de Papa.'"

CHAPTER XIV.

Oglethorpe addresses a letter to Lieutenant-Governor Bull, suggesting an expedition against St. Angustine--Follows this, by application in person--Promised a.s.sistance, and cooperation--Returns to Frederica--Collects his forces--Pa.s.ses over to Florida--Takes several Spanish forts--Is joined by the Carolinean troops--The enemy receive supplies--Oglethorpe changes the siege into a blockade--Takes possession of Anastasia Island--Colonel Palmer and his men surprised and cut to pieces--Spanish cruelties--English fleet quit the station--Siege raised, and Oglethorpe returns to Frederica.

By the information which Oglethorpe was able to obtain from the prisoners, which confirmed the accounts received from other sources, he learned that the garrison at St. Augustine was in want of provisions; and that, the half-galleys having been sent to the Havana for troops and supplies, the river and sea-board were dest.i.tute of defence. Such being the case, he conceived that a fitting opportunity now offered for the reduction of the place, taking the enemy by surprise, before the reinforcements arrived; and thereby dispossessing the Spaniards of Florida. He, therefore, sent an express to Lieutenant-Governor Bull, urging an immediate compliance with his application for a.s.sistance. The consideration was accordingly renewed in the a.s.sembly on the 4th of February. At length Oglethorpe, impatient of delays occasioned by their continued demurring about the feasibility of the project, presented himself before them, that they might be made acquainted more fully with his intentions, and with every thing relative to their being carried into execution. After many conferences, a scheme of action was agreed upon, and an Act of a.s.sembly pa.s.sed, April 5th, 1740, for the raising of a regiment of four hundred men, to be commanded by Colonel Vanderdussen; a troop of rangers;[1] presents for the Indians; and supply of provisions for three months.[2] They also furnished a large schooner, with ten carriage and sixteen swivel guns, in which they put fifty men under the command of Captain Tyrrell.

[Footnote 1: As the Rangers could not be procured, the a.s.sembly afterwards voted an addition of two hundred men.]

[Footnote 2: The term of service, and, of course, the amount of supply, were afterwards extended to four months.]

With this encouragement, and the promise of cooperation by Commodore Vincent Price, who commanded the small fleet on that station, the place of rendezvous was appointed at the mouth of St. John's river.

The General then published his manifesto,[1] and immediately hastened back to Georgia to prepare his forces for the Expedition.

[Footnote 1: Appendix, No. XXII.]

On the beginning of April he went to the Uchee town to engage runners to his Indian allies to inform them of his intended a.s.sault of St.

Augustine; to bespeak their a.s.sistance, and request their chiefs and warriors to join his forces at Frederica, whither he immediately repaired. There he completed the equipment of his forces; selected the field-pieces and their carriages, b.a.l.l.s and powder; and attended to the military accoutrements, stores and provisions.

On the 9th of May he pa.s.sed over to Florida with four hundred selected men of his regiment, and a considerable party of Indians, headed by Molochi, son of Prim the late chief of the Creeks; Raven, war-chief of the Cherokees; and Toonahowi, nephew of Tomo Chichi. On the evening of the 10th, part of the Carolina forces arrived.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

As the first thing to be done was to take the forts that kept open the communication of the Spaniards with the country, and thus cut off their supplies, the General, impatient of losing time, invested the small fort called Francis de Pupa, seventeen miles north of St.

Augustine, commanded by a sergeant and twelve men, who surrendered without a contest. Thence he proceeded to Fort Diego, situated on the plains, twenty-five miles from St. Augustine, defended by eleven guns, and fifty regulars, besides Indians and negroes. In his sortie upon this, he made use of a little stratagem, as well as force; which was by appointing three or four drums to beat, at the same time, in different places in the woods, and a few men now and then to appear suddenly, and withdraw out of sight again. At this, the enemy in the fort were so confounded, with the apprehension that they were surrounded by a great number of troops, that they made only a feint of opposition; and, being summoned to surrender, did so, on condition of being treated as prisoners of war, and, (what they princ.i.p.ally insisted on) not to be delivered into the hands of the Indians, from whom they were conscious that they had incurred the most condign reprisals for former aggressions.[1] The other articles were that they should deliver up the guns and stores, which consisted of nine swivel and two carriage guns, with the powder and shot, &c.; that they should have liberty to keep their baggage; that Seignior Diego Spinosa, to whom the fort belonged, it having been built at his expense, and on his land, should hold his plantation and slaves, and such other effects as were not already plundered in the field; and, finally, that no deserters or runaways from Charlestown should have the benefit of this capitulation. Here he left a garrison of sixty men, under the command of Lieutenant Dunbar, to secure the retreat of the army, in case of accidents, and to preserve a safe communication with the settlements in Georgia. He then returned to the place of rendezvous, where he was joined on the 19th of May by Captain M'Intosh, with a company of Highlanders, and Colonel Vanderdussen, with the rest of the Carolina troops, but without any horse, pioneers, or negroes.

[Footnote 1: Stephens, II. 389.]

By this time six Spanish half-galleys, with a number of long bra.s.s nine pounders, manned with two hundred regulars, and attended by two sloops loaded with ammunition and provisions, had entered the harbor of St. Augustine, so that the forces in the town and castle were very nearly equal in numbers to the land forces brought against them, and their artillery much superior.

Notwithstanding all the reinforcement which Oglethorpe had received, it was judged impracticable to take the place by a.s.sault from the land side, unless an attack could be made at the same time by the boats of the men of war, and other small craft, on the sea side, on which the town had no intrenchments; and to begin a regular siege on the land side was impossible, as he had neither force enough for investing the place, nor any pioneers for breaking the ground, and carrying on the approaches. For this reason it was concerted between him and the sea commanders, that as soon as they arrived off the bar of the north channel, he should march up with his whole force, consisting of about two thousand men, to St. Augustine, and give notice by a signal agreed on, that he was ready to begin the attack by land; which should be answered by a counter signal from the fleet of their readiness to attack it by sea. Accordingly the General marched, and arrived near the intrenchments of St. Augustine, June 4th, at night, having in his way taken Fort Moosa, about three miles from St. Augustine, which the garrison had abandoned upon his approach. He ordered the gates of the fort to be burnt, and three breaches to be made in the walls.

As soon as it was proper to begin the attack, he made the signal agreed on, but had no countersign from the men of war. This was to his utter surprise and disappointment. The reason which was afterwards a.s.signed, was, that the fleet had ascertained that their promised cooperation had been rendered impracticable; as the galleys had been drawn up abreast in the channel between the castle and the island, so that any boats which they should send in must have been exposed to the cannon and musketry of the galleys, as well as the batteries of the castle; and, as no ships of force could get in to protect them, they must have been defeated, if not wholly destroyed; and that it was impossible to make an attack by sea, while the galleys were in that position. It being presumptuous to make an attack without the aid of the fleet, the General was under the necessity of marching back to Fort Diego, where he had left all his provisions, camp furniture, and tools; because he had neither horses nor carriages for taking them along with him by land, nor had then any place for landing them near St. Augustine, had he sent them by water.[1]

[Footnote 1: _London Magazine_, Vol. XXVII. p. 22.]

Disappointed in the project of taking the place by storm, he changed his plan of operations, and resolved, with the a.s.sistance of the ships of war, which were lying at anchor off the bar, to turn the siege into a blockade, and to shut up every channel by which provisions could be conveyed to the garrison. For this purpose, he stationed Colonel Palmer, with his company, at Fort Moosa, to scour the woods, and intercept all supplies from the country, and "enjoined it upon him, for greater safety, to encamp every night in a different place, and, by all means to avoid coming into action." He also charged him, if he should perceive any superior party sallying forth from St. Augustine, to make a quick retreat towards Fort Diego, where it was certain the enemy would not follow him, for fear of having their retreat cut off by a detachment from the army. He sent Colonel Vanderdussen, with his regiment, to take possession of Point Quartell, at a creek which makes the mouth of the harbor opposite Anastasia; and this he did "because they would be safe there, being divided from St. Augustine, and covered from any sally that would be made by the garrison."[1]

[Footnote 1: _History of the British Settlements in North America_.

Lond. 1773, 4to, page 163.]

As there was a battery on Anastasia, which defended the entry to St.

Augustine, the Commodore suggested that, if a body of troops should be sent to land upon that island, under favor of the men of war, and dispossess it, he would then send the small vessels into the harbor, which was too shallow to admit the ships. Upon this, the General marched to the coast, and embarked in the boats of the men of war, with a party of two hundred men, and most of the Indians. Captain Warren, with two hundred seamen, attached themselves to this expedition.

Perceiving that the Spaniards were advantageously posted behind the sand-hills, covered by the battery upon the island, and the fire from the half-galleys which lay in shoal water where the men of war could not come, he ordered the heavy boats to remain and seem as though they intended to land near them, while he, with Captain Warren and the pinnaces, rowed, with all the speed they could, to the southward about two miles. The Spaniards behind the sand-hills strove to prevent their landing, but before they could come up in any order, the boats had got so near to the sh.o.r.e that the General and Captain Warren, with the seamen and Indians, leaped into the water breast high, landed, and took possession of the sand-hills. The Spaniards retreated in the utmost confusion to the battery; but were pursued so vigorously, that they were driven into the water, and took shelter in the half-galleys.[1]

[Footnote 1: _London Magazine_, Vol. XXVII. p. 22.]

All hands were now set to work to erect the batteries, whence a cannonade was made upon the town. This, however, was to little effect; partly from the distance, and partly from the condition of some of the field pieces which were employed. The enemy returned a brisk fire from the castle and from the half-galleys in the harbor. The latter, chiefly annoying the camp, it was agreed to attack them; but though Commodore Price had proposed that measure to Colonel Vanderdussen first, he altered his opinion and would not consent to it.

"Thirty-six pieces of cannon, together with planks for batteries, and all other necessaries, with four hundred pioneers were to have come from Carolina; but only twelve pieces of cannon arrived. Of course, for want of planks for batteries, they were obliged to fire upon the ground, the consequence of which was, that their carriages were soon broken, and could not be repaired."[1]

[Footnote 1: _History of British Settlements in North America_, p.

165.]

The Spaniards, on the other hand, had surprised and cut to pieces the detachment under Colonel Palmer. Of this disastrous event, the particulars are given by one who could say,--"Quos ego miserrimus vidi, et quorum pars magna fui." [Which I had the misfortune to see, and greatly to share.] I refer to a letter from Ensign Hugh Mackay to his brother in Scotland, dated at Fort St. Andrews, on c.u.mberland Island, August 10th, 1740.

After some introductory remarks, he gives the following account of the action:

"On the 9th of June the General sent out a flying party of militia, Indians, and thirteen soldiers, in all making one hundred and thirty-seven men, under the command of Colonel Palmer, a Carolina gentleman, an old Indian warrior, of great personal resolution, but little conduct. Under him I commanded the party, and had orders to march from St. Diego, the head-quarters, to Moosa, three miles from St. Augustine, a small fort which the Spaniards had held, but was demolished a few days before; there to show ourselves to the Spaniards, and thereafter to keep moving from one place to another to divert their attention, while the General took another route, and intended to come to Moosa in five days. The orders were just, and might with safety be executed, had a regular officer commanded; but poor Colonel Palmer, whose misfortune it was to have a very mean opinion of his enemies, would by no means be prevailed upon to leave the old fort, but staid there, thinking the Spaniards durst not attack him. He was mistaken, as will appear presently.

"Upon the 15th day of June, about four in the morning, we were attacked by a detachment of five hundred, from the garrison of St.

Augustine, composed of Spaniards, negroes, and Indians, besides a party of horse to line the paths, that none of us might escape.

Apprehending that this would happen, I obtained leave of Colonel Palmer, and therefore ordered our drum to beat to arms at three o'clock every morning, and to have our men in readiness till it was clear day. Thus it was upon the fatal 15th of June, as I have said, when the Spaniards attacked us with a very smart fire from their small arms; in which Colonel Palmer fell the first. We returned the fire with the greatest briskness that can be imagined; and so the firing continued for some time; but, unluckily, we were penned up in a demolished fort; there was no room to extend. The Spaniards endeavored to get in at the ruinous gate; and our party defended the same with the utmost bravery. Here was a terrible slaughter on both sides; but the Spaniards, who were five times our number, got at last, by dint of strength, the better; which, when I saw, that some prisoners were made, I ordered as many of my party then as were alive to draw off. We had great difficulty to get clear, for the Spaniards surrounded the fort on all sides. However, by the a.s.sistance of G.o.d, we got our way made good; drew up in sight of the enemy, and retired, without being pursued, till we were in safety. I had no more than twenty-five men, and some of them very ill wounded, of which number I was, for I received three wounds at the fort gate, but they were slight ones.

Several of the poor Highlanders, who were in the engagement, and fought like lions, lost their lives,--some of them your acquaintance.

"I commanded, next Colonel Palmer, as captain of the horse, on the militia establishment. My lieutenant was killed. My cornet and quartermaster were made prisoners of war, with four more of the Highlanders. Charles Mackay, nephew to Captain Hugh Mackay, who was ensign of militia, received five wounds in the action, and lost one of his fingers; and, thereafter, rather than fall into the hands of the Spaniards, ventured to swim an inlet of the sea, about a mile broad, and had the good fortune to get to the side he intended, and so to the General's camp.